JUDGMENT - Padhye R.S. J.:-Briefly stated, the facts leading to the present petition by tenants are as under: - Respondent No. 1 Laxman and his brother Ramchandra were having ancestral property and were not separated till Laxman filed an application under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, (for short referred to hereinafter as “Rent Control Order), against the petitioners alleging that he was not having other house of his own and that he needed the portion of a house purchased in 1978 by him as well as other portion occupied by another tenant by name Shrikrishna, for his own residence. At the time when this application was made. Laxman was residing with his brother Ramchandra who was occupying another portion of a big building known as 'Wada' from out of which Laxman purchased a part in the year 1976. Ramchandra was working as Munim with one Shri Madhukar Raibagkar and either he was allowed to reside in the portion of wada owned by Madhukar as a licencee or a tenant. Prior to purchase of the disputed portion of wada by respondent Laxman in the year 1976, both the brothers Laxman and Ramchandra had jointly purchased a house occupied by tenant in another locality and it is alleged by Laxman that, that house had to be sold away because of bickerings between the wives of the two brothers. 1976 purchase was for Rs. 7,500 while the earlier joint purchase in the year 1973 was for Rs. 4,000. It has come in evidence that after sale of the jointly purchased house in 1973, both the brothers got Rs. 2,000 each. Respondent Laxman started two proceedings against two sets of tenants. One was against the present petitioners Bhalchandra and Arvind while the other was against the other tenants Shrikrishna and Anant. In the application against the present petitioners, Laxman stated that the house in question was purchased in February 1976 for Rs. 7,500, that he was not occupying any other house of his own in Amravati and that be needed the whole house, i.e. both the blocks occupied by the two sets of tenants referred to above, “for the purpose of his bona fide occupation.” Laxman is working as a truck driver and, therefore, need for occupation was obviously need for residence. 7,500, that he was not occupying any other house of his own in Amravati and that be needed the whole house, i.e. both the blocks occupied by the two sets of tenants referred to above, “for the purpose of his bona fide occupation.” Laxman is working as a truck driver and, therefore, need for occupation was obviously need for residence. During evidence, he stated that his wife was residing at village Anakwadi, that he had three sons who were taking education in colleges and schools and were residing with his brother Raghunath and that he was residing in motor, i. e. truck. The learned Rent Control authorities have found that he was also residing with his brother Raghunalh and the statement that he was residing in motor, has to be appreciates in the light of circumstances that he was required to move about in track as a driver and probably had few occasions to live with his brother Raghunath whenever he came back to Amravati in the course of the business. Petitioners stated in their written-statement that the entire wada consists of 16 rooms and respondent Laxman and his brother Raghunath had as many as six rooms to live in. It was pointed out that some of the tenants of Madhukar had vacated and the rooms occupied by these tenants also were in possession of Raghunath. The learned Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority found that Laxman had established his need for occupying the disputed premises for residence and these Judgments are under challenge in this petition. 2. Shri R. R. Deshpande, the learned counsel appearing for petitioners, pointing out the vague pleading regarding need for bona fide occupation, submitted that this has resulted in prejudice to the petitioners in making out the defence. According to him, stating all details of the need in evidence was not enough and even at the stage of evidence, all the details that were necessary for establishing his need were not placed before the Court. Relying upon a decision of this Court in (Sukhdeo Krishnarao Ghat ode v. Laxmibcti Dattatraya Moharil)1, it was urged that respondent Laxman had failed to establish need to occupy the premises in question and the evidence on record did not establish anything more than a desire to occupy his own house. Relying upon a decision of this Court in (Sukhdeo Krishnarao Ghat ode v. Laxmibcti Dattatraya Moharil)1, it was urged that respondent Laxman had failed to establish need to occupy the premises in question and the evidence on record did not establish anything more than a desire to occupy his own house. According to Shri Deshpande, it was necessary for respondent, Laxman to establish as to why the house, jointly purchased in 1973, was sold out when permission against the tenants occupying the said house had already been obtained and as to why respondent Laxman did not purchase the half share of Raghunath when the house had to be disposed of due to bickerings between the wives of the two brothers. It was also necessary for 'Laxman to establish as to why he and his sons wanted to leave the house of his brother Raghunath and as to what was the urgent necessity for doing so. According to petitioners, the two impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside on this short ground. 3. Alternatively it was submitted that proviso to clause 13(3)(vi) of Rent Control Order stood revived on abolition of fundamental right to property by the Constitution amendment which came into force on 22–6-1979, as held by me in an earlier decision in the case of (Sheshrao Raghoba Surya-wanshi and others v. Sonchand Sobhagmalji Darda)2. An affidavit has been filed in this Court stating that during the pendency of the Rent Control proceedings, Laxman secured possession of another tenement which was vacated by Shrikrishna and Anant and, therefore, proviso to clause 13(3) (vi) of Rent Control Order was a bar to claim termination on the ground of need for bona fide occupation. During the course of argument, it was admitted, after referring to the records of the Courts below, that this position was not placed before the appellate Court at the time of appeal or at the time of decision of review petition. During the course of argument, it was admitted, after referring to the records of the Courts below, that this position was not placed before the appellate Court at the time of appeal or at the time of decision of review petition. While admitting that subsequent happenings cannot be taken into account in writ proceeding though they can be taken into account in revision or appeal because in the former the lis does not continue while in the latter the lis continues, Shri Deshpande submitted that the burden was on the landlord to make out a case that he had no other house of his own and the landlord having failed to do so, must fail in view of the subsequent happenings. * 4. I am of the opinion that while applying the law as stated in the case of Sukhdeo (supra) to the facts of a given case, great care must be taken. I am reminded of observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 546 of Judgment in the case of (A. D. M. Jabalpur v. S. Shukla)3 which are as under: - “Moreover, it must be remembered that when we are considering the observations of a high judicial authority like this Court, the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the observations of a judge to the precise issues before him and to confine such observations, even though expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of the question before him, unless he makes it clear that he indended his remarks to have a wider ambit. It is not possible for judges always to express their judgments so as to exclude entirely the risk that in some subsequent case their language may be misapplied and any attempt at such perfection of expression can only lead to the opposite result of uncertainty and even obscurity as regards the case in hand.” Reference was made to the famous decision of House of Lords in (Queen v. Leatham)4 wherein it was held that, “every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts in which such expressions are to be found.” It was also found that the Supreme Court had an occasion to show in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra5 that the observations in a Judgment must be “only in the context of the question that arose for decision.” 5. According to me, the statement of law so made in the case of A. D. M. Jabalpur (supra) holds good even for the purpose of deciding the binding effect of an earlier decision of this Court. Examining the case of Sukhdeo cited earlier, I find that the only proposition of law of general applicability that has been laid down in this case is that “the expression 'need' in sub-clause (vi) of clause 13(3) of Rent Control Order is not equivalent to a mere desire and it postulates the element of necessity or urgency, a kind of pressure to have and not a thing which it would be fun to have or it would be advantageous to have something.” The question as to whether in the facts of a given case landlord has been able to establish such need is purely a question of fact to be decided in the circumstances of the given case. It is not permissible to urge by reference to the facts involved in the case of Sukhdeo that the facts in a given case are somewhat similar to the facts involved in the case of Sukhdeo and, therefore, appreciation of those facts must be made as was done in the case of Sukhdeo. 6. It is not permissible to urge by reference to the facts involved in the case of Sukhdeo that the facts in a given case are somewhat similar to the facts involved in the case of Sukhdeo and, therefore, appreciation of those facts must be made as was done in the case of Sukhdeo. 6. If a landlord is not residing in a house of his own, if he purchases a house with the avowed intention of occupying it for his residence and if the accommodation in the house purchased can be said to be reasonably required for the need of the family of landlord, I do not see as to how these facts are not sufficient to establish need and that is exactly what has been found by the Rent Control authorities in this case. In the case of Sukhdeo (Supra), the landlord had not stated as to how many members were in his family. He had stated therein that he wanted more accommodation and not that he had no accommodation. He had not stated what was the accommodation which he was occupying and which he intended to continue to occupy. In view of these circumstances, the Court came to a conclusion, “It seems to me that the main object of the landlord is not to acquire accommodation in the suit house, but to have additional accommodation. If there did not exist any need for additional accommodation, then it would follow that the landlord's need was not bona fide. That aspect of the matter and in what way the landlord needed additional accommodation has nowhere been clarified during the evidence.” In the case before me, though the pleading is vague, details of need have been stated in evidence. A perusal of the written-statement filed by petitioners does not disclose that vague pleadings have resulted in prejudice to them. It has been pointed out in great detail in the written-statement as to the accommodation available in the entire wada and the rooms which were in occupation of Raghunath with whom Laxman and his sons were residing. Accommodation which was in occupation of the each set of tenants was one room, one osari and one more room, a wall which had fallen down. Admittedly Laxman had no other house of his own. Accommodation which was in occupation of the each set of tenants was one room, one osari and one more room, a wall which had fallen down. Admittedly Laxman had no other house of his own. It was nowhere disputed that his three sons were residing with his brother Raghunath and his wife was residing in some other village. Under the circumstances, I do not see as to how the finding of the Courts below that landlord had established his need for bona fide occupation is in any way erroneous. Difference between desire to occupy a house of his own and need to occupy a house of his own was certainly present to the mind of appellate authority, as can be seen from the end portion of paragraph 3 of the appellate judgment, wherein in terms it has been found that the landlord had established his desire to live separately from his brother and had also succeeded in making out need to occupy the house purchased. Shri Deshpande had made a reference to an earlier decision in the case of Ganpat v. Rameshwar and another6, which has been referred to in paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of Sukhdeo (Supra). In the case of Ganpat (Supra), it was not stated in the application and in evidence as to whether the premises were required for residence or for business or for godown and as to how many members were in his family which required accommodation. Landlord had other house and it was not pointed out as to why need of landlord could not be satisfied by occupying the other house. Under the circumstances, it was found that the claim of landlord that he needed the premises in question for this bona fide occupation was nothing but his mere desire. It was under these circumstances that it was held that “need” was not established. As in the case of Sukhdeo so as in the case of Ganpat, the decision that 'need' was not established has turned on the facts of these particular cases and only because* some of the facts in the present case, can be favourably compared with the facts in this case, it cannot be said that the same conclusion about need to occupy the premises in question must be reached in the present case also. 7. 7. Original order passed by the learned Rent Controller is dated 12–12–1977 and on that date, the proviso to clause 13(3) (vi) of Rent Control Order had not revived. Moreover, as held in (Chetandas v. Appellate Deputy Collector)1, the alleged subsequent happenings cannot be considered for the first time in writ proceedings. Consequently the argument based on the alleged subsequent happenings and the proviso must also fail. 8. The result is that the petition shall stand dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.