G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 20. 3. 1975 passed by the Prl. Civi judge, Bangalore Dist. , Bangalore, in r. A. No. 123 of 1973 on his file dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff on con firming the judgment and decree dated 6. 1. 1973 passed by the II Addl. II Munsiff, Bangalore, in O. S. No. 426 of 1967 on his file dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration that the tax revision by the group Village Panchayat of Krishna rajapuram, Bangalore South Tlk. , and, the levy of it on him was illegal, and for a permanent injunction to restrain the Panchayat from recovering the enhanced tax from him. The suit was instituted on 16. 8. 1967. According to him the relevant provisions of the village Panchayat Act were not followed while publishing the notification for authenticated enhanced tax. The panchayat resisted the suit on. the ground that the plaintiff was called upon to pay the enhanced tax by a notice dt. 29. 11. 1959 and the suit instituted in the year 1967 was barred under Sec. 163 (1) (b) of the Mysore Village Panchayat Act, 1952. The Panchayaj also further asserted that the enhancement by way of revision of tax was legal and that the plaintiff was bound to pay the tax. The trial court raised the following issues as arising for its consideration in the suit from the pleadings. ( 3 ) THE trial Court appreciating the evidence on record answered all material issues against the plaintiff and in that view dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff went up in appeal before the Prl. Civil Judge bangalore Dist. Bangalore, as stated above in R. A. No. 123 of 1973. The learned Civil Judge reassessing thr evidence on record, though he held that the preparation of the assessment 19 was not in accordance with the provisions of law, came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by time and in that view he dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff "ms instituted the second appeal before this Court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff "ms instituted the second appeal before this Court. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellant strenuously urged before me that though Sec. 163 (1) (b) of the Mysore Village Panchayat and District Boards Act, 1952 applies to the facts of the case and the limitation was only 8 months, the suit could not be thrown away as barred by time as S. 14 oi the Indian Limitation Act applies to the facts oi the case. He invited my attention to S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act which specifically states that Ss. 4 to 24 of the Act apply to all special laws unless the special laws specifically excluded the same. Hence, he argued that since the plaintiff was agitating the mailer bona fide before the Divisional Commissioner, Government and Tribunal and the final order of the Tribunal was passed only in the year 1967, the suit instituted in the year 1967 was within time as contemplated under S. 163 (i) (b) of the Panchayat Act. ( 5 ) AS against that the learned Advocate appearing for the: respondent- panchayat submitted that 'there was no ground made out in the plaint that the time taken before the revenue authorities should be excluded under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. He further pointed out that S. 14 of the limitation Act could be invoked only when the proceedings in the other forum was rejected for want of jurisdiction or defect in jurisdiction. Such a case was not made out by the plaintiff and it was raised for the first time in this second appeal. Therefore, the sole point that arises for my consideration in this appeal is whether the courts below were justified in holding that the suit was barred by time. ( 6 ) S. 163 (1) (b) of the Village panchayat and District Boards Act, 1952 reads;"every such action shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within eight months after the accrual of the alleged cause of action. "in the plaint itself it is averred that the plaintiff received a notice culling upon him to pay the enhanced tax on 29. 11. 1959. Therefore, it is obvion that the cause of action to pay the enhanced tax as per revised list aro. se on 29. 11. 1959. Admittedl, the suit was filed on 16. 8. 1967. "in the plaint itself it is averred that the plaintiff received a notice culling upon him to pay the enhanced tax on 29. 11. 1959. Therefore, it is obvion that the cause of action to pay the enhanced tax as per revised list aro. se on 29. 11. 1959. Admittedl, the suit was filed on 16. 8. 1967. Therefore, prima facie the case was hopelessly barred by time. ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that S. 9 (2) of the Limitation Act stales thai ss. 4 to 24 of that Act would apply even in the case oi limitation prescribed by any special Act. Kelying on that, learned Counsel for the appellant invited my attention to s. 14 of the Limitation Act. S. 14 of the Limitation Act specifically states:"in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. " ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out that it was nowhere mentioned in the plaint that the proceedings before the revenue forum was defeated for want of jurisdiction. He, further, snbmitted that the Limitation Act of 1963 could not revive a cause of action which was already dead earlier to the application of the Act. He invited my attention to the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908, wherein it was specifically siated that S. 4 to 24 of the Act would not apply unless there was an express provision made in the special Act providing for the application of the same. Therefore, he submitted that even from that point of view when the cause of action arose in the year 1959 when the. old. Therefore, he submitted that even from that point of view when the cause of action arose in the year 1959 when the. old. Limitation Act was in force, S. 14 of of the Act could not be applied as it was not specifically provided for in the Village Panchayat Act, 1952 and the cause of action was lost as being barred by limitation and as such a bald assertion could not revive it under the provisions of the 1963 Act, as the same was barred much earlier to the 1963 Act. ( 9 ) THERE is substance in the: submission so made. In the first place, there is no averment made in the plaint that the litigation prosecuted before the revenue authorities was defeated for want of jurisdiction. Hence, S. 14 of the Act could not be applied. Secondly, the provisions of the 1963 Act could not revive the cause of action already barred by limitation under the previous Limitation Act. The Courts below, therefore, are justified in holding that the suit is barred by limitation by the provisions made under S. 163 (1) (b) of the Mysore Village Panchayat act. It may also be mentioned before concluding that the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the correct provision that was applicable was S. 163 (2) of the Mysore Village panchayat Act, 1952. I mention this only to reject it; for it is clearly stated in S. 163 (2) thai no civil court shall entertain a suit objecting to an assessment, demand or charge made or imposed under this Act, or for the recovery of any sum of money collected under the authority of this Act or for damages on account of any assessment or collection of money under the said authority if the provisions of this Act, have been in substance and effect complied with. Therefore, it is obvious that under S. 163 (2) of the Village Panchayat Act, no suit would lie. Hence, that contention is untenable on the facts of the present case. ( 10 ) IN the result, I am constrained to hold that the appeal is devoid of merits and I dismiss the same. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs in this appeal. --- *** --- .