Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 253 of 1976 is the appellant in the appeal. The suit is for partition and for rendition of accounts. By the judgment of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum under appeal, the suit was dismissed finding against that the claim of the plaintiff that the suit property belonged to the family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 and therefore holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to the 1/35 share claimed in the plaint. 2. The first defendant in the suit was the last Ruler of the erstwhile State of Travancore and he reigned in the State till the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin on 1st July, 1949. The main question in issue in the suit is whether the suit properties, dealt with by the first defendant as if the properties belonged to him individually, are properties which belonged to a family consisting of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34. Defendants 3 and 12 in the suit are the two senior female members in the family, the 3rd defendant being the junior Maharani and the 12th defendant the senior Maharani of Travancore. Defendants 1 and 2 and 4 to 11 are descendants of the 3rd defendant while plaintiff and defendants 13 to 34 are the descendants of the 12th defendant. The 12th defendant and the 3rd defendant are sisters, the 12th defendant being the elder sister. At the time of the demise of His Highness Sreemoolam Thirunal, the previous Maharaja of the State of Travancore, the first defendant, who, as the senior most male member of the family, was entitled to ascend to the Throne of Travancore, was a minor. The 12th defendant functioned as the Regent of the Maharaja until the first defendant, on attaining majority, ascended to the Throne. On 1-7-1949 with the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin the first defendant ceased to be the Maharaja. He was the Rajapramukh of the State of Travancore-Cochin until the formation of Kerala State on 1-11-1956. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 are members of the Travancore Royal Family which according to him is an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad governed by Marumakkathayam Law as modified by custom and usage in respect of succession, inheritance and some other matters. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 are members of the Travancore Royal Family which according to him is an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad governed by Marumakkathayam Law as modified by custom and usage in respect of succession, inheritance and some other matters. The first defendant is said to be the karnavan of the tarwad and he is said to have been managing the properties of the tarwad as such karnavan. The properties scheduled to the plaint are alleged to be tarwad properties liable to be partitioned on per capita basis between defendants 1 to 34 and the plaintiff. The plaintiff avers that the tarwad of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 was known as Valiakottaram in Trivandrum and according to him the tarwad had extensive properties both within the State of Kerala and also outside the State. The properties within the State of Kerala are all within the erstwhile Travancore State. On the eve of integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin in 1949 a covenant was entered into by the Maharaja of Travancore and the Maharaja of Cochin. The covenant had the concurrence of the Government of India. The said covenant provided that the ruler of each covenanting State shall furnish to the Government of India, in the Ministry of States, before the first day of September, 1949 an inventory of all immovable properties and securities and the cash balance held by such ruler as private property. On the basis of the inventory furnished by the 1st defendant and as a consequence of negotiation the government of Travancore-Cochin passed proceedings dated 25th October, 1950 recognising certain properties as the private properties of His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore. This was in accordance with the earlier proceedings dated 2nd February, 1950. It is the plaintiff's case that the properties so listed as private properties of His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore really belonged to the tarwad excepting the Vasanthavilasam Palace which alone, according to the plaintiff, belonged absolutely to the 1st defendant. It is further explained by the plaintiff in the plaintthaton a dispute arising as to the scope of term "private property of the ruler" in covenants or agreements entered into between the rulers of the native States and the Government of India, the Government of India issued a clarification about the position, by letter dated 7th March, 1950. It is further explained by the plaintiff in the plaintthaton a dispute arising as to the scope of term "private property of the ruler" in covenants or agreements entered into between the rulers of the native States and the Government of India, the Government of India issued a clarification about the position, by letter dated 7th March, 1950. The purport of it was that pursuant to the coneenants or agreements Government only sought to decide what properties should be left to the ruler and did not purport to decide any inter se dispute concerning the title to the properties. In other words what is urged by the plaintiff is that by reason of the covenant of the Government of India recognising the properties as private properties of the ruler it should not be taken that the properties belong to the ruler if as a matter of fact they did belong to his family. While A schedule mentions immovable properties, B schedule lists the movable properties including cash, securities and jewellery which according to the plaintiff belonged to the tarwad. Since there were 35 members in the tarwad on the date of suit 1/35 share is claimed. 4. Though some items of properties had been alienated by the 1st defendant, on account of the fact that considerable time had elapsed the plaintiff did not choose to challenge the alienations, but was content with asking for an account of the proceeds of such alienations, to be divided between the members of the tarwad. He also sought a decree in regard to the share of his income from the properties which income was taken by the 1st defendant as karnavan of the tarwad. 5. It may also be necessary to mention that when the ceiling provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act came into force the 1st defendant filed a statement as to lands held by him which statement concerned the plaint A schedule properties. This was filed by him in the status of an unmarried adult person. Evidently on the basis that all the properties belonged to him and him alone, after setting apart for him lands which could be held by him in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act including lauds exempt under the Act, the Kerala Land Board, Trivandrum by its proceedings dated 15-2-1972 declared excess lands which were to be surrendered to the Government. According to the plaintiff he was a minor on the date of these proceedings and therefore he could not contest the same. He filed a revision petition before the High Court later, under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, against the Land Board's order dated 15-2-1972 directing surrender of excess land. On the ground that the petition was belated it was dismissed by the High Court. He therefore filed a petition under S.85(9) of the Land Reforms Act praying to set aside the order of the Land Board dated 15-2-1972 and that petition was rejected by the Board by order dated 7-8-1976. Thereupon the Government assumed possession of all excess lands as determined in the order of the Land Board dated 15-2-1972. 6. Against the said order of the Land Board dated 7-8-1976 rejecting the petition filed by the plaintiff under S.85(9) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act the plaintiff filed a revision petition as C. R. P. No. 3786/76 before the High Court. That revision petition was disposed of on 11th September, 1979 by Justice T. Chandrasekhara Menon with a direction that the petitioner who is the plaintiff here could move for relief under S.85(9) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act on the basis of the decision in this appeal which was pending at the time the Civil Revision Petition was disposed of. The Land Board was directed to decide the question of surrender of excess lands on the basis of the decision of the High Court in this appeal. Till such decision was reached by the High Court the Land Board was not to distribute the excess lands which had come into its possession on the basis of the order passed by the Land Board. The contention of the plaintiff is that the lands belonging to the tarwad must be treated as belonging to different families which are independent units in the tarwad, that in case that contention was accepted the tarwad would be entitled to retain much larger area of the land and if so the surrender as now directed would be improper. The State is made the 35th defendant since the relief of partition is sought irrespective of the direction for surrender. The 36th defendant is a Trust to which the 1st defendant is said to have alienated some land which alienation is challenged as invalid. The State is made the 35th defendant since the relief of partition is sought irrespective of the direction for surrender. The 36th defendant is a Trust to which the 1st defendant is said to have alienated some land which alienation is challenged as invalid. The plaint mentions various gift deeds executed by the 1st defendant and it is contended that these are sham documents created in the name of near kins to defeat the rights of the members of the tarwad. Partition is sought as if the properties continue to belong to the tarwad. 7. The 1st defendant is the main contesting defendant in the suit. That defendants 1 to 34 and the plaintiff are members of a family is not disputed, but the case that they are members of the undivided marumakkathayam tarwad and that the 1st defendant is the karnavan is denied. According to the 1st defendant he was never the karnavan of the tarwad. Defendants 3 and 12 along with their descendants formed a tarwad known as Sreepadom. This Sreepadom, according to the 1st defendant, was known as the Royal Family of Travancore and this tarwad had its own properties. Those properties were divided per stirpes on 13-7-1971 in two equal halves between the branch of the 3rd defendant and the branch of the 12th defendant. The 12th defendant's branch is said to have subsequently partitioned the properties in which partition the plaintiff is said to have taken the individual share. Therefore it is said that subsequent to 13-7-1971, when the properties of the Sreepadom were partitioned, there is no undivided tarwad. 8. The 1st defendant traces the right of the family of Sreepadom to an agreement between the Attingal Ranees and the then Maharaja of Travancore, Marthanda Varma, said to be the founder of the Travancore State. The nucleus of the Travancore State was a comparatively small principality prior to the conquests of Marthanda Varma of many other small principalities and consolidating them. The nucleus of the Travancore State was a comparatively small principality prior to the conquests of Marthanda Varma of many other small principalities and consolidating them. By reason of the treaty entered into between the Attingal Ranees and Marthanda Varma, whereat it was agreed that the eldest male member for the time being in the family of the Attingal Ranees was to be the ruler of the Travancore and the management of the Sreepadom properties was to be with the senior members of the Sreepadom, the members of the family of the Sreepadom or the Attingal Ranees had the right to have the ruler of Travancore from that family, but they had no right over the properties held by the ruler of Travancore. It is said that this was reiterated by a subsequent treaty. That was an arrangement which continued till 1-7-1949. According to the 1st defendant the properties scheduled to the plaint belonged to the 1st defendant absolutely. Before the integration of the two States of Travancore and Cochin there was no distinction between the properties of the ruler and that of the Government. The ruler was the sovereign of the State. All properties (except the properties registered in the name of strangers) belonged to the sovereign and the plaint schedule properties also belonged to the above category. The case of the 1st defendant is that the plaint schedule properties are not acquisitions by the sovereign, but were State properties which could be held by the sovereign as his own and these properties were retained by the ruler for himself absolutely when he surrendered the sovereignty of the State to the people. In the arrangement of surrender he was not representing any family and what was retained by him are his absolute properties. In other words the case is evidently not that the properties were acquisitions made out of any individual resources, but that they being properties of the State it was open to the sovereign to treat them as his own and so, while he chose to surrender the sovereignty to the people, he retained for himself some of the properties for his own use which, for that reason, are his properties and not that of his tarwad. The covenant and the proceedings which took place thereafter did not in any way affect the right of the 1st defendant to these properties. The covenant and the proceedings which took place thereafter did not in any way affect the right of the 1st defendant to these properties. It is also said that the 1st defendant was competent to deal with those properties as he did and that is not challengeable and at any rate the period for challenge had expired. The plea of adverse possession and limitation is also set up. The proceedings of the Land Board are supported by the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant seeks that the suit be dismissed. 9. It may not be necessary to advert in detail to the written statement filed by the 3rd defendant, the mother of the 1st defendant. She supports the 1st defendant and raises identical contentions. The 12th defendant, the senior Maharani, who was the Regent for the 1st defendant while he was a minor has filed a written statement in which she supports the plaintiff, but it may be necessary to refer particularly to her written statement in regard to one item of property over which she claims absolute right. This is plaint A schedule item No. 10 wherein the Sethalmond Palace is situate. Item No. 10 of Plaint A schedule is said to have been obtained by the 12th defendant under a grant by His Highness the late Sreemoolam Thirunal who was, at the time of the grant, the ruler of the erstwhile Travancore State. It is said that ever since the grant in the year 1087 M. E. the 12th defendant was enjoying the full title, ownership and possession of this item to the exclusion of the others of the tarwad. It may be mentioned in this context that the 1st defendant in his written statement has referred to the title to this item. According to him item No. 10 of plaint A schedule was allowed to be used by the 12th defendant, the plaintiff's grandmother, for some time and that arrangement continued even after the 1st defendant became the ruler and later even after the 1st defendant ceased to be the ruler. It is said that this will not confer any right on the 12th defendant to this item. Her subsequent conduct in accepting the said item from the 1st defendant would, it is said, substantiate that even the plaintiff's branch recognised the full ownership over the properties. It is said that this will not confer any right on the 12th defendant to this item. Her subsequent conduct in accepting the said item from the 1st defendant would, it is said, substantiate that even the plaintiff's branch recognised the full ownership over the properties. The other defendants who are descendants of the 12th defendant's branch have filed written statements supporting the plaintiff's case except in regard to item No. 10 in regard to which the case is that it belongs absolutely to the 12th defendant. The only other written statement about which mention has to be made is that filed by defendants 32, 33 and 34. While agreeing with the case of the plaintiff as to title it is contended by the 32nd defendant that she got married on 14-5-1952 under the Special Marriage Act, 1872 and by virtue of her marriage under that Act she became divided in status from the rest of the members of the tarwad from that date. This legal severance on 14-5-1952 is said to enable her to claim 1/6th share in all the properties of the tarwad as at that time there were only 6 members in that tarwad. 10. On behalf of the State a written statement is filed supporting the order of the Land Board and seeking that the suit be dismissed so far as the 35th defendant is concerned. There is a written statement filed in the case by the guardian of minor defendants 6, 7, 9 and 10. In that the case of the 1st defendant is supported. 11. An additional written statement was filed by the 1st defendant later in which it is contended that the suit itself is not maintainable since the Travancore Royal Family, though governed by the Marumakkathayam Law as modified by custom and usage, is not governed by any statute and no member can ask for a compulsory partition of properties of a family governed by pristine Marumakkathayam Law. It is further said that the division could only be per stirpes and therefore the plaintiff cannot claim a partition so long as the 12th defendant is alive. A plea of limitation is set up by the 3rd defendant in an additional written statement. 12. It is further said that the division could only be per stirpes and therefore the plaintiff cannot claim a partition so long as the 12th defendant is alive. A plea of limitation is set up by the 3rd defendant in an additional written statement. 12. Before we deal with the merits of the case it should be noticed that apart from the documentary evidence adduced in the case, for the plaintiff three witnesses have been examined, pw.1 being the father of the plaintiff, pw. 2 being the manager of the 12th defendant's estate and pw. 3 being the Private Secretary of the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant has examined only one witness and that the Honorary Adviser to the 1st defendant who was serving as Private Secretary to the 1st defendant when he was the Maharaja. The other parties have not examined any witnesses in support of their respective cases. 13. The main question the court had to decide concerned the title to the plaint items. Unless the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the items scheduled to the plaint belonged to a family consisting of himself and defendants 1 to 34 the other questions raised in the case would not call for determination. It is apparent that the 1st defendant was treating the plaint items as his own and dealing with them as if he was entitled to alienate them or dispose them at his will. He ceased to be the Maharaja on 1-7-1949 and the suit is filed only in 1976 though it appears that some members of the tarwad had expressed protest by publication in the newspaper challenging the right of the 1st defendant to deal with the properties which he claimed as his own. It may also be necessary to notice here that in 1971 the parties came together to effect a partition of Sreepadom properties and all the members in the family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 then in existence were willing parties to that partition of the Sreepadom properties. The partition deed made no mention of availability of other properties for partition or the right of the members of the family in any other items then in the possession of the 1st defendant, It was in 1976 that the present suit was filed. 14. The partition deed made no mention of availability of other properties for partition or the right of the members of the family in any other items then in the possession of the 1st defendant, It was in 1976 that the present suit was filed. 14. On the question of title to the plaint schedule items the court below found positively that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 do not belong to undivided marumakkathayam tarwad, that the 1st defendant has no karnavanship and that the plaint schedule properties are not tarwad properties as claimed by the plaintiff. As such plaintiff was found not entitled to a share as prayed for by him. The court further held that the plaint A schedule item No. 10 is not the absolute property of the 12th defendant. But all the same in view of the discussion and the findings A schedule item No.10 was found not to be available for partition. 15. We have heard counsel elaborately on all aspects of the case. It is agreed before us that the crucial question that calls for determination in this case is one of title to the plaint schedule items, for, if the plaintiff does not succeed in proving his title no other question would call for consideration. Necessarily therefore we must first rivet our attention to the pleadings and evidence bearing on the question of title and determine that controversy before we refer to the other disputes in the case, or the other contentions raised between the parties. 16. No attempt has been made to adduce evidence directly bearing on the question as to how each one of the plain schedule items was acquired. There is no pleading also as to the source of acquisition. There is no evidence not only as to how they were acquired, but even as to who acquired these items. Perhaps such evidence is not available and it is not possible to get at such evidence in the case. In this background one has to very closely scrutinise the pleadings of the parties to understand the respective cases of the parties Hence we make a close study of the pleadings in so far as they concern the question of title to the plaint schedule properties. 17. In this background one has to very closely scrutinise the pleadings of the parties to understand the respective cases of the parties Hence we make a close study of the pleadings in so far as they concern the question of title to the plaint schedule properties. 17. The relevant pleadings in the plaint are: (1) The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 are members of the Travancore Royal Family an undivided marumakkathayam family. (2) The 1st defendant is the karanavan of the tarwad. (3) The tarwad is known as Valiakottaram in Trivandrum. (4) The properties scheduled to the plaint are tarwad properties liable to be partitioned on per capita basis among defendants 1 to 34 and the plaintiff. (5) As karanavan of the tarwad the 1st defendant was and is managing the properties of the tarwad. (6) The covenant entered into between the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin provided for full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties and the entire properties shown in the lists appended to the proceedings dated 2-2-1950 and 25-10-1950 are properties belonging to the tarwad except Vasanthavilasom Palace. (7) In the Government of India's letter dated 7th March, 1950 it was clarified that the decision of the Government of India does not prejudice the rights of third parties in any way and they are free to seek the remedies open to them. 18. Now we refer to the pleadings of the 1st defendant. In answer it is admitted that: (1) The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 34 are members of the Travancore Royal Family, but they are not members of an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad. (2) The 1st defendant is not the karanavan of any tarwad. (3) There is no tarwad known as Valiakottaram. Descendants of the 3rd defendant and the 12th defendant were members of a tarwad known as Sreepadom. That was the Royal Family of Travancore and that had a number of properties. That family became divided in 1971. There was no undivided tarwad after such division. (4) The plaint properties do not belong to any tarwad, but belong to the 1st defendant alone. (5) The 1st defendant was in management on his own account and not on behalf of the tarwad. That family became divided in 1971. There was no undivided tarwad after such division. (4) The plaint properties do not belong to any tarwad, but belong to the 1st defendant alone. (5) The 1st defendant was in management on his own account and not on behalf of the tarwad. (6) In the treaty entered into between the Attingal Ranees and Marthanda Varma it was agreed that: (a) the eldest male member for the time being in the family would be the ruler of Travancore, and (b) the management of Sreepadom properties would be with the "seniormost female members of Sreepadom". (7) The Attingal Ranees or members of the family of the Sreepadom had no right over the properties held by the ruler of Travancore. (8) Before the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin there was no distinction between the properties of the ruler and that of the government. As the sovereign of the State all the properties (except those registered in the name of strangers) belonged to the sovereign and the plaint schedule properties also belonged to the above category, (emphasis supplied). (9) When the 1st defendant surrendered the sovereignty of the State to the people he retained the scheduled properties for himself absolutely. He was not representing his family in the surrender. (10) No member of the family obtained right either under the terms of the covenant or under the terms of the orders mentioned in the plaint. We are not referring at this moment to the contention in regard to item No. 10 in A schedule to which we may refer later. It may not be necessary to refer to the contentions in the other written statements, for, in regard to the question of title the parties take one or other of the cases set up by the 1st defendant on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other. 19. We have particularly referred to these pleadings because at the hearing several alternative cases have been suggested as explaining the title of the plaintiff and the absence of the title of the 1st defendant. Though we will advert to them, to understand such arguments in the proper setting it is necessary to refer to the case of the parties particularly in the background that there is not much light thrown on the origin of title to these properties. 20. Though we will advert to them, to understand such arguments in the proper setting it is necessary to refer to the case of the parties particularly in the background that there is not much light thrown on the origin of title to these properties. 20. Before we go into the evidence it may be necessary to refer to certain matters which may help in appreciating the case of the parties. The origin of the Sreepadom, the rights of Attigal Ranees, the nature of the Sreepadom properties, the position of the ruler vis-a-vis Sreepadom are matters about which some evidence has been adduced in the case. The deed of partition of the Sreepadom in 1971 is Ext. B3 in the case. Defendants 3 and 12 and those other members who were alive on that day were parties to the partition. Ext. B3 stated: "We are members of the joint Hindu Kshathriya Family known as 'Sreepadom Palace' which by prerogative is the Royal House of Travancore." The first signatory to this document is the 1st defendant. The third signatory to the document is the 12th defendant and the fourth signatory is the 3rd defendant. The document refers to holding of lands by the Sreepadom as freehold in certain villages in Chirayinkil Taluk and other lands in the State of Kerala as also lands in Kanyakumari District now in Tamil Nadu. It further mentions: "the lands and other immovable properties mentioned in the schedule attached hereto have been inherited, held and enjoyed by the Royal Family, the aforesaid Sreepadom Place as Sreepadom Palace private properties and the family continues to have exclusive, absolute and undisputed title of ownership, possession and enjoyment by the laws of inheritance, custom, proprietorship and tradition". Then follows a statement which is of some significance "The Sreepadom lands, enfranchised as aforesaid, as well as the private properties, more particularly described in the schedule hereunder, were administered by His Highness Sree Padmanabha Dasa Sri Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma who is the seniormost male member of the family". The reference is to the 1st defendant. Then follows a statement which is of some significance "The Sreepadom lands, enfranchised as aforesaid, as well as the private properties, more particularly described in the schedule hereunder, were administered by His Highness Sree Padmanabha Dasa Sri Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma who is the seniormost male member of the family". The reference is to the 1st defendant. Then it is mentioned that the partition as between the two branches of the family and the agreement for partition is for the purpose of more convenient and exclusive enjoyment of the family The operative part of the deed provided that the 1st defendant relinquished and conveyed his rights and duties as administrator over the properties described in the schedule to the parties concerned. Further it provided that the first, second and eighth signatories who are major male members relinquished all their rights, title or interest, if any, subsisting or which may accrue to them in future, in favour of the other parties to the deed. Evidently there seems to have been some controversy as to whether male members will be entitled to share in the properties of the Sreepadom Palace. Under Ext. P3 while male members also took part and agreed to the arrangement they did not take shares, but relinquished whatever rights they had in favour of the others and in that way the controversy seems to have been settled without either party accepting the others' case as to the existence or non-existence of title in the male members at a partition. The 1st defendant who evidently was asserting his right to manage the property earlier seems to have given up that right. 21. To understand the right of the Attingal Ranees and that of the family of the Ranees to have the Rajah from among the members of the family, it may be necessary to refer to the ancient history of Travancore. In the Travancore State Manual, Vol. I compiled by Sri. V. Nagam Aiya reference is made to an adoption in the year 1305 A.D. (corresponding to 480 M. E,) of two ladies from the Kolathunad family and that appears to be the origin of the Attingal Ranees. At page 260 of the Manual reference is made to the views of Sankunni Menon. I compiled by Sri. V. Nagam Aiya reference is made to an adoption in the year 1305 A.D. (corresponding to 480 M. E,) of two ladies from the Kolathunad family and that appears to be the origin of the Attingal Ranees. At page 260 of the Manual reference is made to the views of Sankunni Menon. It is said thus: "According to Shungoonny Menon, in the year 480 M. E. (1305 A. D.), two females from Kolathunad family were adopted by Aditya Varma who then reigned and they were installed as Attungal Moothatampuran (Senior Rani) and Attungal Elayatampuran (Junior Rani). Palaces were constructed at Attungal for their residence, and the country around was assigned to them, the revenue derived therefrom being placed at their disposal." Evidently the Ranees had no sovereignty though, they enjoyed a feudal status with right to collect revenue from the lands assigned to them by Aditya Varma the ruler. There appears to have been some doubt whether these Attungal Ranees had sovereign rights over their queendom and whether they later surrendered it to Marthanda Varma. Such a view has been commented upon by a later historian Sri. T.K. Velu Pillai in his Manual to which reference will be made shortly, as arising out of ignorance of the real position of the Ranees. 22. Dealing with the amalgamation of Travancore with Attungal Sri. Nagam Aiya in the same Volume of his Manual refers only to a passage from Hamilton's Description of Hindostan, Vol. II, at page 315. Sri. Nagam Aiya does not offer any comment on that passage. That passage as extracted in the Manual Vol. I p. 338 runs thus: "The Tamburatties of Attingara possessed the sovereignty of Travancore from remote antiquity, until Raja Martandan Warmah persuaded the Tarnburatty to resign the sovereign authority to the Rajas, both for herself and for all succeeding Tamburatties. To perpetuate these conditions, a regular treaty was executed between the Raja and the Tarnburatty, which was inscribed on a silver plate, and ratified by the most solemn imprecations, limiting the successions to the offsprings of the Attingal Tamburatties. Having concluded this arrangement Raja Martandan Warmah directed his arms against the neighbouring States." The above passage does not appear to represent the true position. Hamilton was an Englishman who compiled his work during the earlier part of the 19th century. That formed the groundwork for later opinion on the same question. Having concluded this arrangement Raja Martandan Warmah directed his arms against the neighbouring States." The above passage does not appear to represent the true position. Hamilton was an Englishman who compiled his work during the earlier part of the 19th century. That formed the groundwork for later opinion on the same question. Sri. T. K. Velu Pillai in his Travancore State Manual Volume II at page 283 refers to the above said statement of Hamilton as also a similar statement of Van Rhoode, a Dutch Governor of Malabar and observes thus: "The theory that the Ranis of Attingal exercised sovereign powers, expounded by these writers and those who followed them, was the result of ignorance of local conditions. They did not care to acquaint themselves with the niceties of Malabar law or the correct details of the history of the ruling dynasties." This is established by Sri. Velu Pillai in the succeeding paragraphs of his work. Referring to" Hamilton's observations in the passage quoted above at page 288 of the Manual Sri. T. K. Velu Pillai notices thus: "The details stated by Hamilton provide strong grounds for the rejection of his facile theory. The sovereignty which is said to have been transferred was the sovereignty of Travancore possessed by the Thampurattis of Attingal from remote antiquity. This is a strange proposition. From the earliest times of which we have any evidence Travancore was ruled by kings and not by queens. The kings succeeded to the throne in virtue of their birthright as the eldest male members of the ruling family. It is stated by Hamilton that future succession, was limited by the silver plate treaty to the offspring of the Attingal Thampuratties. From the fifth century M.E., the female members of the ruling family of Travancore were known as Attingal Ranis. It was only the male children of those Thampurattis, either by birth or by adoption, who could inherit the throne. Marthanda Varma and the heir-apparent Rama Varma were sons of Attingal Thampurattis. There was therefore no reason for an agreement, much less for any 'solemn imprecation' as its sanction." 23. Sri. Velu Pillai also noticed that the origin of Attingal Ranis was adoption. Dealing with this at page 289 of the same Volume Sri. Marthanda Varma and the heir-apparent Rama Varma were sons of Attingal Thampurattis. There was therefore no reason for an agreement, much less for any 'solemn imprecation' as its sanction." 23. Sri. Velu Pillai also noticed that the origin of Attingal Ranis was adoption. Dealing with this at page 289 of the same Volume Sri. Velu Pillai observes thus: "The factum of adoption and the assignment of the Attingal tract to the adopted Ranis in the fifth century M.E. is proved by evidence both positive and negative. The emergence of the name of Attingal into importance was almost sudden. It is not met within records earlier than the fifteenth or sixteenth century of the Christian Era Obviously, the residence of the Ranis at Attingal must have begun later. The statement made by Shungponny Menon that the adoption and the installation of the Ranis at Attingal took place in the fifth century (presumably during the last decade) may therefore be accepted as correct." 24. It may be interesting to notice here that the subject-matter treated in Volume II of the Travancore State Manual of Sri. T. K. Velu Pillai was the earliest to be taken up by him. The work of preparing Volume II was finished only after all the volumes were prepared (see preface). That was because the preparation of the volume caused an enormous amount of labour in the field of historical research. At page 7 of the preface reference is made to the Ranis of Attingal thus: "Now, the Ranis of Attingal were and are admittedly members of the Ruling Family; and no princes could become members of the family except as children, natural or adopted, of the Ranis of Attingal. But the erroneous view that the Ranis held Attingal as members of their own independent Kupaka dynasty still finds a place in books on the subject. The whole evidence has therefore been elaborately considered and the conclusion definitely recorded that Attingal was never an independent queendom. but only an estate assigned to the Ranis, the Ruler exercising all political rights as Sovereign and domestic rights as the Karnavan of the Tharavad. The theory of annexation or amalgamation is clearly unsustainable." 25. The above are matters of ancient history. But on record there is evidence by way of 'pathivu' account of 923 M.E. concerning the actual status of the Ranis of Attingal. The theory of annexation or amalgamation is clearly unsustainable." 25. The above are matters of ancient history. But on record there is evidence by way of 'pathivu' account of 923 M.E. concerning the actual status of the Ranis of Attingal. This embodies the result of a careful deliberation by King Marthanda Varma, the Senior Rani of Attingal and the members of the Yogam. (See page 289 of Travancore State Manual, Vol. II by T. K, Velu Pillai). The said pathivu incorporated as document M. Doc. CXXXIV at page 135 of Appendix of the same volume reads as follows: As translated it reads: M. DOC CXXXIV Rajyakarya Churuna. 11th Chithira. Sreeramajayam. (183) Pathivu account made by the Senior King Thrippappur Keezhapperu Chirava Veeravalarnarthanda Varma, Poorurittathi thirunal Rani of Attingal and the members of the yogam at Trivandrum as to adopting females in case there are no female issue for the Thrippappul Swaroopam -(Thrippappur¬dynasty). Settlement made by the members of the Swaroopam and the yogam that since the Poorurittathi Thirunal Attingal Senior Rani of Trippappur Swaroopam has no issue and since the Karthika Thirunal Attingal Junior Rani has no female issue and it so happens that there are no female issue for this Swaroopam, unmarried female issue of Kolaswaroopam should be adopted after the performance of 'padi' 'Padiyattam' and other offerings like 'Kanikka', 'Vattakaprasadam' etc. to the deity Sree Padmanabha Perumal; should conduct their marriages and then the eldest female member would become the Senior Attingal Rani and the other females would become the second and third Ranis according to their age and if both male and female issue were born to these senior and junior Attingal Ranis, the eldest male member shall be the head of chirava and would rule the country and shall administer the temple affairs and the eldest female member shall be the head of Attingal and the other male and female issue would be junior Rajas and Ranis depending on their age. 6th Sravana (9) 92. This document is authentic and on that there is no dispute. That records the mode of adoption to be adopted in case there are no members in the female line in the family of the Attingal Ranis. 26. Further light is thrown on this in a letter addressed by one of the late Maharajas of Travancore to General Cullen. This document is authentic and on that there is no dispute. That records the mode of adoption to be adopted in case there are no members in the female line in the family of the Attingal Ranis. 26. Further light is thrown on this in a letter addressed by one of the late Maharajas of Travancore to General Cullen. In October 1857 A. D. H. H. Rani Lakshmi Bai, the only surviving member of the Royal Family, died at the early age of twenty-eight, after giving birth to a second son who later became the Maharajah. The death of this sole female caused considerable anxiety particularly in the background of the policy of annexation so vigorously carried out by Lord Dalhousie. The Maharajah, determined upon having recourse to adoption and with a view to impress the need of such adoption for which consent of the British Government was necessary, wrote to General Cullen thus: "You are well aware, I believe, of the peculiar importance of the position held by the Ranees in our family and indeed in the whole policy of the country, religious as well as social. Their presence is absolutely and indispensably necessary to the performance of all religious ceremonies both in our family and in the principal Pagodas. In that female line is vested also, as is further well-known to you, the right of inheritance and succession in our own family as well as in the great bulk of our subjects. "In 932 M.E. (1747 A.D.), and again in 964 M.E. (1788 A.D.), in the absence of direct female issue proceeding from the Ranees female members from among our near relations at Kartigapally and Mayelikaray (in the former instance four and in the latter two females at a time) were respectively selected as successors to the Ranees and duly installed in the Sree Padam Palace, the residence exclusively assigned to the female members of the family. Of one of these Ranees (no female issue having survived the other), myself and my predecessors on the musnud, have been the direct off spring. "I deem it proper now to apprise you that in strict conformity with the same usage and precedents, I now propose to bring in two, the most eligible female members from among our relations before mentioned, as Senior and Junior Ranees. "I deem it proper now to apprise you that in strict conformity with the same usage and precedents, I now propose to bring in two, the most eligible female members from among our relations before mentioned, as Senior and Junior Ranees. As the present is a matter of the deepest concern to me, in every point of view, involving as it does the interests of my family, religion and country, and I may add my own peace of mind, the measure cannot be delayed, more especially as some important religious rites are fast approaching, which can neither be postponed, nor performed without the presence of female members in our family." (see page 520 of Travaricore State Manual by Nagam Aiya Vol. I). The adoption was sanctioned by the Madras Government on the 7th November 1857 and two Princesses of eight and six years of age respectively were adopted from the Mavelikkara family on 27th December following. Reference is made to this letter to indicate that the female members from among near relations were being selected as successors to the Attingal Ranees and duly installed in the Sreepadom Palace, the residence exclusively assigned to the female members. 27. Evidently in the written statement the 1st defendant is referring to the pathivu of 923 M.E. when he refers to the agreement between Marthanda Varma and Attingal Rani. Steering clear of the controversial details concerning the history of the State what is disclosed from the materials available to us show that the Attingal Ranees have been invested with certain privileges ever since the first adoption in the 5th century M.E. and it is the eldest male among the children born to the Attingal Ranees that becomes the Maharaja of Travancore. The Sreepadom Palace is the residence of the Attingal Ranees and naturally the Attingal Ranees and the children would constitute a Marumakkathayam tarwad. Properties were assigned even at the time of the original adoption in 483 M.E. to the family of Attingal Ranees for the purpose of their maintenance in accordance with the style of living expected of them. It is those properties and properties which came into the family later which were subject matter of division under Ext. B3 partition deed in 1.971. Ever since such adoption in 1308 A. D. the Maharaja for the time being ascending the Throne was the eldest male member of the family of the Attingal Ranees. It is those properties and properties which came into the family later which were subject matter of division under Ext. B3 partition deed in 1.971. Ever since such adoption in 1308 A. D. the Maharaja for the time being ascending the Throne was the eldest male member of the family of the Attingal Ranees. This much is said by way of background to understand the position of the first defendant vis-a-vis the other descendants of the Attingal Mootha Rani and the Attingal Elaya Rani. 28. As noticed earlier the female ancestors along with their descendants constitute the Marumakkatham tarwad. There can be no dispute that the Attingal Ranees were adopted with a view to provide a line of succession to the gadi of Travancore. The family so constituted by them and their descendants referred to as 'Sreepadom Palace' was a family governed by the Marumakkathayam Law. The adoption was by the sovereign who could lay down the law of the land and who expressly adopted two females who were given the status of elder Rani and the younger Rani, set apart properties for their maintenance in royal style and provided for a rule of succession to the gadi. These naturally modified the usual incidents of a Marumakkathayam family in regard to the family of the Attingal Ranees. Since the adoption was to furnish male heirs to the Throne the eldest male member for the time being born to the Ranees became the Ruler. We find specific expression of the right of the Ranees to the Sreepadom in the pathivu of 923 M. E. which we have adverted to and the practice of the eldest male member of the family of the Attingal Ranees ascending the Throne is indicated therein as well as in the letter written by the Maharaja to General Cullen which we have extracted. 29. The Ruler of Travancore for the time being was a member of the Sreepadom family both before and after he ascended the Throne. The family had properties of its own distinct from the State properties. On ascending the Throne the successive Maharajas exercised sovereign power. There was no limit to the sovereign power except that the sovereigns themselves set on it by the issue of proclamations and Regulations. When the successive Maharajas came to rule the State they came into possession of several palaces and properties which they treated as their own. On ascending the Throne the successive Maharajas exercised sovereign power. There was no limit to the sovereign power except that the sovereigns themselves set on it by the issue of proclamations and Regulations. When the successive Maharajas came to rule the State they came into possession of several palaces and properties which they treated as their own. These were distinct from Sreepadom properties. Now that we do not have any material to know at what time each one of the properties began to be treated by the respective Rulers as their own and the only material available being that it is undisputed that the properties were treated as that of the Rulers it would not be possible to assume that the acquisitions were made with independent sources of the Rulers. The concept of such an independent source, at a time when the sovereign who dealt with the funds of the State without any limitation in law, is itself, to some extent, incongruous. The stand taken by the 1st defendant in his written statement is that when he was the Ruler of the State all properties except those registered in the name of strangers belonged to him and the suit properties belong to that category. In the absence of any other evidence to the contrary this case has to be accepted. In regard to lands which were registered in the name of persons ownership had been conferred on them by the proclamation of the Maharaja. That is the reason why consistent with the proclamation the sovereign cannot claim absolute ownership on such items. Essentially no distinction could be maintained in law at the relevant time between the State properties and funds and sovereign's properties and his funds though the sovereign had his own limitations in the use of the State properties and State Funds. Five days prior to the declaration of independence of India, namely on 10-8-1947, probably sensing what is happening elsewhere in the country, the first defendant, as the Maharaja, issued a proclamation purporting to regulate the succession to the Throne of Travancore and determine other questions incidental thereto including the regulation and fixing of the Civil List of the Maharaja and the members of his family and making provisions for certain other purposes. While providing for succession to the gadi in Clause.8 of the said proclamation, copy of which is Ext. While providing for succession to the gadi in Clause.8 of the said proclamation, copy of which is Ext. Al in the case, the Maharaja made provision for his tour expenditure and the ordinary Civil List in the annual Budget of the State. But this was with a limitation: "The aggregate, in the case of our personal Civil List and Tour expenditure, shall not, however, exceed five percent of the Annual Revenues of the State". 30. In the same proclamation, Ext. Al, Maharaja thought it necessary to make a provision with regard to the properties acquired in the name of the Dewan or on behalf of the Government in any place outside Travancore. These properties though acquired in the name of the Government or the Dewan of the State were proclaimed as the personal properties of the Maharaja. 31. On the eve of the integration of the State of Travancore the position was that the properties enjoyed by the Ruler of the State as his private properties were in fact State properties treated by him as private properties for his personal purpose. Evidently a large number of such properties including several palaces had been treated by him as such personal properties though they were State properties. One of the matters which arose for negotiation at the time the covenant was entered into with the Maharajas of Travancore and Cochin, evidently at the instance of the Government of India, was the retention of private properties by the Rulers of the covenanting States. While it would have been unfair to deprive them of all the properties merely because they were State properties the retention by them of large number of properties which had no relevance to their private or personal needs as Rulers of the States would equally be unfair. Evidently therefore the device adopted at the integration was one more or less of negotiation and settlement of the list of properties the Rulers were allowed to retain and the list of properties which, though treated by the Rulers as their palaces, were to be surrendered to the respective Governments. The retention and surrender of the different items of properties were evidently not based upon any distinction on the basis of title. It was more on the basis of expediency. The retention and surrender of the different items of properties were evidently not based upon any distinction on the basis of title. It was more on the basis of expediency. Keeping in mind that the burden of proving the case of the plaintiff is on him it appears to us that it will be only reasonable to assume that the Ruler of the State of Travancore obtained the benefit of retention of certain properties pursuant to the covenant not on the basis that he had personally acquired the properties so much so that the properties did not belong to the State, but on the basis of recognition that such properties were treated as private properties immediately before the appointed day. Art.15(1) of the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin in the formation of the Travancore-Cochin State, Ext. A2, reads thus: "Article 15(1) The Ruler of each covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him immediately before the appointed day". The words "shall be entitled to" in the Article is significant. The very fact that there was a negotiation as to what should be the private properties to be left to the Ruler and such negotiation was not on the basis of any pre-existing title of the Maharaja would substantiate what we have said above. 32. Reliance has been placed on Ext. A4 proceedings of the Government of Tranvancore-Cochin dated 18-5-1951. That enclosed a copy of letter dated 7th March, 1950 from the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States to the Chief Secretary to State Governments and that concerned the private properties of the Rulers. That referred to representations made by third parties relating to the title to the lands which were allowed to be retained by the Rulers. The State Governments were told that in the event of such representations: "They may invariably by informed that the private property settlement only seeks to decide whether in the Inventory furnished by each Ruler, the State claims any particular property. It does not prejudice the rights of third parties in any way and they are free to seek the remedies open to them." It is not as if this letter of the Government of India would confer a right on members of the Maharaja's family. It does not prejudice the rights of third parties in any way and they are free to seek the remedies open to them." It is not as if this letter of the Government of India would confer a right on members of the Maharaja's family. It is not even that the Government of India recognised any such right. The question such as the one which arose in the State of Travancore might have arisen elsewhere too. Government of India by consenting to the Ruler to retain properties for himself was not adjudicating on any question of title inter se between the Rulers and others who claimed the properties. The consent to the retention by the Ruler of such properties as his private properties only meant that the State was not laying claim to such properties as State properties. The position thus appears to be that the plaint items are not items which were acquired for and on behalf of the tarwad of the plaintiff. Items which belonged to the tarwad of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant were those covered by Ext. B3, that of Sreepadom tarwad. All the properties which were treated by the successive Rulers as belonging to them during their rule were held by them as sovereigns. Whenever a Ruler comes into office he may feel that a new palace is necessary and may build a palace in a new site. He need not acquire any land for that purpose. He need not divert his own funds for it. Funds would be provided by the State, land belonging to the State would be available and the palace will be built thereon. It will become the Maharaja's palace. That explains the many palaces owned by the Ruler. One and the same Maharaja may have thought of more than one palace in one place. All this would indicate that there was no question of acquisition by the Maharaja or by his family. In the absence of evidence the theory that properties were acquired by the Ruler or his family must be discountenanced. If so the only other possibility is the assumption that the Ruler held them as properties of the State and as its. Ruler. If so it was open to him to treat the property as his own prior to 1-7-1949. In the absence of evidence the theory that properties were acquired by the Ruler or his family must be discountenanced. If so the only other possibility is the assumption that the Ruler held them as properties of the State and as its. Ruler. If so it was open to him to treat the property as his own prior to 1-7-1949. The case of the 1st defendant is that he did so and while surrendering his sovereignty to the people evidently referring to the integration of the States he retained some of the properties for himself. That case has to be accepted as that is the only logical approach. 33. We have now to examine the further question whether if the 1st defendant became the absolute owner of the plaint items under the above circumstances the members of his family would have any right to such items. We have referred to the pleadings in extenso in this judgment only to highlight the fact that there is no case set up that the 1st defendant, by virtue of his office as Ruler and on the basis of the advantage obtained by him by holding that office had acquired the suit property and therefore that advantage must go to the other members of the tarwad. No such case had been pleaded and there being no opportunity to meet any such case that does not call for any consideration. Infact such a case has not been set up even at the hearing though a slightly different case is set up to which we will presently advert. 34. Sri. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the appellant, pleaded before us that irrespective of proof of the question of acquisition of the plaint items the benefit of title now shown to be in the first defendant should enure to the members of his family for the reason that it was only on account of the office of Stanom that he held that he obtained title to the plaint item and if so on the cessation of the Stanom, title to such items must be found not in the Stani but in the members of the Stani's family. Before we look into the law on this subject we have to consider whether there is any foundation for such a case in the pleadings of the parties. Before we look into the law on this subject we have to consider whether there is any foundation for such a case in the pleadings of the parties. We found in the pleadings no reference to the office of the Ruler being that of a Stani. Stanom is a peculiar institution familiar in the northern part of the Kerala State, namely, Malabar and is not a well-known institution in Travancore. The institution of Stanom has peculiar incidents. Merely because a person is an eldest member of the family he does not become a Stani. We are mentioning this only to emphasise our point that if it is a case based upon Stanom that the court is now called upon to consider that must necessarily have been a matter of pleadings. There is no such pleading in the case. That apart the case before us is not that of a Stanom ceasing to exist and the Stanom holder left with the properties of the Stanom. What we have discussed earlier would be sufficient to indicate that it is not as if the first defendant retained the suit properties with himself in the same capacity as he was enjoying earlier. While his possession and enjoyment of the palaces and other suit properties prior to 1-7-1949 could be traced to his office as Ruler of the State, as sovereign who could command any property belonging to the State, subsequently he obtained title by virtue of conferment on him of independent title to these properties on the eve of surrender of properties to the people and recognition of that in a settlement concerning such surrender of sovereignty. That is a peculiar and unique circumstance and cannot in any way be equated with a Stani left with properties of stanom in his hands on the stanom ceasing to exist by abolition or otherwise. Therefore the law relating to Stanom which is peculiar and based upon custom and usage will have no application to the unique situation in this case. The case is, we must concede, without precedents and therefore we are called upon to decide it on first principles. 35. In the view we have stated above, we do not think it is necessary to embark upon a discussion on the law relating to Stanom and consider whether that will have any application to the office of the Maharaja of Travancore. 36. 35. In the view we have stated above, we do not think it is necessary to embark upon a discussion on the law relating to Stanom and consider whether that will have any application to the office of the Maharaja of Travancore. 36. In these circumstances we agree with the court below that the plaintiff has not succeeded in establishing the title to the plaint properties. If so the plaintiff has necessarily to be non-suited. 37. The controversy regarding surrender of excess land depends on whether the plaintiff would get a decree for partition. If the plaintiff does not succeed in the suit the ceiling proceedings become final and there is no question of any re-computation of the ceiling area already determined by the Kerala Land Board. 38. Now we come to the controversy concerning the title to the plaint item No. 10. If the plaintiff in the partition suit does not succeed in getting a decree for partition and the suit is being dismissed, there is no need of adjudicating on the question of title to this item. We are no doubt aware that this item of property has been surrendered for the purpose of running the Chitra Medical Centre, one of the most well equipped Hospitals in the State and the question of compensation, namely as to whom it should be paid has not been settled, perhaps awaiting the decision in this suit. Even so if no relief could be granted to the plaintiff in the suit, the suit has only to be dismissed. It would not be appropriate to determine the question of title of the property as between the 1st defendant on the one hand and the 12th defendant on the other. There is no doubt a cross-objection at the instance of the 12th defendant contending that the finding of the court below on title against the 12th defendant ought to be reversed. The cross-appellant has chosen to pay a court fee of Rs. 2/- only on the cross-objection and what is stated is that: "being a cross-objection against a finding, a court fee of Rs. 2/- is paid." If the 12th defendant seeks relief in the appeal when the decision of the court below is against her and in case she is entitled to seek an adjudication in the appeal, it could be only on payment of court fee. 2/- is paid." If the 12th defendant seeks relief in the appeal when the decision of the court below is against her and in case she is entitled to seek an adjudication in the appeal, it could be only on payment of court fee. In the absence of such payment the cross-objection has only to be dismissed. We do so. 39. There is a cross-objection by defendants 32 to 34 contending that they are entitled to 1/6th share as 32nd defendant was married under the Special Marriage Act, 1872 and thereby became divided in status at a time when there are only 6 members in the tarwad. If the plaintiff is not getting a decree that follows in regard to defendants 32 to 34 also and therefore the quantum of share does not call for consideration. Hence the cross-objection by defendants 32 to 34 is also dismissed. In the result, the appeal and cross-objections are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to suffer costs in the appeal as well as in the cross-objections. Dismissed. On behalf of the counsel for the appellant oral application for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art.134A of the Constitution is made. We see no substantial question of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in this case. Leave declined. Leave refused.