JUDGMENT 1. - These 23 special appeals, the particulars of which are given in the Appendix annexed to this Judgement, have been filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petitions and directing the respective Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis to proceed to make appointments of the writ petitioners on the posts of Lower Division Clerks (hereinafter referred to as 'L.D.C.'). Both the State of Rajasthan as well as the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis concerned have filed special appeals against the same order passed by the learned Single Judge in 11 writ petitions However, in the case of Shiv Nath Singh, only the State of Rajasthan has filed D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 322 of 1981 and the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti concerned does not appear to have filed a special appeal. Thus, the 23 special appeals, which we have heard together, arise out of 12 writ petitions and as common question of fact and law are involved in all these special appeals, it would be proper to dispose of them by a common order. 2. The Rajasthan State Agricultural Marketing Board, (hereinafter called 'the Board'), advertised 102 posts of L.D.C. The writ petitioners and several other persons applied for the said posts of L D.Cs. The process of selection considered of a written examination followed by a viva voce test or interview. Those who were successful in the written examination as were subjected to viva voce test and the candidates who were found suitable in both the written examination as well as the viva voce test were then called upon to undergo a typing test, either in Hindi or in English. A list of the successful candidates was communicated by the Director of the Board to the State Government The Director of the Board also prepared region-wise merit lists of the candidates, who were considered suitable for appointment as L D.C.s. and communicated the-same to the various Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis hereinafter referred to as "Samitis" wish the direction that orders regarding appointment of the candidates selected for the posts of L.D.Cs. be issued by the Samitis concerned. In the case of respondents Rajendra Singh son of Shri Sumer Singh, Rajendra Singh son of Onkar Singh, Radhey Shyam and Bhanwar Singh, the concerned Samitis issued orders of appointment on the posts of L.D.Cs. on probation for a period of one year. be issued by the Samitis concerned. In the case of respondents Rajendra Singh son of Shri Sumer Singh, Rajendra Singh son of Onkar Singh, Radhey Shyam and Bhanwar Singh, the concerned Samitis issued orders of appointment on the posts of L.D.Cs. on probation for a period of one year. But in the case of other successful candidates, who filed writ petitions in this Court and who are respondents in other appeals, orders of appointment could not be issued as the Director of the Board sub-sequently issued telegrams to the concerned Samitis between November 6 and 8, 1980 directing them not to issue appointment orders of the newly selected L.D.Cs. It was also mentioned in the telegrams issued by the Director of the Board that if appointment orders had already been issued, then the newly appointed persons should not be taken on duty until further orders. After the receipt of the aforesaid telegrams, the concerned Samitis refrained from issuing orders of appointment in respect of the remaining selected candidates for the posts of L.D Cs. and in case of those persons in respect of whom appointment orders had already been issued and who had already been taken on duty, they were relieved from service by subsequent orders passed by the concerned Samitis. The selected candidates, feeling aggrieved by the failure on the part of concerned Samitis from issuing orders of appointment even after they were declared successful as a result of these selections held by the Board for the posts of L D.Cs . and in relieving subsequently those persons who had already been given orders of appointment and who had joined their duties, filed writ petitions in this Court 3. The main grievance of the writ petitioners was that even after they were duly selected in accordance with the relevant rules contained in the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Service Rules, 1975, hereinafter referred to as "the 1975 Rules", the writ petitioners were not being appointed on the posts of L D.Cs. and those who were appointed were relieved on account of extraneous considerations. and those who were appointed were relieved on account of extraneous considerations. The writ petitioners contended that after the process of selection was completed in accordance with the 1975 Rules and the Director had allotted the various selected candidates to the different Samitis and had issued instructions to the Samitis concerned to give orders of appointment to the selected candidates, there was no discretion left with any authority much less the State Government to withhold the appointment of the selected candidates on the posts of L.D.Cs. and that it was evident from the 1975 Rules that after the selection was made the appointments of the selected candidates were to follow as a matter of course. 4. The State of Rajasthan in its reply contended that the 1975 Rules had undergone a change by the amendments introduced therein by the notifications issued by the State Government dated July 20, 1979, and June 7, 1980 with the result that the functions which were earlier entrusted to the Secretary of the Board were withdrawn from him and were vested in the Director and that the Secretary became functus officio, and thereafter the Director alone was the competent authority to make the selections, according to Rule 64 of the 1975 Rules, as amended. The State Government also took the stand that merely because the writ petitioners were selected at the selections held by the Secretary, they had no vested right to claim appointment to the posts of L, D Cs., as the list of selected candidates was at best a list of eligible candidates and the Director had every authority to annul the list or modify or supersede the same, as the situation might require it. Another contention which was put forward on behalf of the State Government in its reply was that the selections made by the Secretary of the Board were illegal as according to sub-rules (14) and (15) of Rule 43 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1963 Rules'; which were the parent rules, it was for the Market Committee or the Samiti to select candidates for appointment to the posts of superior officers and servants, including clerks, and to make appointments to such posts, subject to the approval of the Director Thus, according to the State Government the respective Samitis were legally competent to make selections of candidates for the posts of L.D.Cs., according to their respective reeds and requirements and to make appointment to those posts, subject to confirmation by the Director. It was also contended that the 1975 Rules had to be read subject to the provisions contained in the 1963 Rules. The State Government lastly took the stand that by its Order dated March 10, 1981, the State Government had rescinded the selections made by the Secretary, as the selections were not made in accordance with law. It was, in this context, submitted that the Director acted properly in revokirg the appointment of the persons, whose names found place in the list of selected candidates, as the Director was competent to withhold the appointments or to rescined or modify the list of selected candidates. 5. Thus, after the return was filed by the State Government, as new situation came to light that the selections were set aside or candclled not by the Director of his own accord but on account of the order issued by the State Government on March 10, 1981, a copy of which was produced as Annexure R. 2 on behalf of the State Government. It would be proper in order to better approc the respective contentions of the parties, to reproduce the relevant portion of the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981, which runs as under:- HINDI MATTER 373150 6. It would be proper in order to better approc the respective contentions of the parties, to reproduce the relevant portion of the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981, which runs as under:- HINDI MATTER 373150 6. The learned Single Judge, who heard these writ petitions came to the conclusion that sub-rule (13), (14) and (15) of Rule 43(b) of the 1963 Rules stood impliedly repealed, after the promulgation of the 1975 Rules and that the recruitment and appointment of persons to superior posts by direct recruitment in the Market Committee or the Samiti, after the commencement of the 1975 Rules, were to be governed by the provisions of Rule 64-1 of the 1975 Rules, which stood amended by the Notifications dated July 20, 1979 and June 7, 1980. It was also held by the learned Single Judge that after the amendment of Rule 64-1, by the Notification dated July 20, 1979, the recruitment was to de made by the Secretary or any officer authorised by him, either by selecting candidates after advertising the posts in a daily newspaper or by making selection after calling a list of eligible candidates from the local Employment Exchange of the area and a discretion was conferred upon the Secretary of the Board to follow either of the aforesaid methods. It was also held that after the amendment in the 1975 Rules made in June, 1980 the nomenclature "Secretary" of the Board was replaced by 'Director', who was the ultimate authority duly authorised to make recruitment for appointment to superior posts in the service. Thus, it was held that sub-rules (13), (14) and (15) of Rule 43(B) of the 1963 Rules ceased to have any effect after the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, to the extent of the matters that were governed by the 1975 Rules. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that there was no basis for cancel of the selection made by the Director and the State Government was not empowered to issue instructions to the Director by its order dated March 10, 1981, to cancel the selections already made and to proceed with making new selections. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that there was no basis for cancel of the selection made by the Director and the State Government was not empowered to issue instructions to the Director by its order dated March 10, 1981, to cancel the selections already made and to proceed with making new selections. It was also held that there was no lawful reason for not giving appointment to the writ petitioners, after they had been validly selected and that there was no other course open to the Samities except to give appointment to the selected candidates, including the writ petitioners. The learned Single Judge felt that although it was not obligatory upon the Samitis to fill up the vacancies on the posts of L.D.Cs. yet if the vacancies were to be filled in, the Samitis should proceed to make appointment of the persons whose names were included in the list of selected candidated sent by the Director on October 24, 1980 with the instructions that they should issue appointment orders in respect of such persons. 7. In these special appeals, Mr. A. K. Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for some of the Samitis argued in the first instance that the order of the State Government was not subject-matter of challenge in the writ petitions. He also argued that the selection in the present case was made by the Secretary of the Board and not by the Director and that the selection was not proper and in accordance with law as the provisions for preparation of region-wise merit lists had been deleted in the year 1979 before the process of Selection had started and that the State Government had imposed a complete ban on making fresh appointments. It was argued that in the afore-said circumstances there was no justification for making the sections. by the Secretary of the Board. The learned Additional Government Advocate also argued that the selected candidates had no indefensible right to be appointed and as such a writ of mandamus could not be claimed and that the Director had absolute authority to revoke the selections because the same were found to be infirm and were not made in accordance with the relevant Rules. It was lastly urged by Mr. It was lastly urged by Mr. Mathur that section 34-A of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1981, hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act", vested the Government with an authority to give instructions and directions to the Board or the Market Committees and that the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981 was issued in pursuance of the powers conferred upon the State Government by Section 34-A of the Act and that the Board and the Director were bound to follow such instructions as were issued by the State Government. 8. Mr. S.N. Deedwania appearing for some other Samitis also justified the issuance of the directions contained in the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981. Mr. M.D. Purohit, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, reiterated the argument which was advanced by him before the learned Single Judge that the 1963 Rules still held the field and the selections of candidates for appointment to the posts of L.D.Cs should have been made by the Samitis and not by the Secretary of the Board. 9. Mr. Marudhar Mridul appearing for the writ petitioners who are respondents in these appeals, submitted that the State Government produced before the learned Single Judge its order dated March 10, 1981 and relied upon it in support of its contention that the selections made were illegal and were rightly cancelled and that the learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in considering the question of validity of the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981, in order to decide the validity and the justification of the plea put forward by the State Government before him for the cancellation or revocation of the selections. It was urged by Mr. Mridul that the ban. which is said to have been imposed by the State Government on August 5, 1980, to the making of fresh appointments was lifted on March 24, 1981, when the was lifted in respect of the regular appointments. The learned Counsel also submitted that there was no infirmity in the selection made, as the same were made by one of the methods specified in rule 64 - I (4) of the 1975 Rules. The learned Counsel also submitted that there was no infirmity in the selection made, as the same were made by one of the methods specified in rule 64 - I (4) of the 1975 Rules. The learned Counsel further contended that the 1963 Rules could not be made applicable in the matter of recruitment to the superior posts in the Samitis, after the coming into force of the 1975 Rules and both the Rules could not stand together on the same subject-matter. Mr. Mridul, therefore, argued that the learned Single Judge was justified in accepting the Writ Petitions and directing the respective Samitis to proceed with the appointment of the writ petitioners on the posts of L.D.Cs. 10. The Act, which provides for establishment of markets for agricultural produce, envisages in Section 6 that a market committee shall be established for every market area in respect of agricultural produce, for which it is declared to be a market area. The market committees to be constituted under section 7 of the Act would consist of elected members, to represent various interests nomineted members also, as provided in section 7 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act provides that the market committees may employ in the prescribed manner such officers and servants as may be necessary for the management of the market and may pay such officers and servants such salaries as the market committee may think fit. The market committees may also utilise the services of officers and servants of the State Government. Section 11-A authorises the Director to issue directions to the Market Committee to reduce the number of employees if the same is found in excess of its requirements or to terminate the appointment of an employee in case his appointment is found to be irregular. Section 34-A of the Act empowers the State Government to give general instructions to be followed by the Board of the Market Committee for carrying out the purposes of the Act, including the purposes for which and the manner in which the funds are to be utilised and the surpluses are to be kept. In pursuance of the powers conferred upon the State Government by section 36 of the Act, the 1963 Rules were framed by the State Government. In pursuance of the powers conferred upon the State Government by section 36 of the Act, the 1963 Rules were framed by the State Government. Rule 43 relates to the servants of the market committee and the relevant sub-rules which relate to the appointment and conditions of service of L-D.Cs. and other clerks, included in the category of superior officers and servants, are as under:- " 43. Servants of the market committee. (A) X X X X (B) Powers and functions of the Secretary- ............................................................................................................ (13) Besides a Secretary, the market committee may employ such other officers and servants as may be necessary and proper for the efficient execution of its duties. Such officers and servants shall be divided into two classes- (a) superior officers and servants and (b) inferior servants. Superior officers and servants shall be the Assistant Secretary Accounts, Treasures, Supervisors, Quanun goes, Clerks and such officers and servants as the Director may determine besides a Secretary. The inferior Servants shall be peons, watchman and other menial servants. (14) The terms and conditions of the superior officers and servants shall be such as are approved by the Director and those of the inferior servants, shall be such as the market committee itself may decide. (15) The appointment of superior officers and servants shall be made by the market committee subject to the approval of the Director. Any punishment, revision in pay or terms of service or dismissal of the superior officers and servants shall also be subject to the approval of the Director. All inferior servants shall be under the full control of the market committee but the committee shall make an immediate report to the Director in regard to their appointment, pay, punishment, dismissal and other matters relating to such servants." 11. Thereafter the 1975 Rules were promulgated by the State Government incorporating provisions relating to recruitment and promotion of the employees of the market committees, their salaries, leave, medical facilities, allowances, liveries and other matters. Rule 64 of the 1975 Rules provides methods of recruitment to the superior posts. Thereafter the 1975 Rules were promulgated by the State Government incorporating provisions relating to recruitment and promotion of the employees of the market committees, their salaries, leave, medical facilities, allowances, liveries and other matters. Rule 64 of the 1975 Rules provides methods of recruitment to the superior posts. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 64, which deals with the method of recruitment for superior posts, including the posts of Clerks, after its amendment by the Amending Rules published by the State Government by notifications dated July 20, 1979 and June 7, 1980, runs as under: "64-I. Method of recruitment for superior posts: (1) Recruitment to the Service after the commencement of these Rules, shall be made by the following method:- (i) by direct recruitment; (ii) by promotion; (iii) by deputation from State Government: Provided that if the Director, or any authority, authorised in this respect is satisfied that suitable persons are not available for appointment by either method or recruitment in a particular year, appointment by either method, in relaxation of the prescribed proportion, may be made in the same manner as specified in these Rules: Provided further that the persons, who have continuously held posts on temporary basis in the service for a period of not less than 6 months on 1-1-1975 shall be screened by the Selection Board referred to in Rule 65(i) for adjudging their suitability to the posts held on 1-1-1975, provided they possess the qualifications prescribed in the Rules either for direct recruitment or for promotion. on the basis of which persons were selected for advocate temporary appointments. (2) The Secretary of the Market Committee concerned will submit at the beginging of every year a statement of existing vacancies in such grade under different categories including vacancies likely to fall vacant during the year, to the Director or to any officer authorised by him. (3) On receipt of a requisition for direct recruitment to the service, application shall be invited by the Director, or any officer authorised by him, by advertising the vacancies in such manner as he may deem fit. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions. (3) On receipt of a requisition for direct recruitment to the service, application shall be invited by the Director, or any officer authorised by him, by advertising the vacancies in such manner as he may deem fit. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions. the recruitment shall be made by the Secretary or any officer, authorised by him by either of the following methods as he may deem fit: (i) by selecting the candidates after advertising the posts in daily news papers, or (ii) by selecting the candidates after calling for the candidates from the local employment exchange of the area. (5) All appointments to the inferior posts shall be made by the Market Committees". 12. By the notification dated July 20, 1979 the 1975 Rules were amended and sub-rules (4) and (5) and clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 64-1 were deleted and a new sub-rule (4) was inserted by which the Secretary or any other officer authorised by him was empowered to select candidates for appointment to the superior posts in the marketing committees either by advertising the post in the daily newspapers or after calling a list of candidates from the local employment exchange of the area. By a subsequent amendment introduced in the 1975 Rules by the notification dated June 7, 1980 the expression "Secretary", as defined in clause (5) of Rule 7 was deleted and in clause (2) of Rule 7, 'competent authority' was defined as the Director or any authority to whom the power thereof was delegated by or under the Rules. In rule 64-I, wherever the word 'Secretary' occurred, the same was substituted by the word 'Director'. Thus, according to sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I, after 20th July, 1979 the Secretary of the Board and after 7th June, 1980 the Director was empowered to make selection of candidates for appointment to the superior posts in the marketing committees. The aforesaid authority could employ one of the two modes prescribed in Rule 64-I, namely, of selecting candidates after advertising the posts in a daily newspaper or by selecting the candidates after calling for a list from the local employment exchange of the area. In the instant case, the Secretary of the Board had initiated the procedure for recruitment of persons for appointment to the posts of L.D.Cs. In the instant case, the Secretary of the Board had initiated the procedure for recruitment of persons for appointment to the posts of L.D.Cs. in the marketing committees at the itme when he was lawfully empowered to do so. The selection was made by the first of the two modes specified in sub-rule (4) of the 64-I of the 1975 Rules, namely, by inviting applications after advertising the posts in a daily newspaper. After the receipt of the applications, the candidates were subjected to a written-test and those persons who were found successful at the written-test were then subjected to a viva voce test and the successful candidates were, thereafter, subjected to a typing test. The aforesaid procedure was completed upto July, 1980. The letter of the Secretary of the Board Annexure I shows that the results of the written-test and the viva voce tests were declared before 5th July, 1980 and the typing test was arranged in the later half of July, 1980. Thereafter, the Director accepted the result of the selection and issued the list of selected candidates. After the amendment introduced in the 1975 Rules by the notification dated 7th June, 1980, the Director was the ultimate authority empowered to make selections for appointment to the superior pests in the service of the marketing committees. The posts of L.D.Cs. also formed part of the class of posts of superior officers and servants. In these circumstances, it is difficult to visualise any infirmity or irregularity in the making of selections, which alone could have constituted a ground for revocation or cancellation of the selections. The Director gave no grounds at all while proceeding to stay and thereafter revoking the selections made for the posts of L.D.Cs. As a matter of fact, he acted in obedience of the directions of the State Government contained in the letter dated March 10, 1981. The submission that the selections were invalid because the list of eligible candidates was not called for from the local employment exchange of the area is untenable. It may be pointed out that sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I, as it stood after its amendment by the notification dated July 29, 1979 empowered the Secretary and then the Director, or any other officer authorised by him, to follow either of the two modes prescribed in that sub-rule for making selections. It may be pointed out that sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I, as it stood after its amendment by the notification dated July 29, 1979 empowered the Secretary and then the Director, or any other officer authorised by him, to follow either of the two modes prescribed in that sub-rule for making selections. The procedure of calling the list of eligible candidates from the local employment exchange of the area was undoubtedly one of the modes prescribed under sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I. But that was not the only method, which was necessarily to be resorted to. The other alternative method prescribed in sub - rule (4) of Rule 64-I, empowers the Secretary or the Director, as the case may be, or any other officer authorised by him to select candidates after advertising the posts in the daily newspaper. It is undisputed that this method was followed in making the selections for the posts of L.D.Cs. as the Secretary of the Board issued an advertisement in the daily newspaper for the posts of 102 L.D.Cs. which were lying vacant in various market committees. The candidates whose applications were found to he in order, were thereafter subjected to a written test as well as a viva-voce test and then to a typing test. Only those candidates who were found successful in all the aforesaid three tests were selected for appointment to the posts of L. D. Cs. by the Director and their names were included in the final list of selected candidates issued by the Director. Thus, it cannot be held that the procedure prescribed in the 1975 Rules for selection of candidates for appointment to the posts of L D Cs. was not followed. If two alternative modes are prescribed for making selections and one of them was resorted to by the authorities empowered to make selections, then it cannot be held that the selections were not properly held or were invalid or even irregular, because the list of eligible candidates was not called for from the local employment exchanges of the area. 13. If two alternative modes are prescribed for making selections and one of them was resorted to by the authorities empowered to make selections, then it cannot be held that the selections were not properly held or were invalid or even irregular, because the list of eligible candidates was not called for from the local employment exchanges of the area. 13. Another argument, which was advanced before us by the learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of the letter of the State Government dated March 10, 1981 was that the selection was made by the Head Office of the Board for all the market committees of Rajasthan at one and the same time and not for the individual market committees separately. The 1975 Rules do not require selection to be made for each market committee separately nor the market committees are empowered to make selections by themselves. After the 1975 Rules came into force, the Secretary of the Board, who was subsequently substituted by the Director, by the amendment introduced by the notification dated 7th June, 1980, was empowered to make selections for appointment to the superior posts; while only the appointments to the inferior posts were left to be made by the market committees themselves, as provided in sub-rule(4) and (5) of Rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules. It appears from the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981 that probably the State Government had in mind the provisions of law contained in sub-rule (15) of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules without regard to the fact that the same were no longer applicable after the coming into force of 1975 Rules. It was perhaps on this erroneous basis that the State Government thought that the selection should have been made by the local market committees and observed that the list of selected candidates issued by the Director did not show as to which of the selected candidates belonged to which market areas. It may be pointed out that after the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, the selections for appointment to the posts of superiors and servants of the market committees were to be made by the Secretary and subsequently by the Director of the Board and not by the market committees themselves. It may be pointed out that after the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, the selections for appointment to the posts of superiors and servants of the market committees were to be made by the Secretary and subsequently by the Director of the Board and not by the market committees themselves. Thus, a wholly irrelevant consideration appears to have prevailed with the State Government that it was not clear as to whether the persons, who were residents of distant areas, would be able to go to the places where they were proposed to be posted. If the selections were made at the State level by the Secretary or the Director of the Board, we are unable to find any provision in the 1975 Rules which prohibited the holding of such selections at the State level for all the market committees together. In that event, it was entirely immaterial as to which of the selected candidates were residents of which market area and further as to whether the selected candidates who might be residents of distant places would be able to go to the places where they were proposed to be posted. A person who offers himself as a candidate for an All India Selection is expected to join his duties at any place in the country, wherever he might be posted. Similarly, when a person applies for and appears at a State level selection it is undoubtedly expected that he may be posted at any place within the State. It is of no consequence as to whether the place of posting is situated at a longer distance from the place of residence of a selected person. Not only that, such a person, in case he is appointed is liable to be transferred to any place within the State. It is difficult to understand or appreciate the reasons which impelled the State Government to set aside the selection Why was the State Government worried as to whether the selected candidates would be able to go to far distant places. where they may be posted ? This question could not arise at all in view of the circumstance that a State level selection had taken place. If a selected candidate was not willing to proceed to a place of posting only on the ground that the same was situated at a distance from his residence. where they may be posted ? This question could not arise at all in view of the circumstance that a State level selection had taken place. If a selected candidate was not willing to proceed to a place of posting only on the ground that the same was situated at a distance from his residence. then be was free not to join the post and many other candidates would have been willing to take his place. looking to the prevailing conditions of unemployment in the country Thus, one of the main reasons advanced by the State Government for revoking the selections. by its order dated March 10, 1981 is not only without any substance but is wholly extraneous and has no relevance. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the market committees and the learned Additional Government Advocate were not able to paint out any breach of the provisions of the 1975 Rules or any other provision of law, which could have justifien the revocation or cancellation of the selections. It was argued by the learned counsel that the selections should have been made the concerned market committees in accordance with the provisions of clause 15 of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules. But there is no basis for making such a submission in face of the fact that sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules governed the selection and appointments of superior Officers and servants of the market committees. After the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, sub - rule (15) of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules could not continue to be applicable to the appointment of superior officers and servants of the market committees, as the provision contained in sub-rule (15) of rule 43 of the 1963 Rules and those contained in sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules were inconsistent and both those provisions relating to the same subject-matter could not stand side by side. In the first place, sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I begins with a non-obstante clause and as such it should prevail, even if sub-rule (15) of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules still hold the field. In the first place, sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I begins with a non-obstante clause and as such it should prevail, even if sub-rule (15) of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules still hold the field. In the second place, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that sub-rule (13), (14), and (15) of Part B of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules must be considered to have been impliedly repealed, after the coming into force of sub-rule (4) and (5) of Rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules, to the extent of the matters governed by the aforesaid sub-rules of rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules. 15. Rule 64 (I) contained comprehensive provisions regarding appointment of employees of the market committees and as such the provisions contained in the earlier Rules of 1963 must be held to be impliedly repealed. We would refer in this respect to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Swastik Rubber Products Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Poona and another (1981) 4 S.C C. 219, wherein it was held that as new rules were framed covering the subject of octroi, the earlier rules relating to the same subject-matter were repealed by implication. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that when octroi was made the subject-matter of a new and comprehensive set of rules which was covered were only by rule 62-B of the earlier rules, and it could not stand to reason that the rule making authority proceeded to frame new set of rules, of which rule 5 (8) alone covered the entire field of the earlier rule 62-B yet the earlier Rule 62-B was kept intact. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that it could not have been the intention of the rule making authority to have two set of rules on the same subject and thus create confusion. The same argument applies with fill force to the matter before us The new Rules of 1975 contain comprehensive provisions relating to employees of market committees, including their recruitment, pay, joining time, leave, medical facilities and allowances etc. which was covered by rule 43 of the 1963 Rules. The same argument applies with fill force to the matter before us The new Rules of 1975 contain comprehensive provisions relating to employees of market committees, including their recruitment, pay, joining time, leave, medical facilities and allowances etc. which was covered by rule 43 of the 1963 Rules. When comprehensive set of rules on the subject of appointment and other matters relating to the employees of the market committees have been framed, it cannot be visualised that the rule making authority desired to keep the old rule 43 of the 1963 Rules alive and thereby create two sets of parallel rules on the same subject-matter and create confusion. Rule 43 was the only rule of the 1963 Rules which dealt with the matter of servants of the market committees, including the Secretary. But the same subject-matter has now been fully dealt with by framing the 1975 Rules and we are, therefore, definitely of the view that the new set of rules contained in the 1975 Rules repealed the earlier rule 43 of the 1963 Rules by necessary implication and it was immaterial that there was no express provision regarding repeal. The aforesaid two sets of rules could not co-exist and as such the earlier rules on the same subject-matter must give way on the framing of subsequent rules. We are, therefore, unable to accept this contention. 16. In Corporation of Madras v. Madras Electric Tramways Ltd., AIR 1931 Mad. 152, it was observed that having made the general Act if the legislature afterwards makes a special Act in conflict with it, we must assume that the legislature had in mind its own general Act when it made the special Act, which is in conflict with the general Act, as an exception to the general Act. 17. It is well settled that in the interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. In J K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1961 SC 1170 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the same principle was applicable in the case of a rule making authority also. In J K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1961 SC 1170 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the same principle was applicable in the case of a rule making authority also. In that case, their Loardships quoted with approval the following dictum of Romilly, M.R. in Pretty v. Solly (1859-53 E.R. 1032):- "The rule is that whenever there is particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sence, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." 18. Thus, after the coming into force of the 1975 Rules those rules would prevail so far as the question of matters relating to recruitment, service conditions etc. of the employees of the market committees, over the provisions contained in the general rules of 1963 which deal with all matters concerning the market committees generally and only rule 43 thereof dealt with the employees of the market committees. 19. In our view, the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the legislature intent. while making the 1975 Rules, clearly appears to be that the power of selection of candidates for appointment to superior posts was no longer to be left with the market committees; but it was taken out of their hands and conferred upon the Secretary of the Marketing Board, who was subsequently substituted by the Director. If the intention of the rule making authority was that the power of selection should continue to be vested in the market committees as before, then the provisions of sub-rule (13), (14) and (15) of Part B of Rule 43 of the 1963 Rules were sufficient and it was not at all necessary to make a different provision in sub-rules (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Rule 64-1 of the 1975 Rules. After the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, the procedure prescribed for making appointment to various posts in the market committees has been drastically changed and has been laid down in Rule 64-I of the new Rules. After the coming into force of the 1975 Rules, the procedure prescribed for making appointment to various posts in the market committees has been drastically changed and has been laid down in Rule 64-I of the new Rules. Now the secretary of the market committees concerned has to submit, in the begining of every year, the number of existing vacancies in each grade under different categories together with the number of vacancies likely to occur during the year, to the Director or any officer authorised by him. On receipt of such a requisition for direct recruitment to the service, the Director or any other officer authorised by him, is required to invite applications by advertising the vacancies in such manner as he may daem fit and then the selection has to be made by one of the two modes namely, either by advertising the posts in the daily newspaper or by calling the list of eligible candidates from the local employment exchange of the area. Although rule 64 provides the procedure for direct recruitment, Rule 64 provides the procedure for recruitment by promotion or transfer. Thus, it is apparent from a perusal of rules 64 and 65 that the entire procedure for appointment to the various posts in the market committees has been prescribed in the 1975 Rules, including the procedure for direct recruitment, promotion and transfer. Therefore, it is not necessary to travel beyond the 1975 Rules, so far as the question of selection and appointment of persons to the various posts in the market committees are concerned. 20. Mr. Mathur laid much stress on the second part of the order of the State Government dated March 10, 1981 and it was argued that as at total ban was imposed by the State Government on making fresh appointments to any post in the market committees, the selection and appointment of L.D.Cs. should not have taken place. However, the facts are not in dispute that the aforesaid ban on fresh appointments was imposed on August 5, 1980 and the same was lifted en March 24, 1981. It also appears from the record that by the end of July 1980 the entire process of selection of candidates for appointment of L.D.Cs. was completed and all the three tests, namely, the written test, viva voce and the typing test, to which the candidates were subjected, had already taken place. It also appears from the record that by the end of July 1980 the entire process of selection of candidates for appointment of L.D.Cs. was completed and all the three tests, namely, the written test, viva voce and the typing test, to which the candidates were subjected, had already taken place. If at that stage a complete ban was imposed by the State Government, prohibiting the making of any fresh appointment on any post in the market committees the fact of imposition of such prohibition would not have the effect of nullifying the selection. The imposition of such a ban could have the effect that the selected candidates could not have been appointed until the hat was lifted. If the selected candidates could not have been given an order of appointments during the period the ban on fresh appointments subsisted, yet the aforesaid ban was lifted on March 24, 1981 and thereafter three was no impediment to the giving effect to the order of the Director releasing the list of selected candidates, who were found successful in all the three tests and directing the market committees to issue appointment orders to the selected candidates. 21. Another argument, which was advanced by Mr. Mathur was that the State Government was empowered to issue an order like the one issued on March 10, 1981 by virtue of the powers conferred upon it under section 34-A. But a bare reading of section 34-A goes to show that it empowers the State Government to give general instructions to the Board or market committees to carry out the purposes of the Act, including. directions relating to the purposes for which and the manner in which the marketing committee fund and the Marketing Board fund shall be spent and manner in which the surpluses of the Board and the committees are to be kept. Thus, only instructions of general nature could he given by the State Government under section 34-A and that too for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Learned counsel was unable to point out as to what purpose of the Act was to be fulfilled by the order issued by the Sate Government on March 10, 1981 nor it is an order of general nature. Learned counsel was unable to point out as to what purpose of the Act was to be fulfilled by the order issued by the Sate Government on March 10, 1981 nor it is an order of general nature. Even if it may be considered that the order dated March 10, 1981 was in the nature of general instructions, yet it cannot fall within the abmit of section 34-A of the Act, as the same was not issued for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. On the contrary, the said order is derogatory of the provisions of rule 64-A of the 1975 Rules. 22. A question relating to the control to be exercised by the State Government came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab and another v. Hari Kishan Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1981. Under the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act the Jurisdiction to consider and decide the applications for grant of cinema licences has been vested in the licensing authority. The State Government in that case required all applications for licenses to be forwarded to it for disposal, which was sought to be justified before their Lordships on the ground that the power of the licensing authority to grant licences under section 5(2) of the Act was subject to the control of the State Government under section 5(l) of the Act and it was argued that while exercising its power tinder section 5(1) the control of the State Government was very wide. Their Lordship repelled the contention advanced on behalf of the State Government and held that howsoever wide the control of the State Government might be, it cannot justify the State Government to completely oust the licensing authority and itself usurp his functions. Their Lordships observed that if the Sate Government required all applications for licences to be forwarded to it then it really converted itself into the original authority and that there was no justification for issuing instructions which had the effect of changing the statutory provision contained in Section 5 (2) and obliterate the licensing authority. Their Lordships observed that if the Sate Government required all applications for licences to be forwarded to it then it really converted itself into the original authority and that there was no justification for issuing instructions which had the effect of changing the statutory provision contained in Section 5 (2) and obliterate the licensing authority. Their Lordships made the following observations:- "The control of Government contemplated by Section 5 (2) may justify the issue of general instructions or directions which may be legitimate for the purpose of the Act and these instructions and directions may necessarily guide the licensing authority in dealing with applications for licenses. The said control may, therefore, take the form of issuance of general directions and instructions which are legitimate and reasonable for the purpose of the Act .............In other words, in the context in which the control of the Government has been provided for by Section 5 (2), it would be permissible to hold that the said control can be exercised generally before applications for licenses are granted. or particularly by correcting individual order, if they are found to be erroneous. ............................................................................................................ Government cannot assume for itself the powers of the licensing authority which have been specifically provided for by Section 5(1) and (2) of the Act To hold that the control of the Government contemplated by Section 5 (1) would justify their taking away the entire jurisdiction and authority froth the licensing authority, is to permit the Government by means of its executive power to change the statutory provision in a substantial manner; and that position clearly is not sustainable." 23. Then, it was argued by the learned counsel. appearing for the appellants, that merely because the names of the writ petitioners appeared in the list of selected candidates, it did not confer any right on them to be appointed on the posts of L.D.Cs. It was argued that the learned Single Judge erred in granting a writ of mandamus directing the market committees to proceed to make appointments of the writ petitioners on the posts of L.D.Cs , in the existing vacancies. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha and others, AIR 1973 SC 2216 , was relied upon in support of this contention. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha and others, AIR 1973 SC 2216 , was relied upon in support of this contention. In the aforesaid case, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that once a list is prepared by the Public Service Commission strictly in order of merit, neither the Public Service Commission nor the State Government nor the High Court can depart from the order of merit given in the list, except in cases of reservations made in favour of backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Of course, it is not nesessary that all the existing vacancies should be filled up at once and it is open to the State Government to decide as to how many posts should be filled in by making appointments in respect thereof. The mere fact that the names of these persons appeared in the list of selected candidates does not entitle them to claim a mandamus that they should be appointed. In that case, an advertisement was made for 15 vacancies to be filled. A list of 40 candidates was prepared who passed the selection test with the minimum score of 45%. In the interest of maintaining high standard of Judicial competence, only seven candidates, who had obtained minimum standard of 55% marks in the examination, were appointed as subordinate Judges. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana took the view that as 15 vacancies were advertised, the first 15 candidates in the select list ought to have been appointed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the afore-said decision holding that it was not obligatory upon the Government to till in all the vacancies and it was open to the Government to decide as to how many appointments shall be made. But their Lordships also held that two fold restraint was placed on the power of the State Government to make appointments. namely, (i) that it shall not make appointments by travelling outside the list of selected candidates; and (ii) that it shall make the appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list of selected candidates published by the Public Service Commission and that subject to the aforesaid two restraints, the State Government could appoint lesser number of persons than the post advertised. 24. 24. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in The State of Punjab and others v. Saroj Devi and others, 1981 Lab. I. C. 257, wherein it was held that a mere selection could not give any indefeasible right to the selected candidate to claim appointment to the post, in the absence of any order having been passed to that effect by the appointing authority itself. Their Lordships of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha's case (5) and held that the selection committee could not be equated with the appointing authority and at the highest the selection by a committee could create an inchoate claim which perfected itself into a right, if and when it was approved by the appointing authority. The learned Judges observed that it was the sanction and the approval of the appointing authority alone which could create or vest any legal right in the selected candidates. 25. Although it cannot be disputed that the selected candidates merely because their names were included by the selection committee in the list of selected candidates, were not conferred with any right of appointment to the post for which they were selected, yet it is well settled that the appointing authority could not refuse to accept the recommendations of the selection committee merely on arbitrary grounds. The appointing authority could not refuse to accept the recommendations of the selection committee simply on the ground that the persons recommended were not acceptable to the appointing authority or that a person rejected should have been recommended. These matters are to be adjudged by the selection committee and if the recommendation of the selection committee is arbitrarily refused by the appointing authority, then the aggrieved person can certainly submit that his legal right has been infringed. If the recommendations of the selection committee are refused on valid grounds, which are not contrary to the provisions of law under which the selections have been made, then it may not be possible for the court to interfere with the refusal of the appointing authority to appoint a selected candidate. In Dr. If the recommendations of the selection committee are refused on valid grounds, which are not contrary to the provisions of law under which the selections have been made, then it may not be possible for the court to interfere with the refusal of the appointing authority to appoint a selected candidate. In Dr. Ram Singh v. University of Sagar, Sagar and others, 1973 (2) SLR 153, it was held that a candidate recommended by the selection committee has a right to see that the power of the appointing authority in accepting or declining to accept the recommendation is properly exercised. Of course, the selected candidate cannot claim that he should be declared to have been appointed, but to the limited extent that the recommendation of the selection committee is not refused by the appointing authority on arbitrary reasons, the grievance can be examined by the Court. 26. In the cases before us there can be no doubt that the selected candidates could not have any indefeasible right merely because of their success in the three tests conduced by the Board. But thereafter the Director of the Board, who was the appointing authority, had issued an order directing the market committees concerned to issue appointment orders to the selected candidates. As a matter of fact, in some of the cases order of appointment had actually been issued by the Secretary of the respective market committee. Thus the situation in the cases before us is not the same as was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha's case (5) or before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Saroj Devi's case (6), but it has passed that stage and the Director, who was the appointing authority in accordance with rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules as amended, had approved the selections and directed the concerned market committees to issue orders of appointment to the selected candidates and had forwarded region-wise lists of selected candidates to the respective market committees for the purpose of issuing orders of appointment to the persons whose names were included in such lists. As the Punjab and Haryana High Court held in Saroj Devi's case (6) though mere selection may not give an indefeasible right to the selected candidates to claim appointment on the posts of L.D.Cs., yet the right of such persons for appointment was perfected when the selection was approved by the appointing authority. The sanction and the approval of the Director to the selections made created a legal right in the selected candidates to claim their appointments. After the Director had passed the order dated October 24, 1980, directing the market committees concerned to issue letters of appointment to the selected candidates and forwarded to them the lists of candidates who were to be appointed by the concerned market committees only the formal issuance of the letters of appointment remained to be complied with. Thereafter, no power was vested in the State Government to set aside the order of the Director. We have already examined above that section 34-A of the Act did not empower the State Government to pass any order of the nature of Ex. R. 2 dated March 10, 1981, setting aside the decision of the Director in respect of the appointment of L.D.Cs. We have also examined above the reasons which have been advanced by the State Government for setting aside the order of the Director in respect of the appointment of the L.D.Cs in accordance with the list of selected candidates and have found the reasons which actuated the State Government in this regard were extraneous in nature and were irrelevant to the basic quest on. The most important reason which has been advanced by the State Government. namely, that the Board could not make selections for the market committees of the entire State has been found to be contrary to the provisions of rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules which governed the selections and the other reason which prevailed with the State Government regarding the imposition of ban on fresh appointments ceased to exist as soon as the ban was lifted on March 24, 1981. Thereafter, there could be no bar to the giving of appointment letters to the selected candidates, in accordance with the direction of the Director of the Board. Thereafter, there could be no bar to the giving of appointment letters to the selected candidates, in accordance with the direction of the Director of the Board. The State Government could not have lawfully insisted that the appointments should be made only after calling for the list of candidates, from the local employment exchange of the area, in face of the fact that sub-rule (4) of rule 64-I gave a discretion to the Secretary or the Director of the Board to adopt either of the two methods specified therein for making selections of candidates for appointment to superior posts. No doubt, the calling of names of candidates from the local employment exchange of the area was one of the two methods specified in sub-rule (4) of rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules. But the other method of selecting candidates after advertising the posts in a daily newspaper was also prescribed in the aforesaid sub-rule and the discretion vested earlier in the Secretary of the Board and thereafter in the Director of the Board. after the amendment was made by the notification dated 7th June, 1980 to follow either of the two procedures prescribed therein. The State Government, if it proposed to give any general institutions under section 34-A, governing the selections, it could have issued such general instructions prior to the making of the selections. But even then it could not have interferred with the discretion vested in the Secretary or the director of the Board. under sub-rule (4) of Rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules to make soiections according to either of the two methods proscribed therein. Moreover, after the process of selections was completed and the list of selected candidares was published, the Director, who by then was substituted in place of Secretary of the Board, under rule 64-I had directed the concerned market committees to make appointments of the selected candidates. The State Government had thereafter no right or authority to set aside the selections and direct that fresh selections be made according to only one of the methods prescribed for making selections, namely, by calling, a list of eligible candidates from the local employment exchange of the area. 27. The decision in the case of State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram, 1968 S.L.R. 92, related to the Mysore Recruitment of Gazetted Probationer's Rules, 1959. 27. The decision in the case of State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram, 1968 S.L.R. 92, related to the Mysore Recruitment of Gazetted Probationer's Rules, 1959. which provided for a single competitive examination to test the suitability of candidates for several cadres. Rule 9(2) gave the right to the State Government of appointing any person to any particular cadre when it considered more suitable for such cadre. On the basis of this provision, the State Government proceeded to appoint a person who ranked lower in the order of merit to the post of Assistant Commissioner in the Mysore Administrative Service lignoring the claim of the person who ranked higher in the order of merit and had indicated his preference for the post of Assistant Commissioner. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the principle of recruitment by happen competition aims at ensuring equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and obtaining the services of the most meritorious candidates. It was held that last part of rule 9(2) subverted the basic objectives of equality of opportunity by vesting in the Government an arbitrary power of patronage and the Government could even arrogate to itself the power of assigning a Class I post to a less meritorious and a Class II post to a more meritorious candidate. Consequently, last part or rule 9(2), which gave the Government an arbitarary power of ignoring the just claims of successful candidates for recruitment to public offices under the State was struck down on the ground that the same was violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. If the Government is held to possess a superior right of appointing or not appointing the successful candidates not according to their merit, but according to its arbitrary whip when the principle of recruitment by open competition, for ensuring equality of opportunity in the matter of employment, would be destroyed. 28. If the Government is held to possess a superior right of appointing or not appointing the successful candidates not according to their merit, but according to its arbitrary whip when the principle of recruitment by open competition, for ensuring equality of opportunity in the matter of employment, would be destroyed. 28. Although, it might have been open to the Director not to fill in the vacancies or to appoint lesser number of persons from amongst those selected, but then the appointment has to be made strictly in accordance with merit and the selecting cannot be set aside on merely elusive grounds, In S.R. Jayaram's case (8), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that High Court should have directed the State Government to appoint the person who stood higher in the order of merit to the post of Assistant Commissioner on the basis of his position in the order of merit. 29. Even according to the decision of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha's case (5), the restraint was placed on the power of the appointing authority not to travel outside the list of selected candidates and not to depart from the ranking given in that list. After the ban imposed on the fresh appointments was lifted on March 24,1I981, the appointing authority could make appointments subject to the restraints mentioned by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha's case (5). We are unable to find any infirmity in the selections made earlier by the Secretary of the Board, which were finally approved by the Director, after the amendment in the 1975 Rules was made by the notification dated 7th June, 1980 and the appointments could have been made in accordance with the list of selected candidates issued by the Director of the Board and strictly in the order in which the candidates were placed in the list of selected candidates. In the absence of any infirmity in making the selections, neither the State Government nor the Director had any authority to revoke the selections, which were made in accordance with the 1975 Rules and by open competition after subjecting all the candidates who applied for recruitment, to a written test, a viva voce test and a typing test. In the absence of any infirmity in making the selections, neither the State Government nor the Director had any authority to revoke the selections, which were made in accordance with the 1975 Rules and by open competition after subjecting all the candidates who applied for recruitment, to a written test, a viva voce test and a typing test. It is although open to the appointing authority to appoint lesser number of persons, but the appointing authority could not travel outside the list of selected candidates or revoke the list and make new selections unless any infirmity or illegality is found in the selections already made. As we have observed above learned counsel for the appellants were unable to point out any infirmity or illegality in the selections made earlier for the posts of L.D.Cs., by making recruitment from the open market. The learned Single Judge was right in holding that Ex. R. 2 by which the State Government purported to give direction or instructions to the Director was without jurisdiction and invalid and deserved to be set aside. 30. In The Distt. Registrar, Palghat and others v. M. B. Koyyakutty and others, AIR 1979 SC 1060 , it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if a Government order impinged upon the statutory rule then such an order has to be ignored. In that case, their Lordships discussed the question as to whether it was proper for the High Court to issue a direction requiring the appointing authority to promote the employee. It was held that ordinarily the court does not issue a direction in positive terms but looking to the peculiar circumstances of the case that the employee was duly qualified for promotion, but he was not promoted because of Govt. notification which tended to superadd or superimpose by an executive fiat on the statutory rules something inconsistent with the same and that in such circumstances, the High Court was justified in issuing a positive direction requiring the appointing authority to promote the concerned employee. 31. In the present case, the Director who was the appointing authority, had approved the list of selected candidates and as such a legal right vested in the selected candidates for appointment to the posts of L. D. Cs. 31. In the present case, the Director who was the appointing authority, had approved the list of selected candidates and as such a legal right vested in the selected candidates for appointment to the posts of L. D. Cs. The market committees were found to follow the directions given by the Director and make appointment of the selected candidates in accordant therewith. 32. In the result. we upheld the order passed by the learned Single Judge and all the appeals are dismissed. However, in the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. *******