Order.- The petitioner is the owner of premises bearing door No. 479, V.E. Road. Tuticorin, he having purchased the property from the original owner, one Bhuvanasundari. At the time of purchase the second respondent Noble Fernando, was the tenant of the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 90. The second respondent thereafter attorned the tenancy in favour of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner filed R.C.O.P. No. 42 of 1981 for eviction of the second respondent under section 10 (2) (i) and 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, before the first respondent. Since the second respondent did not appear pursuant to the notice, so it is alleged by the petitioner, the first respondent set him ex parte and passed an order of eviction. The petitioner then filed E.P. No. 157 of 1981 for execution of the order of eviction. The property was delivered to the petitioner through Court on 2nd July, 1981. Subsequently, the second respondent filed an application I.A. No. 195 of 1981 under rule 12 (3) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, to set aside the ex parte order, of eviction passed on 14th April, 1981. He contended that summons in the rent control proceedings were not served on him and that his signature was forged on the summons. The Rent Controller accepted the contention of the second respondent and set aside the ex parte order of eviction. Against the said order of the Rent Controller setting aside the order of eviction, the petitioner has filed C.M.A. No. 119 of 1981 before appellate authority (Principal Sub-Judge, Tuticorin) and the appeal is pending. The second respondent had in the meanwhile filed E.A. No. 588 of 1981, for redelivery of the property under sections 144 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. In view of the fact that the ex parte order of eviction had been set aside the Rent Controller ordered redelivery by his order, dated 8th December, 1981. The writ petition has been filed to set aside the said order of the Rent Controller. 2. Mr. K. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following conditions. The order of eviction was passed under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960 )), as amended by Act XXIII of 1973 . The writ petition has been filed to set aside the said order of the Rent Controller. 2. Mr. K. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following conditions. The order of eviction was passed under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960 )), as amended by Act XXIII of 1973 . section 18 of the Act as amended dealt with execution of orders. section 18 (1) specifically provided that only orders under sections 10 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17 and every order passed on appeal under section 23 or on revision under section 25 shall be executed by the Controller, as if such order is an order of a civil Court and for this purpose the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil Court. The learned counsel made a comparative reference to section 9 of the 1949 Act, section 18 of 1960 Act, before the amendment in 1973 and also section 18 as it stood amended in 1973. The learned counsel further argued that so long as the Act does not confer a power of redelivery on the statutory authority under the provisions of the Act, the ex parte order of eviction had been set aside. 3. On the other hand, mr. manivannan, the learned counsel for the second respondent contended that the application for redelivery, which in effect is an application for restitution, was an execution application and that consequently the rent controller will be competent to deal with the, same under section 18(1) of the act. the learned counsel emphasised upon the fact that every order made under sections 10 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17, shall be executed by the controller as if such an order is an order of a civil court and the controller shall have all the powers of a civil court. the learned counsel further urged that on the principle that no act of court shall prejudice a party, the rent controller would have jurisdiction to order redelivery when it discovered that the delivery had been effected on the basis of a wrong order of eviction which had been subsequently set aside. 4. The question that arises for consideration is whether the rent controller has jurisdiction to order redelivery of the property to the second respondent consequent on his setting aside the order of eviction. 4. The question that arises for consideration is whether the rent controller has jurisdiction to order redelivery of the property to the second respondent consequent on his setting aside the order of eviction. section 18 of the act as amended in 1973 reads as follows: “18. Execution of Orders.-(1) every order made under sections 10 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17 and every order passed on appeal under section 25 shall be executed by the controller, as if such order is an order of a civil court and for this purpose, the controller shall have all the powers of a court.” No doubt, there is some difference in language between section 18 as amended in 1973 and the corresponding provisions under the 1949 act and the 1960 act before its amendment. section 9 of the 1949 act provided that every order of eviction passed by the rent controller or an appellate authority should be executed by the specified court as if it were a decree of that court. similarly, the 1960 act before its amendment provided that every order made under sections 10 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17 and every order passed on appeal under section 23 or on revision under section 25 shall be executed by the specified courts. however, after the amendment the power of execution is conferred on the Rent Controller himself. However, he shall execute the order as if such order were an order of civil Court. For that purpose section 18 conferred on him the powers of a civil Court. Mr. Srinivasan is right in his submission that it is now settled by decisions of this Court that the Rent Controller is not a civil Court. However, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Srinivasan that since the Rent Controller is not a civil Court, he will not have the power to order redelivery by way of restitution. section 18 while conferring power on the Rent Controller to execute on order, it has equally conferred on the Rent Controller all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of execution. section 10 provides for an order being passed for eviction of tenants. section 14 provides for recovery of possession by the landlord for repairs and re-construction. section 18 while conferring power on the Rent Controller to execute on order, it has equally conferred on the Rent Controller all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of execution. section 10 provides for an order being passed for eviction of tenants. section 14 provides for recovery of possession by the landlord for repairs and re-construction. section 16 deals with the right of the tenants to occupy a building if it is not demolished within the period mentioned therein. section 17 prohibits the landlord from interfering with the amenities available to a tenant. When an order for eviction is passed under section 10 the Rent Controller is empowered under section 18 to entertain an execution petition for eviction of the tenant by the landlord. For the purpose of execution, he has got all the powers of a civil Court. If once in exercise of his powers under section 18 the Rent Controller finds that delivery of possession has been ordered on the basis of an order of eviction which has subsequently been set aside, certainly he has the power to order redelivery. This is because section 18 itself creates a fiction that every order passed by the Rent Controller shall be executed as if such an order is an order of a civil Court and for that purpose the Controller is given all the powers of a civil Court. The application for restitution is only an application in execution. If the Rent Controller is terms of section 18 has got the power to entertain an execution petition he will have equally the power to order restitution. An already stated, the Rent Controller though remains a Rent Controller, in the matter of execution he executes the order as if it is an order of a civil Court and for that purpose he has all the powers of civil Court 5. In Thangaswamy Chettiar v. BapooSahib1, a similar question arose for consideration under sections 9 and 12 of the 1946 Act. In an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent, the landlord got an order for eviction and actually got possession of the building in execution. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was set aside by the appellate authority. Thereafter, the tenant filed an application for restitution and redelivery was ordered by the Subordinate Judge. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was set aside by the appellate authority. Thereafter, the tenant filed an application for restitution and redelivery was ordered by the Subordinate Judge. Against that the landlord carried an appeal before this Court which was disposed of by a Bench of this Court. It was contended before this Court that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to order restitution and that section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, did not apply to orders of eviction passed under the Rent Control Act. On behalf of the tenant it was contended that so far as the Province of Madras was concerned it was established that restitution proceedings were in the nature of execution proceedings, that section 8 of Madras Act XV of 1946, provided a machinery for executing orders passed in appeal, that the Court set up for that purpose in the mofussil was the Court of the Subordinate Judge or District Judge where there was no Sub-Judge and that the general rule was that once the ordinary tribunals were seized of a matter, the forms, procedure and reliefs usually observed by and obtainable in such Courts became applicable and available in respect of that matter. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., speaking for the Bench observed as follows:- “It is clear that the first of the three propositions on which Mr. Narayana Aiyar founded his reply is well-established in the province.” The learned Judge in support of his conclusion extracted the propositions in the following cases. In Somasundaram v. Chokkalingam2, it was decided: “an application for restitution is an application in execution under the new Code of Civil Procedure.” In Unnamalai Ammal v. Mathan3, it was observed: “An application for restitution is an application for execution of a decree and is governed by Article 182 and not by Article 181, Limitation Act. Again in Palaniyandi Pillai v. Rasappa Pillai1, it has been observed:” It is no doubt true that our High Court has taken the view that an application for restitution in an application for execution of the decree whatever may be the view of the other High Courts.” 6. A similar question arose for consideration before Ramaprasada Rao, J., in Arunagiri Nadar v. Rathinasami2. The landlord of the building obtained an ex parte order of eviction against his tenant and pursuant thereto took possession of the property. A similar question arose for consideration before Ramaprasada Rao, J., in Arunagiri Nadar v. Rathinasami2. The landlord of the building obtained an ex parte order of eviction against his tenant and pursuant thereto took possession of the property. In these circumstances, the learned Judge was called upon to decide whether in the absence of an express statutory provision which would enable the Court to direct restitution, it could do so ex debtio justitiae. The learned Judge after extracting a passage from the judgment of the Chief Justice in Mayilsami Gounder v. Rammoorthi Chettiar3, observed thus: “It is, therefore, clear that in the absence of an express provision or a provision by necessary intendment which would enable a civil Court to direct redelivery, the civil Court does not possess such power.” It may be mentioned that the decision relied upon by the learned Judge arose under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and the question that arose for decision was whether the Revenue Divisional Officer acting under section 4 (5) of the said Act had jurisdiction to order restoration in case the order of execution under which possession was taken was reversed by the appellate Court. It is significant that the decision in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib4, was not cited before the learned Judge. 7. An identical situation arose for decision before Ramanujam, J., in Md. Hussain v. Pitchai5. In this case the landlord obtained an ex parte order of eviction and obtained possession of the property in execution of the order. Subsequently, the ex parte order of eviction was set aside at the instance of the tenant. It is unnecessary to narrate the further proceedings between the landlord and. tenant except to State that ultimately the tenant applied for restitution and obtained redelivery of property; the landlord carried the matter in revision before this Court. Ramanujam, J., observed as follows: “On a due consideration of the rival contentions of the parties on the point, I am inclined to follow the decision of the Bench in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bappo Sahib4. Ramanujam, J., observed as follows: “On a due consideration of the rival contentions of the parties on the point, I am inclined to follow the decision of the Bench in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bappo Sahib4. With due respect, I cannot accept the contrary view taken by my learned brother, Ramaprasada Rao, J., in C.R.P. No. 967 of 1968 relying on the decision of the Division-Bench in Mayilsami Gounder v. Rammoorthi Chettiar3, which dealt with the power of the Revenue Divisional Officer, an authority constituted under the Madras Act XXV Of 1955, to order restitution and held that he had no such power for the reason that he is bound by the provisions of the statute,. that he cannot act outside the Act and that statutory Tribunals had no inherent powers-to order restitution. I am not in a positions to apply the principle of that decision dealing with the powers of statutory Tribunals, to the facts of the present case where the eviction order had been executed by a civil Court under the provisions of section 18 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which enables the civil Court to execute an order of eviction as if it were-a decree passed by that Court. Once-the eviction order is treated as a decree of Court and taken to a civil Court for execution as per section 18, such proceedings will be governed by the provisions of the-Code of Civil Procedure, relating to execution of decrees so long as the provisions of the Rent Control Act did not modify or restrict the power of the civil Court under the Code. It is well-established that an application for restitution is treated as an application for execution. Unlike under the Madras Act XXV of 1955, the order of eviction passed under the Rent Control Act has been specifically made executable only in a civil Court and there is no provision in the Act itself curtailing or modifying its powers under the Code in matters of execution. It is because of this special feature by which an order of eviction is brought before a regular Court for execution, Ramaprasada Rao, J., had held in Ramaswamy Iyer v. Ramakrishnayya1, that the provisions of the Limitation Act, would become applicable to the proceedings for eviction arising under the Rent Control Act. It is because of this special feature by which an order of eviction is brought before a regular Court for execution, Ramaprasada Rao, J., had held in Ramaswamy Iyer v. Ramakrishnayya1, that the provisions of the Limitation Act, would become applicable to the proceedings for eviction arising under the Rent Control Act. This is also the view taken by the, Division Bench in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bapco Sahib2. But I find that the said Bench Decision was not bought to the notice of Ramaprasada Rao, J., in C.R.P. No. 967 of 1968. I therefore hold that the lower Court had the power to order restitution under its inherent powers and direct redelivery under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, following the decision in Thagaswamy Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib2.” Mr. K. Srinivasan sought to distinguish the above decision of Ramanujam, J., on the ground that the case arose under section 18 of the Act before its amendment in 1973 when the order of the Rent Controller was to be executed by a civil Court. Undoubtedly the situation arose before the amendment of section 18 in 1973. However, in my opinion, that does not in any manner render the principle laid down by Ramanujam, J., in applicable to the facts of the present case. As already stated after the amendment of section 18 of the Act in 1973 the Rent Controller himself executes the order of eviction as if it were an order of a civil Court and for that purpose he will have all the powers of a civil Court. If by this legal fiction the Rent Controller has all the powers of a civil Court in the matter of execution of an order of eviction, I am unable to understand why he would have no power to order an application for restitution which is nothing but an execution application. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to a decision of Ramaswami, J., in Ramanujam Naidu v. Panchanatha Mudaliar3. The question that has to be decided by the learned Judge was whether the Rent Controller had the power to excuse the delay in filing an application to bring on record the legal representatives. In that case, the application to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased tenant was filed in execution. The question that has to be decided by the learned Judge was whether the Rent Controller had the power to excuse the delay in filing an application to bring on record the legal representatives. In that case, the application to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased tenant was filed in execution. After referring to section 18 of the Act prior to and subsequent to the amendment of 1973, the learned Judge observed as. follows: “It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that prior to the amendment, the Rent Controller while executing the order made by him was acting as a civil Court and it is in those circumstances this Court held in Subramani Pillai v. Rajakanni Nadar4, that the old rule 32 was not applicable to execution proceedings, and that after the amendment, the executing forum now is the Rent Controller and as such rule 25 would be applicable to the present execution petition filed under the amended section 18. I am unable to-agree with this contention of the learned: counsel. Under the old section the decree-remains as that the Rent Controller and the Rent Controller executing it shall be-deemed to be a civil Court. But under the new provision, the Rent Controller but the decree shall be executed as if it is a decree of the civil Court. If once the eviction order of the Rent Controller shall be deemed to-be a decree of the civil Court, and is to be executed an if it were an order of the civil’ Court, then the provisions of Order 21 Civil Procedure Code, as far as may be,. will be attracted. Rule 25 in terms is not applicable to a death occurring after the decree in execution proceedings as it in terms is applicable only to proceedings pending before the Rent Controller. Though the Rent Controller is now executing the decree, he is not executing an order of the Rent Controller, but an order which shall be deemed to be an order of the civil Court which he is executing. In such a proceeding rule 25 is not applicable. The ratio of the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakanni Nadar1, therefore still holds good and is applicable. In such a proceeding rule 25 is not applicable. The ratio of the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakanni Nadar1, therefore still holds good and is applicable. It may also be mentioned that in executing the order of eviction as if it were an order of the civil Court, the Controller shall also have all the powers of the civil Court. In proceedings in execution in civil Courts, the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act, is applicable and therefore, an application for excusing the delay in filing the petition for bringing on record the legal representatives, if there is any delay, could also be maintainable.” I am therefore of the view that an application for restitution is an application for execution and consequently the Rent Controller has got the power to order restitution. 8. The same conclusion can be arrived at on the basis of another principle of law as well, viz., actus curiae nominem gravabit. An act of Court shall prejudice no man. In other words, the Court will not allow a suitor to suffer by reason of a wrong order and the moment the mistake is discovered it will rectify the error and put him as far as possible in the position he would have occupied had the wrong order not been passed. It has further to be noted that section 144 is not exhaustive. 9. In Birendra Nath Basu Thakar v. Surendra Kumar Basu Thakur2, it is observed thus: “The power of a Court to direct restitution is inherent in the Court itself. It rests.on the principle that a Court of justice is under a duty to repair the injury done to a party by its act: Rodger v. The Comptoir D’Escomptede Paris3; Jai Berhma v. Kedar Nath Marwari4. It rests.on the principle that a Court of justice is under a duty to repair the injury done to a party by its act: Rodger v. The Comptoir D’Escomptede Paris3; Jai Berhma v. Kedar Nath Marwari4. The right of a party to have restitution and the duty of the Court to give him restitution do not rest on the provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which defines the procedure only in one class of cases requiring restitution by enacting that the application for restitution is to be made in the Court of first instance.” To quote Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahbi5: “It is a basic rule that the Courts will not permit a suitor to suffer by reason of a wrong order it has made and that when once the error is discovered it will be so far as possible put him in the position which he would have occupied if the wrong order had not been made. The right to restitution is not derived from section 144, Civil Procedure Code.” 10. Ramanujam, J., also stated the above factum of law in Md. Hussain v. Pitchai6, thus: “The ratio of the decision in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib5, is based on the well-known principle that once a matter comes before a regular civil Court, its further course will be governed by the provisions of the Code and all the ordinary incidents of procedure of that Court will apply to that matter, as also the fact that an application for restitution is treated as an application for execution of a decree and is governed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act.” 11. In this context it will be useful to quote the following statement of the law in Craies on Sthtute Law, in Seventh edition, page 111: “If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential), to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers the detail to be carried out.” 12. It is to get over the above principle of law that Mr. It is to get over the above principle of law that Mr. Srinivasan laid stress on the fact that the Rent Controller is not a Court and cited the line of cases to that effect. It is enough to refer to die decision of Ratnavel Pandian, J., in Ghose Khan v. Rent Controller, Coimbatore7. The learned Judge has in dealing with section 11 of the Act after the amendment held that the Rent Controller within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1960 is not a Court but only a statutory functionary competent to exercise the power given to him under the statute and therefore the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are not applicable to proceedings pending before him, though he is clothed with all procedural powers of a civil Court in executing the order passed by him. The learned Judge was dealing with the question whether Article 120 of the Limitation Act would be attracted to proceedings before the Rent Controller. But as regards the power of execution the learned Judge has observed as follows: “It is well-settled that legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose and that the said fictions created by the statute cannot be extended beyond the purposes for which they were created. In interpreting the legal fiction of a statute, the Court is not expected to travel beyond the provisions of the statute by which the fiction is created and the Court also cannot extend such a fiction by importing another fiction. The fiction enacted by the legislature must be restricted by the plain terms of the statute: Vide Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar1, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amarchand2 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II v. Shakuntala and two others3. The fiction enacted by the legislature must be restricted by the plain terms of the statute: Vide Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar1, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amarchand2 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II v. Shakuntala and two others3. Therefore, the Rent Controller ought to have seen that the fiction created by section 18 of the Act can be extended only for the limited purpose of exercising the powers vested in a civil Court, while executing the orders of eviction, such as those provided under Order 21 of the Code, but cannot be extended to matters such as those contained in Order 22 and the other provisions of the Code, relating to the execution of a decree.” The above passage will be sufficient for the present purpose to show that the said decision is not an authority on the question whether the Rent Controller has got the power to order redelivery when it is found that the very order on the basis of which delivery had been effected had been set aside. 13. I have therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Mr. Srinivasan, that the Rent Controller, after the amendment of the Act in 1973 has no powers to order restitution and effect redelivery of the property to the tenant notwithstanding the fact that the order of eviction has been set aside subsequently. To hold otherwise would be to set a premium on fraud and it would also be possible for a landlord to get ex parte orders of eviction behind the back of the tenant and obtain possession and the tenant would find himself in a helpless situation. 14. I, therefore, dismiss the writ petition, but in the circumstances without costs. 15. After I pronounced this judgment, Mr. K. Srinivasan, with his characteristic fairness brought to my notice a decision of Nainar Sundaram, J., in T.K. Sundaram v. V. Balraj4, which the learned counsel received today. The learned Judge has taken the same view and held that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to order re-delivery. This will also form pan of the judgment. R.S. -------- Petition dismissed.