JUDGMENT - Deshpande D.B. J.:- These two writ petitions arising out of two different criminal revision applications which in turn arise out of two different Municipal Appeals, are disposed of by a common judgment by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad and hence both these writ petitions are heard together and are disposed of by a comment judgment and they arise out of the following facts. 2. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 3324 of 1980 filed Municipal Appeal No.3 of 1976 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad under section 169 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, challenging the bill of demand bearing No. 3959 dated 24-5-1976 on the ground that the demand made was not valid, legal and proper and on other grounds mentioned in the appeal memo. Notice of this appeal was issued to the Municipal Council, Aurangabad, and inter alia the Municipal Council contended that the question of validity, legality and propriety of the demand could not be considered in an appeal under section 169 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, and according to the Municipal Council, the only contention that was tenable was regarding the quantum of taxation. 3. After hearing both the sides, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad, held that the validity or legality of imposing the taxes could not be challenged in a Municipal Appeal and he held further that the scope of the appeal was limited to the quantum of taxes only. On this ground he held that the taxes imposed were proper. Consequently he dismissed the Municipal Appeal with costs of Rs. 25. Feeling aggrieved by this decision these petitioners preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 62 of 1979 in the Sessions Court at Aurangabad. 4. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3325 of 1980 filed Municipal Appeal No. 23 of 1976 similarly challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the demand made in bill No. 7959 dated 5-7-1976 and in this Municipal Appeal also the Municipal Council raised similar contentions. By a judgment, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, held that the validity or legality of imposing taxes could not be challenged in a Municipal Appeal and he held that the scope of the appeal was limited to quantum of taxes only y. In this view he held that the tax imposed was proper and so he dismissed the Municipal Appeal with costs of respondent. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, the present petitioner preferred Criminal Revision No. 63 of 1979. 5. Both these criminal revision petitions were beard together by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. Relying upon a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Municipal Council Morshi v. Tulsiram..1 the learned Additional Sessions Judge, upheld the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, and he discussed the other authorities cite before him. He held that the other authorities cited before him were of a learned Single Judge of this Court and that the authority in Municipal Council Morshi was an authority of a Division Bench of this Court and so he preferred to follow the Division Bench ruling. Reliance was also placed before, him on a decision of the Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Co, Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation.1 So far as this ruling of the Supreme Court is concerned, the learned Additional Judge observed as follows: “Besides in any event the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act and not the provisions of the M. P. Act. As is observed in many cases, it is never safe to rely on decision under one statute for considering the language used in another statute.” Consequently he dismissed both the revision petitions filed in the Sessions Court and feeling aggrieved by this decision, the petitioners have filed these two writ petitions and that is why they are heard together and are disposed of by a common judgment. 6. Mr. Sancheti appearing on behalf of the petitioners urged that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in not following the decision of Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Company's case. In addition he relied upon two decisions of this Court and those decisions are of a learned Single Judge of this Court. The facts in these petitions are not in dispute. What is challenged in the Municipal Appeals is the legality, validity and propriety of the tax claimed by the Municipal Council against the petitioners and as in the Courts below the contention of the Municipal Council is that only the quantum of taxation has got to be considered in such Municipal Appeals. Therefore, I shall immediately turn to the authorities in this respect. 7. Therefore, I shall immediately turn to the authorities in this respect. 7. It cannot be disputed that earlier it was the consistent view of this Court for a long time that in Municipal Appeals the only question that could be considered was the quantum of taxation and nothing more. Mr. Sancheti has placed reliance upon some decisions. First of all he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (Bala Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation.)3 I have already pointed out that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed in respect of this ruling that it was a ruling under the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, and, therefore, according to him this ruling was not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Mr. Sancheti urged that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in this respect. It is true that that was a decision under the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, but the provisions in section 84(3) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act which arose in the Supreme Court case are in pare materia with the provisions of section 172 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. For the purpose of facilitating the comparison I will reproduce section 84(3) of the C, P. and Berar Municipalities Act. It runs as follows: ''84(3) No objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.” Then I shall reproduce section 172 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act: “172. No objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.” It would, therefore, be seen that the provisions are in pari materia with each other. Section 83(1) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, provided for appeal against assessment of taxes to the -Deputy Commissioner or to such 9ther officer as may be empowered by the Provincial Government in that behalf. Now there is similar provision in section 169 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. Section 83(1) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, provided for appeal against assessment of taxes to the -Deputy Commissioner or to such 9ther officer as may be empowered by the Provincial Government in that behalf. Now there is similar provision in section 169 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. This section provides for appeal against any claim for taxes or other dues included in a bill presented to any person under section 150 or any other provisions of the Act to the Judicial Magistrate or -Bench of such Magistrates by whom under the directions of the Sessions Judge such class of cases shall be decided. It would, therefore, be seen that before the Supreme Court was a provision which was in pari materia with the provision in the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and the Supreme Court has given a clear decision that any dispute regarding legality and validity of the taxation must be decided by the authority provided under the Municipalities Act. In para 8 the Supreme Court observed as follows: “84(3) No objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. It is plain from this sub-section that any valuation, assessment or levy and the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed can be questioned only in the manner prescribed by the Act and by the authority mentioned in the Act and in no other manner or by any other authority. Since the sub-section expressly prohibits a challenge to a valuation, assessment or levy “in any other manner than is provided in this Act” and since the Act has devised its own special machinery for inquiring into and adjudicating upon such challenges, the common remedy of a suit stands necessarily excluded and cannot be availed of by a person aggrieved by an order of assessment to octroi duty. Similarly, the sub-section excludes expressly the power of “any other authority than is provided in this Act” to entertain an objection to any valuation, assessment or levy or octroi. This part of the provision is in the nature of ouster of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, at least by necessary implication, to entertain an objection to any valuation, assessment or levy. This part of the provision is in the nature of ouster of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, at least by necessary implication, to entertain an objection to any valuation, assessment or levy. This is the evident intendment, meaning and implication of the provision.” Again in para 10 the Supreme Court observed as follows: “If a provision merely giving finality to an order could be construed as ousting the civil Court's jurisdiction, section 84(3) of the Act, which is far more expressive, can legitimately be construed to have the same effect. It excluded in terms a challenge to the various things therein mentioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in the Act.”(Emphasis supplied) It will, therefore, be seen that there is a clear-cut finding of the Supreme Court that the question of legality and validity of the taxes has got to be challenged only in accordance with the provisions mentioned in the Municipalities Act. The Supreme Court further considered the cases which were cited before it and the Supreme Court, observed that so far the question of constitutionality of the taxation is concerned then alone a civil suit would lie. This is apparent from para 20 of the said ruling. As against this reliance is sought to be placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in (Municipal Council, Morshi v. Tulsiram)4. It is apparent from this ruling that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Company's case was not cited before the Division Bench and hence in the absence of the benefit of the ruling of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench reiterated the earlier view of this Court that the only question that can be challenged in the Municipal Appeal is the quantum of taxation and no other. Now Mr. Sancheti placed reliance upon two other decisions, one is a decision of the learned Single Judge of his Court in (Barsi Municipal Council v. Shankar) 5. Vaidya J. divided the Second appeal in two parts. The first part related to the taxation from the year 1961-62 to X965-66. The learned Judge held that so far as the taxation for this period was concerned, the earlier view was correct. Vaidya J. divided the Second appeal in two parts. The first part related to the taxation from the year 1961-62 to X965-66. The learned Judge held that so far as the taxation for this period was concerned, the earlier view was correct. But according to the learned Judge, so far as the taxation of 1966-67 and 1967-68 was concerned, the earlier view was not correct and the learned Judge relied upon the fact that the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 came into force on 15th June 1966 and this included section 172 on which Mr. Sancheti bas placed reliance in these writ petitions. The observations of Vaidya J. are as follows: “As regards the levy for the years 1966-67 and 1967-68 is concerned, the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, which came into force only on June 15, 1966, covered the demand for those years. Under section 172 of the Act of 1965, no objection can be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy nor can the liability of any person to be assessed be questioned in any manner other than that is provided in this Act.” Hence Vaidya J. held that the objection can be taken only in the manner provided in the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. Reference was made before Vaidya J. to Bala Shoe Company's case (supra) and a certain portion of the Supreme Court ruling is reproduced by Vaidya J. in para IX of his judgment. In para 13 Vaidya J. observed as follows: “In Second Appeal No. 254 of 1972, decided by me on 17-3-1978 (Bom), I have, therefore, taken the view that, inasmuch as there are no limitation on the objections which may be raised before the Magistrate in Appeal, the Legislature had intended that the jurisdiction pf the civil Court must be excluded even where the legality of the levy of the tax was challenged.” Mr. Sancheti placed. Reliance upon another decision of Tulpule J. in (Taherali Mul/a v. Municipal Council, Akola)6. Sancheti placed. Reliance upon another decision of Tulpule J. in (Taherali Mul/a v. Municipal Council, Akola)6. Before Tulpule J. also reliance was placed on the Division Bench ruling in Municipal Council Morshi's case, Tulpule J. Observed as follows in para 12: “However, on a consideration of the authorities and in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Company's case (supra) which 'Was not available and was not before the Division Bench of this Court which flecided the Morshi Municipal Council's case and since in view of the Supreme Court decision, I am of the opinion that the Division Bench decision must be considered as no more good law, I do not think it necessary to refer this matter to a larger Bench. “ It will, therefore, be seen that Tulpule J. has clearly observed that the ruling in Morshi Municipal Council's case is no more a good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sata Shoe Company's case. I am in respectful agreement with it. Mr. Sancheti has further relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in (Munshi Ram v. Municipal Council, Chheharta)7. and he relied upon the head note (B) which support the contention raised by Mr. Sancheti. Mr. R. G. Deo placed reliance only upon the decision of the Division Bench in Morshi Municipal Council's case. But I have so far pointed out that the said view cannot be said to be a good law in this respect. In addition Mr. Deo relied upon another decision of another learned Single Judge of this Court in (Shivmanik v. Latur M'unicipal Council)8 Jahagjrdar J. held that in an appeal under section 169, Maharashtra Municipalities Act, a challenge to the legality or vires of the tax cannot be made nor can an assessee challenge the legal competence of the Municipal Council to levy the particular tax. It appears that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Com-pany's case was not cited before the learned Judge and hence I do not think that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, this is also a good law. 8. I have so far pointed out that the provisions of section 84 (3) of the. It appears that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bata Shoe Com-pany's case was not cited before the learned Judge and hence I do not think that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, this is also a good law. 8. I have so far pointed out that the provisions of section 84 (3) of the. C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, and section 172 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, are in pari materia with each other and the observations of the Supreme Court apply on all fours to the facts of the instant case, and therefore, I am satisfied that both the Courts below were wrong in holding that only the quantum of tax can be challenged in the Municipal Appeal. 9. The result is that the decisions of the learned Judicial Magistrate. First Class and those of the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad deserves to be set aside and they are accordingly set aside and both the Municipal Appeals are remanded to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Concerned, for disposal according to law, in the light of the other contentions raised in the Municipal Appeals. Rule made absolute. In view of the uncertainty of the law in this respect, there wi1l be no order as. to costs throughout. Rule made absolute -----