SPECIAL MAMLATDAR v. JAM GAGUBHA NARANJI — 1982 DIGILAW 246 (GUJ)

P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, C. J. ( 1 ) THE respondent herein filed Special Civil Application No. 2745 of 1932 praying for issue of a writ of mandamus or any other writ order or direction directing the 1st appellant herein to make the award in terms of consent writing dated 7-5-1978 taken from the respondent herein and marked as Annexure A in the Special Civ. Application. The respondent farther prayed in the Special Civil Application that if the Honble Court does not deem a St to issue such a writ this Honble Court may be pleased to direct the appellant herein to immediately determine the amount of compensation payable to the respondent and make the necessary award under Section 15 of the Kutch Inams Act Annexure A in accordance with which the respondent wanted the award is in the nature of an affidavit with a solemn affirmation by the power-of-attorney holder of the respondent herein. In this solemn affirmation it is stated that in the compensation the paid to the tune of Rs. 13 76 46. 77 the respondent will not prefer any appeal against the said aware for compensation. It is further stated in the solemn affirmation that 3% interest as held by the Supreme Court may also be awarded. It is the case of the respondent that the respondent and hi brother were owners of approximately 44. 1 % share in Pipar village. Under the provisions of the Bombay Inams (Kutch Area) abolition Act 1958 all Inams in Kutch were abolished with effect from 30-12-1958. Under Section 13 of the said Act at the Inamdars the respondent were entitled to compensation and under Section 15 of the said Act the Inamdars should apply to the Collector in writing for determination of such compensation. The respondent filed necessary application in forms D and E for determination of the amount of compensation in respect of his 44 1/2% share in the Village on 2-2-1967. The Special Mamlatdar made the necessary formal enquiry for the determination of the amount of compensation and all necessary evidence was led before him and the case was pending for final determination in 1977. The Special Mamlatdar made the necessary formal enquiry for the determination of the amount of compensation and all necessary evidence was led before him and the case was pending for final determination in 1977. Since many number of cases were pending before the Mamlatdar for determination of compensation it is the case of the respondent that the Government of Gujarat appointed a Committee consisting of the Deputy Secretaries Revenue and Finance Deparments the Collector of Kutch and the Deputy Conservator of Forest Kutch giving necessary powers to the Committee to report as regard compensation payable under the Act As far as the respondent herein is concerned it is stated by the respondent that the Committee worked out the amount of the compensation payable to the respondent for his share of the village at Rs. 13 76 46. 77 and asked the respondent whether he is agreeable to accept the said amount as compensation in place of the amount demanded by him in his application in Forms D and E The respondent agreed to the said compensation and executed the letter dated 7-5-1978 in favour of the Special Mamlatdar Nakhatrana consenting to accept the award in respect of the said amount and undertaking that the respondent would not prefer any appeal against the award to be so passed by the Special Mamlatdar. In spite of that according to the respondent no award was passed. It is the 898 further case of the respondent that even though awards have been passed in respect of some other claimants who have agreed to the compensation fixed by the Committee the respondent was not given the award in spite of the fact that he has consented to accept the amount in respect of the amount suggested by the Committee and excuted the letter dated 7-5-1978. Since the appellants herein did not pass the award as agreed by the Committee the petitioner has come forward with Special Civil Application No. 2745 of 1982 with the above said prayers. ( 2 ) THE appellants in their reply affidavit filed by the Under Secretary to the Government of Gujarat Revenue Department inter alia contended that the recommendation of the Committee for paying compensation was found excessive and unreasonable and as such the Government decided to review the matter instead of paying the compensation as solemnly affirmed by the respondent herein in his letter dated 7-5-1978. ( 3 ) THE learned Single Judge of our High Court who heard the Special Civil Application thought it fit to set aside the award passed by the Special Mamlatdar Nakhatrana on 12-11-1982 which is subsequent to the filing of the Special Civil Application and directed the Special Mamlatdar Nakhatrana to pass an award in terms of the consent writing obtained from the respondent herein on 7-5-1958. The learned Judge also directed the Special Mamlatdar Nakhatrana to pass the award within three months from the date of the said judgment. Even though the learned Judge observed in his judgment that one course would be to remand the matter to the Special Mamlatdar Nakhatrana with a direction to examine the whole claim of the respondent and pass an appropriate award came to the conclusion that in the interests of justice and to put an end to the litigation an award should be passed in accordance with the agreement obtained from the respondent herein. The learned Judge also warded 15% solatium to the respondent herein. The basis of award by the learned Judge is that there is an agreement between the respondent and the appellant as per Annexure A to the Special Civil Application and that in the interests of justice and to put an end to the litigation which is pending for a long time the award has to be passed in terms of Annexure A. It is as against this judgement the Special Mamlatdar and the State of Gujarat who were respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the Special Civil Application have come forward with the Letters Patent Appeal. ( 4 ) MR. Vin the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no concluded contract to direct the appellants to pass an award in terms of Annexure A to the Special Civil Application that the High Power Committee appointed has absolutely no authority to bind the appellants except giving the report regarding the nature of compensation and that since the amount suggested was excessive and unreasonable the appellants did not pay the said amount. Mr. Mr. Mankad the learned counsel appearing for the respondent who is the original petitioner in the Special Civil Application No. 2745182 strenuously contended that the respondent gave Annexure A only on the understanding that the amount of compensation mentioned in that Annexure A will be awarded and as such the appellants are bound to respect Annexure A on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The learned counsel further submitted that the High Power Committee acted on behalf of the Government and suggested the compensation with the result the respondent has given Annexure A 899 agreeing not to prefer an appeal against the award of compensation mentioned therein and as such there is a concluded contract between the respondent and the appellants herein in respect of paying the sum of Rs. 13 76 46. 77 as compensation. While the matter was pending the 1st Appellant on 12-11-1982 gave award of Rs. 57 888. 02 We have carefully gone through the records in this case including the judgment of the learned single Judge of our High Court. By virtue of the direction given by the learned Single judge of our High Court the 1st appellant has given an award in terms of Annexure A to the Special Civil Application. It is clear from the facts of the case that the High Power Committee as stated in paragraph supra was appointed for the purpose of getting particulars in order to award the compensation. The solemn affirmation which is Annexure A on which the respondent rests his case cannot be taken as a concluded agreement between the appellants and the respondent since it is only an offer as can be clearly seen from the said solemn affirmation itself. In unequivocal terms the respondent has stated in that solemn affirmation that he agrees not to prefer any appeal if the compensation as stated in the said solemn affirmation is awarded to the respondent herein. This letter in our opinion cannot be taken as a concluded contract and at best it is only an offer for the purpose of amicably settling the acquisition proceedings. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the High Power Committee constituted by the Government of Gujarat had in any way committed itself to give the award as stated in Annexure A to the petition. It cannot be assumed that this Committee had necessary power to finalise the compensation amount. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the High Power Committee constituted by the Government of Gujarat had in any way committed itself to give the award as stated in Annexure A to the petition. It cannot be assumed that this Committee had necessary power to finalise the compensation amount. The mere allegation in the petition as if this Committee was given necessary powers of government to finalise the pending matters of compensation under the Act cannot clothe the Committee with such an authority to finalise the compensation. Even assuming that such power was vested with this Committee Annexure A to the main Special Civil Application cannot be taken as a piece of concluded contract in and by which the appellants agreed to pay the compensation amount as mentioned in Annexure A. ( 5 ) MR. Mankad next argued that on the ground of promissory estoppel the appellants are precluded from denying the compensation payable as per Annexure A. In support of his contention the learned counsel cited the decision in the Union of India and other v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies reported in AIR 1968 SC 718 and the decision in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. the State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 . The decision cited by Mr. Mankad in the Union of India and others v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies reported in AIR 1968 SC 718 deals with a case of import and export policy declared by the Government. According to the facts of that case the Textile Commissioner published on October 10 1982 a scheme called Export Promotion Scheme providing incentives to exporters of wool en goods. By the scheme as extended to exports to Afghanistan the exporters were invited to get themselves registered with the Textile Commissioner for exporting woollen goods and it was represented that the exporters will be entitled to import raw materials of the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the F. O. B. value of the exports. Under clause 10 of the Scheme the Textile Commissioner had authority if it was found that a fraudulent attempt was made to secure an import certificate in excess of the true value of the goods exported to reduce the import certificate. Under clause 10 of the Scheme the Textile Commissioner had authority if it was found that a fraudulent attempt was made to secure an import certificate in excess of the true value of the goods exported to reduce the import certificate. In this 900 case the Government contended that such a policy has no enforceable character since it is only an executive action. The Supreme Court repelling this contention observed that it could not be said that executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. Elaborating on this aspect of the case the Supreme Court held that where a person has acted upon representations made in an Export Promotion Scheme that impose Scheme upto the value of the goods exported will be issued and had exported goods his claim for import licence Mr. the maximum value permissible by the Scheme could not be arbtrarily rejected. It further held that the authority vested in the Textile Commissioner by the rules even though executive in character was from its nature an authority ideal with the matter in a manner consonant with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. If the Textile Commissioner had made an order which was not consonant with the basic concepts of justice and Sir play proceeding was open. to scrutiny and rectification by the courts. Dealing further the Supreme Court held that it is open to the party who had acted on the representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. We are afraid that this Act of the case may not haw any relevance to the present case. In this case there is absolutely no representation by the Government that the respondent will be paid as per the evaluation made by the High Power Committee. The High Power Commitee was appointed by the Government for the purpose of finding out the probable compensation payable to the par ties concerned in respect of Inam abolition. Even the solemn affirmation which is Annexure A to the main Special Civil Application does not spell out that the 1st respondent acted to his detriment on the promise given by the appellant. Even the solemn affirmation which is Annexure A to the main Special Civil Application does not spell out that the 1st respondent acted to his detriment on the promise given by the appellant. In short the solemn affirmation on which the learned counsel rests his case can only be an appeal to the Government to grant the compensation as mentioned therein with an offer that if such compensation is granted the respondent in not take that decision in appeal Hence we are of the opinion that there is no solemn promise by the appellants regarding the payment of compensation as mentioned in Annexure A and it cannot also be said that the respondent relying on such a solemn promise acted to his detriment. ( 6 ) THE next decision referred by Mr. Mankad is the decision in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 . In this case the Supreme Court has held that the true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relation or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and his in fact so acted upon the other party the promise would be binding on the party making hand he would not be entitled go back upon it if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The Supreme Court further observed in this case that where the Government 901 makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and in fact the promisee acting in reliance on it alters his position the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. Nevertheless the Supreme Court in that decision observed that if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because on the facts equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. Thus it is clear from the above said decision that there must be an unequivocal promise either by word or by conduct by the Government on which the respondent has acted upon. The solemn affirmation referred in this case does not spell out such a promise made by the Government. Further the High Power Committee constituted to find out the compensation to be paid to various Inamdars whose lands were acquired is only a fact finding committee and cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as an effective organ of the Government to bind the Government for any report it has made. That is why in this case we find that the Government after considering the inequitable nature of the compensation suggested by the High Power Committee did not accept the report of the High Power Committee. Further in the solemn affirmation it is found that the respondent has agreed to accept half of the amount suggested by the High Power Committee which itself runs to several lakhs of rupees. Apart from the fact that the High Power Committee has not made any promise nor could it bind the Government as such for any report it gives the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because on the facts equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. Thus both on fact and equity we do not think that the respondent can base his case on the alleged promissory estoppel pleaded by him. Further there is absolutely no pleading as such in this case to get the benefit of the promissory estoppel nor was the same argued before the learned Single Judge. Thus both on fact and equity we do not think that the respondent can base his case on the alleged promissory estoppel pleaded by him. Further there is absolutely no pleading as such in this case to get the benefit of the promissory estoppel nor was the same argued before the learned Single Judge. The High Power Committee which was only a fact finding committee suggested compensation and the same need not be accepted by the Government. It is always open to the the respondent to establish his case for getting the compensation and his remedy was neither short circulated nor barred by any promise that was held out to him. Hence we do not think that the decisions cited above will be of any use to the respondent herein on the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 7 ) IN view of our discussion we are of the view that there is neither concluded contract nor any question of promissory estoppel arising in this case which will entitle the respondent to get the compensation amount as per Annexure A to the main Special Civil Application. Nevertheless the award of Rs. 57 888. 02 by the 1st appellant towards compensation is ridiculously low and suggests that the authority concerned without proper application of its mind has fixed the compensation. Mr. Vin the learned Government Pleader is able to see that the compensation awarded at Rs. 57 888. 02 has no relation to the 902 actual value of the trees which would have existed at the time of acquisition. Mr. Vin the learned Government Pleader is of the view that from the records and available data it will be easy to determine the compensation as regards the trees which is the only dispute that has to be decided between the parties as on date. ( 8 ) CONSIDERING the above said facts of the case we are of the view that the matter has to be sent back to the 1st appellant with a direction to fix the compensation afresh after taking into consideration the relevant materials and evidence that will be placed before him by the respective parties. Further the respondent in his Special Civil Application has correctly made an alternative prayer for directing the 1st appellant to immediately determine the amount of compensation payable to the respondent under Section 15 of the Kutch Inams Act. Further the respondent in his Special Civil Application has correctly made an alternative prayer for directing the 1st appellant to immediately determine the amount of compensation payable to the respondent under Section 15 of the Kutch Inams Act. ( 9 ) FOR all these reasons this present Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and with it the awards passed by the first appellant during the pendency of the Special Civil Application and subsequently in response to the direction issued by the learned Single Judge of this court are set aside. Instead the compensation proceedings are restored to the file of the first appellant with a direction to determine the amount of compensation payable to the respondent after taking into consideration the materials that may be existing on record and that might be placed before him by the respective parties. The first appellant is directed to complete these proceedings as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four months from the date of receipt of this order at its end. The special civil application filed by the respondent before this court will according-ly stand allowed only in respect of the alternative prayer by the respondent herein with the above directions given by us. It is clarified that as the compensation proceedings are being remanded for a fresh decision on merits by the first appellant the repondent will be entitled to claim full compensation of Rs. 28 25 0 as originally claimed by him and the first appellant will have to decide that claim in the light of the relevant evidence before him. There will be no order as to cost throughout. Order accordingly .