JUDGMENT 1. - This is a criminal revision by the State against an order of discharge passed in favour of the accused respondent by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar, dated 14-6-1977 in a case under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 2. A challan was filed under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 against the accused respondent on the ground that on13-1-77 39 tins of kerosene were found in the possession of the accused. According to the prosecution, the accused respondent could not have kept more than 200 litres of kerosene without licence and he was liable to be punished for violation of the Rajasthan Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Licensing Order). The learned C. J. M. discharged the accused on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused respondent was a dealer and even if all the documents filed along with the challan may be taken to be true, there was no possibility of covicting the accused under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. 3. It was contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that no opportunity to lead evidence was given to the prosecution to prove that the accused respondent was a dealer within the meaning of the Licencing Order. Under Section 20 of the aforesaid Licencing Order, a Notification was issued to the following effect by Notification in Official Gazette; ORDER No. F. 37 (16) Ind. /70. S. O. 379(31), dated March 18, 1972.- (36) In supersession of the Department of order of even number dated 18-1-72 the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 20 of the Rajasthan Kerosene Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1971 hereby exempts retailers who not have stock of more than 200 litres of Kerosene Oil on any day from the operation of the provisions of the said order." Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that under section 14 of the Essential Commodities Act, burden of proof lay on the person who was prosecuted for contravening any order under section 3 to show that he had such authority, permit, licence or other document for being in possession of 39 tins of Kerosene Oil, which were admittedly containing 580 litres of Kerosene Oil. 4. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. 4. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the accused respondent that there was no allegation at all in the challan nor in any of the statement recorded under section 161 Cr P.C. by the Police that the accused respondent was a dealer within the meaning of sub-section (2) (b) of the Licensing Order. It was contended that merely because Kerosene Oil more than 200 Litres was found in the possession of the accused respondent, cannot be considered as a dealer and in the absence of any material on record to show that he was a dealer, there was no necessity for obtaining any license by him. It was further contended that the Notification dated March 18, 1972 merely laid down to exempt retailers from the operation of the provisions of Licensing Order came they did not have stock of more than 200 litres of Kerosene Oil on any day. It was contended that there is no question of applying the aforesaid Notification to accused as he was not a dealer at all within the meaning of Licensing Order. Reliance was placed on Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1533 and Paritosh Khan and others v. State, AIR 1958 Cal. 709 . 5. I have carefully given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the accused respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. A dealer under clause (b) of Section 2 of Licensing order reads as under: (b) 'Dealer' means a person, a firm, an association of persons or a Co-operative Society, engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of Kerosene Oil." There can be no manner of doubt that in order to show a person as a dealer, it will have to be proved that he was engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of Kerosene Oil. It is only when a person is shown to be a dealer then only a question of obtaining license by him will arise and if a dealer is found to have more than 200 Litres of Kerosene Oil at one time without any license then he would be punishable under the Essential Commodities Act for violating the Licensing Order. It is only when a person is shown to be a dealer then only a question of obtaining license by him will arise and if a dealer is found to have more than 200 Litres of Kerosene Oil at one time without any license then he would be punishable under the Essential Commodities Act for violating the Licensing Order. The question here for consideration is whether it could be said that the charge against the accused being a dealer is totally groundless and whether the learned C.J.M. was right in discharging the accused even before any evidence was led by the prosecution before him. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the accused respondent that here is no allegation at all in this regard even in the challan filed by the prosecution. There is a mention in this regard to the following effect in the Challan:- " vftewnhu eqyfte bl izdkj 589 yhVj dsjksflu rsy dks vius dCts esa LVksd fd;s gqos j[ks gqos feyk tcfd mlds ikl rsy j[kus dk ykbZlsUl ugha FkkA og bl rsy dks eagxs Hkkokda ij csprk vkSj ykHk dekrkA " Thus there was an allegation made against the accused respondent in the challan that the accused would have sold the Oil on higher rates and would have earned profit. It is no doubt correct that in the statement recorded so far by the police u/s 161 Cr. PC, it has not been stated by any one of the persons that the accused was a dealer, but it would be for the prosecution to prove the above fact by leading evidence in this regard after commencement of that trial. There is no requirement of law that the prosecution cannot examine evidence other than those whose statement are recorded u/s 161 Cr. PC. The ground for holding that accused was a dealer is there in the challan and in my opinion, it was not proper for the O.J.M. to have taken the view that there was no possibility of conviction of the respondent as the prosecution was unable to prove that the accused was a dealer. It was pre-mature for the learned C J.M. to take such a view. It was pre-mature for the learned C J.M. to take such a view. Admittedly, the accused has been found to be in possession of 39 tins of Kerosene Oil, which contained 580 Litres of Oil and the question whether he was a dealer or not could only be determined after the evidence is led in this regard. Paritosh Khan and others v. State (supra) only laid down that the word groundless used under section 251-A Cr. PC would certainly mean the absence of reasonable ground to expect a conviction. It was further observed that the object of framing a charge was not to prosecute the accused persons by any means but to make them face a trial, which may reasonably lead a conviction. In my view, the above case does not render any assistance in view of the fact that the case in hand before me, it cannot be said that at this stage there is no reasonable ground to expect a conviction. In Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering a case of violation of clause (3)(2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958. The accused was charged with having committed an offence punishable u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as he was found to have stored 178 Mds. of Pady in his godown without any license in violation of clause 3 of the said order. The evidence was led in that case and on the facts, it was found that if, it was shown by a person with whom a storage of more than 100 Maunds of one or the other on the foodgrain is found that the said storage was referable to his personal needs or to some other legitimate cause unconnected with and distinct from the purpose of sale, the presumption would be rebutted, in case, of course, the explanation given and proved by the person is accepted by the court as reasonable and sufficient. In the above case, the evidence had already been led by the prosecution and the conviction was made on the basis of presumption under clause 3(1) of the Manipur Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1958. The accused was convicted by the trial court as well as by the learned Sessions Judge, but his conviction was set aside by the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur. In the above case, the evidence had already been led by the prosecution and the conviction was made on the basis of presumption under clause 3(1) of the Manipur Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1958. The accused was convicted by the trial court as well as by the learned Sessions Judge, but his conviction was set aside by the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur. The matter was, thereafter, taken by the Manipur Administration before the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the scope of presumption to be drawn against the accused under clause 3(1) of the Manipur Foodgrain Licensing Order. The question before me is not of raising any presumption against the accused. The only question is whether it was a fit case to order discharge of the accused even without granting any opportunity to the prosecution to lead evidence. 7. In my view the order of discharge passed by the learned C.J.M. in this case was not proper and as such the same is set aside. The trial Court shall frame charge against the accused and shall try the case in accordance with law.Revision accepted. *******