M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions are disposed of by the following common order at the stage of preliminary hearing after notice to respondents and after hearing the Counsel for parties. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are all students of the 3rd respondent H. Homba gowda Memorial Law College, Mandya, (hereinafter referred to as the College ). The petitioners applied to the 3rd respondent-College for admission to LLB. Degree Course of the 1st respondent-University of Mysore in the academic year 1980-81. It is alleged by the petitioners that they were required to pay donation. It is not clear from the pleadings in what sum they have paid the donation. It is alleged that they paid the tuition fees and have completed their term days in the I year of the Course and further that they took the examination of the i year LL. B Degree Course, conducted by the 1st respondent-University in April-May, 1981. They were issued marks cards through the 3rd respondent-College in respect of their performance at the I year LL. B. Degree examination. After the declaration of the results and issue of marks cards, it is alleged that the Chancellor of the 1st respondent-University telegraphically informed the 3rd respondent-College that the results declared in respect of the petitioners and some others had been withdrawn and the marks cards issued to the petitioners and a few others, should be returned to the University. The petitioners came to know of this when they came back to the College after summer vacation to join the II Year Course in as much as the Regulations of the University permit the students to continue their studies in the II and III Years even though they may have failed in the I and the II years subject, however, to their passing all the subjects in all the years before they are awarded the degree. The 3rd respondent informed that their admissions had not been approved as they did not posssess the minimum qualifying marks in their degree examination in as much, as none of the petitioners had obtained 40 per cent marks on an average in the aggregate in the subjects offered by them in the degree examination which they had passed. The 3rd respondent informed that their admissions had not been approved as they did not posssess the minimum qualifying marks in their degree examination in as much, as none of the petitioners had obtained 40 per cent marks on an average in the aggregate in the subjects offered by them in the degree examination which they had passed. The Regulations which provided for 35 per cent in earlier years came to be modified from the academic year 1980-81 by an amendment to the Regulations of the University concerning the Law Degree Course. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the non-approval of their admission and by the withdrawal of the results and the marks cards issued, the petitioners have approached this Court under Art. 226 of the constitution praying for issue of a writ of mandamus or similar direction or order directing the respondents to publish the results of the petitioners for the J Year LL. B. Degree Examination held in April-May, 1981, and, also a direction to allow them to complete their course in the 3rd respondent college so that they could complete their course leading to LL. B degree, They also prayed for interim relief by way of permission to attend the II Year Course pending disposal of the writ petitions. At this stage it will be relevant to state that interim relief prayed for was not granted as the mam matter itself was to be disposed of expeditiously by this Court. But, however, due to number of reasons, the matter could not be disposed of as expeditiously as it was originally expected and the petitioners in the circumstances have not been able to put in any attendance in the II Year of the course. ( 4 ) THE petitioners have contended, while admitting that they do not qualify in terms of the revised Regulations of February, 1980, to join the course as they have secured less than 40 per cent in the aggregate on the average in all the subjects which were offered for the degree course which they have passed; that the 1st respondent-University is estopped from cancelling the results of their performance in the I Year ll. B. Degree Examination held in april-May, 1961, after having permitted them to take that examination and as such there was no power in the university to withdraw the marks cards muchless the results, as no specific power is conferred on the University by any Statute or Regulations or rules framed' by it or by the provisions of the Karnataka State Universities act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which determines the power of the various authorities under the act. It is also contended that the earlier Regulation prescribing the minimum of 35 per cent of marks held the field in as much as the Regulation of february, 1980 had not been gazetted in the Karnataka Gazette as required by Sec. 39 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE 1st respondent has been permitted to rely on the statement of objections filed in W. P. No. 17772/1981 as the facts are not in dispute, and the questions raised are pure questions of law. ( 6 ) IT will be convenient to take the second of the contentions first and dispose of the same as the petitioners are likely to succeed if that contention prevails. ( 7 ) SHRI Dayananda Karanth, learned Counsel appearing for four of. the petitioners, has placed strong reliance on the decision rendered by me in sarvagna Education Society vs. Unisity of Bangalore (1 ). In that case i had occasion to examine the scope and ambit of Sec. 39 of the Act as well as sec. 36 of the Bangalore University act, 1964, which has since been repealed by the Act. In the said case, the court was essentially concerned with the admission of students to the Bachelor of Education Degree Course of the bangalore University, in excess of the intake fixed by the Government, by some of the Colleges who were petitioners as well as their students. On the facts of those cases, it transpired that the Regulations on which the bangalore University relied upon which were Regulations framed under the Act, were not, in fact, acted upon and those Regulations not acted upon had not received the assent of the chancellor in accordance with Sec. 39 of the Act on the relevant date. On the facts of those cases, it transpired that the Regulations on which the bangalore University relied upon which were Regulations framed under the Act, were not, in fact, acted upon and those Regulations not acted upon had not received the assent of the chancellor in accordance with Sec. 39 of the Act on the relevant date. In fact, till the disposal of the writ petitions it had not received the assent and therefore the Regulations that were in operation in the Bangalore University framed under the Bangalore University act, 1964, were held to be the Regulations governing the Bachelor of Education degree Course in the relevant academic year having regard to Sec. 72 of the Act. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the express language of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 36 of the Bangalore University Act which is to the effectt that every Regulation shall come into force on the date of its publication in the official Gazettee or on, such other date as the Syndicate may direct, it was held that publication in the Gazette was mandatory as that alone would give, effect to the Regulations made, more so in the absence of any date specified by the Syndicate. But, in fact, in so far as those Regulations were concerned, the Syndicate had fixed the date, nonetheless the Reguations had not been published in the official Gazettee, and it was in that circumstance that stricter view of the matter was taken that publication was for the information of the public as well as the Colleges offering that course a,nd hence the, publication, in the Official Gazette was held to be mandatory. ( 9 ) UNDER Sec. 39 of the Act, the academic Council is empowered to make the Regulations subject to the approval of the Chancellor sought and obtained through the State Government and subject to the Regulations being consistent with the Act or statutes or the Ordinances made under the Act. By sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 39 of the Act, the Regulations are made operative with effect from the date they are approved by the Chancellor or on such other date as the Chancellor may direct and Regulations are also required to be published in the Official Gazettte. The difference between the corresponding provision in Sec. 36 of the Bangalore University Act and sec. The difference between the corresponding provision in Sec. 36 of the Bangalore University Act and sec. 39 of the Act lies in the method by which the Regulations are brought into force. While in the earlier Act of 1964 the Regulations came into effect on the date of its publication in the official Gazette or on such other date the Syndicate may determine, the regulations under the Act come, into force the moment the, assent is given by the Chancellor or if the Chancellor otherwise decides on a different date. The requirement of publication in the official Gazette is by a separate sentence in that sub-section and not connected with the coming into force of the Regulations and this difference should not go unnoticed, as the learned counsel for the peititioners has strenuously urged that there is no difference between Sec. 36 of the old Act and Sec. 39 of the new Act in so far as it relates to the publication in the Official Gazette. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-University of Mysore, has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd , rampur vs. The Municipal Board, rampur (2 ). In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question of holding a provision mandatory or directory whan the word 'shall' had been employed by the Legislature. The supreme Court per majority, held that the purpose of the provision was a determining jfactor in sudh, cases and the true nature and intention of the Legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision was read one way or the other, would among other things be relevant factors in determining a provision mandatory or directory. What fell for consideration in that case, was Sec. 131 (3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. It was held that the said section had two parts. The first part required publication of the proposals of the Board inviting objections of the public within a fortnight of the publication of the notice. That provision of publication of a notice proposing the taxes was held to be mandatory,, as it would be inconvenient to the public to be taxed without notice of the proposal of the tax. The first part required publication of the proposals of the Board inviting objections of the public within a fortnight of the publication of the notice. That provision of publication of a notice proposing the taxes was held to be mandatory,, as it would be inconvenient to the public to be taxed without notice of the proposal of the tax. Contending the opposite, Shri shivaramaiah, pointed out that non publication of the Regulations of 1980 february in the Official Gazette did not in any way inconvenience the public as the Colleges concerned had been intimated directly regarding the minimum qualification required to enter the ll. B. Degree Coursq of the 1st respondent university by the University itself. This is not disputed by the 3rd respondent-College, which has remained exparte in these petitions. ( 11 ) SIMILARLY, reliance has been placed by Mr. Shivaramaiah on the decision of the Supreme Court in tht case of Jan Mohd. vs. State of Gujarat (3 ). The Supreme Court in that case held that rules framed for giving effect to the provisions of the Act by power conferred by the Act not being placed before the Legislature as required by the law would not in itself render invalid the Rules coming into force on an earlier date,. I do not think that that ruling of the Supreme Court should be taken down as laying down the general principle of law because the circumstances in that case that there was no Session of the. Legislature between 1941 and 1946 on account of the ii World War and the suspension of the legislature in that period weighed with the Court. But it is a good authority for the proposition that Rules can come into force on an earlier date than what the law may provide. ( 12 ) IN a later decision of the Supreme court in the case of Govind Lal vs. the APMC (4,), the Supreme Court was considering the Gujarat Agricultural produce Markets Act, in which requirement of publication in Gujarati news-paper fell for consideration directly and the requirement of Sec. 6 (1) of the said Act which fell for consideiration of the Superme Court was that a notification under that section should also be published in the Gujarati newspaper and therefore it was contended that failure to publish in the Gujarati news-paper would be fatal to the, notification. While upholding tha,t contention te Supreme Court did so solely on the question of public interest involved, the declaration of a market area or deletion of a market area under that act, was of serious concern to the public in that area and therefore publication in the language news-paper of the area namely, Gujarati was considered mandatory in as much as otherwise it would not serve the purpose of the act. That decision would no doubt in the normal course assist the petitioners' contention that the Regulations requiring publication in the Official gazette should be held to be mandatory. But I am not inclined to accept that view because it is not to be presumed that all graduates subscribed to the Official Gazette in order to know the Regulations which govern their admission to the College in which they have studied or any other College in which they intend to prosecute their higher studies. ( 13 ) THE Regulations came into force the moment the assent was given by the Chancellor or on such other date as the Governor may fix. The latter part of the power of the Chancellor is probably to give retrospective effect to the Regulations and not necessarily to postpone the coming into force of the Regulations. But the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette is a mere formality as the Regulations governing a particular course or courses in the University colleges and Colleges affiliated to the university, are bound to be circulated to its Colleges and affiliated Colleges as has been done in the instant case. I am of the view that the publication required under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 39 of the Act is merely directory in nature and cannot be held to be mandatory and non-publication in the official Gazette cannot be said to be fatal to the Regulations. ( 14 ) ON this contention, the 'three petitioners cannot succeed and establish that they are qualified to enter the ll. B. Degree Course of the 1st respondent-University. ( 14 ) ON this contention, the 'three petitioners cannot succeed and establish that they are qualified to enter the ll. B. Degree Course of the 1st respondent-University. ( 15 ) THE next contention and the vital question is whether the benefit of promissory estoppel should be extended to the petitioners in as much as they have joined the College and attended the classes, paid the examination fees which have been accepted by the University and who in turn has issued the admission tickets to the examination, permitted the students to take the examination, valued the;ir answer books and published the results and issued marks cards which later have been withdrawn without notice to the petitioners. Mr. Karanth has also stressed that there is no specific power in the Statutes or the Regulations or the rules made by the authorities under the Act by the University for such power being exercised. The last mentioned contention I do not think is well founded. The Syndicate and the Academic Council, which are two of the many authorities under the Act, are entrusted with maintaining the standards in the University education and also for the conduct of examinations in order to determine the standards of the students who take up the course in the University and study in the Colleges of the University or the colleges affiliated to the University. That power to 'hold the examinations includes among other things power to cancel the examinations wherever compelling reasons make it necessary to do so. Merely because an examimination is held it cannot be said that the University is without power to retrace its steps and hold any examination or correct any errors that have crept in the conduct of the examination. In this case it is enongh to say this and no more because the real thrust of the argument is founded on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of sri. Krishna vs. the Kurukshetra university, Kurukshetra (5 ). In that case a law student was admitted to the examination conducted by that University and later his results were withheld because he had been so admitted to the examination inspite of his shortage in the required number of term days which he had to put in to be eligible to take the examination. In that case a law student was admitted to the examination conducted by that University and later his results were withheld because he had been so admitted to the examination inspite of his shortage in the required number of term days which he had to put in to be eligible to take the examination. Prima facie, no doubt, the decision of the Supreme court in that case supports the contention advanced by the petitioners. But on a closer examination, it is distinguishable. What fell for consideration in that case was the eligibility to take the examination in terms of the attendance that wasi required to be put in by the students and 'the absence of any specific provision in the Act of the university concerning the conduct of examinations to withhold the, results of a candidate who had offered to take the examination, notwithstanding that he had no attendance as discovered later. The decision entirely turned on the admission ticket having been issued after scrutiny and it was at that time that the University was required to exercise caution in issuing admission ticket. Not having done that the. University could not withhold the results and therefore directed the publication of the results of the candidate. I do not think the facts are disputetd in this case and the ratio decidfendi in Krishan's case is not attracted. ( 16 ) THE 3rd respondent-College which has remained exparte in these proceedings has conveniently evaded several queries made by the University regarding the list of candidates whose- admission was required to be approved by the University. The learned Counsel for the University has placed the records of the case before this Court from which it is easily discernible that the Colltege deliberately withheld sending up the list of its stu dents, till February 1981 and therefore applications received" sometime in December, 1980 could not be ipso facto rejected merely because the College had not sent up the list of students admitted in that academic year for approval of the University. Thousands of applications are received by the university and it is too much to expect of the University, strict scrutiny of every application. It was in such circumstance that admission tickets were issued to the 3rdi respondent-College to be given to the students, presumably to those students who had eligibility to take the course. Thousands of applications are received by the university and it is too much to expect of the University, strict scrutiny of every application. It was in such circumstance that admission tickets were issued to the 3rdi respondent-College to be given to the students, presumably to those students who had eligibility to take the course. It is not open to the petitioners to contend that the Hall Tickets were, issued to them by the University directly. . No doubt, the examination fee has beqn credited to the account of the University through the College but that does not establish that the University dealt with the students after proper verification as they dlealt with the students only through the College. The 3rd respondent-College should have exercised due precaution giving deference to the Regulations of the University in regard to the eligibility of a student to be admitted to that course and give Hall Tickets only to those students whose admissions had been approved; or whose admission could not be questioned on the ground of eligibility. The College not having exercised that caution but deliberately without furnishing the list to the university to approve the admissions of the candidates or disaprove as the case may be cannot now be, made a ground by the students or the Colleges for sympathetic consideration of the court. ( 17 ) THE legal education in the country is of some importance to society. It is governed by the University regulations and the; Indian advocates Act has entrusted the matter of legal education to the Bar Council of India. The minimum qualification prescribed is at a higher level than before. That is so, apparently with the object of improving the standards of education in law in the country as a whole and obviously at the instance of the Indian Bar Council. If this Court were to ignore these facts and permit the petitioners to succeed on what may ostensibly appear to be a case which attracts the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court would be compounding an offence committed by the 3rd respondent-College. If this Court were to ignore these facts and permit the petitioners to succeed on what may ostensibly appear to be a case which attracts the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court would be compounding an offence committed by the 3rd respondent-College. ( 18 ) IN the case, of Nagaraju vs. S. T. J. Polytechnic, (6), I have held that the College which has admitted the students who are, initially ineligible to take the course cannot pass on the buck to the concerned authority by its own conduct and confer rights on students who are ineligible to take the course muchless the examination. ( 19 ) FOR these reasons whatever the hardship that may be caused to the students, for maintaining higher standards in legal education which will ultimately percolate, to the standards at the Bar and the Bench, I should say that these petitioners are not entitled to invoke this doctrine. If they are aggrieved and have suffered any loss or damage, their grievance can only be against the College for its negligence or possibly greed. The petitioners are free to sue the concerned law College for such damage as they may be entitled to in law to compensate their losses. But, the University cannot be asked to relax the Regulation to permit the students to continue the course. I, therefore, do not see any justifiable reason, to issue rule in these cases. Therefore, these petitions are dismissed without rule being issued. ( 20 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .