JUDGMENT - Rege D.M. J.:-This Writ Petition challenges the order of the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, dated 1–2-1982 who dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the order of the single Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, dated 19–10–1981 ordering the execution of the decree for eviction to proceed on the respondent's application. 2. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Court had passed the said order without giving him any notice of the same and without complying with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for execution of the decree. 3. Respondent and his Advocate have remained absent. However, this order is being passed after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner on merit and after considering the material on record. 4. For appreciating the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, certain undisputed facts may be stated at the outset. The litigation relates to a room No. 1 in building No. 736 T. P. S. Plot No.111, Bandra, Bombay. Some time in 1967 respondent who is the owner of the said premises filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay, being suit No. 3114 of 1967 for eviction and possession of the said premises from the tenant one Prithipal singh (hereinafter called the defendant) amongst others on the grounds (1) that the structure was required for demolition and for reconstruction of a building thereon under section 13(1)(h)(h) of the Rent Act and (2) that the defendant had acquired suitable accommodation. On 24th February 1976, the Court passed a decree for eviction and possession in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Defendant's appeal being Appeal No. 301 of 1978 to the Appellate Bench of that Court against the said judgment and order was summarily rejected on 11–1-1977. Against the said order of the Appellate Bench defendant filed Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 486 of 1977 which came to be dismissed for default. An application to restore the same was also rejected. 5. The plaintiff thereafter made to the trial Court an application for execution of the decree against the defendant. At the time of the execution of the decree, the defendant was not found in possession but the son of the petitioner one Dr. An application to restore the same was also rejected. 5. The plaintiff thereafter made to the trial Court an application for execution of the decree against the defendant. At the time of the execution of the decree, the defendant was not found in possession but the son of the petitioner one Dr. Balbirsingh Suri obstructed stating that his father who had gone out and was not in the premises at that time was a licensee in the premises since 1956. Obstruction was noted and thereupon the respondent took out obstructionist notice being No. 2 of 1981 in the said Suit R. A. E. No. 3114 of 1967 against the petitioner's said son. At the hearing of the obstructionist notice petitioner's son Dr. Balbirsingh stated that he did not claim any independent right to the premises and had obstructed on behalf of his father. The Court therefore by its order dated 22–6-1981 made the said notice absolute. 6. In the meantime the petitioner filed a substantive suit on title being R. A. E. Suit No. 1221 of 1981 on 11–3-1981 and in that suit he made an application for interim injunction restraining the respondent from executing the decree. On 11–3-1981, itself, the Court granted an ad-interim injunction and on 10–8-1981 made the said injunction notice absolute. Against that order respondent appealed to the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. Before the Appeal was admitted he also filed in this Court a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 3286 of 1981 without disclosing the fact of having already filed an appeal against the said order in the Court of Small Causes. On 12–10–1981 the respondent obtained in the said petition an order of ad-interim stay of the order of interim injunction granted by the lower Court. Against the said order of ad-interim stay, the petitioner preferred a Letters Patent Appeal being L. P. A. No. 164 of 1981 which was admitted on 16–10–1981. However, on the application for interim stay of the order of ad-interim stay granted by this Court in Writ Petition no order came to be made. Against the said order of ad-interim stay, the petitioner preferred a Letters Patent Appeal being L. P. A. No. 164 of 1981 which was admitted on 16–10–1981. However, on the application for interim stay of the order of ad-interim stay granted by this Court in Writ Petition no order came to be made. The learned counsel for the petitioner stated across the bar that the Court was willing to grant an interim stay if the petitioner were to make an affidavit that the respondent had also filed an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court against the said order of the trial Court but since the petitioner had not filed such an affidavit no interim order for stay came to be made. 7. Thereafter again on 17–10–1981, respondent sought to execute the said decree when the petitioner obstructed and his obstruction was noted. On 10–10–1981, the respondent made an application to the triat Court, which was in the nature of an obstructionist notice making the defendant and the petitioner as obstructionist parties thereto alleging that the petitioner had caused obstruction to the execution of the decree and asking the Court to allow the decree to be executed during the vacation. The Court accordingly, without notice to the petitioner, on 19–10–1981 made an ex-parte order (Ex. C to the Petition) directing execution to issue during the vacation. The relevant part of Court's said order was as under:- “There is no reason to postpone the execution of the decree during vacation. Hence ordered an execution of decree for possession to issue and the warrant for possession be executed by removing the obstruction if any, caused by anybody on the premises, execution during vacation is allowed”. 8. Against the said order of the trial Court, the respondent preferred an appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court being Appeal No. 682 of 1981. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal by observing as under: “6. We have purposely referred to the differeut proceedings between the parties and it will be clear that the plaintiff was kept out of possession for 14 years in spite of the decree passed in R.A.E. Suit No. 3114 of 1967. There was also obst. Notice No. 2 of 1981 taken out by plaintiff against the son of obstructionist in which the trial Court made an order for possession by removing obstruction caused by Dr. There was also obst. Notice No. 2 of 1981 taken out by plaintiff against the son of obstructionist in which the trial Court made an order for possession by removing obstruction caused by Dr. Balbirsingh. It is unnecessary for us to find out whether the present obstructionist had any independent title to defend. It is sufficient to refer to the earlier proceedings which go to show that the present obstructionist can claim no better title than the original defendant against whom the decree is passed. We also do not agree with the arguments advanced by Mr. Sequeira that before any order for execution is passed, it is necessary for the Court to issue notice to the obstructionist in each and every case. 7. If this is treated as a rule every execution proceeding will have unlimited number of obstructionists. Each of them will successively go on obstructing the execution and the Court would have no power to dispose of the proceeding until there is a complete end of the obstruction”. 9. It is this order of the Appellate Bench which is challenged in this petition. 10. Civil Procedure Code prescribes the following procedure for the Court in dealing with obstructionist notices: Order 21, rule 97 provides: “97(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.” In this case, therefore on 17–10–1981 when the respondent had sought to execute the decree the petitioner had obstructed and his obstruction was noted. The respondent had therefore as required under the said rule made an application on 19–10–1981 making the petitioner obstructionist as a party thereto complaining about the petitioner's said obstruction. The further procedure for this Court to adjudicate upon the said application of the respondent was laid down in the provisions of Rules 105 and 101 of the said Order 21. 11. The further procedure for this Court to adjudicate upon the said application of the respondent was laid down in the provisions of Rules 105 and 101 of the said Order 21. 11. Rule 105 so far as relevant provides: “105(1) The Court before which an application under any of the foregoing rules of this order is pending, may fix a day for the hearing of the application. (2) * * * (3) Where the applicant appears and the opposite party to whom the notice has been issued by the Court does not appear, the Court may hear the application ex parte and pass such order as it thinks fit.” (Emphasis supplied) Therefore it is evident that after the application has been made by the decree-holder against an obstructionist under Rule 97 quoted above, it was incumbent on the Court before hearing the said application under Rule 105(1) to issue notice to the obstructionist or the opponent for if on such notice being served, the opponent were not to appear the Court was entitled to hear the application ex parte and pass such order as it thinks fit. 12. Rule 101 provides for the question which could be determined at the hearing of such an application and is as follows: “101. All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) ARISING BETWEEN the parties to a proceeding on .an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representative, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions”. (Emphasis supplied). 13. It was therefore evident that at the hearing of the application that would take place on the obstructionist appearing at the hearing of the application in pursuance of the notice served upon him, the Court was required to determine all questions including the questions relating to right, title and interest in the property. This newly added provision has done away with the provisions of old Civil Procedure Code requiring the unsuccessful party in obstructionist notice to file a separate suit on title. This newly added provision has done away with the provisions of old Civil Procedure Code requiring the unsuccessful party in obstructionist notice to file a separate suit on title. Under the present procedure all the questions including those of title were required to be determined in the obstructionist proceedings itself. 14. As the orders of the lower Courts show that in passing the said order they have completely overlooked the said provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which were mandatory. The Appellate Bench has in its order even sought to hold that the petitioner had no title without even hearing him as required under the said provisions of Civil Procedure Code. The fear expressed by the Appellate Bench as to execution proceedings in that way can never come to an end can hardly be the reason for completely ignoring and bypassing the said provisions of the Civil Procedure Code on any count. The said orders of the lower Courts therefore could not be sustained. 15. The result therefore is that the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) of the petition. The respondent to pay petitioner's cost of the petition. Rule made absolute.