V. ANJAN REDDY v. A. RAMACHANDRA REDDY — 1982 DIGILAW 252 (KAR)

K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) UNDER a deed of partnership dated 14-8-1970 (Annexure-A) the petitioners who are the father and son and seven others formed a partnership firm under the firm name called 'international investment and Finance Corporation' for carrying on the business detailed in clause-3 thereto for a period of five years and, thereafter at will on the terms and conditions stipulated thereto. ( 2 ) ON 7-5-1974 and 1-4-1974 the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 32484 and 32485 of 1982 respectively are stated to have retired from the partnership. O. S. NO. 809 of 1980 filed by one of the partners of the firm for its dissolution in the city civil Court, Bangalore is stated to be still pending. ( 3 ) BUT, in respect of various liabilities incurred by the firm or by one of the partners of the firm, several creditors have instituted suits impleading the firm, the petitioners and other partners of the firm as defendants and in some cases, have obtained decrees also. While contesting the suits or the execution proceedings pending against them, the petitioners have moved this Court on 6-9-1982 under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of sectior. s 25, 32 (2) and 32 (3) of the fndian PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1932, 1932 (Central act No. 9 of 1932) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and for consequential reliefs. ( 4 ) AT the hearing of these cases, sri G. Varadaraja Tirumale, learned counsel for the petitioners, confines his challenge to Section 32 (3) of the Act only and not to the other provisions of the Act. Hence, I will examine the challenge to Section 32 (3) of the Act only. ( 5 ) SRI Tirumale contends that Section 32 (3) of the Act is repugnant to section 4 of the Act and is, therefore, liable to be struck down. ( 6 ) THE Act must be read as a whole and effect must be given to every part of the statute. The principle incorporated in Section 32 (3) of the Act has no relevance to Section 4 of the Act, that defines the terms 'partner' 'firm' and 'firm name'. I do not find any repugnancy or inconsistency between Section 32 (3) and Section 4 of the Act. The principle incorporated in Section 32 (3) of the Act has no relevance to Section 4 of the Act, that defines the terms 'partner' 'firm' and 'firm name'. I do not find any repugnancy or inconsistency between Section 32 (3) and Section 4 of the Act. ( 7 ) EVEN assuming there is repugnancy between Section 32 (3) and Section 4 of the Act, in such an event also, the Court should read them harmoniously and give effect to every provision of the Act. A provision in one and the same Act, cannot be struck down as inconsistent with another provision of the same Act. For all these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Tirumale and I reject the same. ( 8 ) SRI Tirumale next contends that section 32 (3) of the Act that provides for fastening of liability only on retired partners and not benefits and profits, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) SECTION 32 (3) of the Act provides for liability of a partner before his retirement to third parties. Section 32 (3) of the Act incorporates a legal principle in respect of a letired partner as against an innocent third party. A retired partner cannot escape his liability for acts done by him before his retirement against third parties merely on the ground that he has retired from the partnership. ( 10 ) EVEN the principle stated by the supreme Court in Malabar Fisheries company v The Commissioner of Income tax, Kerala (A. I. R. 1980 Supreme Court 176 at para 8) dispels any such doubt. ( 11 ) ARTICLE 14 of the Constitution does not provide for a uniformity of treatment in all matters and to all persons. Article 14 does not provide that liabilities and benefits must always go together. The liability of a retired partner that really arises under a contract, is only given statutory recognition in Section 32 (3) of the Act. In this view, it is difficult to hold that Section 32 (3) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) ON any view, Section 32 (3) of the Act that incorporates a 'legal principle' is not violative of Article 14 of the constitution. In this view, it is difficult to hold that Section 32 (3) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) ON any view, Section 32 (3) of the Act that incorporates a 'legal principle' is not violative of Article 14 of the constitution. ( 13 ) EVERY one of the rulings relied on by Sri Tirumale commencing from the earliest in Ramakrishna Dalmia v justice Tendolkar (A. I. R. 1958 Supreme court 538) and other rulings that have explained the true scope and ambit of aiticle 14 of the Constitution, do not really assist Sri Tirumale to sustain his submission. For these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Tirumale and I reject the same. ( 14 ) SRI Tirumale lastly contends that Section 32 (3) of the Act is repugnant to Section 320 of the Indian Contract act and is, therefore, liable to be struck down. ( 15 ) BEFORE the Act was enacted as a separate Act, the provisions of the Act formed part of the Indian Contract Act itself. ( 16 ) FIRSTLY, Section 32 (3) of the act is not repugnant to Section 320 of the Indian Contract Act. Secondly a provision in one Act cannot be struck down on the ground that it is violative of another provision in another Act enacted by one and the same legislature under one and the same legislative field or power. An act or a provision in en act can be struck down only for want of legislative competence or as infringing a provision of the Constitution and on no other ground. On any legal principle, there is no merit in this contention of Sri Tirumale and I reject the same. ( 17 ) AS all the contentions urged for the petitioners fail, these writ petitions are liable to be rejected. I, therefore, reject these writ petitions at the preliminary hearing stage without notice to the respondents. --- *** --- .