M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition coming up for preliminary hearing after notice to respondents is disposed of by ths following order. The counsel for petitioner has been heard and the counsel for respondent 1, Agricultural produce Marketing Committee, Raichur, is also beard. The Joint Chief Marketing officer, Gulbarga Division, Gulbarga who is 2nd respondent, has remained throughout unrepresented, though served as far back as on 15-3-1982. In that position, he is placed ex parte. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a licensee as a commission agent under the 1st respondent -Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (hereinafter referred to as 'the Committee') He was issued show cause notice dt. 24-12 1981 calling upon him to show cause why his licence should not be suspended for non payment of a sum of Rs. 6,000 claimed by one Asadullakhan, a trader in the market area also licensed by the 1st respondent committee. The petitioner showed cause raising the dispute that the amount was not due to the said Asadullakhan. Thereafter, the committee in accordance with S. 84 of the Karnataka' agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') referred the dispute to the 'disputes Committee' constituted by the committee under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. However, by an order made on 15-1-1982 the Chairman of the committee suspended the licence of the petitioner as a commission agent for a period 15 days with effect from 21-1-1982 to 4-2-1982 under S. 73 (2) (a) of the Act. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the 2nd respondent -Joint Chief Marketing officer, Gulbarga dn. , Gulbarga, under S. 74 of the Act. That appeal came to be dismissed by an order made on 30th Jany. 1982, by the 2nd repondent on the sole ground that the appeal was not maintainable by his office as per S. 74 (1) (b) of the Act. Thereafter, the 1st respondent-committee passed another order on 4-2-1982 suspending the licence for a period of 15 days from 6-2-1982 to 20-2 1982 as the earlier order had not been given effect to. 1982, by the 2nd repondent on the sole ground that the appeal was not maintainable by his office as per S. 74 (1) (b) of the Act. Thereafter, the 1st respondent-committee passed another order on 4-2-1982 suspending the licence for a period of 15 days from 6-2-1982 to 20-2 1982 as the earlier order had not been given effect to. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, inter alia contending that the 2nd respondent was in error in passing an order rejecting the appeal summarily on the sole ground that it was not maintainble, contrary to the notification issued by the Government of Karnataka, bearing No. RDC 261 MM 79 purporting to have been isandued undei S. 140 of the Act. It is fut ther contended that the order made by the 1st respondent committee on 15 1 1982 as well as the order of the 2nd icspcndent dt. 30th Jany. , 1982, were clearly without jurisdiction and erroneous in law in as much as the committee had no jurisdiction to suspend even before the 'disputes committee had resolved the dispute in the matter of payment of dues demanded by Asadullakhan, the complainant before the committee. ( 3 ) THE first of the contentions i. s liable to be upheld for the following reasons: s. 74 of the Act reads as follows: -"74. Appeal :- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order :- (a) of the marketing committee refusing to grant or renew and licence, or cancelling a licence, or suspending any licence may. within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, appeal to the chief Marketing Officer". The expression used is 'chief Marketing officer' and that expression is defined in sub-sec. (7) of S. 2 of the Act and it reads as follows : -" (7) "chief Marketing Officer" means the Officer appointed by the Slate government as such, and Includes any other officer or officers empowered by the state Government by notification to exercise or perform such of the powers or functions of the Chief Matketing offiicer under the provisions of the Act or the Rules as may be specified in auch notification". ( 4 ) FROM the above it is clear, in the definition clause itself the Legislature has conferred on the State Government the power to authorise other officer or officers than the Chief Marketing Officer appointed by the State Government, who can be empowered by the State Government by notification to exercise or perform such of the powers or functions of the Chief Marketing Officer under the provisions of the act. Undoubtedly, S. 140 of the Act speaks of delegation of power by the State government but does not provide delegation of power under S. 74 of the Act. Strangely, it is omitted. The power to authorise other officer or officers by issue of Notification conferred OD the State government under sub-sec. (7) of S. 2 of the Act, is not in any way taken away by s 140 of the Act, nor is there any conflict between the two. Since the aforementioned notification expressly authorises the Joint chief Marketing Officer to hear an appeal under S 74 (1) of the Act, the 2nd respondent was clearly in error in holding that the appeal was not maintainable. In any event, in the order of the 2nd respondent which is at Annexure C to the petition, there is no specific reason given as to why it was not maintainable under any of the sections of the Act which disabled him to entertain the appeal. Therefore, that order is liable to be set aside for the reasons I have given above. ( 5 ) IN the result, it is not open for this court to go in!o the other question raised by the petitioner regarding the correctness of the order passed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent committee while the dispute was pending. Now that the 2nd respondent is competent to entertain the appeal by virtue of this order, that matter may be decided by him. But, what renders the position difficult is that the order made by the Chairman of the Committee in February suspending the petitioner's licence is not under appeal. But if that order is read as merely a continuation of the order passed by the 2nd respondent which has been stayed by the appellate authority while the appeal was pending, then it will not be improper for this Court to stay the operation of the order dt. But if that order is read as merely a continuation of the order passed by the 2nd respondent which has been stayed by the appellate authority while the appeal was pending, then it will not be improper for this Court to stay the operation of the order dt. 30th january 1982, till the appeal filed by the petitioner is disposed of by the 2nd respondent. ( 6 ) IN the result, the order of the 2nd respondent at Annexure-C to the petition is set aside with a direction to the 2nd respondent to entertain and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law within one month from the date of receipt of this order. Till the disposal of the appeal, the order of the Chairman of the 1st respondent committee dt. 5 -2 1982 is kept in abeyance. ( 7 ) RULE will accordingly issue and be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .