ORDER.- In W.P. No. 254 of 1982 the petitioner is one C. Kannan. The petitioner in W.P. No. 383 of 1982 is the Tamil Nadu Livestock Inspectors’ Association represented by the General Secretary. The prayers in both the writ petitions are identical; The petitioners have asked for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash G.O. Ms. No. 2319 Agricultural (A. H. II) dated, 19th October, 1981. The Tamil Nadu Livestock Inspectors’ Association represented the interest of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I and Grade II in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State Government and other like Corporations in the State. Kannan is a Livestock Inspector, Grade II in the Animal Husbandry Department of the Tamil Nadu Government. 2. The facts leading to the two writ petitions may be stated as follows: It is necessary for the purposes of understanding the case of the petitioners to set out the structure of the Animal Husbandry Department The Animal Husbandry Department is what is called the Tamil Nadu Animal Husbandry Subordinate Service. This service consists of two wings viz., Veterinary and Livestock Inspectors carrying a salary of Rs. 600-30-750-35-890-10-1050. Below then come Veterinary Supervisors Ordinary Grade in the scale of Rs. 450-20-590-20-740-30-800, The other wing consists of Livestock Inspectors, Grade II carrying a salary of Rs. 350-10-420-15-600. Above the Livestock Inspectors, Grade II come Livestock Inspectors Grade I, who are posted as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry on a salary of Rs. 450-20-590-25-740-30-800, The General educational qualification required for appointment as Livestock Inspector, Grade II, is a pass in the S. S. L. C. Examination and in the one year certificate course in the Animal Husbandry conducted by the Veterinary College, Madras. In the hierarchy of the Regional set up of Directors of Animal Husbandry there are Veterinary Assistant Surgeons, who came above the Livestock Supervisors. It is the petitioner's case that for nearly twenty-five years, the extension work in the Animal Husbandry in Panchayats was being entrusted to and handled by Livestock Inspectors. In other words, the Inspectors, Grade I are also posted as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry in the Panchayat Unions. It is the petitioner's case that for nearly twenty-five years, the extension work in the Animal Husbandry in Panchayats was being entrusted to and handled by Livestock Inspectors. In other words, the Inspectors, Grade I are also posted as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry in the Panchayat Unions. But, the Veterinary Graduates made representations to the Government that they should be appointed as Extension Officers in the Panchayat Unions replacing Livestook Inspectors Grade I. The First Pay Commission and the Administrative Reforms Commission considered the desirability of appointing Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in Panchayat Unions and were of the opinion that Livestock Inspectors, Grade I were best suited to attend to extension work in the Animal Husbandry in Panchayat Unions and the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons, who were over-qualified, would be unsuitable to be posted as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry. Accordingly the Government, more than once rejected the representation of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons for being appointed as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in Panchayat Unions. However, on 19th October, 1981, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 2319, Agril. (A. H. II) department, directing the posting of the Veterinary Graduates in the posts of Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in Panchayat Unions. It is in these circumstances that the two writ petitions have been filed. 3. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that ever since 1957, Livestock Inspectors, Grade I, were being appointed as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in Panchayat Unions. The system has been in vague for the last twenty- five years. The Veterinary Assistant Surgeons have been making various attempts to persuade the Government to appoint them as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in the place of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I. However, the Government had, till the date of the passing of the impugned Government Order, rejected the representations of the Veterinery Assistant Surgeons. The Government did so on the basis of the recommendations of the First Pay Commission, the Administrative Reforms Commission and the report of the Director of Animal Husbandry. All these authorities were of the view that the qualifications of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons were too high to be appointed as Extension Officers. It would be uneconomic to appoint Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry. All these authorities were of the view that the qualifications of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons were too high to be appointed as Extension Officers. It would be uneconomic to appoint Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry. Further, if the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons were appointed as Extension Officers (Animal Hsubandry) in the place of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I, there would be a stagnation of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I since they have no other avenue of promotions whereas the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons can look forward to other avenues of promotion. The result of the impugned Government Order would be that Livestock Inspectors, Grade II would be deprived of their right to promotion and it would take eight years for a Livestock Inspector, Grade II, to become a Livestock Inspector, Grade I. Therefore, if the Livestock Inspectors, Grade I are not appointed as Extension Officers, (Animal Husbandry) the chances of promotion of Livestock Inspectors, Grade II would be greatly affected. Further, the impugned Government Order is vitiated by arbitratiness and unfairness in action on the part of the Government and is therefore hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Government have not borne in mind the reports of the First Pay Commission, the Administrative Reforms Commission and the Director of Animal Husbandry as well as the fact that on previous occasions, the Government, have, after due consideration of the representations made by the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons, rejected their request. 4. Mr. Narayanaswami emphasised upon the fact that Mrs. L. D. Padalkar. who has filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 had hereself recommended on an earlier occasion that it would be uneconomic to appoint Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers. (Animal Husbandry). 5. Mrs. Padalkar, who is the present Director of Animal Husbandry and the second respondent herein has filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. It is stated that prior to 1957 Veterinary Assistant Surgeons were appointed as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) on par with the pattern and style prevalent in other States and also in conformity with the qualifications and status of other Extension Officers working in each Block prior to the formation of Panchayat Unions throughout the State. However, in the year 1957, there was a dearth of qualified Veterinary Graduates. However, in the year 1957, there was a dearth of qualified Veterinary Graduates. Consequently the Government took a decision to post Vetreinary and Livestock Supervisors and Livestock Inspectors, Grade I as Extension Officers. This arrangement was purely temporary. However, now on account of the increased intake or increased out-turn of veterinary graduates every year from the Veterinary College, qualified hands are now available for appointment as Extension Officers. The stated circumstances, which existed in 1957 have now completely changed. Further, the emphasis in the policy of the State has been on the development of rural economy, new techniques, equipments, preservation methods etc., have been introduced in the Department of Animal Husbandry. Conse-quently qualified hands are required to man the office of the Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry. Further, the impugned Govern- ment Order will not result in reversion of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I to Grade II as their rights are amply protected by the Government Order. It is also contended in the counter-affidavit that the opportunities of promotion of Livestock Inspectors, Grade II would not be affected. Every year vacancies arise in Livestock Inspectors, Grade I due to retirement and resignation as well as creation of new posts. By G. O. No. 1208, Agriculture Department (A. H. VI) dated 18th May, 1981, the Government have sanctioned the establishment of two intensive cattle development projects in South Arcot and Chengle-pattu Districts. This has resulted in the creation of 104 posts of Livestock Inspector, Grade I. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that on completion of ten years of service, a Livestock Inspector, Grade II will be automatically advanced as Livestock Inspector Grade I (Advance) and the scale of pay of both the posts of Livestock Inspector Grade I (Techniques) and Livestock Inspector (Advance Grade II are said to be the same. According to the repondents, the veterinary Graduate has the technical knowledge and he can generate and pool resources and encourage men to have self-employment in the Animal Husbandry sector in the light of the policy of the Government above stated and to develop rural economy. It is further asserted that the impugned order is not the result of any arbitrary decision. The Government have considered all aspects of the matter and taken a policy decision. In the circumstances, according to the counter affidavit the Writ Petitions have to be dismissed. 6. It is further asserted that the impugned order is not the result of any arbitrary decision. The Government have considered all aspects of the matter and taken a policy decision. In the circumstances, according to the counter affidavit the Writ Petitions have to be dismissed. 6. In W.P. No. 254 of 1982 the respondents 3 to 6 have been added as additional respondents. Respondents 3 and 4 are represented by Mr. N.C. Raghavachari and respondents 5 and 6 are represented by Messrs. Aiyar and Dolia. Mr. N.C. Raghavachari has taken a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the Writ Petition No.. 385 of 1982, where the petitioner is the Tamil Nadu Livestock Inspectors Association. The contention of the learned counsel was that the Association as such, is not an aggrieved person and consequently has no locus standi to file the said Writ Petition. It may be mentioned at this stage, the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. Sundar, who appeared for respondents 5 and 6, had not raised any contention regarding the maintainability of the Writ Petition No. 38 of 1982. I do not think there is any merit in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. N.C. Raghavachari. It cannot be said that the Tamil Nadu Livestock Inspectors’ Association, which is composed of Livestock Inspectors Grade I and Grade II have no manner of interest in the subject-matter of the writ petition. It is not disputed that the Association is registered under the Societies Registration Act for taking care of the interests of its members in general. Therefore, the question whether the discontinuance of the practice, which has admittedly existed for nearly twenty-five years, of appointing Livestock Inspectors, Grade I as Extension Officers. (Animal Husbandry) would adversely affect the members of the Association or not is a matter of general interest so far as the Association is concerned. If the discontinuance of such a practice by the Government would detrimentally affect the members viz., the Livestock Inspectors Grade I and Grade II, the Association representing as it does, the general interest of the members, will be entitled to. take up the cause of the members in general and agitate the same in Court.. If the discontinuance of such a practice by the Government would detrimentally affect the members viz., the Livestock Inspectors Grade I and Grade II, the Association representing as it does, the general interest of the members, will be entitled to. take up the cause of the members in general and agitate the same in Court.. Undoubtedly, originally there was a theory that to maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the individual person aggrieved must approach the Courts for appropriate relief and a third party who might only be indirectly concerned in the subject matter of the proceedings cannot maintain a writ petition. However, this theory has been exploded and can be said to have vanished by some of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. 7. Mr. Raghavachari relied heavily on the decision by Ismail, J., as he then was, in The North Arcot District Pawn Brokers’ ‘ Association v. Secretary to Government of India1. The Madras Financiers and Pawn-Brokers Association and one Hansraj filed two writ petitions, W. P. Nos. 2611 and 2612 of 1970 on the file of this Court They prayed for the issue of writs of mandamus restraining the Union of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and the Collector of Central Excise, Madras from proceeding with the enforcement of Gold Control Trade Notices 6 and 7 of 1970 dated 18th June, 1970 and 27th July, 1970, respectively, said to have been issued by the Collector of Central Excise, Madras. The contention was that the provisions contained in the Gold Control Act, 1968 did not apply to the pawnbrokers. One of the contentions raised before the learned Judge was that the Writ Petition filed by the pawnbrokers’ Association was not maintainable. The learned Judge held as follows: “It is well-established that only a person whose rights are alleged to have been threatened or transgressed or on whom obligations are imposed by any statute can approach this Court invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not the case of any of these Associations that the Association as such has been called upon to discharge any obligation or perform any duty imposed by the Gold Control Act. Therefore, the said Association cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”. It is not the case of any of these Associations that the Association as such has been called upon to discharge any obligation or perform any duty imposed by the Gold Control Act. Therefore, the said Association cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”. The learned Judge followed the decision of Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, in The Point Town Panchayat Tax Payers’ Association v. The Polur Town Panchayat and others2, in respect of a Writ Petition filed by the Polur Town Panchayat Taxpayers Association challenging the levy of the tax made by the Panchayat. The learned Judge in the later case had followed an earlier Bench decision of this Court in W. A. Nos. 49 to 52 and 58 to 60 of 1963. No doubt, these decisions certainly support Mr. Raghavachari in his preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the Writ Petition. 8. Before I deal with the later decisions of the Supreme Court, which have rendered the above decisions absolete, it is necessary to emphasise upon the fact that the Livestock Inspector's Association, Grades I and II is a society registered under the. Societies Registration Act. Under section 6 of the said Act every society can sue or be sued in its name and the provisions of the Act make the society a legal entity by itself. It has a separate existence in the eye of law and can act in its own name and in the manner prescribed by the Act and therefore the said Association is an independent legal person. It was therefore conceded by Mr. Raghavachari that the Association as such can sue and be sued in its name. The only other question is, whether the writ petitions can be dismissed on the ground that the legal right of the Association as such is not affected by the impugned Government Order. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in F.C.K. Union v. Union of lndia3. The only other question is, whether the writ petitions can be dismissed on the ground that the legal right of the Association as such is not affected by the impugned Government Order. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in F.C.K. Union v. Union of lndia3. The Union of the workers of the Fertiliser Corporation, Sindri, which is a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act along with others filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality of the sale of certain plants and equipments of the Sindri Fertilizer Factory whereby the highest tender submitted by the person in a sum of Rs. 4.25 crores was accepted. The reliefs sought in the writ petition were that the Corporation should be directed not to sell away the plant and equipment, that they should be asked to withdraw their decision to sell the same and that the said decision should be quashed as being illegal and unconstitutional. The learned Attorney-General, on behalf of the Union of India, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the petition inasmuch as their right had not been affected. Chandrachud, CJ., dealing with the question as regards the maintainability of the writ petition observed as follows: “But we feel concerned to point out that the maintainability of a writ petition which is correlated to the existence and violation of a fundamental right is not always to be confused with the locus to bring a proceeding under Article 3. These two matters often mingle and coalesce with the result that it becomes difficult to consider them in watertight compartments. The question whether a person has the locus to rile a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. But in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or at least a section of the public which is diffctly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations. Public enterprises are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people. The accountability of the public sector to the Parliament is ineffective because the Parliamentary control of public enterprises is” diffuse and haphazard”. We are not too sure if we would have refused relief to the workers if we had found that the sale was unjust, unfair or mala fide.” 9. Krishna Iyer, J., who particularly dealt with the question as regards access to justice particularly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in detail, observed, as follows: “Last there should be misapprehension we wish to keep the distinction clear between the fundamental right to enforce fundamental rights, and the rights and the interest sufficient to claim relief under Article 226 and even relief under Article 226 and even under other jurisdictions. The learned Attorney-General almost agreed, under pressure of compelling trends in the contemporary law of procedure, that Article 226 may probably enable the petitioner to seek relief if the facts suggested by the Court hypothetically existed. Shri A.K. Sen, also took up a similar position. I will put aside Article 32 for a moment and scan the right under Article 226. There is nothing in the provision (unlike under Article 32) to define ‘person aggrieved’, ‘standing’ or ‘interest’ that gives access to the Court to seek redress… “Law as I conceived it, is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action only when some one with real public interest ignies the jurisdiction, we cannot be scared by the fear that all and sundry will be litigation happy and waste their time and money and the time of the Court through false and frivolous causes. In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative public-justice, some mistakes have to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public-minded citizen to rely on the legal process who cannot be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locusstandi.” “We have no doubt that in competition between Court and streets as dispenser of justice the rule of law must win the aggrieved person for the law Court and wean him from the law-less street. In simple terms, locus standi must be liberalised to meet the challenges of the times. Ubi jus ibi remedium must be enlarged to embrace all interest of public-minded citizens or organisations with serious concern for conservation of public resources and the direction and correction of public power so as to promote justice in its triune facets”. “Public interest litigation is part of the process of participative justice and ‘standing’ in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception, at the judicial doorsteps. The floodgates argument has been assailed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission…….. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any of the 66 J million people of the country, the door of the Court will not be open for him. But he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subjectmatter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered, I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Article 226. (See Judgments of Krishna Iyer, J., in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dalhalkar and Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dalhatra1. 10. A similar question arose again before Krishna Iyer, J., in A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly)-v. Union of India2. Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.,) challenged by way of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India the validity of ten circulars issued by the Railway Board on the promotion of candidates belonging to Schedule Castes and Tribes. 10. A similar question arose again before Krishna Iyer, J., in A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly)-v. Union of India2. Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.,) challenged by way of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India the validity of ten circulars issued by the Railway Board on the promotion of candidates belonging to Schedule Castes and Tribes. A technical point was taken in paragraph 3, where the learned Judges observed as follows: “A technical point is taken in the counter affidavit that the 1st petitioner is an unrecognised association and that, therefore the petition to that extent, is not sustainable: It has to be overruled. Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exist and they have approached this Court under Article 32. Our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people oriented, and envisions process to justice through “cless actions”, “public interest litigation’ and “representative proceedings”. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in Courts through collective proceedings; instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of “cause of action” and “person aggrieved” and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions It must fairly be stated that the Attorney-General has taken no objection to a non-recognised association maintaining the writ petitions”. 11. The question of locus standi again loomed large in the Judges’ Transfer Case S. P. Gupta and others v. President of India and others1. In that case, Bhagwati, J., observed as follows: “The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entilement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. The basis of entilement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era when legal scene and public law had not yet been born. According to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress……………..” The individual who moves the Court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the Court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the thresh-hold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the Court or even in tne form of a regular writ petition filed in Court. ………As a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the Court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cases of judicial redress. This rule in regard to locus standi thus postulates a right-duty pattern which is commonly to be found in private law litigation. But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the years. This rule in regard to locus standi thus postulates a right-duty pattern which is commonly to be found in private law litigation. But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the years. Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons…… There is a vital distinction between locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable.” The learned Judge further held: “There can be no doubt that practising lawyers have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if any unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary, they would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such action. They had clearly a concern deeper than that of a busy-body and they cannot be told off at the gates.” Therefore, it is a clear that the rule laid down by Ismail, J, as he then was, in N.A. District Pawn Broker's Association v. Secretary to Government of India1, that only a person, who suffered a specific legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest, who could bring an action by a regular writ petition to be filed has been described as a rule of ancient vintage and as arisen during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. Consequently, the rule has become obsolete. In this case, it cannot be said that the Livestock Inspectors, Grades I and II cannot be said to be wayfarers or officious interveners without any interest or concern over the subject matter of writ petition. The Association as such representing the body of Livestock Inspectors, Grades I and II are really interested in safeguarding the welfare of its members. If therefore by the impugned notification the rights of any of members of the Association have been prejudiced or excised without the authority of law by any act on the part of the State Government, certainly it would be open to the Association to come forward and protect the rights of its individual members, whom it represents. It cannot be said that each and every one of the Livestock Inspectors, Grades I and II must come forward, spend money and file individual writ petitions. I therefore over- rule the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Raghavachari. 12. The next question to be considered is, whether the petitioners are entitled to any relief. In this context, it is necessary to refer to certain admitted facts. It is not disputed that Livestock Inspectors were directed to be appointed as Extension Officers in Panchayat Unions only in 1957 as a temporary measure though no doubt ever since then they were being appointed as Extension Officers. By G.O. Ms. No. 2130, Food and Agriculture, dated 15th July, 1957, the Government directed that Veterinary Assistant Surgeons available in the Extension Service areas shall be withdrawn and in their place, the Veterinary and Livestock Inspectors should be posted to replace the existing Extension Officers for Animal Hubandry in the National Extension service Blocks in the State. By G.O. Ms. No. 2130, Food and Agriculture, dated 15th July, 1957, the Government directed that Veterinary Assistant Surgeons available in the Extension Service areas shall be withdrawn and in their place, the Veterinary and Livestock Inspectors should be posted to replace the existing Extension Officers for Animal Hubandry in the National Extension service Blocks in the State. This Government Order took note of the fact that while 366 Veterinary Assistant Surgeons would be required to implement the various schemes and activities of the Animal Husbandry Department only 232 Veterinary Assistant surgeons were then available in the Animal Husbandry Department, and 72 in the National Extension Service areas. In view of this the Government directed that out of the 72 Veterinary Assistant Surgeons available in the National Extension Service areas 62 shall be withdrawn. This was followed by G.O.Ms.No. 3408, dated 4th December, 1957. By this Government Order the Government referred to G.O.No. 2130, Food and Agriculture, dated 15th July, 1957, by which the Government had ordered that Veterinary and Livestock Inspectors should be placed under the Animal Husbandry Department Veterinary Assistant Surgeonse and accorded sanction to the employment of 71 Veterinary and Livestock Inspectors. From the above Government Orders it is clear that, as contended, by the respondents in the counter-affidavit, there was a dearth of veterinary graduates in the year 1957, which necessitated the Government, withdrawing Extension Officers (Veterinary Assistant Surgeons) from the extension service areas and replacing them by Livestock Inspectors, Grade L This practice has continued till the impugned Government order was passed. It is also not disputed that these arrangements were only temporary. The respondents have not challenged the statement of the petitioners that the first Pay Commission, as early as in 1976, made a recommendation that parsons who are less qualified than the veterinary graduates should be appointed as Extension Officers. It will be useful to refer to the actual report of the first Pay Commission, which is relied on by Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami. The passage, occurring at page 65 in the printed volume of the report of the Madras Pay Commission, 1959-60, reads as follows: “We feel that with the existing facilities for the training of Veterinary Graduates, it will not be possible to man all the posts of Extension Officers for Animal Husbandry with Veterinary Assistant Surgeons. M. R. Narayanaswami. The passage, occurring at page 65 in the printed volume of the report of the Madras Pay Commission, 1959-60, reads as follows: “We feel that with the existing facilities for the training of Veterinary Graduates, it will not be possible to man all the posts of Extension Officers for Animal Husbandry with Veterinary Assistant Surgeons. In any case, for the type of work which an Extension Officer has to do, perhaps an agency less technically qualified and therefore, less costly would suffice. We discussed with the Director of Animal Husbandry the desirability of reviewing the two-year diploma course in Animal Husbandry. The Director is against the revival of the disploma course as he feels that there should not be any lowering of the standards of veterinary education. While the expert advice of the Director is entitled to all respect, we feel that a more realistic attitude in regard to the man-power requirements of the department in the context of the third Five-Year Plan is clearly needed. Though all the posts of Extension Officers for Animal Husbandry are expected to be held by veterinary graduates, most or them are now in fact being held only by Veterinary Livestock Inspectors, who are diploma holders and some even by Stockmen, who have had only eleven months training’ With the progressive increase in the number of blocks the staffing position will become even more unsatisfactory. Further, while a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon may be needed for a Veterinary dispensary or hospital, it will perhaps be a waste of their highly specialised professional training to entrust them with extension work which consists merely in the discrimination of information in regard to proper feeding and management of cattle, early diagnosis of cattie diseasse and the provision of first-aid, etc. We therefore, consider that there is prima facie a need for the revival of the two-year disploma course in Animal Husbandry, and that these disploma holders could progressively replace the Stockmen as Extension Officers in Animal Husbandry”. It is thus clear that ‘even according, to the first Pay Commission, all the posts of Extension Officers for Animal Husbandry were to be held by veterinary graduates though, at that time they were being held by Livestock Inspectors due to paucity of veterinary graduates. It is thus clear that ‘even according, to the first Pay Commission, all the posts of Extension Officers for Animal Husbandry were to be held by veterinary graduates though, at that time they were being held by Livestock Inspectors due to paucity of veterinary graduates. It is equally clear that the Pay Commission was conscious of the fact the qualifications of Livestock Inspectors who had underwent only eleven months’ training would hot be sufficient and they suggested the revival of the two-year diploma course to enable such diploma holders to be appointed as Extension Officers in the place of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons even though the Director of Animal Husbandry did not accept the proposal. Thus, the report of the Pay Commission does not support Mr. Narayanaswami, in his argument that the first Pay Commission has recommended the retention of the Livestock Inspectors as Extension Officers. On the other hand, they had only suggested that persons more qualifide than the Livestock Inspectors but less qualified that the veterinary graduates could be appointed to man the posts of Extension Officers. Similarly there is no dispute the Director of Animal Husbandry gave a report in 1976 (i.e., on 9th September, 1976) to the affect that the posting of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons would only result in a collossal waste of human and financial resources and that it would only pave the way for Veterinary Assistant Surgeons to get out of touch with the usual practice and thereby finding themselves within a few years useless. On the other hand, the Director of Rural Development, Madras expressed his view as early as on 5th June, 1976, that veterinary graduates would be better suited to be appointed as Extension Officers. He had referred to the fact that the Animal Health Intelligence reporting which used to be one of the fundamental duties of the Touring Veterinary Assistant Surgeons is how down in an unsatisfactory manner. He had also stated that the Livestock and poultry development has grown up to such a scale that higher technical knowledge is required by the Livestock farmers whether it is poultry dairying, piggery etc., and the veterinary graduates during the course of education in Veterinary Science study extension as special subject. He had also stated that the Livestock and poultry development has grown up to such a scale that higher technical knowledge is required by the Livestock farmers whether it is poultry dairying, piggery etc., and the veterinary graduates during the course of education in Veterinary Science study extension as special subject. He had also emphasised upon the fact that with the present approach of Integrated Rural Development, wherein such emphasis is placed on the use of the highest scientific knowledge and technology for the uplift of the rural people, it is highly essential to post Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in blocks. I am unable to get any assistance from the report of the Administrative Reforms Commission at pages 44 to 46 and 101, to which my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is nothing in the said report which goes against the tenor of the impugned government Order. It is true that on earlier occasions, representations were made by the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons that they should be appointed as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry in Panchayat Unions but that was not accepted by the Government. However, the fact that on an earlier occasion the Government did not accept the representation of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons could not mean that the Government is debarred from revising its policy. Mr. M.R Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner mainly emphasised upon the fact that the impugned Government Order has to be struck down as arbitrary, in view of the fact that the Government i had not considered the various matters touching upon the subject-matter and the fact that on earlier occasions the representations of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons for being appointed an Extension Officers has not been accepted. In this connection, the learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in K.K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu1. He invited my attention particularly to paragraphs 7, 32, 33 and 34 I have carefully gone through the said decision and I am unable to see how far the said decision applies to the facts of the present case. The paragraphs to which the learned “counsel drew my: attention deal with the fact that whether a post could be abolished should essentially be a matter for the Government to decide. The paragraphs to which the learned “counsel drew my: attention deal with the fact that whether a post could be abolished should essentially be a matter for the Government to decide. As long as such decision of the Government is taken in good faith, the same cannot be set aside by the Court. The decision to abolish the post should, however, be taken in good faith and be not used as a cloak or pretence to terminate the services of a person holding that post. The Supreme Court further held that in case it is found on consideration of the facts of a case that the abolition of the post was only a device to terminate the services of an employee, the abolition of the post would be liable to be set aside. We are not concerned here with the abolition of the post. The learned counsel then referred to the fact that the deponent of the counter-affidavit, Mrs. L.D. Padalkar had herself made a recommendation in 1976 that Veterinary Assistant Surgeons should not be appointed on the ground that it would be a collossal waste of time to appoint Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers and curiously she has now filed a counter-affidavit stating that Veterinary Assistant Surgeons alone were qualified to be appointed an Extension Officers. I do not find that there is any rule of law or principle which prevents Mrs. L.D. Padalkar from taking a view of the matter, dissenting from the opinion found by her earlier, according to the circumstances of the situation. She has stated in the counter-affidavit that the situation in 1976 was quite different from what it is today. Even otherwise, nothing prevents an Officer of the Government from taking a different view of a matter if he or she finds that at the time when the, decision is taken, a particular line of approach is called for. In the counter affidavit it is stated categorically “that the situation prevalent in the State twenty years back when Livestock Inspectors were posted as Extension Officers (Animal) Husbandry) has now completely changed”. The people have become more and more conscious about the rearing of quality livestock for better profit and progress. New techiniques, equipments, preservation methods, breeds, etc., have been introduced and propularised. The people have become more and more conscious about the rearing of quality livestock for better profit and progress. New techiniques, equipments, preservation methods, breeds, etc., have been introduced and propularised. A highly sophisticated service in the fields of Animal Husbandry (including preventive and curative health cover, feeding, breeding and management, is expected by the ryots. Consequent to the efforts of the Department and other Development agencies, the animals of high quality and price are being reared on commercial lines, by the people and they are demanding better technical know-how. Due to the multiplicity of the sources of information, the message on Science and Technology, Research and Development in Animal Husbandry reach the public quickly, creating doubts and requiring clarification on many pointed issues. The rural people look to the Animal Husbandry extension workers for the clarity of views; upto date knowledge on Research and Development. Animal Husbandry extension workers with a capacity to go deep into the problems and subject will alone be able to clear the genuine doubts of the public arising out of availability of information on latest developments. The real role of the Extension Officer can be performed by the persons with adequate technical and academic qualifications. Therefore, veterinary graduates alone will be suited to work as Extension Officers in the field of Animal Husbandly“. Again it is further stated in pragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit that ‘‘the veterinary graduate has the technical knowledge and he can generate and pool resources and encourage men to have self-employment in the Animal Husbandry sector. With the various cast intensive schemes to improve the quality of Livestock, the appropriate liaison officer to function as Extension Officer (Animal Husbandry) is a veterinary graduate. Our rural people should not be denied the high level technology which could be popularised and put to actual use through veterinary graduates in panchayat unions for their Livestock”. In the light of these statements it is futile on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that the impugned Government Order is vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness so as to be struck down by invoking the enlarged scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as enunciated in paragraph 11 in the decision in Ramanadayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India1. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Narayanaswamy then contended that the basis of the promulgation of the impugned Government Order was the fact that the post of extension Officers, Agriculture were being held by Agricultural Graduates The Extension Officers, Agricultural are no longer being held by agricultural graduates. The basis behind the impugned Government Order thus having disappeared the impugned Government Order is liable to be quashed. This argument is devoid of merits. A reading of the impugned Government Order does not show that the basis of the Government Order was the fact that posts of Extension Officers, Agriculture were being held by Agricultural Graduates. It merely states that the Government have desired that the veterinary graduates may be appointed as Extension Officers, Animal Husbandry in the panchayat unions “as in the case of posts of Extension Officers, Agriculture, which are held by Agricultural Graduates. Apart from this, the learned Advocate-General has stated that posts of Extension Officers, Agriculture are even how being manned by Agricultural Graduates and they are directly under the control of the Government. In my opinion, neither the reference to the fact that the posts of Extension Officers, Agriculture are held by the Agricultural Graduates nor the fact that the Extension Officers, Agriculture are no longer held by Agricultural Graduates, even if proved, can in any manner vitiate the Government Order. Mr. Narayanaswami then took exception to the statement in the impugned Government Order that Livestock Inspectors, Grade I would be upgraded tq the cadre of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons in the Tamil Nadu Animal Husbandry “Subordinate Services” and stated that there cannot be any upgrading of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I to the Animal Husbandry Subordinate Service. The learned Advocate-General plainly stated at the Bar that the use of the word ‘Subordinate, in that paragraph was a mistake and that what the Government meant was that Livestock Inspectors, Grade I would be upgraded to the cadre of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons in the Tamil Nadu Animal Husbandry Services. 14. The next contention of Mr. Narayanaswamy was that with the appointment of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers, Grade I, there would be deployment of Livestock Inspectors. Grade I. There is no substance in this contention as well. 14. The next contention of Mr. Narayanaswamy was that with the appointment of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers, Grade I, there would be deployment of Livestock Inspectors. Grade I. There is no substance in this contention as well. It is stated in the Government Order itself that posts of Livestock Inspectors in the Veterinary Sub-centres would be upgraded to the grade of Livestock Inspectors, Grade I so that Liverstock Inspectors, Grade I on reversion from the posts of Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) can be posted in those posts. The Government Order further clearly directs that whenever the Livestock Inspectors, Grade I on relief from the post of Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) are posted in the Veterinary Key Village Sub-Centres, the existing posts of Livestock Inspectors, Grade II in the Sub-centres be upgraded to that of Livestock Inspectors Grade I so long as the Livestock Inspectors Grade I are holding the posts. The Government have also directed that the posts of Extension Officers (Animal Husbandry) in the Panchayat Unions which are now in the Grade of Livestock Inspectors Grade I be upgraded to the cadre of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons in the Tamil Nadu Animal Husbandry Subordinate Service. 15. Similarly there is no substance in the argument of Mr. Narayanaswami that the Livestock Inspectors, Grade II would also be affected. In G.O. No. 1208, Agriculture Department (AH VI), dated 18th May, 1981, Government have sanctioned the establishment of two Intensive Cattle Development Projects in South Arcot and Chingleput Districts and for their implementation, the Government have created 104 posts of Livestock Inspectors Grade I. Similar opportunities will occur in future years also similarly as has been pointed out in the counter affidavit, vacancies are likely to occur in Livestock Inspectors Grade I posts due to retirement, resignation as well as creation of new posts for implementing part II and new schemes under five year plans. There is another important fact, which is not disputed, that on completion of ten years of service, Livestock Inspectors Grade II will be advanced to Livestock Inspectors Grade I (Advanced). The scale of pay of both the posts-Livestock Inspectors Grades I and II is the same. It is further stated on behalf of the respondents and that is not disputed that the holders of posts of Livestock Inspector's Grade I (Advanced) are also allowed Livestock Attendants’ extra amount of Rs. The scale of pay of both the posts-Livestock Inspectors Grades I and II is the same. It is further stated on behalf of the respondents and that is not disputed that the holders of posts of Livestock Inspector's Grade I (Advanced) are also allowed Livestock Attendants’ extra amount of Rs. 13 per month which the normal Grade I Livestock Inspectors are not getting. Therefore, even assuming that chances of promotion constitute conditions of service, it is amply made out that the opportunities for promotion of Livestock Inspectors Grade II are not in any way affected. 16. Mr. Narayanaswami made repeated emphasis that for the last twenty-five years the practice of appointing Livestock Inspectors, Grade I as Extension Officers has been prevalent and therefore, a change from the said practice cannot be considered to be rational. There is no merit in this contention. So long as the practice has not been converted into a Rule which is binding on the Government, the fact, that the practice has been followed for twenty five years, cannot clothe the Livestock Inspectors with any vested right to be appointed as Extension Officers. The mere discontinuance of a practice cannot amount to an injury to any legal right. Chandrachud, CJ., has observed thus in R.K. Khandelwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 is: “But apart from that, discontinuance of a mere practice cannot sustain a charge of injury to legal rights. The practice had not ripened into a Rule and the University was under no obligation to admit only those who had passed their D.C.H. Examination”. So, unless the Livestock, Inspectors Grade I have any legal right to be appointed as Extension Officers in Panchayat Unions, the impugned order cannot be questioned. 17. Though it is unnecessary for the present purpose, it is but fair that I refer to the citations made by the learned Advocate-General. In R.S. Dichhar v. State of Maharashtra2, the Supreme Court has laid down that a rule which merely affects the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of services. Again it has been stated in Mohamed Thujat Ali v. Union of India3, at paragraph 15: “It is true that a rule which confers a right of actual promotion or a right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribing a condition of service. Again it has been stated in Mohamed Thujat Ali v. Union of India3, at paragraph 15: “It is true that a rule which confers a right of actual promotion or a right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribing a condition of service. This propositioa can no longer be disputed in view of several pronouncements of this Court on the point and particularly the decision in Mohammed Bhakar v. Krishna Reddy4, where this Court, speaking through Mitter, J., said” Any rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his condition of service”. But when we speak of a right to be considered for promotion, we must not confuse it with mere chance of promotion; the latter would certainly not be a condition of service. This Court pointed out in State of Mysore v. G.R. Purchit5, that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service”. 18. I am therefore satisfied that the decision in the impugned Government Order cannot be characterised as arbitrary and as having been issued without having regard to the various aspects, which are relevant to be considered on a matter like this. The Government have taken a policy decision, on the basis of relevant materials and it is not for this Court to interfere with the policy decision of the Government in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it be that the decision arrived at is so arbitrary and unconscionable that it would affect all canons of fair play in State action and unless this Court comes to a conclusion that the decision is absolutely arbitrary or irrational. In this connections, it will be useful to recall the observation of the Supreme Court in The Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu1. The case dealt with the question of validity of Tamil Nadu G. O. Ms. No. 1948 regarding the integration of District Board staff with Government servants and the introduction of A wing and B wing. v. State of Tamil Nadu1. The case dealt with the question of validity of Tamil Nadu G. O. Ms. No. 1948 regarding the integration of District Board staff with Government servants and the introduction of A wing and B wing. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 17 at page 383: “Sri Govind Swaminathan drove home the point that in some cases even a few hundred ‘A’ wing members have been passed ever by some one in the ‘B’ wing far junior to them. Once the principle is found to be rational the fact that a few freak instances of hardship may arise on either side cannot be a ground to invalidate the order or the policy, Every cause claims a martyr and however unhappy we feel to see the seniors of yesterday becoming the juniors of today, this is an area where, absent arbitrariness and irrationality the Court has to adopt a hands-off policy”. It is unnecessary to pursue the discussion on the question that in 1957 only Rs. 3,000 has been allotted for Panchayat Union Extension activities while it is now Rs. 7½ lakhs. 19. The net result is, there are no merits in the writ petitions. The impugned Government Order, which is the result of a policy decision taken by the Government on relevant considerations cannot be characterised as arbitrary or irrational. It does not in any manner affect the rights of the members of the petitioners’ Association or the petitioner Kannan. The impugned Government Order protects the rights of Livestock Inspectors Grade I who are likely to be reverted from the posts of Extension Officers by reason of appointment of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons as Extension Officers. I therefore dismiss both the writ petitions, but, in the circumstances, without costs. 20. After I pronounced the judgment, dismissing the writ petitions, Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, the learned counsel for the petitioners requests for a stay of the operation of the judgment for a period of one month to enable the petitioners to file appeals and move the appellate Court for stay. Mr. Kanagaraj, the learned Additional Government Pleader, opposes, the stay on the ground that the polity decision has already been partly implemented and if that any order of stay is granted, it would cause inconvenience to the administration. Mr. Kanagaraj, the learned Additional Government Pleader, opposes, the stay on the ground that the polity decision has already been partly implemented and if that any order of stay is granted, it would cause inconvenience to the administration. In view of the statement made by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the policy decision has already been implemented to a certain extent, I do not think the stay asked for by the learned counsel for the petitioners can be granted. B.S.----- Petition dismissed.