Judgment :- 1. This revision filed by the plaintiffs arises from an order passed on I. A. No. 1616/82 in O. S.411/82 on the file of the H Addl. Munsiff's Court. Ernakulam. The plaintiffs are residing in a plot of 10 cents situated in Kontbu-ruthy. It is said that the property of the plaintiffs is enclosed by compound walls on all the four sides The defendants 1 and 2 are residing in the property lying adjacent to the plaintiff's property on the south. It is said that there is a private pathway about 20 feet wide proceeding northwards from Konthuruthy Church Road running along the eastern boundary upto the northern boundary of the property of defendants 1 and 2 and thereafter this pathway turns to the east. According to the plaintiffs, as they had no access to the pathway from their property they purchased the plaint schedule item lying adjacent on their eastern compound wall under a sale deed dated 7-2-1981. The plaint schedule item is said to be a small strip of land having width of 6 links and a length of 105 links. The plaintiffs allege that ever since they purchased the plaint schedule item they have been using it as the only way to their house from the private pathway referred to above. The third defendant is this case is the Corporation of Cochin and the fourth defendant is a neighbour. The fourth defendant put up a basement and compound wall on 5-4-1982 on the eastern boundary of his property and as a result of this, the drainage of water to the low lying lands on the east was stopped. Defendants 1 and 2 therefore wanted to drain the water to the plaint schedule property. They influenced the third defendant and succeeded in persuading it to take a decision to open a drain through the plaint property running south to north. The construction of such a drain would cause severe inconvenience and hardship to the plaintiffs. The representations made to the third defendant in this regard bad no effect. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiffs instituted the suit for an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from cutting out or opening drainage through the plaint schedule property. In the suit, I.A. No. 1616/82 was filed by the plaintiffs praying for the issue of a temporary injunction. 2. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiffs instituted the suit for an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from cutting out or opening drainage through the plaint schedule property. In the suit, I.A. No. 1616/82 was filed by the plaintiffs praying for the issue of a temporary injunction. 2. The learned Munsiff after hearing both parties passed an order as an interim arrangement, and posted the petition for final hearing to some other day. It is this order that is strongly assailed before this Court on several grounds. 3. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner. Mr. John Mathew, submitted that the order passed by the learned Munsiff without properly and duly considering the application filed by the plaintiffs and passing a final order therein, allowing the third defendant to construct the drain by putting up pipes through the plaint schedule property, is clearly illegal and that the learned Munsiff failed to note that none of the defendants has put in any application praying for such an order and the application filed by the plaintiffs was for issue of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from cutting open any drain through the plaint schedule item. The counsel also submitted that the rain water and other water stagnated in the property of defendants I and 2 could be very conveniently drained out to the low lying lands on the eastern side of the pathway, that this has been actually pointed out and suggested by the commissioner appointed in the case and that it was without considering any of these things that the learned Munsiff passed the order under challenge. 4. Smt. Seemanthini, learned advocate appearing for the respondents, with equal vehemence supported the order and contended that the revision itself is not maintainable as the order in question is an appealable order under 0.43 R.1(r); that there is a specific prohibition in sub-section (2) of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against entertaining a revision against such orders and that on merits also the petitioners have no case and this petition therefore only deserves to be dismissed. 5. In support of her contention that the revision is not maintainable the counsel for respondents 1 and 2 cited the decisions in Hamid Hussain Khan v. Masood Hussain Khan (AIR. (39) 1952 All. 279); Abdul Rahiman Saheb v. Vanaopathi Bhatta (ILR. 5. In support of her contention that the revision is not maintainable the counsel for respondents 1 and 2 cited the decisions in Hamid Hussain Khan v. Masood Hussain Khan (AIR. (39) 1952 All. 279); Abdul Rahiman Saheb v. Vanaopathi Bhatta (ILR. 23 Madras 517); Bhaskaran v. Ambika (1977 KLT 476) and Khem Chand v. Hari Singh (AIR. 1979 Delhi 7); while the learned counsel for the petitioners wanted to place reliance on Vasu v. Narayanan Nambooripad (1961 KLT. 946); K. Virupakshiah v. M. Sivalingaiah (AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 540) and M.L. Gowda v. Channamma (AIR. 1974 Karnatak 63). 6. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners, that the order sought to be revised is not a final order passed under 0.39 R.1; that it is only an interim order and therefore it is not an appealable order; that the petitioners bona fide believed on the facts and circumstances of the case that this is only an interim order, which is not appealable and that in such a case the revisional jurisdiction is not ousted and that if there is any doubt on this question the benefit of that should be given to the revision petitioners. 7. As stated earlier, it was the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, who moved the trial court for issue of a temporary injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from cutting out or opening a drainage through the plaint schedule property. It may be noted that neither the first defendant nor the second defendant filed any application praying for the issue of any order in their favour permitting them to make an opening or to construct a drainage through the plaint schedule property for letting out rain water collected and stagnated in the property of the first defendant. The third defendant, the Corporation, has also not made any application. In a way the suit itself has been partly decided by this order. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the attack made against the impugned order is without any basis or foundation. But in view of the legal bar ousting jurisdiction of this Court, in a matter like this, this Court should not alter or modify or reverse any decree or order sought to be revised. 8. By virtue of the provisions in 0.43 R.1(r), an order under R.1, R.2, R.2A, R.4 or R.10 of 0.39 is an appealable order. But in view of the legal bar ousting jurisdiction of this Court, in a matter like this, this Court should not alter or modify or reverse any decree or order sought to be revised. 8. By virtue of the provisions in 0.43 R.1(r), an order under R.1, R.2, R.2A, R.4 or R.10 of 0.39 is an appealable order. The application for temporary injunction was filed by the revision petitioners admittedly under 0.39 R.1 and it was on that application the order under attack was passed. It is true that no temporary injunction has been granted as contemplated in the first part of that rule and instead, only the order in question has been passed and after passing the impugned order the learned Munsiff has adjourned the application for issue of temporary injunction for final hearing to another date. It was relying on these facts that the counsel for the petitioners contended that the order in question is not a final one and therefore it is not appealable. There is nothing in O.43 R.1(r), either expressly or impliedly showing or indicating that the order contemplated therein is only a final order and not an interim or temporary order. Any order, whether final or interim or temporary passed or purported to have been passed under 0.39 R.1 is an appealable order. The grant of remedy tinder S.115 is in the discretion of the High Court and as a rule of practice, this discretionary power will not be exercised in favour of interference, where there was another remedy open to the party which he did not avail of. The view taken by the various High Courts on the question of entertaining a revision under S.115 CPC. as it stood before amendment, where the order sought to be revised is appealable, was that it would be proper to interfere in revision where the existence of alternative remedy is doubtful or where the alternative remedy is inconvenient or is not efficacious or is barred or where non-interference will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary expense and delay or results in grave injustice, (vide K. Virupakshiah v. M. Slvalingaiah: AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 540), There has been drastic change brought about by introducing sub-section (2) to S.115 CPC. by the amendment in 1976. Under S 115 (2) CPC. there is an express ouster of jurisdiction of this Court in the case of appealable orders. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 540), There has been drastic change brought about by introducing sub-section (2) to S.115 CPC. by the amendment in 1976. Under S 115 (2) CPC. there is an express ouster of jurisdiction of this Court in the case of appealable orders. Sub-section (2) of S.115 CPC. clearly states that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. This Court in Vasu v. Narayanan Nambooripad (1961 KLT.946), following a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Sreemathi Tarubala Dasi (AIR. 1927 Cal 354) held that when there is a doubt whether a particular order would fall under a particular rule or not the benefit of that doubt should be given to the petitioner and civil revision petition should be allowed to be proceeded with. That was a case where there was a bona fide doubt whether the order under attack in that case really fell under R.5 or R.6 of 0.38 CPC. The decisions reported in Virupa-kshiah's case (AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 540) and Gowda's Case (AIR. 1974 Karnatak 63) do not in any way support or improve the case. In Gowda's Case (AIR. 1974 Karnatak 63) on the facts it was found that there was no order passed under 0.39 rule I CPC. It may be noted that these decisions were rendered before the CPC. was amended in 1976. As stated earlier, even if the order in question is an interim order passed under 0.39 R.1, no doubt it is appealable being an order passed under this rule. This aspect has been fully considered by Balagangadharan Nair J. in Bhaskaran v. Ambika (1977 KLT. 476) where it has been held that an order of injunction, whether interim or final, is an order falling within R.1 or 2 of 0.39 and therefore appealable as it is an order passed under a particular rule. T am in respectful agreement with this decision and in the light of the decision of this Court there cannot be any doubt that the order under attack is appealable and not revisable in exercise of the powers of this Court under S.115 C.P.C. In Khem Chand's case (AIR. T am in respectful agreement with this decision and in the light of the decision of this Court there cannot be any doubt that the order under attack is appealable and not revisable in exercise of the powers of this Court under S.115 C.P.C. In Khem Chand's case (AIR. 1979 Delhi 7) the effect of the amendment to S.115 C.P.C. has been duly considered and the learned judge who rendered the decision observed that although the order under attack was not supportable in law and was not in accordance with equity and good conscience, in view of the express prohibition in S.115(2) C P.C. the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, it is clear that the remedy against the order in question is by way of an appeal and this revision is not maintainable. The proper procedure is to return the petition to the petitioner for presentation before the proper court. But at the fag end of the arguments on the points involved in the petition, the counsel appearing for both parties submitted that this petition need not be further pursued and it is enough if the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. In the result this petition is dismissed; and the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. No costs in the circumstances of the case. Carbon copy of this order will be given to the counsel appearing for the parties on the usual terms.