ORDER H.G. Mishra, J. This is a revision directed against the order dated 18-2-1982, passed by the trial Court, whereby the application submitted by the defendant-applicant under Order 9, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Court on 21-8-1981 has been rejected. The facts material for the decision of this revision are these. The plaintiff-non-applicants herein had filed a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of the suit-property on the cause of action laid in details in the plaint. The claim of the plaintiffs was resisted by the defendant on various grounds set out in answer to the suit in his written statement. After framing of the issues, the case was fixed on 7-8-1981 for submission of lists of witnesses of the parties. On 7-8-1981 the plaintiffs submitted list of their witnesses and also submitted an application under Order 13, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code copy of which was supplied to the defendant-applicant, and 21-8-1981 was fixed as the date for reply and arguments on the said application. However, on 21-8-1981, since neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, the Court proceeded ex parte and fixed 3-9-1981 as the date for ex parte evidence. On 3-9-1981 the plaintiffs sought an adjournment for producing ex parte evidence. Accordingly, the case was adjourned to 8-9-1981. On 8-9-1981 the plaintiff Rajkumar examined himself in support of his claim and closed his evidence. Arguments were heard and the case was fixed for judgment on 16-9-1981. On 11-9-1981 the defendant-applicant herein submitted an application under Order 9, Rule 7 read with section 151, Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte proceedings and relegating the case to the position as it was on 21-8-1981. It was also submitted in the said application that, at the best, what the trial Court could have done on 21-8-1981 was to decide the application submitted by the plaintiffs under Order 13, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, but the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte against the defendant-applicant: more so, because it was not a case fixed for hearing of the suit. This application was opposed by the plaintiff-non-applicants, inter alia, on the ground that the application was not maintainable, since the hearing of the case was closed and the case has been fixed for judgment. This application was opposed by the plaintiff-non-applicants, inter alia, on the ground that the application was not maintainable, since the hearing of the case was closed and the case has been fixed for judgment. After hearing arguments, the trial Court has, by the impugned order, rejected the application as not maintainable. Hence this revision. In this revision, it is contended by Shri M. G. Khedkar, learned counsel for the defendant-applicant that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte, since the date 21-8-1981 was not a date fixed for hearing of the suit; that on 7-8-1981 when the case was adjourned by the trial Court to 21-8-1981 for filing lists of witnesses and hearing arguments, on the application for summoning record, it could not be said that the hearing of the suit was adjourned to that date, within the contemplation of Order 17, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, and, as such, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte under any one of the modes indicated in Order 9, Civil Procedure Code, because Rules 6, 7 and 8 of Order 9, Civil Procedure Code postulate that the case must be called on for hearing and that all orders passed and proceedings transacted thereafter are without jurisdiction. Shri N. P. Mittal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicants argued in support of the impugned order and placed reliance on the ratio of the decisions in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & others AIR 1964 SC 993 , Bhagwandas v. Rampyari 1976 MPLJ 80, Gyan Mala Sharma v. Narayan Singh 1974 MPLJ 24 and Kedarnath v. Tulsabai 1980 (1) MPWN 180. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that this revision deserves to be allowed. In this case, the facts stated above are not in dispute between the parties. On 7-8-1981 the case was adjourned to 21-8-1981. On 21-8-1981, merely the parties had to tile lists of their witnesses and the Court had to consider the application submitted by the plaintiffs under Order 13, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, the question, which is posed by this revision, is whether 7-8-1981 and 21-8-1981 were the dates of hearing of the suit or not. On 21-8-1981, merely the parties had to tile lists of their witnesses and the Court had to consider the application submitted by the plaintiffs under Order 13, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, the question, which is posed by this revision, is whether 7-8-1981 and 21-8-1981 were the dates of hearing of the suit or not. In order that a suit may be regarded to have been fixed for hearing, it should be the date for taking up of evidence, or hearing of arguments, or considering of questions relating to the suit, which would enable the Judge to finally come to an adjudication upon it, and not for consideration of merely interlocutory matters. In this case, the trial Court, purporting to act under Order 17, Rule 2 read with Order 9, Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, appears to have acted on the assumption that from 7-8-1981, the "hearing of the suit" was adjourned to 21.-8-1981 and that the latter date was a date to which the "hearing of the suit" had been adjourned. In this respect, the trial Court appears to have acted in oblivion of the correct position of law governing the situation. Order 17, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code provides that- Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit." (Emphasis supplied.) Order 9, Civil Procedure Code refers to cases of default of appearance of parties at the first hearing, whereas this Rule (Rule 2 of Order 17) makes the provisions of Order 9 applicable to cases of such default on the adjourned hearing. Now, even on the adjourned hearing, in order that the Court may, on failure of a party to appear, proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9, it is necessary that the hearing of the suit should have been adjourned from an earlier date to a subsequent date. To put it differently, if the hearing of the suit is not so adjourned, the trial Court will have no jurisdiction to proceed in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9, or make such order as it thinks lit. To put it differently, if the hearing of the suit is not so adjourned, the trial Court will have no jurisdiction to proceed in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order 9, or make such order as it thinks lit. I am fortified in this view by the ratio of the decision in Balmukund v. Lachmi Narain AIR 1920 Pat. 595, wherein it has been held that - Rules 2 and 3 of Order 17, apply only to cases where the actual hearing of the suit has been adjourned, and by the hearing of the suit it meant the hearing at which the Judge would be either taking evidence or hearing arguments or would have to consider questions relating to the determination of the suit which would enable him finally to come to an adjudication upon it. But in cases where it was clearly never intended that there should be a hearing of the suit in the ordinary sense of the word but merely some interlocutory matter decided between the parties as to the future conduct of the suit, the provisions of these rules have no application. The law on the point has been further laid down in Manohar Dass v. Birandari Sheikhupurain AIR 1936 Lah. 280 thus: By the hearing of the suit is meant the hearing at which the Judge would be either taking evidence or hearing arguments or would have to consider questions relating to the determination of the suit which would enable him finally to come to an adjudication upon it. In a case where a Commissioner is appointed and is asked to submit his report by a certain date and the Commissioner before that date files an application praying for an extension of time, it is for the Court to extend the time which the Commissioner asks for or it can refuse it. The parties have nothing to do with the matter. The date on which the Court expected the report of the Commissioner is not "the date of the hearing. In Balmukund Ram Marwari v. Madho Prashad AIR 1924 Pat. The parties have nothing to do with the matter. The date on which the Court expected the report of the Commissioner is not "the date of the hearing. In Balmukund Ram Marwari v. Madho Prashad AIR 1924 Pat. 714, where the suit was adjourned for appointment of a guardian on plaintiff's petition and the suit was dismissed in default of the plaintiff's appearance, it was held that the suit could not be so dismissed for default, nor the date so fixed could be regarded to be a date fixed for disposal of the suit. When the case was taken up by the Court on 7-8-1981, it cannot be regarded that the suit was "called on for hearing" within the contemplation of Order 17 Rule 2 read with Order 9 Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code, it being merely a date fixed for interlocutory matters. So also, when the case was adjourned to 21-8-1981, it cannot be regarded that the hearing of the suit was adjourned to that date, since the business to be transacted on that date related to interlocutory matters merely, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed ex-parte in the suit against the defendant-applicant. In order to resist the aforesaid conclusion, Mr. Mittal placed reliance on the ratio of the decision in Arjun Singh (supra). In Arjunsingh's case (supra) in para. 17 it has been observed that the opening words of that rule (Order 9 Rule 7) are, as already seen, 'Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex-parte.' Now what do these words mean ? Obviously they assume that there is to be a hearing on the date to which the suit stands adjourned. (Parenthesis supplied). In the instant case, as stated above, when the suit was adjourned from 7-8-1981 to 21-8-1981, it cannot be regarded that the hearing of the suit was adjourned to that date, it being merely a date fixed for interlocutory matters. That apart, in the case of Arjun Singh (supra), the case was fixed for May 29, 1958, the order stating "if no compromise is filed, the case would be taken up for final hearing." On 29th, the plaintiff was present, but the appellant was absent. The latter's counsel who was present, reported that he had no instructions to conduct the case. The latter's counsel who was present, reported that he had no instructions to conduct the case. Thereupon, the Court passed an order in the suit "The case proceeds ex-parte, plaintiff examined Mohinder Kumar and closed." The decision in the case of Arjun Singh (supra) turns on the fact that the hearing of the suit was adjourned on the date when the Court proceeded ex-parte against the defendant. This makes its ratio inapplicable to the present situation. In the case of Bhagwandas (supra), evidence of both the parties was led and, after closure of evidence, the case was fixed for arguments on 20-3-1974. After hearing arguments, the case was posted for judgment on 25-3-1974. It was held that the hearing came to an end as soon as the arguments were over and the case was fixed for delivery of judgment, and that at that stage no party was entitled to produce any additional evidence. So also in the case of Gyanmala Sharma (supra), neither the defendant nor bis counsel appeared on the date of hearing. Likewise, in the case of Kedar Nath (supra), after the parties had closed their evidence, the case was fixed for arguments and it was at that stage that an application for setting aside the ex parte order was moved under Order 9 Rule 7. Accordingly, none of the ratio of the aforesaid cases relied on by Mr. Mittal can be usefully employed in the plaintiff-non-applicant's service. In this view of the matter, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte against the defendant on 21-8-1981. As a logical corollary flowing from this legal position, it has further to be held that all subsequent orders, passed by the trial Court, without jurisdiction. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the impugned order manifests exercise of jurisdiction in an illegal manner and /or with material irregularity. If the impugned order is allowed to stand, the defendant-applicant herein will suffer irreparable injury and it will occasion failure of justice also. Accordingly, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The application submitted by the defendant-applicant on 11-9-1981 be and is hereby allowed. The order passed by the trial Court on 21-8-1981 and subsequent thereto are also set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed from the stage at which the case was fixed on 21-8-1981. Accordingly, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The application submitted by the defendant-applicant on 11-9-1981 be and is hereby allowed. The order passed by the trial Court on 21-8-1981 and subsequent thereto are also set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed from the stage at which the case was fixed on 21-8-1981. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the costs, which the defendant-applicant is entitled to get on success in the revision, are set off against the costs that are awardable to the plaintiff-non-applicant on setting aside the ex parte order. Application allowed