N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is by the tenant. He is in occupation of the premises in question as a lessee under the respondent. The landlord had filed an application under S. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act) in HRC No. 14 of 1974 on the file of the Munsiff, Sirsi, for recovery of possession of the premises from the tenant on the allegation that he was in arrears of rent and had failed to pay the same in spite of a statutory notice. During the pendency of that proceeding the landlord had also filed an application under S. 29 of the Act stating that the tenant was not entitled to contest the application having not paid the rents due. The trial Court, after hearing the parties, determined summarily on 21-8-1976, as provided under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29, that the tenant, being liable to pay monthly rent at Rs. 45, had committed default from September, 1971 to july, 1976, and was in arrears of Rs. 2,610 and should pay the same on or before 21-9-1976, and further directed that be should go on paying or deposit in Court the rent at that rate month by month during the pendency of that proceeding. That case was posted to 22-9-1976 awaiting compliance by the tenant of the said order. The tenant did not comply with that order. Therefore, the landlord requested the Court to take further action as provided in sub-sec. (4) of S. 29 of the act. On 6-10-1976 the trial Court called upon the tenant to show cause for not stopping further proceedings. For tills purpose the case was get down te 16 10 1976. The tenant was absent. The trial Court made the following order :"16-10-1976. Case called out. Plaintiff pleader R. S. Joshi. Opponents pleader Shastri and pleader M. S. Dhareshwar. Notice to opponent. Opponent served. Called, absent. No cause has been shown as to why further proceedings should not be stopped. Hence, further proceedings are stopped and the opponent tenant is directed to put the petitioner landlord in possession of the petition premises under S. 29 (4) of KRC Act. No costs". ( 2 ) THAT order was called in question by the tenant before the Dist. Judge, Karwar. The learned Dist. Judge, by his order dt. 29-7-1977 in HRC Revn. Petn. No costs". ( 2 ) THAT order was called in question by the tenant before the Dist. Judge, Karwar. The learned Dist. Judge, by his order dt. 29-7-1977 in HRC Revn. Petn. No. 34 of 1976 on his file, dismissed the revision as provided in sub-sec. (4) of S. 29 of the act on the ground that the tenant had failed to pay or deposit the rents during the pendency of the revision before him. The said order is challenged by the tenant in this revision. ( 3 ) IT is very relevant to note that what bad been challenged before the Dist. Judge in the revision was only the order of the munslff dt. 16-10-1976. This fact is clear from the preamble portion of the memo of revision filed therein. It is also clear from this that the previous order dated 21-8-1976 of the Munsiff, which has been referred to above, had become final. It is by that order the Munsiff had determined, under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act, the rate of rent payable per month and the quantum of arrears. It may also be relevant to note that in the objections he had filed in the trial Court, though the tenant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and himself, he had subsequently conceded before the Munsiff that he was the tenant (see the order-sheet dt. 31-7-1976 "maintained by the Munsiff ). ( 4 ) IN a case like this it was the bounden duty of the tenant to have deposited the rents as ordered by the Munsiff under S. 29 prior to the preferring of the revision before the Dist. Judge. And not merely this, he should have gone on depositing the rent payable month by month during the pendency of the revision before the District judge. ( 5 ) THE revision before the Dist. Judge had been preferred on 5 11-1976. On 29-7-1977, by which date there had been several adjournments, IA III came to filed by the landlord's counsel under S. 29 (4) of the Act stating therein that the tenant had not deposited the arrears and, therefore, further proceedings in the revision should be stopped. It is stated that the tenant was in arrears of a total sum of Rs. 2,880 in all. It is stated that the tenant was in arrears of a total sum of Rs. 2,880 in all. This IA, as can be seen from the original, had been drafted and presented on 27-7 1977 serving a copy of the same on the learned counsel appearing for the tenant on 27th itself i. e. , two days earlier to the hearing date. Now on the 29th, IA III rightly was taken up first. Since no explanation was forthcoming on behalf of the tenant, the learned District judge proceeded to pass the impugned order, and dismissed the revision with a direction to the tenant to hand overvacant possession of the premises forthwith to the respondent. ( 6 ) CHALLENGING the order of the Dist. Judge, mainly two submissions were made by the counsel for the petitioner-tenant. The first contention is that the tenant did not have enough opportunity to have his say re : IA III before the Dist. Judge and, therefore, quashing the impugned order, the matter may be remitted to the District judge for a fresh consideration. His second contention is that, even otherwise, the order of the Court below on IA III was bad in law having been made on an interlocutory application which itself, in the circumstances, was not maintainable before the Dist. Judge in that proceeding and also could not have been invoked by the landlord therein. ( 7 ) SINCE the 2nd submission goes to the root of the matter, let me consider it first. Elaborating this submission what was contended on behalf of the tenant was that the revision before the Dist. Judge was not against an order made under S. 21, but was against one made under S. 29 and, therefore, S. 29 was not attracted to that proceeding in revision before the District judge at all. In order to appreciate this contention it may be necessary to know the ambit and scope of sub-sec. (1) of S. 29 of the Act. That provision reads like this :29. In order to appreciate this contention it may be necessary to know the ambit and scope of sub-sec. (1) of S. 29 of the Act. That provision reads like this :29. Deposit and payment of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction : (1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under S. 21, shall be entitled to contest the application before the court under that section or to prefer or prosecute a revision petition under S. 50 against an order made by the Court on an application under S. 21, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Court, or the Dist. Judge, or the High Court as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises upto the date of payment or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the premises at the rate at which it was last paid or agreed to be paid, until the termination of the proceedings before the court or the Dist. Judge or the High court, as the case may be". As enjoined above "no tenant shall be entitled to prefer or prosecute a revision petition under S. 50, against an order made by the Court on an application under S. 21 unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Court, the Dist. Judge, or the High Court, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due". (Underlining (italics) supplied ). ( 8 ) THE question is, was the revision preferred before the Dist. Judge under S. 50 by the, tenant not one against an order made by the Munsiff on an application under S. 21. Admittedly the proceeding nitiated before the Munsiff by the landlord by filing an application therein was under S. 21 of the Act. While dealing with that application the Munsiff had passed the order referred to above under s. 29. Is it not "an order made by the court on an application under S. 21". It appears to be very much so. The order under S. 29 could not have been made by the Munsiff, had the proceeding before him was not one under S. 21. Is it not "an order made by the court on an application under S. 21". It appears to be very much so. The order under S. 29 could not have been made by the Munsiff, had the proceeding before him was not one under S. 21. We have to understand these words "an order made by the Court on an application under S. 21" as meaning "an order made by the Court in a proceeding commenced before it on an application under S. 21". S. 29 is an ancillary provision brought into play only when there is a proceeding under S. 21 of the Act. By itself S. 29 has no legs to stand. The order, against which the tenant had preferred a revision under S. 50 before the Dist. Judge, was an order made by the Munsiff in a proceeding commenced by the landlord on an application under s. 21 of the Act. Therefore, S. 29 was certainly attracted to the proceeding pending before the Dist. Judge. It cannot be said, in the circumstances, that IA III filed under S. 29 (4) by the landlord in the court below was not maintainable. ( 9 ) NOW, coming to the merits. The tenant was represented by a counsel. Two days earlier to the hearing date a copy of ia III had been served on the learned counsel for the tenant. On 29-7-1977, when IA III was taken up, the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner was present before the Dist. Judge. He has been heard In the matter. That day's order-sheet reads as follows:"29-7-1977. Taken up today. Sri N. D. V. Bhat for petitioner sri G, K. Haldlpurkar for respondent? arguments. IA III filed by Sri G. K. Haldipurkar for respondent along with the affidavit praying to order stopping all the further proceedings and to order delivery of possession of the petition premises from the tenant-applicant to the respondent. Sri N. D. V. Bhat is heard. Heard. Despite the order of the lower court to deposit the rentals, revision petitioner has failed to deposit or show- cause under S. 29 (4) KRC Act. Even the rentals due after revision petition are not deposited. Hence, further proceedings are stopped under S. 29 (4) KRC Act, and the revision petitioner is directed to handover vacant possession forthwith to the respondent. Costs follow event. Sd. 29-7-1977". Even the rentals due after revision petition are not deposited. Hence, further proceedings are stopped under S. 29 (4) KRC Act, and the revision petitioner is directed to handover vacant possession forthwith to the respondent. Costs follow event. Sd. 29-7-1977". If the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner had no instructions, would he have argued ? He would have sought for some time, and, if adjournment had been refused, would have retired. The learned counsel, it appears, had no cause to show for not stopping further proceedings. If he had said anything by way of an answer to IA III certainly that would have been mentioned by the Dist. Judge in his order. To say that the tenant did not have adequate opportunity to make his representation on IA III is not correct. The tenant, who had been represented by a counsel, had had that opportunity through his counsel. It is presumed that a counsel, unless he says otherwise, will always have the necessary instructions to plead on behalf of his client. ( 10 ) I have carefully gone through tht records. I find no substance in these submissions of the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner. The learned District judge has rightly dismissed the revision acting under S. 29 (4) of the Act. There are no good grounds to interfere with that order in this revision. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this revision petition is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .