Judgment :- 1. A police station is hardly the venue and the small hours after midnight hardly an auspicious time, for the resolution of what is essentially a civil dispute. A transaction entered into at such a place and at such a time, is likely to be viewed as susceptible to vitiating influences. That was what had happened in Kottayam town; and in the year 1970, 2. Those who feel vanquished by unjust official might are not always likely to give expression to their moral indignation by resort to the process of law. Quite often, people suffer in silence, such indignities and such losses. The plaintiff in the case, however, with commendable courage, sought to resort to a court of law for the vindication of his just claims. The courts below have granted him relief. Whether the judgments and decrees of the courts below are vitiated, so vitiated on any substantial question of law as to invite interference in the attenuated jurisdiction of a second appeal, is the matter arising for consideration in this case. 3. The salient facts relevant for the issue arising for decision in the second appeal may be briefly stated as follows: 4. The defendant is the appellant in the second appeal. He was a partner of a firm known by the name and style 'Rooparekha'. It engaged itself in the production of films. A Malayalam feature film Janmabhoomi' was its product. The financial requirements for the production had to be met by the firm. The plaintiff, Proprietor of Dinny Films, was engaged in the distribution of films. According to the plaintiff, on the understanding that the film when released would be entrusted with the plaintiff for the distribution in the State of Kerala, he had advanced to the defendant a sum of Rs. 27,749/- covered by two promissory notes, Ext. Al dated 30-12-1968, for Rs.15,000/- and Ext. A2 dated 29-1-1969 for Rs. 12,749/-. 'Rooparekha' appears to have availed of a loan from the firm Financial Corporation of Bombay, to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/-. That corporation bad stipulated as a condition for advancing the loan that the producer should itself be the distributor and that 85% of the collection should be paid over to the Corporation in repayment of the debt. The plaintiff started distribution of the film only from October, 1969 in accordance with the directions of the partners of the firm. 2,00,000/-. That corporation bad stipulated as a condition for advancing the loan that the producer should itself be the distributor and that 85% of the collection should be paid over to the Corporation in repayment of the debt. The plaintiff started distribution of the film only from October, 1969 in accordance with the directions of the partners of the firm. We are not concerned with the details relating to the arrangement between Rooparekha on the one hand and Dinny Films of which the plaintiff is the proprietor, on the other. The plaintiff would contend that the partners of the firm 'Rooparekha' developed serious differences of opinion between themselves and the firm itself ceased to function. The plaintiff alleged that when he was pressing for repayment of the amount due to him under the promissory notes Exts. Al and A2, the defendant, out of unjust motive, initiated criminal proceedings against the plaintiff Ext. A13 is the criminal complaint, filed on 15-5-1970 before the District Magistrate, Kottayam. A case was registered under S.403, 408 and 409 I. P. C. by the Kottayam West Police Station against the plaintiff and others, on the basis of the complaint so forwarded to the police station by the District Magistrate. Within a month thereafter, the investigation of the case, resulted in serious happenings. On 11-6-1970, the Sub Inspector of Police, along with others, effected a search in the business premises of the plaintiff. They seized certain prints of the film from the custody of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, later in the evening, the plaintiff and his office manager were taken to the police station and unlawfully detained there till about 1.30 a m. the next day. There was a threat from the Sub Inspector of Police that unless the plaintiff executed an agreement in favour of the defendant and paid over to the defendant the money as stipulated by the defendant, he would be arrested. He was told that serious charges bad been levelled against him. It was represented by the Sub Inspector that there will not be any prosecution proceedings, if the agreement was executed and money paid as directed by the defendant. Plaintiff claims to be a member of a respectable family. His father was a member of the legislative Council. His father was suffering from serious ailments. It was represented by the Sub Inspector that there will not be any prosecution proceedings, if the agreement was executed and money paid as directed by the defendant. Plaintiff claims to be a member of a respectable family. His father was a member of the legislative Council. His father was suffering from serious ailments. Arrangements had been made for taking him to Velloor for availing of the medical facilities there, having regard to the seriousness of his ailments. Even a train reservation for journey on 2-6-1970, had been made earlier. According to the plaintiff, it would have caused great shock to his father, in case be came to know about the son's arrest and detention in the police station. In the above situation, as he bad only a Hobson's choice in that helpless situation, he decided to yield. He had overdraft facilities with pw. 3 who owned the Kerala National Bankers, a financing institution. pw.-3 was accordingly contacted over the phone, with an emergent message to reach the station with Rs. 10,000/-. pw. 3 collected the money from his bank at the dead of night, proceeded to the police station, and handed it over to the plaintiff, who in turn passed it on to the Sub Inspector. The Sub Inspector paid over the money to the defendant. Not only that, an agreement Ext. A6 was prepared in the lines indicated by the advocate of the defendant. The plaintiff was made to sign the agreement, which contains, according to the plaintiff false recitals. In addition to the payment of Rs. 10,000/-the agreement created an obligation in future as regards the plaintiff; he was also forced to execute a promissory note along with his uncle for a sum of Rs. 5,500/-the promissory note being evidenced by Ext. B20 dated 12-6-1970. The agreement and the promissory note have been impugned as resulting from undue influence, coercion, fraud and threat practised upon the plaintiff. The agreement, it is alleged, is without consideration and consequently void ab initio. Soon after the return from Velloor, where he had taken his father for treatment, the plaintiff caused to send on 30-6-70 a notice to the defendant repudiating the agreement and demanding the return of Rs. 10,000/-paid at the police station. The letter was refused by the defendant and was accordingly returned to the plaintiff. The suit was thereafter instituted for the realisation of the sum of Rs. 10,000/-paid at the police station. The letter was refused by the defendant and was accordingly returned to the plaintiff. The suit was thereafter instituted for the realisation of the sum of Rs. 10,000/ -with interest from the date of the suit. 5. The business connections between the plaintiff and the defendant are admitted by the defendant. However, according to the defendant, the distribution of the film was done from August, 1969 with the approval of the Film Financial Corporation. The proceeds from the distribution of the film had not been properly accounted for by Dinny Films. They diverted the prints. According to the defendant, the plaintiff misappropriated the collection, taking advantage of the difference of opinion between the defendant and the other partners of Rooparekha. It was for the above reason that he filed the criminal complaint. When the prints of the film were seized from the office of the Dinny Films, the plaintiff contacted the defendant to settle the matter amicably. The defendant would have it that the parties approached the police for effecting such a settlement. The plaintiff bad discussed with his lawyer; the draft. of the agreement and promissory note were prepared after due deliberation; the originals were executed on 12-6-1970 at the office of the Dinny Films and the payment of the money was also made there. It was contended that the documents were executed, and the money was paid, voluntarily and out of free consent of the plaintiff. 6. In the wake of the above pleadings the trial court raised the issues, of which the material issues are issues 2 and 3 which read: "(2) Whether the agreement dated 12-6-1970 is void and illegal for all or any of the reasons mentioned in the plaint? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to realise the plaint amount from the defendant as claimed in the plaint?" These issues were considered together by that court. The evidence in the case consisted of Exts.Al to A21 on the side of the plaintiff and Exts. B1 to B38 on the side of the defendant. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examining himself as pw.1. Besides the defendant who gave evidence as dw.1, one other witness was examined on his side. 7. The evidence in the case consisted of Exts.Al to A21 on the side of the plaintiff and Exts. B1 to B38 on the side of the defendant. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examining himself as pw.1. Besides the defendant who gave evidence as dw.1, one other witness was examined on his side. 7. Out of the documentary evidence, letters which show about the business dealings, are not very relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy in the second appeal. The two promissory notes Exts. Al and A2, the proceedings relating to the criminal complaint, Ext. A13 already referred to above, the 'refer report' dated 23-8-1971 submitted by the appellant to the District Magistrate's Court, Ext. A20 and the order passed by the court on 20-8-1971, Ext. A21, the impugned agreement, Ext. A6 dated 12-6-1970, the promissory note executed on the same day by the plaintiff in favour of pw.3 Ext. B20 and the notice repudiating the transaction sent by the plaintiff on 30-6-1970 Ext. A18, appear to be relevant documents on the side of the plaintiff. Most of the documents produced on the side of the defendant relate to details of the business transaction including those in relation to the distribution of the film. As stated earlier they are not very material for the consideration of the central issue arising in the litigation. Ext. B20, the promissory note executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on 12-6-1970 is, however, a very crucial and important document. The defendant wanted to rely on it to establish that the agreement reached on that day was voluntary and that the promissory note also was executed on the next day of their visit to the police station and at the office of the Dinny Films, the attempt being to show that it was executed voluntarily and out of free consent. Little did the defendant perhaps realise then, how this document would give an important clue in relation to the happenings on the night of the 11th and the early morning of the 12th. Ext. B 36 is yet another receipt which purports to evidence that in accordance with the terms of Ext. A6 agreement, the plaintiff entrusted to the defendant some trailers, gramaphone records etc., and in token thereof the defendant had issued the above receipt. The genuineness of this document was disputed by the plaintiff. Ext. B 36 is yet another receipt which purports to evidence that in accordance with the terms of Ext. A6 agreement, the plaintiff entrusted to the defendant some trailers, gramaphone records etc., and in token thereof the defendant had issued the above receipt. The genuineness of this document was disputed by the plaintiff. The attempt of the defendant was to establish that not only Ext. A6 was executed voluntarily but also was it followed up by other steps as envisaged in the agreement Ext. A6, thus buttressing the voluntary character of Ext. A6 and the story of the defendant. 8. The trial court entered a finding to the effect that the object of the agreement Ext. A6 "was to hush up the criminal proceedings". It considered the question whether the payment of Rs. 10,000 was made under compulsion. The evidence in that regard which mainly consisted of the testimony of pws.1 and 3, was fully acceptable to the trial court, which had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of all the witnesses who gave evidence before that court. It may be noted that the examination of the plaintiff and the defendant particularly was a very prolonged one, the deposition of the plaintiff covering 81 pages, and 106 pages in the case of the defendant. pw. 3, was a cousin of the Advocate of the defendant himself. The trial court observed about him: "Pw.3 has impressed me as a witness of truth". It also noted that even the defendant's own witness dw.2 admitted that pw. 3 was a person commanding esteem. On a meticulous analysis of his evidence, the version spoken to by the plaintiff and corroborated almost to the hilt by the testimony of pw. 3, was found acceptable to the trial court. The version of the defendant that a settlement was arrived at in the night of 11-6-1970 at the police station and that the documents were, as a matter of fact, executed only on the next day, and at the office of the Dinny Films of the plaintiff was found to be totally unsustainable. The version of the defendant that a settlement was arrived at in the night of 11-6-1970 at the police station and that the documents were, as a matter of fact, executed only on the next day, and at the office of the Dinny Films of the plaintiff was found to be totally unsustainable. In Para.21 of the judgment, the trial court observed: "The facts admitted by the defendant, and those proved by the evidence tendered by the plaintiff disprove this version of the defendant, and well support the case of the plaintiff that the payment was in fact made at the police station around about mid-night on the 11th. That the payment was made under compulsion is also abundantly clear from the evidence that is on record." 9. The trial court also adverted to the principles of law, noted the scope and ambit of S.72 of the Indian Contract Act and held that in the light of the judicial interpretation of the above provision, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 10,000/-, which had been received by the defendant under coercion. 10. The appeal of the defendant was unsuccessful. The appellate court also held that the "defendant had considerable influence of the police at that time" and that the circumstances conclusively established that "not merely the draft of Ext. A6 was prepared in the police station as contended by the defendant, but the original itself was executed there and that Rs. 10,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in the police station". The development in the criminal case as disclosed by the refer report Ext. A20 and the dropping of further proceedings under orders of the District Magistrate Ext. A21 were also referred to by that court. Ultimately the court held: "A clear case of stifling prosecution is therefore made out by the plaintiff. It has also been made out that plaintiff was coerced into executing Ext. A6 agreement and to pay Rs. 10,000/- to the defendant." Taking the view that the amount bad not been paid on the free will and that there was no evidence to show that at the time the plaintiff paid Rs. 10,000/-to the defendant, moneys were due to the defendant from the plaintiff, and also noting other circumstances, the appellate court summed up as follows: "there is no evidence to show that when Ext. 10,000/-to the defendant, moneys were due to the defendant from the plaintiff, and also noting other circumstances, the appellate court summed up as follows: "there is no evidence to show that when Ext. A6 agreement was executed and an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in the Kottayam West Police Station, any amount were due to the defendant from the plaintiff. Even if any amounts were due as contended, the defendant would be liable to return the same as no settlement of accounts had been made and the plaintiff was forced to part with the amount under threat of arrest and prosecution." 11. There is absolutely no scope for doubting the correctness of the findings of fact entered by the courts below. Having gone through the testimony of the plaintiff and pw. 3 on the one side and that of the defendant and dw.2 on the other, I have no hesitation to uphold the assessment and appreciation of evidence made by the courts below. pw.1 has spoken coherently and specifically about the circumstances under which he had been subjected to coercion and forced to execute the agreement Ext. A6 the promissory note Ext. B20 and pay over a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. An admittedly respectable person, pw.3 the owner of a financial institution of considerable standing and a cousin of the lawyer of the defendant, has given evidence in a natural manner, as to how he was woken up at about midnight and informed about the emergent plea for rushing a sum of Rs. 10,000/-to the plaintiff who was in the police station at that time. He has spoken about going to the Bank, opening the safe with the owner's key (the other key is with the cashier) and proceeding to the police station, handing over the currency notes to the plaintiff, about the plaintiff passing on the same to the Sub Inspector, who in turn paid over the money to the defendant. He obtained Ext. A5 promissory note from the plaintiff at the police station. The date 12-6-1970 was entered in the promissory note, as according to him, it was midnight of the 11th and as the transaction could be entered in his book's only as on 12-6-1970, the accounts of 11-6-1970 having already been closed. He also speaks about the execution of Ext. A5 promissory note from the plaintiff at the police station. The date 12-6-1970 was entered in the promissory note, as according to him, it was midnight of the 11th and as the transaction could be entered in his book's only as on 12-6-1970, the accounts of 11-6-1970 having already been closed. He also speaks about the execution of Ext. B20 in the police station itself and this demolished the story of the defendant that the originals of Ext. B20 and A6 were executed only during day time of 12th of June and at the office of Dinny Films. The version given by the plaintiff is supported by pw.2 also. Even when one may attempt to manipulate things cleverly, some circumstance or some piece of evidence may knock the bottom of such attempts. Ext. B20 has such an effect. Though the defendant would have it that that promissory note was executed after day break on the 12th of June and at the office of the Dinny Films, the writings are seen in a paper, which has the paper marks of the Government of Kerala, the Asoka Chakra included. The trial court refers to that circumstance in the following words: "Further the promissory note Ext.B20 that has been filed by the defendant shows that it is written on paper empossed with the emblem of the Government of Kerala. In the circumstances there is every reason to believe the plaintiff when he swears that the promissory note was actually written at the police station itself." 12. Yet another ugly feature of the defendant's case is the receipt Ext. B37. The artificial nature of that document has been discussed at length in Para.28 of the trial court's judgment. The plaintiff denied the execution of such a receipt and the authenticity of the artificial endorsement contained therein. The evidence of dw. 2, relied on for establishing the genuineness of Ext. B36 did not, for good and valid reasons, find acceptance by the courts below. Though dw. 2 asserted that the advocate of the defendant was a witness to the plaintiff signing the receipt, that advocate, though included in the witness list, was not examined by the defendant. The events which have followed after the filing of the complaint on J 5-5-1970, the refer report and the ultimate dropping of the proceedings by the District Magistrate also corroborates the version of the plaintiff. The events which have followed after the filing of the complaint on J 5-5-1970, the refer report and the ultimate dropping of the proceedings by the District Magistrate also corroborates the version of the plaintiff. It therefore follows that the agreement Ext. A6 and the promissory note Ext. B20 were executed by the plaintiff at the police station and at about 1-30 a. m. on 12-6-1970 and in the atmosphere surcharged with threat and intimidation. These documents as also the payment of Rs. 10,000/- made out of the amounts given by pw. 3. at the police station, are all vitiated by lack of free will on the part of the plaintiff. The findings of fact on this aspect have only to be upheld. 13. The further question that arises is as to whether the plaintiff would, in the above circumstances, be entitled to return the amount having regard to the provisions of S.72 of the Contract Act. The Section reads as follows: 72. A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it." (emphasis supplied) The question whether coercion referred to in the above section is to be understood in the strict sense in which that term has been defined under S.15 of the Contract Act, has been considered by judicial decisions from early times. The settled legal position appears to be that while considering the provision relating to repayment under S.72, of money paid under coercion, the term'coercion' is not necessarily within the narrow definition of S.15 (See page 131, Pollock and Mulla on Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 9th Edn.) The word 'coercion' is used in its general and ordinary sense. The Privy, Council held so in Sethi Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India (1913-40 IA 56). A discussion on the case law, and the principles emerging therefrom, and the present position culminating in the supersession of the earlier view held by the decision of Indian courts are given at pages 524-5 of the same book. In Deputy Commr, v. Har Narain (AIR. 1956 Allahabad 205), the court held that money paid under threat of a prosecution is money paid under coercion within S.72 of the Act. Consequently such amount is recoverable by the payer under the section. In Deputy Commr, v. Har Narain (AIR. 1956 Allahabad 205), the court held that money paid under threat of a prosecution is money paid under coercion within S.72 of the Act. Consequently such amount is recoverable by the payer under the section. In a sense, this is implicit from the illustration(b) given to S.72 in the Act itself, reading: "(b) A railway company refuses to deliver up certain goods to the consignee, except upon the payment of an illegal charge for carriage. The consignee pays the sum charged in order to obtain the goods. He is entitled to recover so much of the charge as was illegally excessive." A case nearer in point, is that of the Rajasthan High Court, reported in State of Rajasthan v. Mandaswarup & another (AIR. 1962 Rajasthan 127). In that case, at the instance of a third party, a person was taken to and kept under wrongful confinement by the police. In the situation then prevailing, the brother of the person so detained paid money out of joint funds to get the detainee released. The High Court held that the money in such a situation could not be said to be money paid voluntarily. The maxim in pari delicto was held to be inapplicable. The person detained and the person who paid the money to get the detainee released, were both held to be entitled to recover the money from the third party. A decision of a later date is that of the Gujarat High Court in Retla v. Union of India (AIR. 1970 Gujarat?59). It is not necessary to add to the list of decisions which have applied the principles to differing factual situations. The principle appears to be fairly well settled, in the background of the judicial decisions, including those alluded to above. 1970 Gujarat?59). It is not necessary to add to the list of decisions which have applied the principles to differing factual situations. The principle appears to be fairly well settled, in the background of the judicial decisions, including those alluded to above. When a person such as the plaintiff in this case, is taken to a police station, and detained there for over eight hours, and mostly during night, the detention prolonging to desperate and desolate hours of mid-night, and with content threats of a police official that he would be arrested, when the person so detained is under an additional stress and anxiety about his aged and ailing father scheduled to undertake a journey on the following day to seek expert medical aid from a far off hospital (for which reservation of tickets for the journey has been already made) and when the person is distresssed about the loss of his social and business reputation, and is even terrified about infliction of bodily injury, it could not admit of any doubt that the situation is one of coercion as understood under S.72 of the Act. It has been well said that law does not lend countenance to either form of coercion, 'whether the target is the mind or the muscle; or the focal point of attack is the body or the nerves, or the form of torture subtle or severe'. The atmosphere of the police station, the duration of the detention, the tone and tenor of the threatening language of a police official, and the encircling gloom left behind by a day that was dead, all conjure up to produce a situation of coercion, with torment both to body and to mind. The facts as established therefore, vitiate the transactions entered into in such an atmosphere, and in such a situation, as obnoxious and violative of S.72 of the Act. It follows that the findings of the courts below that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the money paid at the police station to the defendant under the circumstances as detailed by them, is eminently justified. No interference whatever is called for with those conclusions. 14. Despite a shrewd scheming and illegitimate official pressure and interference, justice has thus emerged victorious and wickedness has been vanquished by the legal process and the resort to the courts of law. No interference whatever is called for with those conclusions. 14. Despite a shrewd scheming and illegitimate official pressure and interference, justice has thus emerged victorious and wickedness has been vanquished by the legal process and the resort to the courts of law. Truth is sometimes like a volcano covered with snow, erupting violently against the surrounding misdeeds. Fertile fields emerge when the lava gets cooled. In the lush greenery springing in that area, many a fair flower of justice blooms. 15. The second appeal at the instance of the twice defeated defendant suffer the same fate, as did the pleas of the defendant in the courts below. It is totally devoid of merit. It deserves to be, and is hereby dismissed; and with costs. 16. The facts of the case are somewhat distressing in that even in such an advanced State and in an enlightened atmosphere, the ghosts of coercion should still haunt the innocent and the law abiding. May be, it is not justifiable to make a sweeping generalisation from isolated instances. However, even an isolated instance is sufficient to tarnish the glory and dignity of a disciplined force. 17. There is sufficiently voluminous literature on the subject of the police force, ranging from Chanakya to Job Charnock. It has been remarked, though with a tint of cynicism that, 'Dand Neethi' that was prevalent even before Alexander's invasion did not seem to change much through the ages. Justinian, Jeremy Bentham, Cesar Beccaria, have all dealt with some aspects or other of the police and their conduct. Some have commented how the police had been called upon to perform a role "in the manner which was at once protective, detective and repressive" and how, in performance of such a role, the police came to be projected as the 'strong arm' of the Government, and as 'an agency designed to intimidate, deter and punish.' The Malayalam literature also has portrayed the police force in its lights and shades. A novel almost contemporaneously published with'Indulekha' is one of the first in the series of books dealing with that aspect in that literature. One of the eminent humorous writers in Malayalam, had written fairly profusely, in essays, poems, and stories, with considerable understanding of, and sympathy for, the difficulties and duties of the police force. The main thrust of the critical remarks made by him are particularly noteworthy even now. One of the eminent humorous writers in Malayalam, had written fairly profusely, in essays, poems, and stories, with considerable understanding of, and sympathy for, the difficulties and duties of the police force. The main thrust of the critical remarks made by him are particularly noteworthy even now. (See page 225 of 'Jeevitbasmaranakal', an autobiography by E. V. Krishna Pillai, D. C. Books, 1978 Edition.) 18. The Court of Appeal in a recent case dealt with the responsible role and the difficult duties of the police force. Lawton, Lord Justice, observed: "Police Constables are no one's lackeys; but they do have a duty to preserve the peace no matter how unpopular that may make them with some sections of the community." See R. v. Chief Constable, (1981) 2 All E. R.826 at page 836. Lord Temple-men sketched the difficult task to be performed by the police in a situation of tension, obstruction and resistance. He observed: "Even Mahatma Gandhi discovered to his sorrow that in the conduct of ordinary mortals passive resistance only remains passive so long as the resistance is successful the police have difficult tasks to perform and their interventions may be exploited and misrepresented, but, if persuasion fails, action must follow." (emphasis supplied) (See page 839) The duty of the police to protect life and property and the limits within which they have to perform their arduous task, have been sketched in the decisions reported in Glasbrook Bros. Ltd. v. Glamorgan County Council, 1925 A. C. 270 at p.285. Christie v. Leachinksky,1947 A.C. 57 3 and Rice v. Connolly, (1966)2 Q. B. 414 at p. 419. The guidelines for their action have been given by the decision of this court also (vide C. Kannan v. Superintendent of Police, 1974 KLT. 516). 19. Only recently Trilok Nath, a former Inspector General of Police in Bihar, dealt with in detail about the police force, giving his assessment about its past working and his suggestion for future reforms. He opined: "The case for a new image for the police in this country is incontrovertible. 516). 19. Only recently Trilok Nath, a former Inspector General of Police in Bihar, dealt with in detail about the police force, giving his assessment about its past working and his suggestion for future reforms. He opined: "The case for a new image for the police in this country is incontrovertible. This would imply not merely a refurbishing of the raiments but would involve a complete change in the inner content." Equally relevant in the context, are the editorial comments of a national newspaper, (a newspaper which Alan Campbell-Johnson) "particularly admired" as "a paper brought up on the best traditions of nineteenth century British Journalism" appear to reflect some balanced views on this topic (see his book 'Mission with Mountbatten' page 202), which inter alia, contains the following passage: "Much of course, depends on the kind of policemen that constitute the force. Not all the constables as at present recruited have the right education and outlook to undertake even the routine duties assigned to them with reasonable efficiency. Added to this is the impression among the public that the police personnel are unhelpful, rude and overbearing and not as reliable as one would desire them to be. There is the other side to the story, equally valid that the police are overworked, ill paid and labour under sub-human conditions that do not exactly help to promote work consciousness. What is really needed is to change the police perspectives by suitable training (apart from raising the quality of the men recruited) that promotes greater rapport with the public". 20. 'Principles of Police Conduct' have been fairly, clearly and exhaustively delineated in Para.87 of the Police Manual, Volume I (compiled under the directions of the then Inspector-General of Police, Sri. M. Gopalan). It would be worthwhile for the members of the Force always to adhere to the principles so clearly and so cogently laid down. Of particular relevance in this context appear to be clauses (b), (c) and (1) reading as follows: "(b) The police are essentially a law enforcing agency. They should not question the propriety or necessity of any duly enacted law. They should enforce the law firmly and impartially, without fear or favour, malice or vindictiveness. Of particular relevance in this context appear to be clauses (b), (c) and (1) reading as follows: "(b) The police are essentially a law enforcing agency. They should not question the propriety or necessity of any duly enacted law. They should enforce the law firmly and impartially, without fear or favour, malice or vindictiveness. (c) The police should recognise and respect the limitations of their powers and functions, They should not usurp or even seem to usurp the functions of the judiciary and sit in judgment on cases. Nor should they avenge individuals and punish the guilty. (I) The police should recognise that they can enhance their utility to the administration and the country only by maintaining a high standard of discipline, unstinted obedience to superiors and loyalty to the Force and by keeping themselves in a state of constant training and preparedness." It needs no emphasis that any dilution in the devotion for duty and in the disciplined conduct of this Force, will have undesirable consequences in the good governance of the country. 21. Judges have not hesitated to make critical remarks when they came across the unseemly conduct on the part of the police officers. Viscount Simon sitting in the House of Lords and delivering judgment in Christie v. Leachinksky,1947 A. C. 573 at p. 582, in dignified language, demonstrated a note of caution to the Liverpool Police. The learned Law Lord observed: "It is much to be hoped that the Liverpool Police will be instructed not to disregard the limitations laid down by law in this connection again." Perhaps in stronger terms, were the views expressed by Tek Chand, J. when he commented upon the undesirability and futility of police torture in the decision in Kidar Nath L. Jagan Nath Aggarwal v. State of Punjab and Others, AIR. 1960 Punjab 122. 22. The deviation on the part of the police force from the conduct expected of them under the Police Manual itself as revealed from the facts of the case, has prompted this court to make these observations. 23. It is hoped, as did Blackburn, L. J. in a different context, that "this exordium is justifiably venial". 1960 Punjab 122. 22. The deviation on the part of the police force from the conduct expected of them under the Police Manual itself as revealed from the facts of the case, has prompted this court to make these observations. 23. It is hoped, as did Blackburn, L. J. in a different context, that "this exordium is justifiably venial". These observations shall not, however, further be prolonged; for it is useful to remind one of the excerpts from the Seventeenth Century Nun's prayer (whose source is unknown but whose text is happily preserved in the British Museum): "Lord, Thou knowest better than I know myself that I am growing older and will some day be old.... Keep me from the fatal habit of thinking I must say something on every subject and on every occasion... Make roe thoughtful but not moody; helpful but no bossy Keep my mind free from the recital of endless details; give me wings to get to the point... Give me the ability to see good things in unexpected places, and talents in unexpected people. And, give me, 0 Lord, the grace to tell them so."