JUDGMENT A.R. Navkar, J. This is an appeal under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against the judgment and decree dated 15-1-1980, passed by the Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No. 15-A of 1979. The plaintiff is the husband, -while the defendant is the wife. The plaintiff, in the plaint, has alleged that the parties were married according to Hindu rites at lndore on 14-12-1973. After two days of the marriage, the wife and the husband came to Gwalior and started residing at 182, Sindhi Colony, Lashkar. After some time, it is alleged by the plaintiff that he observed a scar on the abdomen of the wife, so he enquired about it. But, the wife did not say anything regarding the matter. On 15-6-1975, the plaintiff took his wife to Dr. (Mrs.) Niglye, Nai Sarak, Lashkar and when the lady Doctor observed the scar, she opined that it is due to an operation per-formed on the wife sometime ago. When the plaintiff pressed his wife to tell about, she confessed that there was an operation before her marriage with the plaintiff because there was an abortion and the operation was performed by one Dr. Kukreja, practising at lndore. The fact that there was an abortion before the marriage was never made known to the plaintiff. The wife, to show her repentance at her lapse prior to the marriage, gave a letter to the plaintiff that she is very sorry for the lapse and the lapse should be condoned by him. The plaintiff did not do anything in the said matter on the basis of the admission of the wife. On 4-12-1975, the defendant left the house of the plaintiff and with-out consent or permission of the husband, when the members of the family, were absent, after taking jewellery with her, she went to lndore, to the house of her parcnts. The plaintiff searched for her and then he went to Shivpuri along with one Nichaldas Sindhi, but he could not find the defendant at Shivpuri. Therefore leaving'Nichaldas behind, the plaintiff further went in search of his wife upto Guna and when he could not find her at Guna, he came back and made an urgent trunk call to the parents of the defendant. As the parents were not at home, the trunk call could not mature. Therefore leaving'Nichaldas behind, the plaintiff further went in search of his wife upto Guna and when he could not find her at Guna, he came back and made an urgent trunk call to the parents of the defendant. As the parents were not at home, the trunk call could not mature. Then, after some time, the plaintiff wrote a letter to her. After some time, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the father of the defendant for sending the wife back. The registered letter was received by the father of the defendant on 10-12-1975 and the letter was replied by the brother of the defendant on the same date. On 9-1-1976, the plaintiff sent a registered letter to the defendant saying that firstly, there was a lapse on her part and secondly, leaving the house of the husband without the permission of the husband is not proper for a married lady and. the behaviour is highly objectionable. The letter was received by the defendant. But, she did not reply the same, nor she returned back to the house. As a last resort, the plaintiff, along with his father, went to the house of the defendant's father to bring her back, but the father of the defendant and her brother behaved improperly with the plaintiff and his father and, therefore, they had to come back to Gwalior. Since then the defendant has not come back to Gwalior. She remained with her parents for nearly two years and just to make a defence available on 3-10-1977, she sent a reply through one advocate Tej Kumar Sethi, alleging certain facts which were incorrect to the knowledge of the defendant. The said letter was replied on 20-10-1977, by a registered notice through M. N. Pendharkar, advocate. As the defendant has not come back to the plaintiff's house and she has left the house of the plaintiff for a period of two years, continuously without any cause, it will amount that she has deserted the plaintiff and she wants to put the matrimonial relations to an end. Alleging this the plaintiff has said that he is entitled to a decree of divorce because the defendant has deserted the husband for a continuous period of two years without any sufficient or reasonable cause. The suit is filed on 5-10-1977. The defendant, in her defence, has admitted the marriage and coming to Gwalior. Alleging this the plaintiff has said that he is entitled to a decree of divorce because the defendant has deserted the husband for a continuous period of two years without any sufficient or reasonable cause. The suit is filed on 5-10-1977. The defendant, in her defence, has admitted the marriage and coming to Gwalior. But, she has denied that there was any scar on her abdomen and that there was any abortion, as alleged. It was further denied that there was any operation performed on her by one Dr. Kukreja of Indore. On the contrary, she has alleged that the plaintiff started beating the defendant and started be-having cruelly with her and was asking for additional amount of dowry. As the amount was not paid the plaintiff still persisted in giving cruel treatment to the defendant. The plaintiff's sister Maya had a major hand in the cruel treatment meted to the defendant. The plaintiff gave a severe beating to the defendant in the month of December and asked the defendant to write a document by which it will be possible to get a divorce, but all these facts were not accepted by the defendant and as such, on 4-12-1975, whatever ornaments were on the body of the defendant were forcibly taken out by the husband and she was made to sit in a bus which was to go to Indore and she had the wearing apparel on her body and nothing else. The allegation that on 4-12-1975, the defendant left the house of the plaintiff without his consent is false and it was denied. On the contrary, she was forced to leave the house of the husband, as mentioned above. The treatment of the defendant was very much cruel and she had every fear that her life is in danger and because of this fear, she had no other alternative but to stay with the parents. The plaintiff really wanted to marry again and to facilitate second marriage, somehow the plaintiff drove the defendant out of his house. The ailegations that the letters were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant are false and are denied. It is denied by the defendant that the plaintiff and his father came Jo take her away with them to Gwalior. The ailegations that the letters were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant are false and are denied. It is denied by the defendant that the plaintiff and his father came Jo take her away with them to Gwalior. When enquired, the defendant came to know that the plaintiff and his father had come to Indore to settle the second marriage with one Jaywanti, whose father's name is Tirathdas and who is a resident of 17, Alapura, Indore and on 6-5-1977, at the house of maternal uncle of Jaywanti, she was married to the plaintiff. After .6-5-1977, Jaywanti and the plaintiff are residing together as husband and wife. Jaywanti has changed her name from Jaywanti to Meena after the said marriage. Further, the defendant has alleged that Jaywanti alias Meena stayed with the plaintiff in the house of one Sher Singh Raghuvanshi in Tahsil Bareli, District Raisen as husband and wife and similarly they stayed as husband and wife at house No. 17, Alapura, Old Indore, Indore. It was further stated that the defendant is ready and willing to stay with the plaintiff as wife. But, as the plaintiff has married Jaywanti, which marriage is illegal, it will be difficult for the defendant to stay with the plaintiff as a wife as long as Jaywanti is residing with him. If plaintiff stops staying with Jaywanti, the defendant is ready and willing to stay with the plaintiff. The allegation that the defendant has deserted the plaintiff is false and is not admitted. Alleging all these facts, the defendant has stated that the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed and the costs be given. Taking into consideration the plaint and the written statement and averments made therein, the learned trial Court has framed the following issues: Whether on .4-12-1975, in the morning the defendant ran away from the-house of the plaintiff in the Sindhi Colony without anybody's knowledge ?... Yes. Whether from the said date till the date of filing of the application, that is, 5-12-1977, the defendant has continuously deserted the plaintiff ? ......No. Whether on 4-12-1975, the plaintiff forcibly took out the ornaments from the body of the defendant and made the defendant to board the bus going to Indore only with the wearing apparels ? ......No. Whether the plaintiff wanted to have the second marriage' and because of this he drove the defendant out of his house ? ...... Yes. ......No. Whether on 4-12-1975, the plaintiff forcibly took out the ornaments from the body of the defendant and made the defendant to board the bus going to Indore only with the wearing apparels ? ......No. Whether the plaintiff wanted to have the second marriage' and because of this he drove the defendant out of his house ? ...... Yes. Whether the plaintiff has married with Jaywanti on 6-5-1977 for the second time ? ......Yes. Relief and costs ? ......Case dismissed against the defendant with costs. After recording the evidence, the trial Court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the present appeal is filed. The first issue which is decided by the trial Court is whether on 4-12-1975 in the morning, the defendant left the house of the plaintiff with-out informing anybody. The issue has be found in favour of the plaintiff and, in my opinion, correctly. It was submitted before me by the learned counsel for the defendant that the issue has not been correctly decided by the_ learned trial Court and the reason for saying so is that nobody has see the defendant leaving the house of the plaintiff and going to Indore. But, this submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it has come in the evidence of the defendant that a trunk call was made to the plaintiff by the defendant's father as well as brother, saying that Radha, the defendant, had reached Indore safely. It was further asked by them as to what is the reason why the defendant has left the house of the plaintiff and has come to Indore. Therefore, the submission that nobody saw the defendant leaving the house of the plaintiff is not of much importance. The fact remains that the defendant left the house of the plaintiff on 4-12-1975 and that she did not take the consent of the plaintiff to leave the house. After leaving the house, the other factor which is admitted in the evidence of the parties is that till filing of the suit, that is, upto 5-12-1977, the defendant did not return to the house of the plaintiff. Therefore, if these two dates are taken into consideration, then it can safely be presumed that marital relations between the two came to an end and they were never revived again. Therefore, if these two dates are taken into consideration, then it can safely be presumed that marital relations between the two came to an end and they were never revived again. The learned trial Court has held in deciding issue No. 2 that the defendant has not deserted the plaintiff as alleged by him in his suit filed before the Court. The other issue which is considered by the trial Court is as to whether the plaintiff wanted to marry again and, therefore, he has driven the defendant put of his house? The next issue is the corollary to this issue and the Court has held that on 6-5-1977, the plaintiff has-married one Jaywanti and as such, the defendant was within her rights to leave the house of the plaintiff and to stay with her parents. I will now consider whether the trial Court has decided issue No. 2 correctly or not. To prove desertion certain facts are necessary and those facts were considered in Lachman v. Meena AIR 1964 SC 40 in which it was observed as under : - In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi.) Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : .(1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. The inference may be drawn from certain facts may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time. It is settied Law that the burden of proving desertion-the "factum" as well as the "animus deserendi "-is on the petitioner, and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. In other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner-husband has still to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. Once, desertion, AS defined earlier, is established there is-no obligation on the deserted husband (taking the case where he is the deserted spouse) to appeal to the deserting spouse to. change her mind and the circumstance that the deserted husband makes no effort to take steps to effect a reconciliation with the wife does not debar him from obtaining the relief of judicial separation, for once desertion is proved the deserting spouse, so long as she evidences no sincere intention to effect a reconciliation and return to the matrimonial home, is presumed to continue in desertion. Of course, the matter would wear a different complexion and different considerations would arise where before the end of the statutory period of 2 years pr even thereafter before the filing of the petition for judicial separation the conduct of the deserted spouse was such as to make the deserting spouse desist from making any attempt at reconciliation. Of course, the matter would wear a different complexion and different considerations would arise where before the end of the statutory period of 2 years pr even thereafter before the filing of the petition for judicial separation the conduct of the deserted spouse was such as to make the deserting spouse desist from making any attempt at reconciliation. If he or she so acts as to make it plain to the deserting spouse that any offer on the part of the latter to resume cohabitation would be reject-ed, then the deserting spouse could obviously not be blamed for not bringing the desertion to an end. Or again, if before the end of the period of two years or the filing of the petition his or her conduct is such as to provide a just cause for the deserting spouse for not resuming cohabitation, the petition cannot succeed, for the petitioner would have to establish that the desertion was without just cause during the entire period referred to in section 10(1)(a) of the Act before he can succeed. The question whether a deserting spouse has a reasonable cause for not trying to bring the desertion to an end and the corresponding question-whether desertion without cause has existed for the necessary period must always be question of fact. The question for consideration in such cases is: "Is the conduct of the deserted spouse such as to excuse the deserting spouse from making any attempt to put an end to the desertion or from attempting any reconciliation?" The basis of this' rule rests on this, that such conduct on the part of the deserted spouse would legally operate as a consent to the existing separation and would have the effect of absolving the deserting spouse from any obligation to return to the matrimonial home or to make amends for her improper conduct, for the petitioner in a petition for judicial separation grounded on desertion by the other spouse has to prove that for the period of two years specified in section 10 (1)(a) of the Act the respondent has without cause been in desertion and that intention must be proved to exist throughout that period. Two distinct matters have to co-exist in order that desertion might come to an end. Two distinct matters have to co-exist in order that desertion might come to an end. In the first place, there must be conduct on the part of the deserted spouse which affords just and reasonable cause for the deserting spouse not to seek reconciliation and which absolves her from her continuing obligation to return to the matrimonial home. In this, one had to have regard to the conduct of the deserted spouse. But there is one other matter which is also of equal importance, that is that the conduct of the deserted spouse should have had such an impact on the mind of the deserting spouse that in fact it causes her to continue to live apart and thus continue the desertion. But where, however, on the facts" it is dear that the conduct of the deserted spouse has had no such effect on the mind of the deserting spouse there is no rule of law that desertion terminates by reason of the conduct of the deserted spouse. The principle that the conduct of the deserted spouse which is proved not to have caused the deserting spouse to continue the desertion does not put an end to the desertion appears to be self-evident and deducible from the legal concepts underlying the law as to desertion. Per Subba Rao J. : - Heavy burden lies upon a petitioner who seeks relief on the ground of desertion to prove four essential conditions, namely, (1) the factum of separation; (2) animus deserendi; (3) absence of his or her consent; and (4) absence of his or her conduct giving reasonable cause to the deserting spouse, to leave the matrimonial home. The offence of desertion must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt and as a rule of prudence the evidence of the petitioner shall be corroborated. In short the proof required in a matrimonial case is to be equated to that in a criminal case. The burden of proof to establish that the deserting spouse has just cause or not to leave the matrimonial home lies on the petitioner. There is a well-known distinction between legal burden and onus of proof. Legal burden always remains on the petitioner; and onus of proof shifts and is as continuous process. But the Court has to hold on the evidence whether the legal burden to establish desertion without cause has been established by the petitioner. There is a well-known distinction between legal burden and onus of proof. Legal burden always remains on the petitioner; and onus of proof shifts and is as continuous process. But the Court has to hold on the evidence whether the legal burden to establish desertion without cause has been established by the petitioner. The inclusive definition of desertion in the Explanation to section 10(1) is only intended to incorporate therein the doctrine of 'constructive desertion' known to English law and the language is designedly made wide to cover the peculiar circumstances of our society. The ingredients of desertion as well as constructive desertion are the same, namely, animus and factum, though in one case there is actual abandonment and in the other there is expulsive conduct. Under certain circumstances the deserted spouse may even stay under the same roof or even in the same bed-room. In our society it is well known that in many a home the husband would be guilty of expulsive conduct towards his wife by completely neglecting her to the extent of denying her all marital rights, but still the wife, because of social and economic conditions, may continue to live under the same roof. The words 'wilful neglect' in the Explanation were designed to cover constructive desertion in the English law. If so, it follows that wilful conduct must satisfy the ingredients of desertion as indicated above. Section 9(2) of the Act does not afford any dictionary for ascertaining the meaning of the expression 'reasonable cause' in the Explanation to section 10(1). Further, section 9 and section 10 deal with different subjects- one with restitution of conjugal rights and the other with judicial separation. It is not open to the Court to import the provisions of the one into the other, except in so far as the sections themselves provide for it. The Explanation does not expressly or by necessary implication equate reasonable cause with a legal ground for sustaining a plea against an action for restitution of conjugal rights. Indeed, it is a limitation on one of such legal grounds. There is an essential distinction between the scope of the two sections. The Legislature even in socially advanced countries leans on the side of sanctity of marriage; therefore, under section 9 of the Act, our Parliament imposes stringent conditions to non-suit a claim for restitution of conjugal rights. Indeed, it is a limitation on one of such legal grounds. There is an essential distinction between the scope of the two sections. The Legislature even in socially advanced countries leans on the side of sanctity of marriage; therefore, under section 9 of the Act, our Parliament imposes stringent conditions to non-suit a claim for restitution of conjugal rights. On the same reasoning, under section 10 of the Act, it does not permit separation of spouses on the ground of desertion except when the desertion is without reasonable cause. The expression 'reasonable cause' must be so construed as to bring about a union rather than separation. The said expression is more comprehensive than cruelty and such other causes. It takes in every cause which in a given situation appears to be reasonable to a Court justifying a spouse to desert the other spouse. Section 9 of the Act does not throw any light on the construction of the expression 'without reasonable cause' and whether there is a reasonable cause or not in a given case shall be decided only on the evidence and the peculiar circumstances of that case. To sum up the legal position the legal burden is upon the petitioning spouse to establish by convincing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the respondent abandoned him or her without reasonable cause. The petitioner must also prove that there was desertion throughout the statutory period and there was no bonafide attempt on the respondent's part to return to (he matrimonial home and that the petitioner did not prevent the other spouse by his or her action by words or conduct from cohabitation. The expression 'wilful negicct' included in the section does not introduce a new concept in Indian law unknown to the English law, but is only an affirmation of the doctrine of constrictive desertion. The said doctrine is not riaid but eiastic and without doing violence to the principles governing it. It can be applied to the peculiar situations that arise in an Indian society and home. No inspiration could be derived from Section 9 of the Act in order to construe the scope of the expression 'without reasonable cause' and other there is a reasonable cause or not is a question of fact to be decided on the facts of each case. No inspiration could be derived from Section 9 of the Act in order to construe the scope of the expression 'without reasonable cause' and other there is a reasonable cause or not is a question of fact to be decided on the facts of each case. Held, in a petition by the husband for judicial separation under Section 10(l)(a) on the ground that is wife had cleserted him, on the appreciation of the facts in the case (per majority Subba Rao J. contra) that the wife (respondent) did not leave the house of the husband (petitioner) with his consent but she did so of her own accord and without his knowledge. There was satisfactory proof that besides the factum of desertion there was also the animus deserendi at the time when she left the husband's house and the requisite animus continued for the duration of two years before the presentation of the petitioner's petition for judicial separation under section 10(1)(a). Her offer to return after some time as expressed in her letters was not sincere and there was in reality no intention to return and the mere fact that letters were written expressing such an intention did not interrupt the desertion from continuing. The letter of the appellant, dated 1-4-1955, assuming that it contained insinuation of unchastity against the respondent, did not have such an impact on the mind of the latter (wife) that it caused her to continue to live apart and thus continue desertion. That letter, therefore, did not afford a justification in law to the wife for her refusal to come back to join him. The petitioner (husband) had thus proved that the respondent (wife) had deserted him without just cause for the period requisite under section 10(1)(a), and was entitled to a decree for judicial separation: AIR 1960 Bom. 418 , reversed. In the present case, there is evidence of the plaintiff Satyapal that along with his relation who had been to the house of the defendant, asked her to accompany him and to stay with him. But when Satyapal along with his relation, went to the house of the defendant to bring her to Gwalior, the plaintiff and his relations were not treated properly but, on the contrary, they were insulted and the defendant denied to accompany the plaintiff. But when Satyapal along with his relation, went to the house of the defendant to bring her to Gwalior, the plaintiff and his relations were not treated properly but, on the contrary, they were insulted and the defendant denied to accompany the plaintiff. There was exchange of notices also between the parties and when I consider the reply given by the defendant through one counsel Tej Kumar Sethi, the position of relations between the parties becomes dear. In the said notice dated 3-10-1977, the defendant has admitted that she is married according to Sindhi rites with the plaintiff and the defendant is the legally wedded wife of the plaintiff. Further, the notice mentions that the plaintiff repeatedly asked for additional amount of money and also the threatened that if the amount is not paid, the defendant will have to suffer serious consequences. It also mentions that Rs.1,200 and Rs.5,000 on another occasion were paid to the plaintiff. A document which the plaintiff knows to be false, was got written from the defendant by giving her threat. The plaintiff used to beat the defendant every now and then and that her life was in danger. It further says that the plaintiff wants to marry a girl who was his beloved prior to the marriage with the defendant and the plaintiff wanted to keep her in his house as his wife and when the defendant showed her unwillingness to accept this, on 4-12-1975, the defendant was given beating and was turned out of the house. If this notice is taken into consideration, it leaves no doubt that the defendant, after leaving the house of the plaintiff, wanted to put an end to the marital obligations and for her stay with her parents, she had a sufficient and reasonable cause and as she had a reasonable and sufficient cause, her staying away from the house of the plaintiff will not amount to desertion. So, the main point to be seen in this case is as to whether the allegations made by the defendant have been proved by her or not. If she has proved the allegations made in the notice sent by her to the plaintiff, then the judgment passed by the trial Court, I will have to uphold. So, the main point to be seen in this case is as to whether the allegations made by the defendant have been proved by her or not. If she has proved the allegations made in the notice sent by her to the plaintiff, then the judgment passed by the trial Court, I will have to uphold. But, in case, I come to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove sufficient and reasonable cause as alleged by her in her notice, then the position of the case will be altogether different. Therefore, I will consider whether the defendant had a reasonable and sufficient cause. The learned counsel for the defendant submitted before me that the plaintiff married one Jaywanti and as he has married Jaywanti, defendant was within her rights to stay away from the plaintiff. In my opinion, the marriage of Jaywanti alias Meena with the plaintiff has not been proved. To prove the alleged marriage, the defendant has examined one Mohanlal (D. W. 4). He has stated in his statement that he knows Satyapal and he performed the marriage of Satyapal at Tilak Colony, Budhwara, Bhopal. The girl was daughter of one Tirathram and her name was jaywanti. The name of the girl Jaywanti was changed to Meena and in the said marriage, there were about 40 to 50 persons present. When he was cross-examined as to the identity and complexion ?f the girl, he had to say that he is not definite about the identity of the girl and he has got only faint idea as at the time of the marriage, he could have a slight glance of the face of the girl. Whether she is fair or of dark complexion, he could not say. From his statement it is not dear that he could remember the date, the date or the month of the marriage he has performed. Further there were about 40 to 50 persons who were present to witness the marriage ceremony, but no one has been produced to substantiate it. From his statement it is not dear that he could remember the date, the date or the month of the marriage he has performed. Further there were about 40 to 50 persons who were present to witness the marriage ceremony, but no one has been produced to substantiate it. Therefore his evidence is not sufficient to hold that he has performed the marriage of Satyapal with Jaywanti, along with his evidence, if I consider the evidence of Tirathdas (P. W. 5) father of Jaywanti and also the evidence of Kaushalyabai (D. W.3 mother of Jaywanti, it is seen that they have stated that Jaywanti was not married to Satyapal as alleged by the defendant. No valid reason was shown to as to why the parents should speak false with respect to the marriage ceremony of their daughter. The defendant further wanted to examine Jaywanti as her witness and when she attended the Court, she was given up by the defendant. Yhis action of the defendant dearly shows that if Jaywanti had been examined as her witness, she would have stated against her. There is also contradiction in the evidence," of the defendant as to where the marriage took place. Therefore, if all these facts are taken into consideration, I am of the opinion that the alleged defence of the defendant that the plaintiff married Jaywanti and was staying with Jaywanti as her husband cannot be accepted. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that because of the alleged marriage, the defendant used to stay away from the house of the plaintiff cannot be accepted and I will have to hold that she had no reasonable cause to leave the house of the plaintiff. It was arpued that the burden to prove desertion is not on the plaintiff and if the wife proves that she had reasonable cause to stay away, then the petition for divorce should fail. But, the question of burden of proof was considered in Manglabai v. Deorao 1963 MPLJ 878 : AIR 1962 MP. It was arpued that the burden to prove desertion is not on the plaintiff and if the wife proves that she had reasonable cause to stay away, then the petition for divorce should fail. But, the question of burden of proof was considered in Manglabai v. Deorao 1963 MPLJ 878 : AIR 1962 MP. 193 - and it was observed therein as under:- In order that desertion may furnish a ground for judicial separation, the petitioner must prove the following ingredients: (1) Factum of separation; (2) Animus deserendi i.e. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end; and (3) period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, during which separation has been continuing. If in fact there has been a separation, the essential question is whether the act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. In a matter of domestic quarrel between husband and wife it is hardly possible to adduce ocular evidence. But, at the same time, a mere allegation of ill-treatment and more so when it is very vague, cannot necessarily be an answer to the petition under Section 10. Where direct evidence is not available it is an absolute requirement that the written statement must contain the allegations with precision and with all necessary details. It is imperative to assert the nature and extent of ill-treatment or beating when the wife complains of constructive desertion b\ her husband. The question of desertion cannot be decided by merely enquiring which party left the matrimonial home first. The husband may live in the place but make it impossible for his wife to live there and if in that state of things the wife leaves the matrimonial home it can be said to be desertion by the husband or the wife. In deciding the question of desertion the court has to look at the conduct of both the parties. Indeed there is no substantial difference between a husband leaving his wife with animus deserendi and a husband who by his conduct with like intention, brings cohabitation to an end by virtually compelling his wife to depart from the matrimonial home. But it is not every conduct of the husband although irritating to the wife, which may justify her in leaving the husband. It must be of a grave and convincing character. But it is not every conduct of the husband although irritating to the wife, which may justify her in leaving the husband. It must be of a grave and convincing character. A line of demarcation must be drawn between blameworthy conduct causing unhappiness to the other spouse and conduct equivalent to dismissal from consortium. In the absence of any pleading or proof to establish grave and convincing conduct of the husband equivalent to expelling the wife, it cannot be said that he was guilty of constructive desertion. Her bald statement of apprehinsion of danger to her life is neither here nor there. The same principles are laid down in Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabfiavati AIR 1957 SC 176 . Therefore, before proceeding further, I will have to consider the evidence produced by the parties in the case. [After considering the evidence in paras 10 to 17, the Judgment proceeds:] As the defence of the defendant is not proved by the defendant and as the plaintiff has proved that the defendant has left his house without any cause and against his wishes and she stays away for the period of more than two years continuously, the plaintiff, in my opinion, is entitled to a decree of divorce as claimed for. Before proceeding further, I will have to consider the proceedings taken by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court for reconciliation between the parties. It was argued before me when the reconciliation proceedings were being taken by this Court that the wife is ready and willing to stay with the husband and as she is ready and willing to stay with her husband, a decree for divorce need not be granted in favoar of the plaintiff. The real question is whether the offer made by the defendant Radha is genuine and bonafide. As I have already stated above, the defendant has stated that she is willing to stay with Satyapal if she agrees to stay away from Jaywanti, the alleged second wife taken by him. This offer is a conditional one and that too, the alleged second marriage is not proved by the defendant. Therefore, such a conditional offer in which the condition itself is a false one cannot be said to be a genuine offer and the plaintiff was within his rights to reject such an offer and to refuse reconciliation. This offer is a conditional one and that too, the alleged second marriage is not proved by the defendant. Therefore, such a conditional offer in which the condition itself is a false one cannot be said to be a genuine offer and the plaintiff was within his rights to reject such an offer and to refuse reconciliation. The other aspect is that when the period of two years is elapsed and the plaintiff has a right to get a decree for divorce, to set at naught the right which is accrued in favour of the plaintiff if the offer is made, it cannot be termed to be a genuine one. The effect of such offer should not be to disentitle the plaintiff to get his legal rights through the Court. Therefore, the reconciliation proceedings which were taken in the trial Court as well as in the appellate Court and the offer of the defendant to stay with her husband not being a bona fide offer, will not disentitle the plaintiff from getting a decree of divorce. The next point to be considered is that if decree for divorce is granted in favour of the plaintiff, then the defendant will be entitled for alimony. She has already been granted Rs.50 p. m. as alimony during the pendency of the suit as well as the appeal. She will be entitled to get this alimony till her life or till she remarries. 'Asaresailt of the above discussion it is held that on 4-12-1975, the defendant left the house of the plaintiff and the defendant has deyerted the lmsband without any cause continuously for a period of two years. Further, it is held that on 4-12-1975, the defendant, of her own accord, went to Indore and it is not the plaintiff who made her board the bus forcibly. Further, it is held that the plaintiff did not turn out of his house the defendant as he wanted to remarry. Lastly, it is held that en 6-5-1977, the plaintiff did not marry Jaywanti, as aSleged by the defendant. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside and a decree for divorce is granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant, as mentioned above. Lastly, it is held that en 6-5-1977, the plaintiff did not marry Jaywanti, as aSleged by the defendant. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside and a decree for divorce is granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant, as mentioned above. Taking into consideration the fact of the case, the partiey are directed lo bear their own costs of this appeal in this Court, and also of the lower Courts. q