MONOJ KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated Sept. 25, 1981 passed by a learned Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 2731 (w) of 1980, which was issued on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India jointly filed by the Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. , and Sri Keshab Narayan Banerjee, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 respectively. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioners is that the petitioner No. 1 was incorporated on Aug. 24, 1948 and is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner No. 2 is a Director of petitioner No. 1. In the late 19th Century one Jadablal Banerjee, the great grandfather of petitioner No. 2, of Birbhum, West Bengal, acquired leasehold interests in some collieries in the district of Dhanbad, including a colliery known as Bhangabandh Colliery, hereinafter referred to as the said colliery, from the Rajas of Jharia. The said colliery was originally leased by the Rajas to Jadavlal Banerjee for a period of 999 years and the latter leased out the coal mining right in the same in favour of one F. W. Heilgers also for 999 years. F. W. Heilgers, in his turn, transferred his interest in the said colliery to Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. who ran and managed the same as a Sub-lessee at all material times. By diverse devolutions and transfers, details whereof have been given in the writ application, Messrs Dubrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. and Jadavlal Trust Estate, a religious-cum-charitable Trust, became owners of the leasehold interests in the collieries, which were originally acquired by Jadavlal Banerjee from the Rajas of Jharia, and in turn, Sub-leased by him to different Sub-lessees, except in the said colliery, which through such devolutions and transfers came to be owned by the petitioner No. 1 as lessee. ( 3 ) AFTER the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force the petitioner No. 1, as the head lessee of the mining leasehold interest of the said colliery under the landlord Raja of Jharia, filed by way of abundant caution, an application in the year 1956 for compensation in respect thereof under the Act although it was not required to do so. The application was filed before the Circle Officer, Jharia by the constituted attorney of the petitioner No. 1, one Bhabani Prosad Chatterjee, and an acknowledgment receipt in respect of the said application was duly issued by the said Circle Officer. By reason of circulars issued by the State of Bihar after the Act came into force the Sub-lessee M/s. Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. , slopped paying royalty to the petitioner No. 1. But from 1956 onwards the Sub-lessee resumed payment of royalty as it was adjudicated by appropriate Courts in the meantime that the mining lease in respect of the said colliery had not vested in the State of Bihar. However, in or about Nov. , 1961 by promulgating an Ordinance the State of Bihar imposed a levy upon the head lessees of all the mining leases, including the petitioner No. 1, and started collecting royalties from the sublessee to the exclusion of the head lessee, viz. the petitioner No. 1. ( 4 ) IN or about 1964 the State of Bihar passed another Ordinance and thereafter in or about 1965 passed an Amendment Act incorporating the contents of the Ordinances and amending the Act whereby the interests of all the head lessees in mines which were subject to Sub-leases, including the interest of the petitioner No. 1, came to vest in the State of Bihar. Consequent thereto the leasehold mining interest in the said colliery, whereof the petitioner No. 1 was the lessee, came to vest in the State of Bihar. According to the petitioners, as a result of such vesting of the leasehold interest of the petitioner No. 1 it became entitled to the payment of compensation in terms of the amended provisions of the Act. ( 5 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, in or about May, 1974, the petitioner No. 1 made an application to the then Compensation Officer claiming payment of compensation in respect of its lease-hold interest in the said colliery which vested in the State in terms of the provisions of the said Act. In the application the petitioner No. 1 stated that a claim had been originally filed in 1956 for compensation and along with the application an attested copy of the receipt issued by the Circle Officer, who had received the original return along with the claim for compensation way back in 1956, was annexed. In the application the petitioner No. 1 stated that a claim had been originally filed in 1956 for compensation and along with the application an attested copy of the receipt issued by the Circle Officer, who had received the original return along with the claim for compensation way back in 1956, was annexed. The petitioner No. 1 also annexed to its said application a statement of raisings and despatches of coal for the years from 1951 to 1961 in the prescribed form for enabling the Compensation Officer to verify its claim as to its average income from the said mining leasehold interest in terms of the provisions of the Act Other documents to support the petitioner No. 1's claim as a lessee in respect of the said colliery were also filed. ( 6 ) THE petitioners' further case is that after due enquiry into the claim of the petitioner No. 1 for compensation and after complying with the statutory requirements and procedure, the appropriate authorities made payment of the compensation to the petitioner No. 1, which was received by the petitioner No. 2 on behalf of the former as its duly constituted attorney. The payments were made both in cash and in bonds and particulars of the said payments have been detailed in an annexure to the writ application (Annexure 'g' ). In April, 1978, the petitioner No. 1 transferred the bonds which were for an aggregate sum of Rs. 52,28,000/-and which were obtained in Aug. , 1977, in favour of Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd. at 48. 9% face value thereof. ( 7 ) EVEN though, according to the petitioners, their claims for compensation as lessee in respect of the said colliery and for that matter the payments in respect thereof, were legal, valid and proper, the petitioner No. 2 was served with a letter on or about August 19/21, 1978 issued by the Additional Collector of Dhanbad, the respondent No. 1 in the writ application, containing an order purportedly cancelling the said bonds and directing the petitioner No. 2 to return the same. A true copy of the said letter has been annexed to the writ application (Annexure 'h' ). A true copy of the said letter has been annexed to the writ application (Annexure 'h' ). ( 8 ) THEREAFTER on or about July 6, 1979 Sri B. Section Banerjee, Inspector of Police, Cabinet Vigilance Department, Bihar, who has been arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the writ application, lodged a First Information Report with the Vigilance Police Station against the petitioner No. 2, one Purushottam Das Goswami, a Director and Principal Officer of the petitioner No. 1, some Govt. Officials who were entrusted with the duty of entertaining and processing the claims for compensation of and granting the same to the petitioners and others alleging that the accused persons entered into a criminal conspiracy for causing wrongful loss to the State of Bihar and consequential wrongful gain to the petitioner No. 2, and through him to themselves, and that in furtherance of the said conspiracy they aided, abetted and committed forgery in respect of official documents and also committed the offence of cheating by acting upon documents which were not genuine and by deliberately violating the provisions of laws and thereby obtained huge amount of compensation fraudulently and dishonestly. On the basis of the said report a case under Sections 120-B/ 409/420/467/109/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was started against the persons mentioned in the F. I. R. , including the petitioner No. 2. and investigation of the case was taken up by Sri D. N. Singh, Additional Superintendent of Police. ( 9 ) THE institution of the case was immediately followed by another order passed by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad on July 17, 1979 in the Compensation Case of the petitioner No. 1, being Compensation Case No. 1 of 1974-75 which had been earlier fully adjudicated upon, whereby the said officer in exercise of powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure reviewed the order of compensation earlier passed in favour of the petitioner No. 1 and directed that the amount already paid in the shape of bonds issued in favour of petitioner No. 1 was to be kept suspended pending further investigation. A copy of the said order has also been annexed to the writ application (Annexure 'k' ). A copy of the said order has also been annexed to the writ application (Annexure 'k' ). ( 10 ) CHALLENGING the propriety, validity and legality of the institution of the case and the two orders (Annexures 'h' and 'k'), the petitioners moved the writ application praying, inter alia, for a writ of or in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents and their servants and agents to forbear from proceeding on the footing or from taking any steps in furtherance of the First Information Report and from instituting any prosecution or further proceeding in respect thereof; and for a similar writ commanding the respondents from applying, enforcing or giving effect to the order contained in the letter of the respondent No. 1 (Annexure 'h') and the other order (Annexure 'k') and obtained a Rule Nisi in terms of the said prayers. While disposing of the rule, the learned trial Judge rejected the prayer of the petitioners in respect of the First Information Report and the case instituted thereupon, but granted relief to the petitioners so far as the two impugned orders of the Additional Collectors were concerned by setting aside the same. ( 11 ) AGGRIEVED by the decision of the learned trial Judge rejecting their prayer in respect of the First Information Report, the two petitioners filed an appeal which was registered as F. M. A. T. No. 3127 of 1981; while the other one, being F. M. A. T. No. 1033 of 1982, was filed by the State of Bihar and the other respondents of the original writ application challenging the legality and propriety of the decision of the learned Judge setting aside the two orders passed by the Additional Collector. ( 12 ) DR. Debi Prosad Pal, appearing for the petitioners raised two points in support of their appeal. He first contended that the investigation started on the First Information Report, lodged by the respondent No. 3, was liable to be quashed as it did not disclose any cognizable offence. He next urged that in instituting the case and investigating into the same the respondents acted mala fide. To appreciate the contentions of Dr. Pal it will be necessary at this stage to refer to the F. I. R. , which runs through 55 type-written pages. He next urged that in instituting the case and investigating into the same the respondents acted mala fide. To appreciate the contentions of Dr. Pal it will be necessary at this stage to refer to the F. I. R. , which runs through 55 type-written pages. In the F. I. R. if has been, inter alia, alleged as follows :-- (a) The petitioner No. 2 entered into a criminal conspiracy with Sri A. K. Banerjee and Sri R. Section P. Sinha (since deceased), Additional Collectors during the period 1974-1977. and obtained payment of Govt. money in all amounting to Rs. 1,48,60,950/-in bonds and Rs. 65,11,259-14 in cash by way of compensation as an intermediary, by falsely claiming to own certain mines which vested in the State Government under tha provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, by fraudulent means, on the basis of forged receipts and forged documents, showing him as Director and constituted attorney of Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. and Dubrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. and as the managing trustee of Jadavlal Trust Estate. (b) Preliminary enquiry has disclosed the abovementioned fraud of petitioner No. 2 and it has also disclosed that he had no connection with any of the said Companies or the Trust Estate during the relevant period and further that even those Cora-parties and Trust Estate themselves were not entitled to any portion of the compensation paid to petitioner No. 2 or any compensation in respect of any land or mine which had vested under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. read with Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1951. (c) But suddenly in 1974 the petitioner No. 2 with the help and assistance of his accomplice Purushortam Das Goswami came up with a forged handwritten receipt claiming the same to be an attested copy of the original receipt granted to him by the Circle Ollicer. Jharia in the year 1956 in token of receipt of returns for vested mining interests and on this basis the case records in respect of the Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. were started on April 15, 1974 by the accused A. K. Banerjee, the then Additional Collector of Dhanbad. Jharia in the year 1956 in token of receipt of returns for vested mining interests and on this basis the case records in respect of the Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. were started on April 15, 1974 by the accused A. K. Banerjee, the then Additional Collector of Dhanbad. The so-called returns filed by the petitioner No. 2 were shown to have been verified by the District Mining Officer Sri Namanath Jha who was also a party to the conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government of Bihar. (d) The enquiry has disclosed that in furtherance of this conspiracy the petitioner No. 2 clandestinely forged, fabricated and produced several documents such as deed of release, which had already been destroyed long back, fake documents of transfer of mining interest etc. only with a view to putting up a false claim which were immediately accepted and acted upon by the accused Govt. Officials. (e) It was also found that after initial payment of ad interim compensation through such clandetstine deals another conspiracy was hatched to further defraud the Government and a case was made out for higher payments on the basis of figures of actual despatches of coal and for that purpose the petitioner No. 2 with the help of accused Purusottam Das Goswami and other conspirators produced a fake and fictitious statement of despatches claiming to have obtained the same from the Office of the Director General of Mine Safety, Dhanbad. This was forwarded by the District Mining Officer Sri Namonath Jha to the Additional Collector, who immediately revised the calculations in utter violation of the statutory provisions of Settion 25 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 which did not countenance such a procedure. Though under the statutory provisions, the only basis for computation of net income was the incomes shown by the Ex-intermediary in bis returns for the assessment of Income-tax or payment of cess, the provisions were wilfully disregarded. Later inquiries from the Income-tax Officer, Suri Circle. Birbhum have disclosed that the petitioner No. 1 had never been assessed to Income-tax which shows that the company was a fake creation and had no income from the so-called mining interest. (f) The petitioner No. 2 with the connivance and active assistance of the accused officials produced fake income returns showing the incomes having been transferred to a couple of trusts. (f) The petitioner No. 2 with the connivance and active assistance of the accused officials produced fake income returns showing the incomes having been transferred to a couple of trusts. Enquiry has disclosed that all such returns arc fake and forged documents but this was wilfully ignored by the Additional Collectors and the compensations were paid to the petitioner No. 2 on the basis of a fraudulenl power of attorney. (g) Enquiry has also disclosed that while making final payment of compensation the Additional Collector, late R. Section P. Sinha, deliberately and in conspiracy with the petitioner No. 2, disregarded statutory provisions and passed orders for making final payments only after 72 days of the publication of the Compensation Assessment Rolls, that is, 18 days before the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days. (h) Enquiry has disclosed that the petitioner No. 1 had no legal authority to claim compensation in the manner it did inasmuch as the petitioner No. 2 failed to produce a single instrument through which the mining rights were granted to the Company by the original proprietors. Even during the review undertaken by the Additional Collector Sri A. C. Chakraborty, the petitioner No. 2 failed to turn up and deliberately avoided production of the documents in support of his claim. Sri Chakraborty further found that the petitioner No. 2 was also associated with the theft of documents from the compensation records of the then Jharia Raj and had in this manner manipulated the payments in his favour. (i) Enquiries have also disclosed that in Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 1/71-72. which was started to consider the claim of compensation payable to Jadavlal Trust Estate on a petition dated 23-6-71 filed by petitioner No. 2. who this time presented himself as the sole trustee and claimed compensation for the mining interests vested in the State, compensation amounting to Rs. 4,58,367/- was paid to Sri Banerjee by the two Additional Collectors in utter disregard of the statutory rules and directions of the revenue department of the Government relating to the manner in which compensation in respect of trust properties were to be dealt with and paid. In obtaining those payments Sri Banerjee in collusion with the other accused officials forged and fabricated receipts and documents. In obtaining those payments Sri Banerjee in collusion with the other accused officials forged and fabricated receipts and documents. (j) The same modus operandi was resorted to by the petitioner No. 2 and the other accused persons for obtaining compensation in respect of Dubrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. in Compensation Case No. 3/74-75. (k) Enquiries have also revealed that in respect of the self same properties compensation was paid to Raja of Jharia as an intermediary and to the petitioner No. 2 as a lessee. ( 13 ) TN the F. I. R. details of payment received by the petitioner No. 2 in respect of Central Manbhum Coal Co. Ltd. (Compensation Case No. 1/74-75) in respect of Duhrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. (Case No. 3/ 74-75) and in respect of Jadavlal Trust Estate (Case No. 1/71-72) have been given. Besides, the nature of the documents forged and the manner in which such forgery was committed by the accused persons in conspiracy with each other as disclosed in the preliminary enquiry have also been stated. ( 14 ) DR. Pal took us through the different averments made in the writ application and the documents annexed thereto in support of his contention that the allegations made in the First Information Report that the petitioner No. 1 was not a genuine company and that the petitioner No. 2 was not its Director were without any basis whatsoever. Dr. Pal also took us through the different provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 to contend that the claim of the petitioners for compensation as a lessee in respect of the said colliery was a genuine claim and the allegations to the contrary made in the First Information Report were baseless. On those principal contentions Dr. Pal asked us to hold that the F. I. R. disclosed no offence and as such the investigation was liable to be quashed. Dr. Pal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar, reported in to contend that besides the F. I. R. other materials as annexed to the writ application could be taken into consideration to hold that the F. I. R. did not disclose any offence. We are not at all impressed by the above contentions of Dr. Pal. ( 15 ) DR. We are not at all impressed by the above contentions of Dr. Pal. ( 15 ) DR. Pal's entire endeavour has been to show that the claim of the petitioner No. 1 for compensation in respect of the said colliery and that of the petitioner No. 2 to receive the same on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 was legal and valid but no case has been made out in the writ application to even counter the allegations made in the F. I. R. that the claim for compensation of Dubrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. and that of Jadavlal Trust Estate were fictitious and the petitioner No. 2 obtained compensation money in respect of the above Company and Trust on the basis of forged and fictitious documents and pursuant to a conspiracy with the government officials. As stated earlier according to the First Information Report the Government of Bihar has been defrauded of a huge sum in respect of those claims, besides that of the petitioner No. 1. Even if Dr. Pal's argument is accepted the only conclusion that can be drawn therefrom is that the First Information Report does not disclose any offence so far as it relates to the role of the petitioner No. 2 in receiving compensation as a Director of the petitioner No. 1; and not in respect of his role for the other Company and the trust estate details whereof have been disclosed in the First Information Report. That apart, having gone through the First Information Report we are fully satisfied that it manifestly discloses serious allegations of the commission of cognisable offences such as forgery; cheating and conspiracy against the petitioner No. 2 as a Director of the petitioner no. 1 also. Whether the allegations made in the First Information Report are true or not is not for us to decide at this stage and in this writ jurisdiction and it is within the exclusive domain of the investigating agency, which is now in seizin of the matter to find out the same. ( 16 ) TO support his contention that the institution of the case was mala fide Dr. Pal relied upon certain statements made in the writ application whereby the petitioners have sought to suggest that the allegations were absolutely untrue. According to Dr. ( 16 ) TO support his contention that the institution of the case was mala fide Dr. Pal relied upon certain statements made in the writ application whereby the petitioners have sought to suggest that the allegations were absolutely untrue. According to Dr. Pal the very institution of the case on such incorrect allegations amounted to mala fides on the part, of the respondent No. 3 and the First Information Report was liable to be quashed on, that score, argued Dr. Pal. relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Section N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari reported in. The above contention of Dr. Pal. in our view, is wholly misconceived. Ratio of the said decision is that an investigation can be quashed if it is found that the same was mala fide. Tn the four corners of. the records there is not an iota of allegation, far less any material, to indicate that the investigating agency is acting mala fide in investigating into the casej started on the basis of the First Information Report. On the contrary, the case of mala fides of the petitioners is against the persons at whose instance the First Information Report was lodged. Such plea of ma1a fides cannot be entertained for the purpose of quashing an investigation started over a First Information Report. If the investigating agency finds on completion of investigation that the case has been falsely instituted against the petitioner No. 2 and others they may prosecute the persons who were instrumental in starting the case, but then, this Court cannot sit in judgment over the truth or otherwise or for that matter the mala fides of the informant or other persons at whose instance the First Information Report was lodged. As no other point has been raised in support of the appeal preferred by the petitioners the same is liable to be dismissed. In view of our above findings on the merits of the appeal we refrain from deciding the question of its maintainability which was raised by the respondents. As no other point has been raised in support of the appeal preferred by the petitioners the same is liable to be dismissed. In view of our above findings on the merits of the appeal we refrain from deciding the question of its maintainability which was raised by the respondents. ( 17 ) COMING now to the appeal preferred by the State of Bihar and others, we find that the principal ground which weighed with the learned trial Judge for setting aside the decision of the Additional Collector, Dhan-bad contained in his communications dated August 13/21, 1978 (Annexure 'h') and dated July 17, 1979 (Annexure 'k') was that the Additional Collector, Dhanbad sought to take away the rights which accrued in favour of the petitioners without giving them an opportunity of being heard. Mr. Prosad appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that no such order as communicated by Annexure 'h' appeared in the record of the Compensation Case No. 1 or 3 of 1974-75 and in this connection he referred to the statements made in paragraph 36 of the affidavit-in-opposition, which was filed by the respondent No. 3 on behalf of the respondents to the writ application of the petitioners, wherein it has been averred that the order sheet of the Compensation Case No. 1 of 1974-75 does not show any order which could be the foundation for the order at Annexure 'h' to the writ application which seems to have been procured irregularly by petitioner No. 2. As regards the other order dated July 17, 1979 Mr. Prosad contended that the communication of the said order as incorporated in Annexure 'k' has not been properly reproduced and the correct reproduction appeared in Annexure 3' to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents. Mr. Prosad next contended that even if the orders in question as disclosed in Annexures 'h' and 'k' were passed still then it could not be said that the petitioners were entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the said orders were passed as the former order (Annexure 'h') was superseded by the order (Annexure 'k') and the latter order was purely an interlocutory order. Mr. Mr. Prosad further argued that the Additional Collector, who was functioning as a Tribunal exercising powers under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 had the inherent power to rectify its own mistakes, particularly when the mistake was occasioned by the fraud perpetrated by the officers concerned and the petitioner No. 2 He lastly contended that the petitioners, who obtained compensation by taking recourse to fraud and cheating, should not be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong. ( 18 ) DR. Pal on the other hand contended that having regard to the stand taken by the State of Bihar that Annexures 'h' and 'k' did not depict the correct state of things appearing on the records of the relevant compensation cases, the State of Bihar could not now turn round and say that they were aggrieved by the judgment of the learned trial Judge setting aside those orders. In other words, according to Dr. Pal, when those two communications were non-existent there could not be any valid grievance of the State on that score which could be agitated in this appeal. Dr. Pal next contended that by the two impugned orders the Additional Collector was seeking to review his own orders which he could not legally do in absence of any statutory power under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Dr. Pal further contended that recourse to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Additional Collector to set aside the earlier orders and to cancel and/or suspend the bonds was not legally permissible as the authority under the Act had no powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dr. Pal lastly contended that the Additional Collector even had no inherent powers to cancel or suspend the bonds. ( 19 ) TO appreciate their respective contentions it will be necessary at this stage to refer to the impugned communications :--ANNEXURE 'h' no. 112/c Registered. From : Shri A. C. Chakraborty, additional Collector, Dhanbad. To : Shri K. N. Banerjee, 7, Queen's Park, calcutta. Dated, Dhanbad, the 21-8-1978. p Sub: Payment of compensation Bond to M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (p.) Ltd. and M/s. Dubrajpur Rice Mills P. Ltd. in compensation case Nos. 1 and 3 of 1974-75. 112/c Registered. From : Shri A. C. Chakraborty, additional Collector, Dhanbad. To : Shri K. N. Banerjee, 7, Queen's Park, calcutta. Dated, Dhanbad, the 21-8-1978. p Sub: Payment of compensation Bond to M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (p.) Ltd. and M/s. Dubrajpur Rice Mills P. Ltd. in compensation case Nos. 1 and 3 of 1974-75. Sir, under instructions, the bonds issued to you in payment of final compensation in the above cases are hereby cancelled and you are requested to kindly deposit the bonds bearing serial Nos. P. T. O. 614226 to P. T. O. 615794 and P. T. O. 615795 to 6156320 immediately in this office and latest by 31-8-1978 failing which suitable legal action will be taken against you. You may note that the Treasury Officer, Dhanbad and the Manager. Reserve Bank of India, Public Debt Office, Patna have been requested not to make any payment of interest against these bonds and not to redeem the amounts of the bonds respectively. Yours faithfully, Sd/- 13-8-78 Addl. Collector, Dhanbad. ANNEXURE 'k' in the Court of Compensation Office (Additional Collector) Dhanbad. State v. Sri K. N. Banerjee, Director, Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. To The K. N. Banerjee. Director, Central Manbhum Co. (P.) Ltd. In the Matter of : Compensation Case No. 1 of 1974-75. ORDER Whereas it appears on scrutiny that a sum of Rs. 52,28,000. 00 has been paid to you (K. N. Banerjee) in shape of the bonds Nos. P. T. O. 615795 to 616320 -- total 576 bonds in your capacity as Director of M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. on 17-8-1977 although the actual amount payable to you works out as Rs. 14,65,448. 00 and whereas you had executed an indemnity bond while receiving the above payment from the State Govt. and whereas the amount paid in excess stands recoverable under law. I Sri A. C. Chakraborty, Additional Collector, Dhanbad and successor-in-office of Late R. C. P. Sinha, Compensation Officer. 14,65,448. 00 and whereas you had executed an indemnity bond while receiving the above payment from the State Govt. and whereas the amount paid in excess stands recoverable under law. I Sri A. C. Chakraborty, Additional Collector, Dhanbad and successor-in-office of Late R. C. P. Sinha, Compensation Officer. Dhanbad do hereby in exercise of powers vested in me under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by which the Compensation proceedings are guided being the proceedings taken under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 do hereby review the Final orders passed in the above case by Late R. S. P. Sinha and order that the payment of the said amount already made or being made in the shape of bonds issued in favour of M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. be kept suspended pending further investigation in the matter. Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this day the 17th July, 1979. Additional Collector, dhanbad. ANNEXURE 3' in THE COURT OF COMPENSATION OFFICER (ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR) DHANBAD IN THE MATTER OF COMP. CASE No. 3/74-75. ORDER Whereas, suspicion has arisen with regard to the legality of the claim of M/s. Dubrajpur Rice Mills (P.) Ltd. and Messrs. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. , to receive compensations in respect of the Mining Lease held in the District of Dhanbad and whereas suspicion has also arisen as to the quantum of royalty @ 1. 25 P. M. Ton fixed in the case appears to be unusually high and whereas this might have resulted in excess payment of compensation money than it would have been actually and legitimately payable to the compensation holder and whereas circumstances under which such excess payment might have been made require thorough investigation, I, Shri A. C. Chakravorty, Additional Collector, Dhanbad, and the successor in office of late R. S. P. Sinha, the Compensation Officer, in the cases (Comp. Cases Nos. 1 of 1974-75 and 3 of 74-75) do hereby in exercise of powers vested in me under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with relevant orders, order that payment in the bonds Nos. detailed in the margin in the above cases should remain suspended till further orders. Given under my hand and the seal this day the 17th July, 1979. Sd/- A. C. Chakravarty, additional Collector and Compensation Officer. Bonds Nos. PTO 614826 to 615794. Total 969 bonds. detailed in the margin in the above cases should remain suspended till further orders. Given under my hand and the seal this day the 17th July, 1979. Sd/- A. C. Chakravarty, additional Collector and Compensation Officer. Bonds Nos. PTO 614826 to 615794. Total 969 bonds. ( 20 ) AS regards the first contention of Mr. Prosad, we are unable to accept the same having regard to the fact that the originals of the above two documents were produced before us by the petitioners and those appear to be genuine documents. Even if we assume that Annexure 'h' was not preceded by any valid order as contended by the State of Bihar, still then the communication sent to the petitioners (Annexure 'h') remains and the petitioners can legitimately challenge the same. As regards the other order (Annexure 'k') it appears that the recitals thereof are not the same as of Annexure 3' which, according to the State, depicts the correct order, but then it appears to us that the confusion has been created by the fact that while the former (Annexure 'k') relates to the order in respect of M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. only in Compensation Case No. 1 of 1974-75, the order Annexure 3' relates to the claim in respect of both M/s. Dubrajpur Rice Mill (P.) Ltd. and M/s Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. , and in the latter the payment of bonds in respect of both the above companies have been clubbed together. This will be evident from the fact that while Annexure 'k' refers to 57ft bonds, Annexure 3' relates to 969 bonds. In any case, the question to be decided by us does not depend much upon the controversy over the exact wordings of these two orders, namely, Annexurcs 'k' and 3', as the purpose of passing those two orders by the Additional Collector-cum-Compensation Officer was the same namely, to invalidate the bonds which were earlier delivered to the petitioner No. 2. ( 21 ) SO tar as the merits of the contention of the respective parties on the issuance of the communication under Annexure 'h' are concerned, we are in agreement with Dr. Pal that the same could not have been validly issued for the simple reason that the Additional Collector passed the order for cancellation under instructions and not in exercise of his own powers. Pal that the same could not have been validly issued for the simple reason that the Additional Collector passed the order for cancellation under instructions and not in exercise of his own powers. Even if the contention of Mr. Prosad is accepted that the Additional Collector had the inherent power to cancel his earlier order still then he could exercise such power only upon His own satisfaction and not pursuant to the instructions of someone else. Surprisingly even the person under whose instruction Annexure 'h' was issued had not been disclosed. Then again, by cancelling the bonds the Additional Collector was trying to take a final decision and was thereby depriving the petitioners of their legal rights. As Annexurc 'h' is liable to be set aside on these two grounds, we need not detail other grounds on which also the issuance of the same cannot be legally justified. The above finding of ours will not however entitle the petitioners to any relief as the order of cancellation (Annexure 'h') stands superseded consequent upon the passing of the subsequent order of suspension communicated through Annexiire 'k' and/or Annexure 3'. ( 22 ) IT has next to be ascertained whether the order of suspension of the bonds pending investigation is valid or not. At the threshold we may point out that the exercise of powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which recognises the inherent powers of a Civil Court, by the Additional Collector cannot be legally supported. The Act or the rules do not contain any provision treating the authority thereunder as a Civil Court for all intents and purposes entitling the authorities to invoke Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the only powers of a Civil Court that have been given to the authorities under Section 38 of the Act are in respect of summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons or witnesses and for compelling the production of documents and nothing more. This finding of ours however is not sufficient to set aside Annexure 'k' as the law is now well settled that if any authority has the valid power to do a certain thing reference to a wrong source of power would not invalidate the exercise of such power. ( 23 ) IT is in that context that Mr. This finding of ours however is not sufficient to set aside Annexure 'k' as the law is now well settled that if any authority has the valid power to do a certain thing reference to a wrong source of power would not invalidate the exercise of such power. ( 23 ) IT is in that context that Mr. Prosad argued before us that the statutory Tribunal had the inherent powers to rectify his own mistakes and in exercise of such powers the suspension of the bonds was fully justified. In support of his contention he relied upon a Full Bench Judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of Jagir Singh v. Settlement Commissioner, reported in which has laid down the following proposition :--". . . . . . . . every tribunal has inherent power to correct its own error, provided, of course, the circumstances are such that the correction of that error is necessary in the interest of justice. Such inherent power is necessarily implied in the setting up of any authority on whom the responsibility of deciding any matter rests, and it seems to me that to deny such power to any tribunal would render that tribunal incapable of properly deciding the matters entrusted to it. " ( 24 ) DR. Pal however argued that the above decision of the Punjab High Court which is based upon the decision of ihe Supreme Court in the case of Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen, reported in could not be said to be good law as the Supreme Court dealt with inherent powers of a Civil Court in respect of which there cannot be any dispute whatsoever. According to Dr. Pal when any authority had power to do a thing and did it that decision became final and the same authority could not subsequently alter the decision unless it had statutory power of review granted to it. In support of his contenlion Dr. Pal relied upon the cases of Indira Devi v. State of West Bengal reported in State of West Bengal v. Indira Debi reported in and Haji Mahabub Hossain v. Biswanath reported in. In support of his contenlion Dr. Pal relied upon the cases of Indira Devi v. State of West Bengal reported in State of West Bengal v. Indira Debi reported in and Haji Mahabub Hossain v. Biswanath reported in. In the case of Indira Debi v. State a Division Bench of this Court held that a quasi judicial tribunal could not claim or exercise the inherent powers of the Civil Court unless the statute had conferred all the powers of the Civil Court on such a tribunal either expressly or by implication. In that case the authorities under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 issued a notice upon the appellants under Section 57 of the said Act to file relevant records in connection with the settlement earlier recorded as in the opinion of the authority concerned the settlement was invalid. In the notice it was specifically stated that the case was under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The validity of the notice was challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that the concerned authority was not a Civil Court and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including Section 151 could not be applied for correction of a finally published record of rights, and that the proceedings for correction of record of rights could not be initiated under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as there were specific provisions in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act for such corrections, and that there was a right of appeal. This Court upheld the above contentions of the appellant and quashed the proceeding initiated under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal was preferred by the State of West Bengal against the said judgment and the Supreme Court modified the above judgment as reported in State of West Bengal v. Indira Debi (supra) with the following observations:--"it is obvious that reference to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be a source of power as far as notice under Section 57 of the Act is concerned. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any additional jurisdiction on the Court. Insofar as the Courts of record and Civil Courts are concerned they have their inherent power which is recognised by Section 151. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any additional jurisdiction on the Court. Insofar as the Courts of record and Civil Courts are concerned they have their inherent power which is recognised by Section 151. The parties accept that this notice be treated as notice under Section 57 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 and it will be valid for the purpose mentioned under Section 57 of the Act. It is made clear that whatever the power the authorities have under the Act they will be at liberty to call in aid only those powers for the purposes mentioned under the Act. " ( 25 ) THE ratio of the above two decisions therefore is that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure recognises the inherent powers of the Courts of record and the Civil Court and is not the source of power and that a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot claim or exercise the inherent powers of a Civil Court under Section 151 unless the Statute under which the tribunal functions has conferred all the powers of a Civil Court on such a tribunal either expressly or by necessary implication. The same principle was reiterated by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hazi Mohabub Hossain (supra ). ( 26 ) MR. Prosad however did not rely upon Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to support his contention that the Tribunal was justified in issuing the notice (Annexure 'k') but, relying upon the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab High Court, contended that the tribunal had the inherent power to correct its own mistakes, as in the present case. He also drew our attention to the following observations made by this Court in the case of Mohabub Hossain (supra), on which Dr. Pal relied (at p. 382):--"mr. Mitter then refers to a single Bench decision of this Court in Durga Devi v. Bhagwandas Jayaswal reported in (1963) 67 Cal WN 935. There a Thika Controller made an ex parte order on the basis of certain reports submitted by the Courts officers. The persons against whom the order was made filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. There a Thika Controller made an ex parte order on the basis of certain reports submitted by the Courts officers. The persons against whom the order was made filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. Chatterjee, J. held that Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code is not attracted, but the controller has the inherent power to do justice or, in other words, to enquire into if he has made an order on the basis of some mistake committed by his officers and to remedy the same. Chatterjee, J. has not specifically said that the Thika Controller has the inherent powers of a Civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. What he has said is that the Thika Controller as a tribunal has the inherent power to correct its own mistakes. But no tribunal can be said to have jurisdiction to make an order of injunction because it has the inherent power to correct its own mistakes. When a tribunal corrects its own mistakes, it acts within its jurisdiction. But no new jurisdiction can be created for a tribunal on the basis of its inherent power to correct its own mistakes. Here in this case to hold that the Revenue Officer has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction will mean that the Revenue Officer will acquire a new jurisdiction not otherwise conferred on him tinder the statute which created it. Inherent power of a tribunal to correct its own mistakes cannot be the basis of such a jurisdiction. " ( 27 ) HAVING considered the contentions of the respective parties in the light of the decisions cited before us we are of the view that a tribunal, can, even in the absence of specific powers rectify its own mistakes in exercise of its inherent powers for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of its process. It is true of course that this power cannot and should not be exercised to reverse every wrong order made by it but should be exercised sparingly when the mistake is glaring and rectification of which is absolutely essential for the ends of justice. In this connection we may also refer to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Baul Chand Sen v. Surish Chandra Sen, reported in AIR 1914 Cal 170. In this connection we may also refer to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Baul Chand Sen v. Surish Chandra Sen, reported in AIR 1914 Cal 170. In that case an application was made for amendment of the record of rights finally prepared under Section 103-B of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The appellants contention was that there had been interpolation in the record of rights and that the initials of the Settlement Officer in the record of rights were forged. An enquiry was made and it was found that the interpolation was unauthorised, that the same had not been duly attested, and that the initials of the Assistant Settlement Officer to the interpolation were forged. Thereupon the name of the recorded owner was struck out and it was noted that the action was taken under Section 108-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In appeal to the Special Judge it was contended that Section 108-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act had no application to the facts of the case, as it empowered a Revenue Officer to correct an entry in a finally published record of rights only when he was satisfied that the entry had been made owing to a bona fide mistake. The Special Judge accepted this contention and set aside the order of the Settlement Officer as having been made without jurisdiction. Against the said order an appeal was preferred to this Court and a revisional application was also filed by way of abundant caution. This Court upheld the finding of the Special Judge that Section 108-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act had no manner of application as rectification of an unauthorised interpolation made in the record of rights was not a case of correction of an entry made in the record of rights owing to a bona fide mistake. This Court however upheld the order of rectification on the around that the Settlement Officer had the inherent power to set the record right and observed that it was also incumbent upon the authority to take the necessary action as soon as it has been appraised of what was a grave fraud. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Revenue Officers, entrusted with the duty of preparation of record of rights and under the Bengal Tenancy Act, were not clothed with the inherent powers of the Civil Court. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Revenue Officers, entrusted with the duty of preparation of record of rights and under the Bengal Tenancy Act, were not clothed with the inherent powers of the Civil Court. ( 28 ) THE above decision was cited on behalf of the State of West Bengal in the case of Indira Debi v. State (supra), in support of their contention that the authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 was a Civil Court and had the inherent power to correct a mistake in the record induced by forgery. In negativing the above contention this Court observed as follows (at pp. 473-74):--"in our opinion, this contention of Mr. Chakravarty is not well conceived. In Baul Chand Sen's case (1914) 19 Cal LJ 251 : (AIR 1914 Cal 170) (supra) the rectification was sought to be made under Section 108-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act which conferred upon a revenue officer the power to correct an entry in the record, made by bona fide mistake. This section had been subsequently transferred and renumbered as Section 115-B, by the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1928. But this section dealt with the question of correcting an entry in the record of rights made by a bona fide mistake only. The exercise of inherent power by the Settlement Officer was upheld, because there was no provision in the Bengal Tenancy Act corresponding to Section 44 (2-a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954. Section 44 (2-a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act creates very wide powers to revise the finally published record of rights for any reason whatsoever. It is not confined or restricted to the correction of entries made by bona fide mistake as was the case under Section 108-A. (later 115-B) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The decision in Baul Chand Sen's case (1914) 19 Cal LJ 251 : (AIR 1914 Cal 170) (supra) has therefore no application to the facts in this appeal. There was no provision in the Bengal Tenancy Act whereby the revenue officers could correct an entry in the record of rights except in cases where an entry had been made through a bona fide mistake. There was no provision in the Bengal Tenancy Act whereby the revenue officers could correct an entry in the record of rights except in cases where an entry had been made through a bona fide mistake. It was in these circumstances, and because there was no provision in the statute to rectify a mistake caused by fraud, that the exercise of inherent powers by the Settlement Officer was upheld. But in the instant case the statute has clearly provided for revision of the record of rights for any reason whatsoever, even after final publication of such records. We cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Chakravarty's contention that the respondent No. 3 should be allowed to exercise the inherent powers of a Civil Court to rectify a mistake in the record of rights in complete disregard of the provisions in Section 44 (2-a) of the Act. " ( 29 ) THE principle of taw enunciated in the case of Baul Chand Sen and as explained in the case of Indira Debi aptly applies in the case before us. No provision has been made in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 to rectify a bona fide mistake or a mistake occasioned by fraud, but then it must be held that every Tribunal which is clothed with the duty of acting judicially or quasi-judiciaily has the inherent powers to correct not only its bona fide mistakes but also mistakes occasioned or induced by fraud, as otherwise it would not be possible for the Tribunal to decide correctly and effectively the causes before it. ( 30 ) IT is not in dispute that hi the instant case the notice, Annexure 'k', was issued by the authorities concerned after the First Information Report was lodged wherein serious allegations of fraud and cheating committed by Government officials resulting in payment of compensation to petitioner No. 2 have been made. Since it is in that context that the authorities concerned decided to suspend the bonds pending further investigation inte the matter, it cannot be said that the decision of the Additional Collector, Dhanbad to re-open the proceedings of the case is illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 31 ) IT was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioners that in re-opening the proceeding the Additional Collector, Dhanbad violated the principles of natural justice as the petitioners were not given any opportunity of being heard before such re-opening. ( 31 ) IT was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioners that in re-opening the proceeding the Additional Collector, Dhanbad violated the principles of natural justice as the petitioners were not given any opportunity of being heard before such re-opening. We do not think that the stage of giving notice to the petitioners has arisen as by the impugned order Annexure 'k' the encashment of bonds have only been suspended and it has been made clear in the order that further investigation would be held into the matter. By the order of suspension of the encashment of the bonds the petitioners have not been deprived of their rights in respect of bonds and they will have opportunity to represent their case in the investigation that has been directed into the matter. In any case, to dispel any misgivings of the petitioners we direct that before taking any final decision, pursuant to the issuance of order (Annexure 'k') the petitioners should he given reasonable opportunity of being heard. ( 32 ) WE are therefore unable to uphold the order of the learned trial Judge selling aside the order dated July 17, 1979 though we agree with the learned Judge that the communication dated August 21, 1978 is not valid and legal. The said order however aeed not be set aside as we have already held that the same is no more valid order in view of the subsequent order dated July 17, 1979 (Annexure 'k' ). For the foregoing discussions, while we dismiss Appeal No. F. M. A. T. 3127 of 1981, we allow Appeal No. F. M. A. T. 1033 of 1982. There will however be no order for costs in any of the appeals. ( 33 ) AS prayed for by Dr. Pal, we direct that the police investigation which has been started will continue but no report in final form should be filed by the investigating agency without the leave of this Court. This order will remain effective for a period of four weeks from date.