JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition directed against an order of eviction passed against him in respect of a residential house under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 by the Prescribed Authority which has been confirmed on appeal by the Additional District Judge. Both the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority have held that the need of the landlord for the personal occupation of the accommodation was bonafide and further that on a comparison of likely hardship to the parties, the case of the landlord is better. The petitioner has challenged both the findings on a number of grounds. It has been contended that the landlord had been letting out other accommodation to tenants even shortly before the filing of his application under Section 21 and also during the pendency of the writ petition itself. 2. The case was heard on more than one day of hearing and even after arguments were commenced, supplementary affidavits were filed by the parties with the permission of the Court. 3. The accommodation in the occupation of the petitioner consists of two living rooms besides a verandah, a kitchen, bath and W.C. The landlord contended that he was in occupation of only two rooms and verandah, a kitchen, a latrine and a bathroom. The contention of the petitioner, on the other hand, was that the landlord was in actual occupation of three rooms, one verandah, a store, a kitchen and latrine-cum-bathroom, vide Para 17 of the written statement, Annexure 2 to the writ petition. The family of the landlord consists of himself, his wife Smt. Prandi, his two married sons and their wives, two unmarried daughters, aged 20 and 15 respectively, and two minor grand-children. The petitioner's family consists of himself and his mother. His father who was the original tenant has died during the pendency of the proceedings. Thus, even the facts as admitted by the petitioner are eloquent enough to justify the two findings of the authorities below, namely, that the need of the landlord is genuine and that on a comparison of hardship also the landlord's case is better. His father who was the original tenant has died during the pendency of the proceedings. Thus, even the facts as admitted by the petitioner are eloquent enough to justify the two findings of the authorities below, namely, that the need of the landlord is genuine and that on a comparison of hardship also the landlord's case is better. Even if we accept that there are 3 rooms in the landlord's house, the accommodation in his possession is grossly inadequate inasmuch as three married couples and two unmarried and grown daughters, besides two minor grand-children are to be accommodated. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the daughters-in-law of the landlord should not have been taken into account while counting the numbers of the landlord's family. The definition of the landlord's family given in Section 3(g) mentions any lineal descendants of the landlord and also any female who has a right of residence in the family house. No specific mention is made of wives of the lineal descendants. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Jagdish Singh v. Additional District Judge 1978 All. Rent Cases 330, in which it was held, after considering the provisions of Sections 19 and 3 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, that a widowed daughter-in-law has a right, to maintenance, which includes the right of residence in her father-in-law's house. There can be no quarrel with that proposition, but it does not follow that daughter-in-law has no right of residence in her father-in-law house, while her husband who lives with his father is alive. Every married woman has an inherent right to reside in her husband's house. Even if her husband is residing with his father, then also that right would subsist. It is not disputed that the husband of the two daughters-in-law had a right of residence in their father's house under Section 3(g) itself. It necessarily follows that the wives of the two sons had also a right to reside in the same house. 5. The only controversy is about certain portions of adjacent house, it now transpires is owned by the landlord's wife. It has been said that those which portions have been let out even during the pendency of the writ petition and were also let out shortly before the filing the application under Section 21 by the landlord. The facts in this regard are disputed. It has been said that those which portions have been let out even during the pendency of the writ petition and were also let out shortly before the filing the application under Section 21 by the landlord. The facts in this regard are disputed. But assuming the contentions of the petitioner to be correct there is nothing in Section 21 or in Rule 16 to indicate that the property owned by the wife of the landlord should also be taken into account while considering the availability of accommodation with the landlord. According to Katyayana cited in Mulla's Hindu Law 1974 Edition, in Section 141 "Neither the husband, nor the son nor the father, nor the brother has power to use or to alienate the legal property of a woman. If thus a landlord has no right to use his wife's property the same cannot be taken into account for purposes of considering whether his need would be satisfied by use of that property. A wife has a right to usufruct of that property. Although she is entitled to be maintained by and to live with her husband, she is not under reciprocal obligation to share her property with her husband. In the instant case the landlord is a retired head clerk of the railway department. If his wife wants to secure for herself some income by letting out her property that cannot be set down as a circumstance militating against the landlord's good faith. In view of this legal position it is not necessary to go into the factual controversy. Indeed even otherwise, the factual controversy in this regard should have been raised before the authorities below and it is not possible to decide it in a writ petition. There is no averment that the property standing in the name of the landlord's wife is held by her benami, for him. Nor is there any presumption that a property held by a wife is held by her benami for her husband. 6. The Additional District Judge has no doubt wrongly referred, inter alia, to Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1). This Explanation had already been deleted by the legislature. His conclusion, however, is not based merely on this Explanation. Even after excluding this Explanation from consideration the finding recorded by him on need and hardship are clearly sustainable. 7. 6. The Additional District Judge has no doubt wrongly referred, inter alia, to Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1). This Explanation had already been deleted by the legislature. His conclusion, however, is not based merely on this Explanation. Even after excluding this Explanation from consideration the finding recorded by him on need and hardship are clearly sustainable. 7. The impugned findings do not thus suffer from any manifest error which may call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. The writ petition has no force and is accordingly, dismissed but without any order as to costs. 9. In the end learned counsel for petitioner prayed for six months time to vacate the premise and offered to give an undertaking that within the time granted the petitioner would deliver vacant possession O.P. No. 3. In view of the scarcity of availability of accommodation the request is reasonable. The petitioner is granted six months' time to vacate the premises on condition that the petitioner furnishes on affidavit an undertaking within a week to the effect that he will deliver vacant possession of the premises before the expiry of the said period to O.P. No. 3 and that during this period he will not transfer possession to anyone and will regularly pay the rent or damages for use and occupation to the O.P. 3 and that such payment will not entitle him to any right.