Judgment :- 1. This appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff who un-successfully filed a suit against the Union of India, claiming a sum of Rs. 315.65 as damages on the ground that there was shortage in and damage to the rice carried under a Railway receipt dated 31-7-1973 by the Railway owned by the Union of India. 2. The question is whether the suit is fatally defective in its institution, in as much as no notice as contemplated under S 80 CPC. had been served. This question was considered in the light of the contentions raised by the defendant-Union of India, though no written statement repudiating any of the allegations in the plaint had been filed. 3. The courts below have concurred to find that there has not been any compliance with S.80 CPC., in as much as no notice has been issued to the General Manager of the Railway concerned 4. Ext. A3 dated 25-6-1975 is the notice which is purported to have been sent, as obligated under S.80 CPC. It is not controverted that this notice was one which is issued to the Chief Commercial Superintendent. The question therefore is whether such a notice answers the description of a notice contemplated in the later limb of S.80, viz., S.80(b). That sub-section provides that in the case of a suit against the Central Government, where it relates to a Railway, the notice must be delivered to, or left at the office of the General Manager of that Railway, Obviously, no such notice had been served on the General Manager. 5. The interpretation of the section is not a matter res Integra, as far as this Court is concerned. That provision had been considered by this Court, as early as in 1959. The objective behind the statutory provision had been explained thereunder. It was held that a notice addressed to the Chief Commercial Superintendent will not do duty for the one required under S.80(b) and that the notice should necessarily be to the General Manager of the Railway. The plaintiff had contended that the office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent was in the same premises as that of the General Manager and therefore, personal delivery to the General Manager was not to be insisted upon and that the delivery of the notice to the Chief Commercial Superintendent would, in the circumstances, be sufficient notice. The plaintiff had contended that the office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent was in the same premises as that of the General Manager and therefore, personal delivery to the General Manager was not to be insisted upon and that the delivery of the notice to the Chief Commercial Superintendent would, in the circumstances, be sufficient notice. Reliance was sought to be placed on the decision of the Assam High Court in Union of Indict v. Suraj Bhan, AIR. 1963 Assam 179. The following observations were particularly emphasised: "The office of the General Manager being a big one, if the notice is left at the office of the General Manager in the bands of a responsible senior official of the office, both the letter and the spirit of the section must be deemed to have been complied with." 6. I am not prepared to accept the above proposition, as laying down the correct law, when this court had considered this question and made an authoritative decision in Dahyabhal Patel & Co. v. Union of India, 1959 KLT. 933. The fact that the office of the General Manager is big, if at all, only, reinforces the necessity to have such a notice (which is of serious consequence as far as the Railway is concerned) served in the manner required by law. When the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not sufficient if the requirement is satisfied in what is termed 'the spirit of the section.' Admittedly the letter of the law has not been satisfied. 7. The second appeal apparently has been filed, despite the paltry nature of the amount involved, in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court contained in Raghunath Das v. Union of India, AIR. 1969 SC. 674 and the observations of a later decision in P.P. Abubakar v. Union of India 1972 KLT. 74 of this Court. It is, however, to be noted that those observations have to be understood in the context in which the question arose for decision in the cases. 8. In the first case, the question was one relating to the identity of the person on whose behalf notice was sent. Minor variations in the name of the party on whose behalf notice was sent, it was held, did not affect the substantial character of the notice, particularly from the object underlying the service of such a notice on the Railway. Minor variations in the name of the party on whose behalf notice was sent, it was held, did not affect the substantial character of the notice, particularly from the object underlying the service of such a notice on the Railway. These observations had been followed in the later decision of this Court where also the disparity in the name of the plaintiff as given in the notice and that as given in the plaint, was the subject-matter of consideration before this Court. These details, treated as trivial, did not amount to a fatal defect in the frame of the suit. No notice as contemplated under S.80 (b) bad been addressed to the respondent, on the senior official designated in that behalf. The omission to do so is defective. That has been the finding of the court below which is fully justified by the decision of the Supreme Court already referred to. The observations contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court do not warrant a departure from the view taken in 1959 KLT. 933 where the identical point arose for decision and was decided upon. In the result, I do not find any merit in the second appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. However, in view of the fact that there was a reasonable justification on the part of the appellant in exploring the point of legal controversy in the light of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, I do not make any order as to costs. Dismissed.