JUDGMENT Chandra Pal Singh, J. 1. This judgment shall also govern the disposal of Criminal Appeal No. 444 of 1978 (Surya Prakash v. The State). 2. The appellants Kailashchandra and Surya Prakash were charged with offences punishable under sections 120-B and 420 Indian Penal Code and Surya Prakash in addition with offences punishable under section 468 Indian Penal Code and section 5(1) (d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and tried before the Special Judge, Indore in Special Case No. 1-A of 1976 in their having conspired with each other, while of them Surya Prakash being a Development Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation (for the brevity sake being referred to as LIC hereinafter) was a public servant, to cheat LIC that it may issue a life assurance policy for Rs. 20.000/- on the life of Ramprasad (PW. 4), Kailashchandra being his nominee. They by falsely representing the said Ramprasad being 47 years old when in fact he was 72 years of age and no policy could have been issued to him, induced the LIC to deliver policy No. 28421813. Surya Prakash criminally misconducting himself, forged certain documents like the proposal form, statement to be filled in by the agent and confidential report TO respect of the said insurance. The Special Judge finding each of them guilty of the offences punishable wader sections 120-B and 420 IPC has sentenced each of them to R.I for two years on each count with a fine of Rs. 1,500 in addition for the offence punishable under section 420 IPC failing the payment of which each is to undergo further R.I for six months, and Surya Prakash in addition to R.I for two years and Rs. 1,000 fine failing the payment of which further R.I for six months for the offence punishable under section 468/109 IPC and two years R.I and Rs. 1,000 fine and in the event, of non-payment of fine further R.I for six months for the offence punishable under section 5(1) (d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act with a direction for the substantive sentences in each case to run concurrently. Kailashchandra and Surya Prakash appeal. 3. Ramprasad (P.W. 4) in the month of December 1972 was about 72 years of age and thus being more than 60 years of age was not assurable. Kailashchandra and Surya Prakash appeal. 3. Ramprasad (P.W. 4) in the month of December 1972 was about 72 years of age and thus being more than 60 years of age was not assurable. He is the uncle of the appellant Kailashchandra, who is one of the beneficiaries in the Will (Ex. P. 7) of this Ramprasad (PW. 4). The appellant Kailashchandra being the agent in the LIC, he having been so appointed on the recommendation of the appellant Surya Prakash, the Development Officer in the LIC conspired with the appellant Surya Prakash that Ramprasad (P.W. 4) be assured in a sum of Rs. 20,000. In pursuance of this conspiring the appellant Surya Prakash Choudhary executed the proposal for insurance (Ex. P. 10) of the life of Ramprasad Agrawal, his personal statement (Ex. P. 11) and the extract (Ex. P. 19) purporting to have been made from some horoscope describing the age of Ramprasad to be 47 years. The two appellants thereafter took a stranger aged about 47 years before Dr. Y.S. Kapoor (P.W. 6), one of the Medical Officers for the LIC, who on examining that stranger finding him to be so aged gave his confidential report contained in the document (Ex. P. 18). The LIC, relying upon these fraudulent misrepresentations were induced to accepting the proposal and after obtaining the first premium of Rs. 611.90 (the estimate contained in the document (Ex. P. 70) sent the LIC policy whose office copy is Ex. P. 69, in a registered cover to Ramprasad Agrawal care of M/s Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal where the appellant Kailashchandra used to live with his brother-in-law Babulal (P.W. 9). The LIC also sent commission of Rs. 152.98 on this policy included in the amount of the cheque (Ex. P. 71) for Rs. 706.47 to the drawee appellant Kailashchandra in the capacity of his being the agent for the said policy. On receiving a subsequent payment of premium the LIC sent at the same address yet another amount of commission to the drawee appellant Kailashchandra included in the amount of the cheque Ex. P. 72. Later on through secret investigation these facts having come to the knowledge of the Superintendent Police C.B.I. Jabalpur, the first information report contained in the document (Ex. P. 34) was submitted. During the course of investigation, the specimen and undisputed signatures and writings of the two appellants, Dr. P. 72. Later on through secret investigation these facts having come to the knowledge of the Superintendent Police C.B.I. Jabalpur, the first information report contained in the document (Ex. P. 34) was submitted. During the course of investigation, the specimen and undisputed signatures and writings of the two appellants, Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6) and Ramprasad (PW. 4) were taken. They along with the disputed ones were sent for being examined. Darshandayal Goyal (P.W. 24) the Assistant Examiner of the questioned documents examined these questioned documents. The necessary sanction (Ex. P. 1) purporting to be under section 6(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to prosecute the appellants Surya Prakash was taken from Harishankar Joshi (P.W. 1) the Divisional Manager in the LIC, Divisional Office, Indore. 4. On these facts when charged with and tried for the specified offences, the appellants denied their guilt. Of them the appellant Kailashchandra while admitting most of the facts contained in the documents explained that he had not known that his uncle had executed a will (Ex. P. 7). He did not prepare the document, nor did he sign the concerned documents particularly Ex. P. 19. He had not taken any person to be examined by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6). The agent's report (Ex. P. 19) was prepared by the co-appellant Surya Prakash who had known the party (Ramprasad - PW. 4) for the past one year. He had not accepted any commission. His further explanation was that he was on bad terms with his brother-in-law (Babulal - PW. 9) whose friend Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6) is. He, therefore, suggested that he through the two of them had been falsely implicated. 5. The explanation of the appellant Surya Prakash was that since 8-12-1971 the co-appellant Kailashchandra was the agent in his organization. He had not known Ramprasad (P.W. 4). He came to know him only after he appeared in the Court. The co-appellant Kailashchandra had made him meet a man aged about 47 years or 48 years described as Ramprasad as his uncle twice or thrice at his brother-in-law, Babulal Agrawal's shop, Agrawal Jewellers at Chowk Bazar, Bhopal. 6. He had not known Ramprasad (P.W. 4). He came to know him only after he appeared in the Court. The co-appellant Kailashchandra had made him meet a man aged about 47 years or 48 years described as Ramprasad as his uncle twice or thrice at his brother-in-law, Babulal Agrawal's shop, Agrawal Jewellers at Chowk Bazar, Bhopal. 6. He, in order to speed up the business (of his organization) and to help the agent in conformity with the practice followed by the Development Officers generally and his own practice particularly, as he had done with regard to other proposal forms that came to him through the agency of the co-appellant Kailashchandra, on the information supplied to him by the co-appellant filled in the proposal form (Ex. P. 10) also. He did not suspect that he was being misled; for the co-appellant Kailashchandra had been working with him for the past one year and the information was with regard to his near relative. He after signing Ex. P. 10 instructed the co-appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal vide Ex. P. 21 to take the concerned man to Dr. N.M. Gupta who used to live nearest to him and send the medical report to the Branch Office. In the last week of December generally and on the last day of it in particular, the Development Officer and other officers of various branches remain very busy. On 30-12-1972 at about 4-p.m. the co-appellant Kailashchandra came to him with a closed envelope saying that he had brought the medical report from the doctor. He told him to deliver the envelope in the office. Thereafter he after calculating the first instalment payable on the insurance policy being Rs. 611.90 told the co-appellant Kailashchandra so, who got it deposited at the counter. 7. Regarding the proof of age, the co-appellant Kailashchandra told him that he had brought with him the original horoscope of Ramprasadji. He directed him to submit that too in the office. The co-appellant Kailashchandra went away but after 15 minutes came back and told him that the concerned clerk had asked him to wait for an hour because he was busy. The co-appellant showed his reluctance to stay on in the office for that long time. The co-appellant, therefore, brought the hundred year calendar from Mr. R.D. Shukla (DW. 1) and on the basis of it, he prepared the extract (Ex. The co-appellant showed his reluctance to stay on in the office for that long time. The co-appellant, therefore, brought the hundred year calendar from Mr. R.D. Shukla (DW. 1) and on the basis of it, he prepared the extract (Ex. P. 19) regarding the birth (of the person to be assured) which the co-appellant Kailashchandra took to Mr. N.K. Bose (PW. 13) the then Branch Manager for verification and thereafter the co-appellant with the original horoscope went away. 8. With regard to his having written Q-11 in the document (Ex. P. 19) his explanation was that he had forgotten to strike out the words 'signature' and write 'name' instead, because of his being over busy. He wrote down the name of the co-appellant (K.C. Agrawal) in Ex. P. 19 (at Q-11) in a normal way without any intention of forging that document. The co-appellant had got the person concerned introduced as his uncle and had himself got entered in the document as his uncle's nominee. Every correspondence regarding the insurance with the co appellant was at his address of Agrawal Jewellers. The co-appellant Kailashchandra against his advice had got the person examined by Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6). There was no question of his introducing that person to Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6). That day be had kept himself busy in the office right from 10-30 a.m. till 7 p.m. It was not his responsibility to see whether the horoscope was genuine or not. It was that of the Branch Manager's Mr. Bose (PW. 13). 9. It was the appellant, who had deposited the initial premium and the subsequent premium at the counter. Had he been paid the premium he would have issued the necessary receipts. It was the co-appellant who had received the commission concerning the two premiums. From the evidence of Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6) and Babulal (PW. 9) he explained, it appeared to him that they were known to Ramprasad. Dr. Kapoor being a friend of Babulal Agrawal (PW. 9) had attended on Ramprasad (PW. 4) when he was sick. Yet Ramprasad had been described to be aged only 47 years. 10. Lastly his explanation was that during 29 12 1972 and 30-12-1972 he had filled in similar proposal forms in 19 other policies, secured through the agency of the co-appellant Kailashchandra. 11. 9) had attended on Ramprasad (PW. 4) when he was sick. Yet Ramprasad had been described to be aged only 47 years. 10. Lastly his explanation was that during 29 12 1972 and 30-12-1972 he had filled in similar proposal forms in 19 other policies, secured through the agency of the co-appellant Kailashchandra. 11. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the learned Special Judge found the two appellants guilty of the offences charged with the exception that the appellant Surya Prakash in his judgment though had not committed the offence punishable under section 468 Indian Penal Code had done so with the help of section 109 Indian Penal Code. He sentenced the appellants as already indicated. 12. The only question for decision by me in this appeal is whether the appellants have been rightly held guilty of the offences charged and rightly punished for them. 13. As already noted both the appellants have been held guilty of the offences punishable under sections 120B and 420 IPC and the appellant Surya Prakash in addition of offences punishable under sections 468/109 IPC and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corrupts on Act. 14. All the offences of which the appellants have been found guilty require the proof of intention to commit the specified offences. Neither of them is an offence of strict criminal responsibility (liability). "Intention" consists of desire that certain specified consequences shall follow from party's act or omission. Intention, therefore, includes foresight of certainty of a consequence. The consequence of an act may range in every degree from the remote and unexpected, through the reasonably, possible, the likely or probable, to the inevitable. (See generally Prof. Williams-Criminal law, the general part, second edition at p. 34 and p. 59). 15. To establish the offence punishable under section 120-B IPC, reference has to be made to section 120-A IPC which defines 'criminal conspiracy, as follows:-- When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act, which is not illegal by illegal means, such agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy. Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.--It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. The mere agreement between two or more persons to do or causing any illegal act to be done, or engaging in such an agreement constitutes an overt act (actus reus). The word 'illegal' according to section 43 Indian Penal Code is applicable to everything which is an offence prohibited by law or which furnishes ground for an action. The word 'act' also includes an illegal omission. The overt acts (actus reus) necessary to be proved to establish conspiracy include acts (i) signifying agreement, (ii) acts preparatory to the offence and (iii) acts constituting the offence itself. The gist of the offence of conspiracy, therefore, lies in forming the scheme or agreement between the parties, the external or overt act of the crime is concert by which mutual consent to a common purpose is exchanged. It, therefore, suffices if the Combination exists and is unlawful. In Lennart Schussler and another v. Director of Enforcement and another AIR 1970 SC 549 it was laid down as follows:-- The first of the offences defined in section 120-A Penal Code which is itself punishable as a substantive offence is the very agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act and legal act by illegal means subject however to the proviso that where the agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence the agreement does not amount to a conspiracy unless it is followed up by an overt act done by one or more persons in pursuance of such an agreement. There must be a meeting of minds in the doing of the illegal act or the doing of a legal act by illegal means. If in the furtherance of the conspiracy certain persons are induced to do an unlawful act without the knowledge of the conspiracy of the plot they cannot be held to be conspirators, though they may be guilty of an offence pertaining to the specific unlawful act. If in the furtherance of the conspiracy certain persons are induced to do an unlawful act without the knowledge of the conspiracy of the plot they cannot be held to be conspirators, though they may be guilty of an offence pertaining to the specific unlawful act. The offence of conspiracy is complete when two or more conspirators have agreed to do or cause to be done an act which is itself an offence, in which case no overt act need be established. An agreement to do an illeged act which amounts to a conspiracy will continue as long as the members of the conspiracy remain in agreement and as long as they are acting in accord and in furtherance of the object for which they entered into the agreement. It is seldom that a conspiracy may be established by direct evidence. Usually both the facts of the conspiracy and its object have to be inferred from the conduct of the accused. 16. The offence of cheating (punishable under section 420 IPC) is defined in section 415 IPC laying down as follows:-- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property is said to cheat. Explanation:--A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. 17. The offence punishable under section 468 IPC requires the prosecution to prove the commission of forgery by the accused for the purpose of cheating. "Forgery" is defined in section 463 IPC. It lays down as follows:-- Whoever makes any false document or part of a document, with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. In other words, it requires the proof of making a false document in order that in may be used as genuine and secondly with the intent specified in the section. 18. Section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act requires the prosecution to prove that the accused was a public servant, that he in his capacity as such by corrupt or illegal means or other by abusing his position as public servant obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. Section 6 (1) (c) of the Prevention of corruption Act requires the sanction of the authority competent to remove the accused from his office. 19. Regarding the appellant Surya Prakash, the evidence of Harishankar Joshi (P.W. 1), Divisional Manager, LIC, Divisional Office, Indore is that Surya Prakash is removable by the Divisional manager and he had given his sanction contained in Ex. P. 1 for his prosecution. The appellant Surya Prakash did not challenge his prosecution being sanctioned. 20. Mrinal Kant Bose (P.W. 13) proves that the document (Ex. P. 0) at A to A and B to B contains the signatures of the appellant Surya Prakash and at C to C his own signature in the capacity of the Branch Manager of LIC. This document is regarding the application for the agency of the co-appellant Kailashchandra. This witness further proves the document (Ex. P. 83) and thereby the fact that the co-appellant Kailashchandra was appointed as an agent for the period between 22-12-1971 and 21-12-1974 and was working under the appellant Surya Prakash, the Development Officer for the period 1972-73. This fact is not disputed by the appellants. 21. Babulal Agrawal (P.W. 9) proves that the co-appellant Kailashchandra, who is his brother-in-law, till December 1972 was working at his shop called "Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal". Kailashnarayan Khandelwal (P.W. 17) the Development Officer in the LIC and Balkrishna Verma (P.W. 19), then Branch Manager, State Bank of Indore, and Jagdish Sharan Sharma (P.W. 21) at that time the postman, if their evidence be considered cumulatively, prove that from 22-11-1971 till July 1973, the address of the co-appellant Kailashchandra was care of the Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal. This fact is admitted by the appellants. 22. Similarly the facts that Dr. This fact is admitted by the appellants. 22. Similarly the facts that Dr. Yeshwantsingh Kapoor (P.W. 6) was one of the medical examiners of the LIC to examine proponents desiring to obtain policies, the procedure that after the medical examination of a proponent the medical officer would send the proposal form and the attached personal statement with his report directly to the Branch Office, and the procedure for obtaining a policy as proved by Maganlal Vohra (P.W. 12) the Divisional Manager, LIC and other officers of the LIC beginning from 'he submission of the proposal form and various stages it goes through till it is accepted, cultimating in the issuing of an insurance policy, remain undisputed. 23. In short, it is proved and not disputed that Ex. P. 10 the proposal form for assuring the life of one Ramprasad S/o Moolchand, cultivator, resident of village Handia, tahsil Harda, district Hoshangabad whose address was given as Care of Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal (the same address at which the appellant Kailashchandra used to receive his letters) was executed by the appellant Suray Prakash, who bad also executed the document (ExP. 11 ) the personal statement regarding the said Ramprasad. The facts that for the proof of age of the proponent, the statement contained in the document like Ex P.19 is called from the agent, that if a horoscope is produced in proof of age, an extract in a separate form like the document ExP. 20 is prepared, that the proposal thereafter is registered and sent along with the review slip to the Divisional Office, that the officer decides whether to accept the proposal and that if it is accepted after receiving the first premium the regular LIC policy is sent to the proponent's address which in this case was care of M/s Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal did not remain disputed. There is proof and indeed the appellant Surya Prakash does not dispute the execution also of the document (Ex. P.19) particularly at Q 11 purporting to have been signed by the co-appellant K.C. Agrawal (when in fact it was not so) and the documents Ex. P. 20 and P. 21 at portions Q-12 and Q-13 respectively. The fact of the policy No. 28421313 (Ex. P. 69) in the name of the said Ramprasad coming to be issued is also not disputed by any of the appellants. 24. P. 20 and P. 21 at portions Q-12 and Q-13 respectively. The fact of the policy No. 28421313 (Ex. P. 69) in the name of the said Ramprasad coming to be issued is also not disputed by any of the appellants. 24. All the documents Ex. P. 10, P. 11, P. 12, P. 18, P. 19 and P. 20 and others generally describe the age of the proponent Ramprasad Agrawal to be 47 years. There is evidence of Ramprasad (P.W. 4) and also the confirmation of his evidence by the evidence of the expert Darshandayal Goel (P.W. 24) that he had signed neither of the documents Ex. P. 10, P. 11 or at the portion Q. 16 in the document Ex. P. 12 Ramprasad (P.W. 4) has a so proved that he was 78 or 79 years of age on the date of his deposition on 18-7-1977 (implying thereby that in any event he was more than 72 years of age on 28-12-1972).The appellants Surya Prakash and K.C. Agrawal did not dispute these facts. The fact that a person could not be assured unless he was between 18 years of age and 60 years again did not remain disputed. 25. In the face of this evidence, considering particularly the positive assertions in nature of misrepresentations contained in the documents (Ex. P. 10) P. 11, P. 12, P. 13, P. 19 and P. 20) it stands proved that but for those Misrepresentations regarding the age of one Ramprasad (who certainly was not Ramprasad P.W. 4) being 47 years of age, the LIC would not have been induced to assure the life of Ramprasad (P.W. 4), aged 72 years. Thus, the offences punishable under sections 468 and 420 IPC had been committed. 26. The documents in question were obviously false particularly with regard to the age of the proponent. They had contained representations which were false and those representations were calculated to defraud the LIC. They in fact were relied upon when the LIC was induced to issuing a life insurance policy whose copy is Ex. P. 69. Neither of the appellants has explained, who that Ramprased was, who had signed the documents (Ex. P. 10, P. 11 and the portion Q.--16 in the document Ex. P. 12) and who was the person examined by Dr. P. 69. Neither of the appellants has explained, who that Ramprased was, who had signed the documents (Ex. P. 10, P. 11 and the portion Q.--16 in the document Ex. P. 12) and who was the person examined by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6) whose evidence though wavering clearly brings home that either both the appellants together or anyone of them had produced that person before him. 27. There is no force in the argument by the learned counsel for the appellants that the issuing of insurance policy (like the original of Ex. P. 69) does not constitute property within the meaning of section 420 IPC. An insurance policy is a document embodying a contract uberrima fide. The duty of full disclosure of special facts lies on the assured (or his agent or the Development Officer acting on his behalf). An insurance policy, therefore, does constitute property defining the respective obligations of the parties to the contract and the mode of those obligations being discharged. 28. The argument for the learned counsel for the appellants Surya Prakash that he had on other 19 occasions filled in similar proposal forms between 29-12-1972 and 30-12-1972 through the agency of the co-appellant Kailashchandra only proves that on the occasion in question also it was not by an accident that he had come to execute the document in question. It was as a result of a definite system of working (see section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act where evidence of similar acts is Admissible not to show that because the accused has committed one crime (or was once innocent) he would, therefore, be likely to commit another (or be innocent), but to establish the animus of the act and rebut by anticipation the defences of ignorance, accident, mistake, or other innocent state of mind). 29. In the context of the other documents admittedly executed by Surya Prakash, his explanation regarding the execution of Q.--11 in the document (Ex. P 19) that he had forgotten to strike out the words "signature" and write 'name' instead because of his being overbusy, is not believable. Similarly in the face of his declaration contained in the document Ex. P. 11. P 19) that he had forgotten to strike out the words "signature" and write 'name' instead because of his being overbusy, is not believable. Similarly in the face of his declaration contained in the document Ex. P. 11. I declare that I have explained the above portions to the proposer that the proposer's answers thereto have been recorded by me and that he/she has affixed his/her signature/thumb impression after satisfying himself/herself that answers have been correctly recorded, "and his endorsement in Ex. P. 19 to the effect that "I had seen the party and discussed with him the question of standard proof of age. I am satisfied that he cannot submit a standard proof of age for the following reasons 'because there was no school or hospital on that place", his explanation that it was not his responsibility to see whether the horoscope was genuine or not but that of the Branch Manager Mr. Bose (P.W. 13), is not acceptable. It was rather his concerned declaration and statement which appear to have misled Mr. Bose (P.W. 13) to signing the document (Ex. P. 19) at D to D. Indeed in this document even the portion C to C is in the handwriting of the appellant Surya Prakash. 30. It is no doubt true as established by the defence witnessess that during the month of December generally every year, particularly in the last week there is and more particularly on the last day of December of that year, there was, rush of work. The appellant Surya Prakash might have been busy that day, but his executing a number of documents in the face of positive duty cast upon him to verify facts particularly with regard to the age of a proponent, his conduct was not merely careless or negligent. It was intentional and hence he is responsible for all the consequences that flowed from his conduct. The argument that vide the document, Ex. P. 21 his instructions to the co-appellant Kailashchandra, were to get the concerned man medically examined by Dr. M.M. Gupta and contrary to it he was examined by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6), pales into insignificance because the document (Ex. P. 19), particularly its portion C to C; "there is no age proof is available other than horoscope," came to be executed by the appellant after the examination of that man by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6). M.M. Gupta and contrary to it he was examined by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6), pales into insignificance because the document (Ex. P. 19), particularly its portion C to C; "there is no age proof is available other than horoscope," came to be executed by the appellant after the examination of that man by Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6). It was on the basis of this representation that Mr. Bose (P.W. 13) signed the document (Ex. P. 19) at portion D to D. In any event, admittedly Dr. Kapoor (P.W. 6) was also authorized to examine a proponent. 32. The argument that he did not have any axe to grind is not sound. He was interested in his agent, the co-appellant Kailashchandra, who had been regularly supplying him with business. He had been responsible for recommending his case for the agency. He had on his own admission visited him at his place of business when allegedly, according to him, he was made to meet a man aged about 47 or 48 years described as Ramprasad, his uncle twice or thrice at his brother-in-law Babulal Agralwal's shop Agralwal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal.' Apart from it, he himself had interest because apart from earning bonus on the amount of work done by him his promotion would depend on it. The appellant Surya Prakash, therefore, in having forged the document with the intention to defraud the LIC and having been a party to inducing the LIC to issue policy to assure the life of one Ramprasad which it would otherwise have not done, has committed the offences punishable under sections 468 and 420 IPC. 33. It is true that he has been found guilty of offence punishable under section 468 read with section 109 IPC but that appears to be with regard to abetting one Ramprasad to signing those documents. That, however, was not the charge which the appellant Surya Prakash was called upon to face and as just demonstrated, Surya Prakash has actually made false document for the successful purpose of cheating the LIC. Punishment for both an abettor and perpetrator is the same. 34. He having committed the offences punishable under sections 468 and 420 IPC, while admittedly being a public servant he has during the course of discharging his duty as such misconducted himself. Punishment for both an abettor and perpetrator is the same. 34. He having committed the offences punishable under sections 468 and 420 IPC, while admittedly being a public servant he has during the course of discharging his duty as such misconducted himself. He has rightly been held guilty of the offence punishable under section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 35. As to the appellant Kailashchandra, most of the evidence concerning him has already been discussed while determining the criminal responsibility of the co-appellant Surya Prakash (for the offences charged save the one punishable under section 120-B, IPC). From the evidence of Ramprasad (P.W. 4), it remains established that he had executed his will (Ex. P. 7) in which his real nephew, the appellant Kailashchandra is one of the beneficiaries. Kailashchandra is a nominee in the insurance policy. Ramprasad being aged more than 72 years there was apparent temptation on the part of Kailashchandra to get his uncle Ramprasad (P.W. 4) assured so that he might be benefited to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- after his possible early death. The contents of the document (Ex P. 10) do describe Kailashchandra as the agent, so also the documents (Ex. P. 12 and P. 21) and above all the copy of the insurance policy contained in the document (Ex. P. 69) along with his address. The very nature of the contents of (Ex. P. 10) particularly regarding the name of the father and the village address of the proponent Ramprsad Agrawal are sufficient to lead one to the inference under section 114, Indian Evidence Act that that information was supplied only by the appellant Kailashchandra, within whose peculiar knowledge (as compared with that of the co-appellant Surya Prakash) those facts were. This presumption incidentally is also in conformity with a definite system of working referred to in paragraph 28 above regarding 19 other occasions when similar proposal forms between 29-12-1972 and 30-12-1972 through the agency of Kailashchandra had been filled in by the co-appellant Surya Prakash. 36. The document (Ex. P. 10) not only describes the address of the proponent Ramprasad Agrawal care of M/s. Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal, to which his insurance policy was to be sent, but also the address, of the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal his nominee-being the same. Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6) proves that in the documents-Ex. 36. The document (Ex. P. 10) not only describes the address of the proponent Ramprasad Agrawal care of M/s. Agrawal Jewellers, Chowk Bazar, Bhopal, to which his insurance policy was to be sent, but also the address, of the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal his nominee-being the same. Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6) proves that in the documents-Ex. P. 14 (Art A at page 35) and Ex. P. 18, he has described the introducer to be the co-appellant Surya Prakash because according to the proposal form contained in the document (Ex. P. 10), the appellant Kailashchandra, the agent was proponent's relative. From the evidence of Dr. Kapoor (PW. 6), it stands proved beyond doubt that he had not only known the appellant Kailashchandra and his brother-in-law Babulal (PW. 9) but also Ramprasad (PW. 4) who had sustained a fracture and was treated by him. Babulal Agrawal (PW. 9) proves that Ramprasad Agrawal is his uncle-in-law; he has no-issue and he had sustained fracture. The evidence of Mr. Vohra (PW. 12) regarding the proof of age of the proponent is that in the absence of the school leaving certificate, baptism certificate or birth certificate, a horoscope in the original and also the statement of the agent (like the document Ex. P. 19) have to be submitted. This fact is not disputed by the appellant Kailashchandra. Kailash Narayan Khandelwal (PW. 7) in his cross-examination admits that the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal had brought an envelope containing some papers for completion on 30-12-1972 and had even admitted of his having brought a horoscope. This witness was cross-examined at length but to no apparent benefit to the appellant Kailashchandra. 37. Tulsiram Sethia, a clerk in the LIC proves that the policy on the life of Ramprasad was sent by him under a registered cover (registration No. being A-1820) Ex. P. 198. The registration receipt issued by the post office corroborates this fact. Jagdishsharan Sharma (PW. 1) then a post-man at Bhopal proves that he had delivered the registered letter (Registration No. A-1820) at Agrawal Jewellers, Chok Bazar, Bhopal. Makhanlal Sharma (PW. 22) a Munim of Agrawal Jewellers Chock Bazar, Bhopal corroborates the fact of having received such a letter. Ex. P. 3 the postal receipt which he had signed, further corroborates this fact. According to Makhanlal Sharma (PW. Makhanlal Sharma (PW. 22) a Munim of Agrawal Jewellers Chock Bazar, Bhopal corroborates the fact of having received such a letter. Ex. P. 3 the postal receipt which he had signed, further corroborates this fact. According to Makhanlal Sharma (PW. 22), the letters used to be kept at a particular place where from they used to be collected by the persons for whom they were meant. Murlidhar (PW. 3) another post-man at Bhopal, establishes that another registered letter (Ex. P. 113) was delivered by him at the same address to the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal. The postal acknowledgment receipt (Ex. P. 6) corroborates that fact. It has, therefore, to be presumed that the registered letter (containing the insurance policy) was delivered to Kailashchandra. 38. About the events subsequent to the delivery of the insurance policy, Mohammad Khan (PW. 23) a Record Clerk in the HEL Branch No. 2 of the LIC proves that the cheque (Ex. P. 71) for Rs. 706.47 was sent by a registered post to the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal on 9-2-1973 by register No. 113 of that day. The document (Ex. P. 207 an entry in the register) further proves this fact. This witness also proves that another cheque (Ex. P. 72) for Rs. 409-80, under postal certificate had been sent to the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal. The document Ex. P. 208 corroborates this fact. He proves that Ex. P. 6 is the acknowledgment. Even the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal does not dispute these facts. Vishnukumar Mehta (PW. 15) proves that the amounts specified in the cheque (Ex. P. 71) includes the sums of commission specified in the bills (Ex. P. 88, P. 121, P. 122 and P. 123). Even this fact of receiving commission is not disputed by the appellant Kailashchandra Agrawal. 39. The document (Ex. P. 88) specifies not only the amount of the insurance policy being Rs. 20,000 but also its proposal number, policy number, name of the assured being Agrawal and also the amount of the first premium being Rs. 611.10. By looking into it and the evidence of Vishnukumar Mehta (PW. 15) it stands proved that the bills sent to the appellant Kailashchandra had also included the amount of commission which he had earned as the agent for the policy in question. The explanation of the appellant Kailashchandra therefore that though he had received the cheque (Ex. 611.10. By looking into it and the evidence of Vishnukumar Mehta (PW. 15) it stands proved that the bills sent to the appellant Kailashchandra had also included the amount of commission which he had earned as the agent for the policy in question. The explanation of the appellant Kailashchandra therefore that though he had received the cheque (Ex. P. 71), it was not accompanied by the bill is of no avail. In the circumstances just indicated particularly with reference to the details regarding the insurance policy in question, it stands proved that he had received the commission as the agent of that policy. Similar is the case with the cheque (Ex. P. 72) which the appellant Kailashchandra had admittedly received. The document (Ex. P. 124) the bill clearly specifies the policy number and the commission being Rs. 152.98 the identical amount as covered by the amount of cheque (Ex. P. 71). The facts that the appellant Kailashchandra had an account (No. 164) at Branch Office, the State Bank of Indore, Kotwali Koad, Bhopal and that he had actually deposited the cheques Ex. P. 17 and P. 72 including the amounts of his commission in the Bank so that the amount therein could be deposited into his account as established by Balkrishna Verma (P.W. 19), do not remain disputed. 40. It is true that the documents (Ex. P. 88 and Ex. F. 124) are not the original bills. They are merely the copies they having been seized from Hiralal Agrawal (P W.20). But according to Hiralal Agrawal (P.W. 20) whenever the (agent's) commission is paid, the original copy (of the bill) is also sent along with the cheque. It has, therefore, to be presumed that the bills had accompanied the two cheques (Ex P. 71 and P. 72) in the ordinary course of business. The argument that in the bill (Ex. P. 88) only the word "Agrawal" against policy No. 28421813 and in the bill(Ex. P. 124) only the policy number were given, is attractive only on surface. Having received the cheques including the amounts of his commission, in all probability along with the bills accompanying those cheques and he actually having deposited those cheques in his account are circumstances leading to the inference that he had knowledge of those cheques including the amounts of commission of his agency with regard to the insurance policy in question. Having received the cheques including the amounts of his commission, in all probability along with the bills accompanying those cheques and he actually having deposited those cheques in his account are circumstances leading to the inference that he had knowledge of those cheques including the amounts of commission of his agency with regard to the insurance policy in question. The principle of law is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further inquiries because be wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge. Lord Summers observations in The Zamora [(1921) 1 A.C. 812 (P.C.)] are pertinent.-- There are two senses in which a man is said not to know something because he does not want to know it. A thing may be troublesome to learn, and the knowledge of it, when acquired, may be uninteresting or distasteful. To refuse to know any more about the subject or anything at all is then a wilful but a real ignorance. On the other hand, a man is said not to know because he does not want to know, where the substance of the thing is borne in upon his mind with a conviction that full details or precise proofs may be dangerous, because they may embarrass his denials or compromise his protests. In such a case he flatters himself that where ignorance is safe it is folly to be wise, but there he is wrong, for he has been put upon notice and his further ignorance, even though actual and complete, is a mere affectation and disguise. 41. The act of preparing false documents fraudulently misstating in them the age of the proponent one Ramprasad to be 47, when in fact Ramprasad (P.W. 4) was 72 and his life could not have been assured, was a joint venture as a result of the conspiracy between the two appellants Kailashchandra of them supplying the false information and Suryaprakash Choudhari preparing those false documents knowing them to be so. Pursuant to this conspiracy to defraud the L.I.C. the LIC was induced to issuing the policy whose copy is Ex. P. 69. These facts prove by inference not only the agreement between the two appellants but also the acts preparatory to the offence and the acts constituting the offence of cheating itself. Pursuant to this conspiracy to defraud the L.I.C. the LIC was induced to issuing the policy whose copy is Ex. P. 69. These facts prove by inference not only the agreement between the two appellants but also the acts preparatory to the offence and the acts constituting the offence of cheating itself. The extent of the LIC being defrauded did not stop merely at its issuing the disputed policy but continued further inasmuch as the appellant Kailashchandra earned his commissions which he otherwise would not have done. Both the appellants have rightly been held guilty of the offence punishable under section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and section 420 Indian Panel Code (in addition to the other offences which the appellant Surya Prakash as already seen has committed). 42. As to the sentence awarded, these are the first offences of the kind committed by the appellants Both of them by now are about 40 years of age and at the time of commission of offences were about 30 years of age. The offences themselves were committed in 1972. The design of the two appellants to cheat the LIC had a charmed life only for about a year; it came to be frustrated and in the bargain Surya Prakash in all probability would lose his service and the appellant Kailashchandra appears to have already lost the affection of his brother-in-law Babulal (P.W. 9) and his uncle Ramprasad (P.W. 4). These are some of the circumstances calling for leniency in punishment to be awarded to the appellants. 43. The appeal, in consequence, is partly allowed. Though the convictions of the two appellants for offences punishable under sections 120-B and 420 IPC and those of the appellant Surya Prakash in addition for offences punishable under section 468 (without the help of section 109) of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are maintained, each of them is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year for each of the offences punishable under sections 120-B and 420 IPC. The appellant Surya Prakash for each of the offences punishable under sections 468 IPC and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one years on each Count. Sentences of both the appellants shall run concurrently. The appellant Surya Prakash for each of the offences punishable under sections 468 IPC and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one years on each Count. Sentences of both the appellants shall run concurrently. The articles and documents seized from the LIC shall be returned to it. Each of the appellants shall appear before the Special Judge, Indore on 4th May 1982 when his personal bail bonds shall be cancelled and he shall be committed to prison to serve out the remainder period of his sentence. Appeal allowed