ORDER :- This petition arised out of the proceedings which were initiated by the filing of a suit by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. A suit was filed by the respondent No. 3 as the landlord for the eviction of the petitioner who was the tenant. Arrears of rent and damages were also claimed. The suit for eviction was dismissed but so far as the relief for rent was concerned, it was observed in the judgment that as the money had been deposited in the Court by the defendant therefore, no relief was needed to be given to the plaintiff landlord. However, a direction was given that the money so deposited in the Court, could be withdrawn by the plaintiff. Thereafter, a revision was filed and the same was allowed by the lower Revisional Court by its judgment dated 19-5-1975. Thereafter, a second revision was filed in this Court and during the pendency of the said revision in this Court an application under S.40 read with S.39 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was given by the petitioner. By an order dated 8th Oct. 1975 the Court permitted the petitioner to make the deposit subject to objections, if any, filed by the landlord. In the judgment of this Court dated 15th Sept. 1978, it has been observed that no objection was filed by the landlord, and, therefore, the said application under S.40 read with S.39 of the Act was allowed. Subsequently, this Court by its judgment dated 15th Sept. 1978 allowed the revision and sent back the case to the lower Revisional Court for deciding whether the deposits and other conditions laid down in Ss.39 (sic). After determining the said controversy, the lower Revisional Court was directed to decide whether the landlord was entitled to a decree for eviction or not. 3. When the case went back to the lower Revisional Court , it carried out the directions given by this Court and held that the tenant was not entitled to the benefit under S.40 read with S. 39 of the Act and was therefore, liable to be ejected because there was a shortfall in the deposit made by the tenant. A true copy of the lower Revisional Court s decision dated 12-12-1979 is Annexure-3 to the petition. A true copy of the lower Revisional Court s decision dated 12-12-1979 is Annexure-3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said order is also on the record. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri S.N. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioner and in opposition. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Counsel for the landlord has made his submissions. 5. Sri Misra contended that the view of the lower Revisional Court, that there was a shortfall in the deposit, is not correct. He contended that once the application under S.40 read with S.39 of the Act had been made in this Court in the aforementioned revision and no objection had been filed by the landlord to the same, it is not open to the landlord to contend now that the said application under S.40 read with S.39 of the Act was not maintainable. He further contended that the landlord submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the aforesaid revision and he cannot now call in question the orders passed in the said revision. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in this connection placed reliance on the well known decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Pannalal Vinjraj v. Union of India ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ), which was a case under the Indian Income-tax Act 1922. In para 45 the Supreme Court laid down as follows:- "There is moreover another feature which is common to both these groups and it is that none of the petitioners raised any objection to their cases being transferred in the manner stated above and in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases had been transferred. It was only after our decision in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India ( AIR 1956 SC 479 ) (supra) was pronounced on 20th March, 1965, that these petitioners woke up and asserted their alleged rights, the Amritsar group on 20th April, 1956, and the Raichur group on 5th Nov. 1956. If they acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.32. 1956. If they acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court (Vide Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. II, 3rd Edn., p. 140, para 165, Rex v. Tabrum, Ex Parte Desh, (1907) 97, LT 551, O.A.O.K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Corporation of Madras, (1927) ILR 50 Mad 130 : (AIR 1927 Mad 130).") 6. In the said Supreme Court decision the vires of S.5 (7-A) of Income-tax Act 1922 were being questioned. The said provision enabled the Commissioner of Income-tax to transfer any case from one I.T.O. subordinate to him to another and the Central Board of Revenue to transfer any case from any I.T.O. to another. While rejecting the challenge to the vires of the said provision, it was laid down as follows (at p. 409) : "There is no fundamental right in an assessee to be assessed in a particular area or locality. Even considered in the context of S.64 (1) and (2) of the Act. this right which is conferred upon the assessee to be assessed in a particular area or locality, is not an absolute right but is subject to the exigencies of tax collection. Even considered in the context of S.64 (1) and (2) of the Act. this right which is conferred upon the assessee to be assessed in a particular area or locality, is not an absolute right but is subject to the exigencies of tax collection. The difference, if any, created in the position of the assessee qua others who continue to be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which they reside or carry on business is not a material difference but a minor deviation from the general standard and would, therefore, not amount to the denial of equal rights (per Mukherjea, J., as he then was in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (at p. 325 of 1952 SCR 284 ) : (at p.90 of AIR 1952 SC 75 ) (supra).) There is also the further fact to be borne in mind that this inconvenience to the assessee is sought to be minimised by the authority concerned transferring the case of such assessee to the Income-tax Officer who is nearest to the area where it would be convenient for the assessee to attend and if, on account of administrative exigencies this is not possible and the assessee requests that the examination of accounts or evidence to be taken should be in a place convenient to him, by the Income-tax Officer complying with the request of the assessee and holding the hearing at the place requested. We are bound to take this statement contained in para 5 of the affidavit of Sri V. Gouri Shanker at its face value and if this is done as it should be, the assessee will not be put to any inconvenience or harassment and the proper balance between the rights of the subject and public interest will be preserved." 7. In the aforesaid context the Supreme Court emphasised in the said para 45 that the petitioners had taken no exception to the order of transfer whereby their cases were transferred from one Income-tax Officer to another, and, therefore, they should not be allowed to maintain the petition before the Supreme Court. 8. In the aforesaid context the Supreme Court emphasised in the said para 45 that the petitioners had taken no exception to the order of transfer whereby their cases were transferred from one Income-tax Officer to another, and, therefore, they should not be allowed to maintain the petition before the Supreme Court. 8. The learned Counsel next placed reliance on the Division Bench pronouncement reported in Mukund Ram Tanti v. S.I. Raza, Registrar, Trade Unions, Bihar, Patna ( AIR 1962 Pat 338 ), where the head-note (a) is as follows : "Where the petitioner himself called for an enquiry with regard to the election of new office bearers of the Mazdoor Union and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Registrar Trade Union, he cannot be allowed to urge that the Registrar, Trade Unions had no jurisdiction to make an enquiry; once he took A chance of getting a favourable order from the Registrar, he was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction if the result of the enquiry happened to be against him." 9. On the other hand, Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Counsel for the landlord submitted that the second revision was not at all maintainable in this Court and the judgment passed by this Court allowing the revision must be treated as nullity or non est. He placed reliance on Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ), where it has been laid down as follows (at p. 897):- "All the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. ........................ No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under S.25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge, It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, We are of firm opinion that the Central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding, the amendment effected in Sec.25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act represented a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to Proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute." 10. The Supreme Court thereafter specifically overruled the decisions of this Court in Smt. Bimla Rani Kohli v, M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Private Ltd. ( AIR 1972 All 242 ), wherein it had been held that a second revision under Section 115, C.P.C. was competent against the revisional order passed by the lower Revisional Court under S.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, The learned Counsel for the landlord further submitted that it was now fully settled by the case law of this Court that the benefit of Ss.39 and 40 of the Act cannot be given during the pendency of writ petition in this Court, In other words, d the petitioner had filed a writ petition instead of a second revision which he filed, and which was not maintainable in law, then this Court in the writ jurisdiction could not allow the benefit Of S.39 read with S.40 of the Act to the petitioner. He cannot be allowed to get the benefit of the said provision by his mistake in filing a second revision in this Court, which was not maintainable in law In this connection, reliance was placed on Lakshmi Shanker Srivastava v. Dr. J.C. Sharma (1980 All Rent Cas 43) and Mohamad Shamim Ashmi v. The 1st Addl. Distt. Judge, Allahabad (1980 All Rent Cas 203) : (1980 All LJ 251). 11. Lastly, Sri Jain placed reliance on the judgment of Hon, N.D. Ojha, J. in Radhey Shyam v. District Judge, Bulandshahr (1982 (UP) RCC 9), where the said learned Judge observed as under :- "Firstly, the benefit of S.39 can be given only if deposit contemplated by the said section is made before the Court where the suit is pending. If the second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not at all maintainable, it cannot be said that the suit was pending in this Court on account of filing of the said revision." 12. Sri Misra contended that all the cases on which the learned Counsel for the landlord placed reliance, were distinguishable. The peculiar feature in the instant case was that the second revision was actually allowed by this Court and the lower Revisional Court was given certain directions to be carried out. The lower Revisional Court was bound by the said directions and could not ignore them. The peculiar feature in the instant case was that the second revision was actually allowed by this Court and the lower Revisional Court was given certain directions to be carried out. The lower Revisional Court was bound by the said directions and could not ignore them. In this view of the matter, when the landlord had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the aforesaid second revision, it is not open to him now to question the correctness or validity of the judgment which was delivered in the said second revision by this Court. The learned Counsel further contended that on merits it can be demonstrated that the lower Revisional Court was wrong in thinking that there was a shortfall in the deposit which was made in terms of S.40 read with S.39 of the Act. I have anxiously considered the aforesaid aspects of the matter. In my view, it is not necessary to decide whether the judgment of this Court in the second revision could be said to be nullity or non est. However, it should be seen that it is not a case where it can be said that the revision was maintainable at the time when it was filed and that it became subsequently not maintainable on account of any statutory change. It is a fact that the revision was entertained by this Court and even allowed because the earlier view which prevailed then was that a second revision was maintainable under S.115, C.P.C. This was the law which had been laid down in the earlier decision of this Court Bimla Rani v. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Private Ltd. ( AIR 1972 All 242 ). The position in law became clear only after the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Pd. ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) (supra). However, it is well known that the decisions of the Court do not create law. The law is deemed always to have been the same throughout and the Supreme Courts decision only clarified what the law had always been there. It will, therefore, not be correct to say that the second revision in this Court was earlier maintainable but became non-maintainable due to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, The said revision would always be deemed to have been not maintainable in law, Under a wrong notion it was allowed by this Court. It will, therefore, not be correct to say that the second revision in this Court was earlier maintainable but became non-maintainable due to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, The said revision would always be deemed to have been not maintainable in law, Under a wrong notion it was allowed by this Court. However, as I have said above, the question whether the said judgment can be said to be nullity and non est need not be gone into. 13. So far as the Supreme Court pronouncement in Pannalal Binjrajs case ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ) is concerned, that is clearly distinguishable. It was emphasised there that no assessee has a right to be assessed by any particular Income-tax Officer of the locality, He could be assessed by any Income-tax Officer in case the superior authorities, namely. the Commissioner or Central Board of Revenue so decided (referring to the position as it prevailed under the repealed 1922 Act), It was certainly not a case where it could be said that one Officer had jurisdiction to do a job and the other Officer did not have the jurisdiction. This makes a fundamental difference between the position, which was there in the aforesaid Supreme Court pronouncement and the position where it is held that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case. The conduct of the petitioners in that case was emphasised as an additional factor which disentitled them to get any relief from the Court. 14. So far as the pronouncement in Mukund Ram Tanti ( AIR 1962 Pat 338 ) (supra) is concerned, I do not think that the same is really helpful to the petitioner. The position in this case was that the petitioner himself had called for an enquiry with regard to the election of the new office-bearers of the Mazdoor Union and thus had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Registrar Trade Unions. Subsequently, he began to contend that the said Registrar had no jurisdiction to make the enquiry. The principle will apply in such a case. 15. Sri Misra further elaborated that a judgment inter partes is always binding upon the parties concerned irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. Subsequently, he began to contend that the said Registrar had no jurisdiction to make the enquiry. The principle will apply in such a case. 15. Sri Misra further elaborated that a judgment inter partes is always binding upon the parties concerned irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. If the landlord-respondent was unhappy with the judgment which was passed in the second revision, then he was bound to have taken recourse to his remedy by getting the judgment scrutinised by a higher forum, namely, by the Supreme Court, Since he failed to do the same, it is not open to him to question the said judgment and he is estopped from doing the same. 16. It should be seen that the landlord has not come to this Court as a petitioner. It is Sri Misras client who has come to this Court and is seeking the assistance of this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. This jurisdiction as is well known as discretionary and is not to be exercised at the asking of the petitioner and as of right on his part. This Court in its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution in the instant petition has basically to decide whether it should act in such manner that a relief should be granted, which will be in the face of the verdict of the Supreme Court, The petitioner wants that he should be given the benefit of S.40 read with S.39 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that during the pendency of the second revision in this Court, he had made an application under the said provisions and had complied with the requirements laid down in the said provisions. If this contention is accepted and the necessary relief is granted in this petition, it will mean that it will be held that the revision was maintainable. This, of course, will be against the clear verdict of the Supreme Court, Unless the revision is held to be maintainable it is not possible to grant the benefit of S.39 read with S.40 of the Act to a tenant; in fact, the same is a precondition before the needed relief can be granted to a tenant. This, of course, will be against the clear verdict of the Supreme Court, Unless the revision is held to be maintainable it is not possible to grant the benefit of S.39 read with S.40 of the Act to a tenant; in fact, the same is a precondition before the needed relief can be granted to a tenant. When the revision was not maintainable, according to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, any relief to be granted on the basis of the maintainability of the said revision will be almost perpetuating a point of view in the face of the Supreme Courts verdict to the contrary. I am clear that this cannot be allowed to be done in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. No relief will be granted in this jurisdiction which runs counter to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter, the conduct of the landlord becomes absolutely non-relevant. Whether any rule of estoppel should or should not be applied against him is besides the point. In short, this Court will act under Art.226 of the Constitution in consonance with law laid down by the" Supreme Court and not contrary to the law laid down by the said Court. 17. This petition accordingly falls and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has prayed for some time to be granted to his client to vacate the shop and deliver peaceful possession to the landlord, I grant three months time to the petitioner to vacate the shop and deliver peaceful possession to the landlord. Petition dismissed.