Judgment :- Both these civil revision petitions are filed by two tenants of the same landlord against the orders passed by the Special Deputy Collector, passing an order of eviction straightway without giving time to deposit arrears claimed in the petitions. These civil revision petitions have been entertained by this Court in view of the decision of this Court to the effect that the Revenue Court in passing an order of eviction on the basis of arrears of rent must first pass an order determining the arrears and then grant time to the tenant to deposit the arrears and only in case of default an order of eviction should be passed. But the Supreme Court has observed in Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo1. "Now as I read sub-section (4) (of section 3 of Tamil Nadu Act XXV of 1955), it gives the Revenue Divisional Officer power either to allow the application of the landlord or to dismiss it after he has held a summary enquiry into the matter. If the application is allowed an order of eviction has to be passed. If it is dismissed the proceedings again come to an end. However if the ground of eviction is non-payment of rent, the Revenue Divisional Officer is clothed with power to allow the cultivating tenant to deposit the arrears and costs as directed. The power is discretionary and, while exercising the same, it is not incumbent on the Revenue Divisional Officer to grant time. If the legislature intended to make it obligatory on the part of the Revenue Divisional Officer to fix a time for deposit of the arrears in all cases covered by clause (a) or clause (aa) of sub-section (2) there is no reason why it should have used the word may in relation to the grant of time. Support for this view is available in clauses (b) of sub-section (3) wherein, the legislature has directed: "If the Court finds that any sum is due it shall allow the cultivating tenant such time as it may consider just and reasonable.................." In this situation it must be held that while the opportunity of depositing the arrears of rent cannot be denied to a cultivating tenant during the course of proceedings under subsection (3), the same is not available as of right under clause (b) of sub-section (4). The difference in the language used by the legislature is significant and not without purpose. The intention of the legislature appears to be that normally a defaulting tenant must seek the help of the Court all by himself and that if he does so he must be protected but that a defaulting tenant who waits for payment of rent till he is sought to be evicted by the landlord is not necessarily entitled to the same protection. Circumstances may exist which may place him at par with a tenant covered by sub-section (3) but then it may not necessarily be so. That is why it is left to the discretion of the Revenue Divisional Officer to grant time to the cultivating tenant or to deny him that opportunity." 2. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, the orders passed by the Special Deputy Collector in both the cases cannot be assailed. 3. No doubt, both orders are passed ex parte. The remedy by way of setting aside the ex parte order under law is available to the tenants and they can pursue the same, if so advised. I am not expressing any opinion on the question of limitation with reference to such an application. 4. In the result these two civil revision petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no orders as to costs.