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1982 DIGILAW 278 (KER)

hydrose v. makkar

1982-11-11

KADER

body1982
Judgment :- 1. This revision is directed against an order passed by the learned I Addli. Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam, in O.S. 164 of 1981 on his file answering additional issue No. 7 relating to court fee raised on a petition filed by the first defendant. The suit is one for a declaration that the licence issued in respect of Room No. 52 in the Ernakulam Market and the ownership of all goods and equipments in the said room belonged to the plaintiff and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their persons from alienating or disposing of them. It is said that this suit was at first filed before the Munsiff's Court as O.S. 1/1979 and there the defendants appeared and filed a written statement contending that the court fee paid was insufficient. As the goods found in the stall were valued at Rs. 5000/-, the learned Munsiff found that he has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, the suit came up before the T Addl. Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam There the first defendant filed I. A. 1085/1981 accompanied by an affidavit stating that the court fee paid is insufficient; and requesting the court to raise an additional issue on court fee Thereafter an additional issue on court fee as Issue No. 7 was raised and that was heard as a preliminary issue. 2. The trial court after hearing both sides accepted the version given by the plaintiff and held that the court fee paid is sufficient. 3. It is this order that is challenged before this Court. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner strongly attacked this order contending that the court below has failed to estimate value of the licence and the furniture in the shop; and that the court below ought to have held that S.25(b) or S.31 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1959 hereafter called the Act applied to the facts of the case. 4. Under S.25(b) of the Act the court fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; while under S.31, the fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher. 4. Under S.25(b) of the Act the court fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; while under S.31, the fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher. Although it was argued that the proper sections under which court fee had to be paid were S.25(b) and 31 of the Court Fees Act the main argument was that the court below did not assess the market value of the goods and the furniture in the shop and it was without any basis that it valued these articles. The counsel for the respondent pointed out that before the Munsiff's Court the present revision petitioner had filed a counter stating that the goods in the shop will be worth Rs. 5000/- and the plaintiff accepting the valuation of the goods stated by the revision petitioner got the goods released on kychit. There is therefore no merit in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the goods will be worth not less than Rs. 36,527.11. Regarding the value of the furniture, the defendant has not stated even the approximate value of the furniture in the stall in question either in the petition or in the written statement. It was in these circumstances that the trial court stated that no basis was shown for the valuation of the furniture. Another attack is that the licence issued to the stall is capable of valuation. The counsel argued that this licence used to be auctioned every year and it was after paying a good amount that the licence was issued to the party and that therefore that amount should have been considered as the market value of the licence. I am unable to agree with the counsel. A fee collected for issuing a licence cannot be treated as its market value. A licence being terminable and revokable cannot be said to have any market value as such. Court fee payable must be determined primarily and essentially on the allegations in the plaint. A decision on court fee cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits. 5. A licence being terminable and revokable cannot be said to have any market value as such. Court fee payable must be determined primarily and essentially on the allegations in the plaint. A decision on court fee cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits. 5. None of the points raised is sufficient to interfere with the order under attack in exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction. This apart, this revision could have been dismissed on a short point that the decision under attack does not relate to the jurisdiction of the court. When the decision under attack does not relate to the jurisdiction, even if the decision is wrong, it is not proper for this Court to interfere with the decision in exercise of revisional jurisdiction The law in this respect has been authoritatively pronounced by the Supreme Court in Ratnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimala (AIR 1961 S.C.1299 =1961 KLT. (S C.) 67), where it was held that whether proper court fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State; that the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) thereof; that the defendant who may believe and even honestly, that proper court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court fee payable on the plaint. It was further observed that the Court Fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a defendant with a weapon of technicality or defence to obstruct the progress or a suit or the trial of an action and that by recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter in issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the order adjudging court fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits will be effectively frustrated. 6. 6. The counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision of this Court in Vasu v. Chakki Mani (AIR. 1962 Kerala 84) contended that the question before this Court in revision is what is the correct section in the Act that has to be applied and not whether the valuation is adequate or not; and that in other words, the point in dispute related to the question of category and in such a case if the question relates to whether the suit falls under one section or other is a question of law and in fit cases can be the subject-matter of revision. It is true that the above statement is found in one of the paragraphs in Vasu v. Chakki Mani. In that paragraph the learned judge was discussing and referring to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Nemi Chand and another v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and another (AIR. 1953 SC. 28). But, in the next paragraph following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimala (AIR. 1961 SC. 1299), it was held by Raman Nayar J. (as he then was) that the distinction between an error regarding category and error regarding valuation pure and simple, is of no relevance in a revision by the defendant. Bearing in mind the observations made in Nemi Chand and another v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and another and referring to the decision in Ratnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimala the learned judge further observed that although the question in (1961 KLT. (SC.) 67) Ratnavarmaraja v. 5m/. Vimala, would appear to be one of valuation pure and simple, the reason given there namely, that the defendant is not aggrieved and the observations made, apply equally to a case where the alleged inadequacy arises through an error regarding category, so long as the error does not affect jurisdiction. I am in respectful agreement with the dictum laid down in this decision. This is a revision by the defendant, Even if it is assumed that the error pointed out related to category, in the light of the decisions referred to above, this revision is not maintainable and is hereby dismissed in the circumstances, without costs.