JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a first appeal from a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Notwithstanding their Hindu names, the parties are Christians and even so they appeared to be utterly rustic and illiterate, when I talked to them in an attempt to bring about a reconciliation. The attempt failed because the appellant said that she may be cut to pieces but she would not go back to live with the respondent-husband. The marriage would seem to have broken down completely beyond any chance of repair. The appellant is at present living not with her parents but with another man Brahma by name, whom she has married, according to the respondent husband's own allegation, notwithstanding the subsistence of the marriage between the parties. And yet, the respondent husband says, he is keen to have her back. I could not understand this attitude of the respondent-husband. So I asked him to explain the reason why in spite of this infidelity of the wife, to which he had sworn, he was keen to have her back and had not asked for divorce or judicial separation even after coming to know of it. I was not made any the wiser for it. Of course, the appellant wife does not admit that she has remarried Brahma but the lower court has, on an appraisal of the evidence, come very near to finding that she has, and having talked to the appellant-wife, and a stray word which escaped her while replying to a question put by me, I think that she is living as Brahma's wife, although there has been no proper marriage between them. Indeed, there could be no marriage between them so long as the marriage between the parties subsists. That stray word, which escaped the appellant, while talking to me, was her description of Brahma's younger brother. This fact also explains why the appellant's parents appear to have forsaken her, by not appearing in support of her case, of which the learned District Judge has made a point for rejecting her uncorroborated testimony. That stray word, which escaped the appellant, while talking to me, was her description of Brahma's younger brother. This fact also explains why the appellant's parents appear to have forsaken her, by not appearing in support of her case, of which the learned District Judge has made a point for rejecting her uncorroborated testimony. For reasons which shall presently appear I do not quite agree with the learned District judge on that, as a ground for rejecting her version and accepting the respondent-husband's case on the merits, and decreeing restitution of conjugal rights, and that too with the knowledge that the decree would not be obeyed, as the appellant wife had categorically stated before the learned District judge also, that she was not willing to return to the respondent husband at any cost. 2. The parties were married on 25th May 1978. According to the husband's case the wife lived with him at his place for about a week after the marriage, when, her father, who was originally impleaded as the second respondent, took her away along with gold ornaments weighing about 2 tolas, silver ornaments weighing about 100 tolas, and clothing worth about Rs. 1000/-. The wife has not come back in spite of repeated calls by the husband. There was no reason, and now the wife refuses to come and live with him and fulfil her marital obligations. This was followed by the allegation that the wife was under the influence of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 who wanted to marry her to respondent No. 5 to the petition that was originally filed in the District Court. Respondent No. 2 was the wife's father, and respondent no. 3, the latter's wife, or to put it directly, the appellant-wife's mother. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were Ramman and his wife Katoria. Their exact relationship is not clear from the petition. Respondent No 6 was the very same Brahma or Birma, with whom the appellant was, it was alleged later on, living as a wife. Their motive was said to be the desire to misappropriate the ornaments and clothes presented by the husband at the time of marriage. It was even alleged that they were making improper gain from the earnings of the appellant wife, who it was said was living sometimes at the residence of her father and at other times at the residence of Brahma. It was even alleged that they were making improper gain from the earnings of the appellant wife, who it was said was living sometimes at the residence of her father and at other times at the residence of Brahma. The petition was presented on 10th October 1979. There was no direct allegation of adultery against the appellant wife, and even if her conduct amounted to desertion, the necessary period of two years had not elapsed on the date of the petition, so as to have entitled the husband to judicial separation. This seems to be the reason why the relief claimed was restitution of conjugal rights. 3. Birma or Brahma, the 6th respondent to the petition, was the first to file a written statement. He denied the only allegation which concerned him in the petition, and the only additional plea raised was that the petition was filed out of enmity. The next written statement filed was by the appellant-wife's father and mother, the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the petition. They denied the allegations against them. They also pleaded that the wife had been to the husband's house thrice after the bida and that after the appellant-wife's third departure from their house for the husband's place with him, the appellant-wife had not returned to their house, though she had left the husband's place. They further stated that the appellant wife was not living with them and that they did not want to marry her to the 6th respondent, and that they had come to know from the husband that the fifth respondent who was his own uncle had taken the appellant-wife with him. Lastly they pleaded that goods worth about Rs. 3000/- presented by them had remained with the husband. The respondents Nos. 2 to 6 were discharged from the petition on the husband's own application by order dated 11th July 1980. The appellant wife filed her written statement thereafter on 30th August, 1980. 4. The appellant-wife's defence was that her parents had, out of greed, deceived her and got her married to the husband by representing him to be a man of good character. He was a drunkard, a gambler and a profiligate. He did not treat her as his wedded wife, but very cruelly, and compelled her to indulge in sex with third persons. He was a drunkard, a gambler and a profiligate. He did not treat her as his wedded wife, but very cruelly, and compelled her to indulge in sex with third persons. It was then alleged that the husband had illicit connection with a woman named Chandra, resident of village Dariagarh, who was the sister of the husband's sister's husband, and married in Chamravva, but had left the husband and was living with her father; that the respondent-husband did not often come back home for days on end, and beat the appellant wife if she complained about it; and that on one occasion, the respondent-husband even brought the said woman Chandra to the house and slept with her in the same bed; and further that he also brought other bad men and women in the house and himself indulged and made them indulge in sexual intercourse with each other, and also compelled the appellant-wife to meet third persons, and on her refusal, he beat her because she was not prepared to so make a living for him to enjoy. Ultimately, when in or about July 1978, the appellant-wife refused to submit to the illicit demands and activities of the respondent-husband, and wanted him to give them up, she was given a severe beating by him and left at her parents' place after detaining her ornaments and clothes. After sometimes the respondent-husband came to the appellant's greedy parents and wanted to take her away by offering some money to them, but she did not agree and came away to the place of the mother of Birma or Brahma who is her father's sister, and has been since then, living with her, that is with her father's sister. Lastly, the appellant-wife pleaded that she was afraid for her life and honour in living at the respondent-husband's place, which had adversely affected her health and character and had caused her mental and physical pain ; and since the respondent wanted to earn money by making her sell her body, and to spend the earnings on drinks and on his beloved, the said Chandra, she was not prepared to live with him or to submit to his society at his place as his wife. 5. 5. Under Order X Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant wife stated that after the marriage, which had taken place on 25th May 1978, she had lived with the husband as wife for about 2 months, and that the husband's allegation that she left his place after a week was wrong. 6. In view of the clear declaration by the appellant-wife even in her written statement that she was not prepared to give her society to the respondent husband, for the reasons alleged by her, the real issue which arose between the parties was, whether there was reasonable excuse for her to so withdraw from the society of her husband, or that the cause alleged by her for her doing so was true, and, if so, was it a reasonable ground or justification for doing so. Under Section 33 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, nothing which would not be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage could be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Any of the facts alleged by the appellant wife in her written statement against the respondent husband, would, if proved, be a good ground for judicial separation, and would ipso-facto constitute reasonable excuse for her withdrawal from the society of the respondent husband. 7. The evidence in this case was entirely oral. The husband examined himself and Chhutey, an ex-pradhan of the village in which the husband lives. The wife examined herself alone. The trial court rejected the wife's evidence on the ground that it is uncorroborated, and also because in her written statement the wife had specified the name of the husband's own sister and could not give the name of any of the man or women who are alleged to have been brought by the husband for the alleged illicit sexual activities complained of. The husband's case was accepted because the Pradhan, Chhotey P.V. 2, had spoken well of his character, and pradhan could know of it because his own daughter was married to a neighbour of the husband. 8. The evidence being entirely oral and the learned District judge having had the opportunity of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, I gave due weight to the appraisal of the evidence that has been made by the learned District Judge. 8. The evidence being entirely oral and the learned District judge having had the opportunity of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, I gave due weight to the appraisal of the evidence that has been made by the learned District Judge. But I find, the emphasis on corroboration of the wife's evidence was uncalled for in this case. Indeed, the facts alleged were such that there could be almost no corroborative evidence, unless the wife had the aid of an expert lawyer from the beginning, and the necessary means of understanding and preparing for what was required, or what could be had, by way of corroboration. Then, in making capital out of the fact that the name of the woman with whom the husband was said to have had illicit relations was specified to be Chandra, which was the name of the husband's own sister and not the name of that sister's husband's sister, with whom the husband was in fact alleged to have been carrying on in the wife's statement on oath, the learned District judge did not make due allowance to the illiteracy and rusticity of the appellant-wife. I had occasion to see her and talk to her in the course of the attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. Her statement on oath is clear and explicit, and there is no confusion or contradiction in that. The mistake in giving the wrong name in the written statement must have arisen due to some mistake in understanding between the appellant-wife and her counsel who drafted the written statement. Then there is no mistake about his relationship with the woman with whom the respondent husband was alleged to be carrying on, whether in the written statement or the statement on oath of the appellant-wife. The nature of the allegations made, and deposed to on oath by the wife, were such as closely touch her own modesty and honour, and no reason has been suggested by the husband as to why a young woman in the position of the wife would invent such a false story against her own husband, and that too on so short an experience of married life as in this case, and having done to state it on oath in a clear manner without any contradictions or apparent inconsistency, and then not break down on cross-examination. Her ignorance of names of the several persons who are said to have been brought by the husband on a visit for the activities complained of, seems to be natural, for the allegation was that the husband wanted to use her as a prostitute. Even the ignorance of the name of the husband's sister's husband's sister's name was not against the nature of things or such as to discredit the wife's testimony. 9. As to the emphasis on corroboration, I must add that the standard of proof required in matrimonial cases, has recently undergone a change with the declaration of the law on the point by the Supreme Court in Dastane v. Dastane, 1 (1981) D.M.C. 293. Moreover, emphasis on corroboration was found necessary in divorce cases to avoid falling prey to collusion between the parties. That is not the case here. So far as the parents of the appellant-wife are concerned, it was idle to expect that they would appear as witnesses for her in the face of the uncharitable allegations made by her against them in her written statement. Even so, their written statement does not run counter to the appellant wife's cases; rather it supports her on one crucial point of fact, namely, the length of her stay at the husband's house. But it does support the husband on the point that the wife has been living with Brahma, without explicitly admitting or saying so. The evidence has to be judged on a balance of probabilities in the light of the respective cases set up by the parties, and it is not the law that the wife should have, standing by herself alone, proved her case to the hilt, and on her failure to do so, the husband would be entitled to a decree in the same manner as an accused would be entitled to acquittal in a criminal case on the failure of the prosecution to prove the charge to the hilt. Judged in this light, I find it impossible to agree with the learned District judge that the wife's evidence must be rejected as untrue on all points, for want of corroboration or for any of the reasons given by him for doing so. Of course, her denial of her connection with Brahma does not appear to be true, but that is no ground for rejecting her whole statement on all points. 10. Of course, her denial of her connection with Brahma does not appear to be true, but that is no ground for rejecting her whole statement on all points. 10. In so far as the evidence led by the husband is concerned the learned District judge was in error in relying on the evidence of P.W. 2 Chhotey. His evidence was entirely hearsay, and was in the nature of a certificate of character given by the Police on enquiry made, that there was nothing in their knowledge against the man, and therefore his character was certified as good. The husband's own evidence was to my mind wholly unworthy of belief. It is no positive evidence of any facts which could be perceived. It contains more a denial of the allegations made against the husband. Moreover, to me it is against the nature of man to want his wife back although she is to his knowledge, openly living with another man as wife. Either the husband has no sense of honour or good morals, or he has something up his sleeve which he wants to achieve on having the wife back in his house under the Court's decree. I would totally reject the husband's testimony as unreliable. This attitude of the husband and the standard of morals evidenced by his statement, such that the wife's father wanted to place her with another man for money, makes me think that the values of life with the parties in this case, are not of a high order, and possibly, the allegations made by the wife against the husband could be true, or at any rate she could have reason to believe in the their truth. That gave her a reasonable excuse for withdrawing herself from the respondent husband's society, even if her allegations of adultery and cruelty against him were not fully proved according to the objective standards of proof that have been insisted upon by the Courts in the past in matters like this. 11. Lastly, the Court has a discretion in these matters, and a decree may not be passed as a matter of course on proof of grounds entitling the petitioner to the particular relief claimed. The provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which was enacted more than a century ago, do not answer the needs of the space age. 11. Lastly, the Court has a discretion in these matters, and a decree may not be passed as a matter of course on proof of grounds entitling the petitioner to the particular relief claimed. The provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which was enacted more than a century ago, do not answer the needs of the space age. Nevertheless, Section 7 thereof enacts that : "Subject to the provisions of the Act" that is to say, without violating any express provision of the Act, the Court "shall, in all suits and proceedings" under the Act, "act and give relief on principles and rules which in the opinion of the "Court are as nearly as may be conformably to the principles and rules on which the court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief." And in England, the law has not static. The principle of breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce has come to be recognised in English law, and the right to claim restitution of conjugal rights has been abolished. Under our Code of Civil Procedure, Rules 32 and 33 of Order XXI, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against a wife can be executed only by attachment of her property, which remains in force only for six months, and after that, if the decree holder so applies, the attached property may be sold and some compensation paid to the decree holder, otherwise, the attachment ceases. The lint necessity is that the wife must have property which could be attached. She cannot be arrested or otherwise forced to obey the decree. The decree in the present case would be more or less of no use. The only purpose it sometimes serves is as a defence to a claim for maintenance but there is no need even for that in this case. I must add that this is not a case under the Hindu Marriage Act, where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights could be made a stepping stone for a decree of divorce, where the other grounds for divorce do not exist and the other spouse is not ready for a divorce by consent. Under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, there can be no divorce or judicial separation without proof of the grounds entitling a husband or a wife to either. Under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, there can be no divorce or judicial separation without proof of the grounds entitling a husband or a wife to either. Under the circumstances, looking to the entire facts of the case and keeping in view the categorical refusal of the wife to go and live with the husband, the passing of the decree of restitution of conjugal rights can serve no purpose. It would be utterly futile. Therefore, it should not be passed. 12. I accordingly allow this appeal, and setting aside the judgment and decree of the Court below I dismiss the respondent husband's petition (Suit No. 69 of 1979) of the Court of the District Judge Rampur, with costs throughout.