Lahiri, J.:- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order in case No. 37 E/81 passed by the Assam Board of Revenue. The Deputy Commissioner in his capacity as District Collector called public tenders for settlement of No. 5 Labac Country Spirit Shop. The petitioner was a tenderer. Shri Uma Shankar Sarma was the other tenderer. However, it was settled with the petitioner by the Addl. Deputy Commissioner (ADC). Shri Uma Kanta Sarma filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue which held that the A. D. C. had no jurisdiction to make the settlement and also held that the appellant before it, namely, Shri U. K. Sarma was ineligible to get the settlement. The Board, therefore, ordered the Deputy Commissioner to make the settlement afresh. The petitioner was however not found to be ineligible or disqualified by the Board. 2. The indubitable position is that the Board of Revenue has co-extensive power with the Settling Authority. If it found that the original authority had no jurisdiction to settle the shop with the petitioners, the Board itself could have settled it with the petitioner, more so when it did not find that the petitioner had any disqualification, There is no reason why the Board of Revenue did not exercise the power which it had. Therefore, it has been rightly urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has failed to exercise the power vested in it by law and as such the impugned order need be quashed. 3. Admittedly the tenders were called by the District Collector and the Addl. Deputy Commissioner passed the order of settle­ment. If that was found to be irregular or invalid the learned Tribunal which had co-extensive power should have made the order of settlement, when the contesting parties were before it. This is all the more necessary to avoid loss of time and money. 4. This apart, we find that Rule 209 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 empowers the District Collectors to authorise other persons to preside at the sales. We extract the relevant provision of Rule 209 : ".......In the absence of the District Collector such other persons as may be authorised by the District Colle­ctor........shall preside at the sales.............." (Emphasis supplied) It follows, therefore, that ordinarily the District Collector is to preside at the sales. We extract the relevant provision of Rule 209 : ".......In the absence of the District Collector such other persons as may be authorised by the District Colle­ctor........shall preside at the sales.............." (Emphasis supplied) It follows, therefore, that ordinarily the District Collector is to preside at the sales. However, this power can be dele­gated by him to other persons. Power of delegation is clearly expressed in Rule 209. In the instant case, the District Collector,, while he was away from the head quarter, had authority vested in him by law to delegate his power to the Addl. Deputy Commissioner. It is true that the word 'Collector" has been defined in Sec. 3(4) of the Assam Excise Act, 1910. It reads as under : 3. * * * (4) "Collector" includes the District Collector, and in any provision of this Act includes also any officer whom the State Government may, by notification, declare or appoint to be a collector for the purposes of that provision". (Emphasis added) So the District Collectors come within the definition of term "Collector". This apart, the State Govt. may, by notification, declare or appoint any officer to be a "Collector" for the purposes of that provision. Therefore, the Govt. have the power to declare or appoint any officer to act as "a Collector" for any purpose under "the Act". The Assam Excise Rules, 1945 have been framed under Section 36 of "the Act" and form a part of "the Act". The State Government in exercise of its rule making power authorised delegation of power by the District Collector to any person vide Rule 209. The validity of Rule 209 of "the Rules" was not challenged before the Board nor had it the authority to declare it to be invalid. The said Rule providing for authorisation by the District Collector has not been struck down as invalid by any Court of law. It follows, therefore, that the power of the Collector to appoint or declare a person to preside at the sales, is statutorily recognised in Rule 209. 5. The power to appoint an officer to act "as a Collector" can be made by the State Government by a Notification. The State Government has authorised the District Collector to appoint a person to act, in his absence, as "District Collector" for a limited purpose, namely, for presiding at the sales. 5. The power to appoint an officer to act "as a Collector" can be made by the State Government by a Notification. The State Government has authorised the District Collector to appoint a person to act, in his absence, as "District Collector" for a limited purpose, namely, for presiding at the sales. This being a valid delegation, the appointment could not have been decla­red invalid by the Board. We find that the term "Collector" was a larger connotation and it includes "District Collectors" and also other officers whom the State Government may appoint by notification. When the question of appointing a Collector comes the State Government is empowered to appoint an officer to be a Collector. However, Rule 209 empowers a "District Collector", under certain exceptional circumstances enumerated in Rule 209, to appoint a person to act as "District Collector". This authorization, in our opinion, is different from the act of appointment of an officer as the Collector. 6. Be that as it may, it is apparent that the District Collector had power under Rule 209, in exceptional circumstan­ces stated therein, to appoint a person to act as "District Collector" at the sales. Therefore, we are of the opinion, under the facts and circumstances of the case that it must be held that the Addl. Deputy Commissioner was duly appointed by the District Collector to act as presiding Officer under Rule 209 of the Rules and had jurisdiction to make the settlement. Therefore the finding of the Board as to the absence of his jurisdiction must be set aside. This is another ground why we hold that the impugned order is liable to be self aside. 7. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the impugned order cannot be sustained, and, accordingly, it is set aside upon hearing at length the learned Counsel for the parties, namely, Shri K. C. Das Counsel for the petitioner and Shri D. N. Choudhury, Senior Govt, Advocate appearing on behalf of Respondents 2,3 and 4, 8. We do not consider that it is at all necessary to issue any Rule as it would cause injustice, waste of time and undue hardship to all concerned. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. The order of the settling authority stands restored.