JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This revision arises out of the judgment of Additional District Judge (I) (Appellate Authority), Kangra Division, whereby the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Chamba, in Rent Petition No. 1 of 1979 dated 1-7-1982 has been set aside 2. Briefly, the facts are that eviction petition was moved seeking eviction of the tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent and sub-letting. The case of the landlord is that after the death of Hoshiara Ram, the tenanted premises, consisting of shops and residential rooms, passed on to his widow Smt. Leela Devi. Smt. Leela has married one Kishan Chand and has number of children out of this wedlock. She not only failed to pay the rent for the premises but also inducted Kalyan Chand, Gurdhian and Amar Nath as sub-tenants without the consent of the landlord. These premises, according to the landlord, are in possession of these persons, so, Smt. Leela is liable to be evicted on these two grounds. 3. The case of the respondents is that the premises have not been sublet and no rent was payable. Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath had been working as apprentices with her husband and were continuing in the premises as labourers with no concern with profits and losses of the shop since they were doing work at the instance of Smt. Leela Devi. The allegation of marriage with Kishan Chand and birth of children out of this wedlock was also denied. A few other submissions have also been made in the written statement which are no longer necessary for the determination of the dispute between the parties. Similarly, although number of issues were framed by the Rent Controller, however, only issue No. I survives for decision at this stage and the Counsel for the parties also confine their submissions to the same. Issue No. 1 is as follows: (1) Whether the property in dispute has been sublet by the respondent Leela to respondents Kalyan Chand, Gurdhian and Amar Nath without the consent of the petitioner as alleged ? OPP. 4. After allowing the parties to adduce evidence in the case, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Smt Leela Devi has sublet the shop to Amar Nath and Kalyan Chand without the consent of the landlord. OPP. 4. After allowing the parties to adduce evidence in the case, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Smt Leela Devi has sublet the shop to Amar Nath and Kalyan Chand without the consent of the landlord. Ultimately, the eviction of the tenant was ordered and the matter came before the Additional District Judge (I) as Appellate Authority under the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. 5. The tenant succeeded before the Appellate Authority which came to the conclusion that although Smt. Leela Devi had remarried and was living with her husband at Sundla but she had not parted with the possession of the entire premises in favour of Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath although the shop in question was being used exclusively by these persons. In such a situation, the Appellate Authority observed that these persons were not in possession of the entire premises since other part of the premises was lying locked and that there was no evidence pointing out that the rest of residential portion was being kept by these persons. Finally, it observed that since Smt. Leela Devi had been contesting the petition, this fact indicated that she had interest in the premises and was holding the possession of the remaining residential portion of the premises with her. However, by the final order the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of subletting. It is in these circumstances that the landlord has assailed this judgment of the Appellate Authority by way of this revision petition. 6. Since both the authorities have differed while deciding the issue of subletting, it was considered necessary to go into the matter comprehensively and the learned Counsel tor the parties also made elaborate submissions and referred to the statements of witnesses recorded by the Rent Controller as well as the findings recorded by these authorities thereon. 7. Sh. Chhabil Dass, learned Counsel for the landlord, submitted that the Appellate Authority has committed gross error in allowing the appeal despite coming to the conclusion that the shops were in possession of Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath. 7. Sh. Chhabil Dass, learned Counsel for the landlord, submitted that the Appellate Authority has committed gross error in allowing the appeal despite coming to the conclusion that the shops were in possession of Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath. The fact that the residential portion was not proved to be in the occupation of anyone other than Smt. Leela Devi subletting on her part could not have influenced the decision when part of the tenancy was found in the possession of these two persons, he argues. Mrs. Pratima Malhotra, on the other hand, submits that on the basis of evidence recorded by the Rent Controller, no case of subletting has been established and the order of eviction recorded by the Rent Controller has been rightly set aside by the Appellate Authority In order to substantiate this submission, it was submitted that Kalyan Chand has specifically stated that they were the pupils of Hoshiara, the husband of Smt. Leela Devi and after the death of Hoshiara, they were working as labourers with Smt. Leela Devi at a rate of four Annas in a Rupee and they also make reference to ornaments prepared by them and that the licences under the Gold Control Act were in their names. It is denied that Smt. Leela was living in Village Sundla and the house and shop were in their possession. 8. Smt. Leela Devi also supports this witness and states that she keeps the keys of the premises in question. She has denied her marriage with Kishan Chand and birth of children out of this wedlock. 9. On the basis of this kind of evidence Mrs. Malhotra contends that the tenant has not parted with the legal possession of the premises in dispute and the eviction application is liable to be rejected. Reference to cases like (1985) 2 RCJ 27, Ram Kumar and others v. Rajinder Thakur and others, 1969 R^R 982 ; Bhagwati Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad and others, 1971 RCJ 289 ; 2 ae Punjab Handloom Weavers Apex Co-operative Society v. Smt. Gian Wati9 (1983) 1 RCR 83 ; Janab M. P. Azad v. Fathima Sarohini Suresh and others, and 1970 RCR 60 \ Shri Bhagwan Dass and others v. Rajdev Singh and another, was also made. There is no dispute so far as the legal principles decided in these cases are concerned. There is no dispute so far as the legal principles decided in these cases are concerned. However, in order to apply these principles, one has to look to the evidence that has been adduced by the parties to substantiate their contentions. These principles cannot, thus, be applied unless there is cogent and convincing evidence to demonstrate that the tenant has not parted with the legal possession of the premises although someone is found in the disputed premises. 10. It is usually impossible for the landlord to produce specific evidence to prove subletting because the tenant and the sub-tenant usually agree together to throw a cloak over the transaction. Sub-tenancy can hardly be proved by direct evidence of persons in whose presence the terms of sub tenancy are settled since the transaction between them is confidential. It may in most cases, be a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts of each case. If a tenant himself closes the business and allows another person to run his shop, it would not be wrong to presume that he has sub-let the premises even if it is contended that the key of the premises is kept by the tenant since keeping of the key by the tenant may be one of the understandings between them to keep away the landlord from initiating eviction proceedings in the matter. So, the initial burden to prove that the tenant has parted with the possession of the premises may be on the landlord, but as soon as the same is discharged by him, it is the duty of the tenant to prove by such evidence as is sufficient to rebut the onus which has come to lie on him. (See AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 186 ; Raj Kumar v. Harbans Lai and others, (1980) 1 RLR 439 ; Ram Chander v. Smt. Amar Devi and others, and 19,0 RCR t04, Hari Shankar Pekkaraia v. Radha. 11. Subletting can be proved by relying on circumstances and by drawing correct inferences on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. (See AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 186 ; Raj Kumar v. Harbans Lai and others, (1980) 1 RLR 439 ; Ram Chander v. Smt. Amar Devi and others, and 19,0 RCR t04, Hari Shankar Pekkaraia v. Radha. 11. Subletting can be proved by relying on circumstances and by drawing correct inferences on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. In Kishan Chand v. Kundan Lal, 1967 PLR (SN) 57, Dua, J (as he then was) has correctly indicated the approach in case of subletting in the following words :— ".........that a landlord is almost always a stranger to agreements of sub-letting between his tenant and sub lessee and he has generally to rely on attending circumstances to establish subletting by necessary inference. It must be very rarely that direct evidence of sub-letting without the landlords consent whether in the form of a lease deed or of testimony of witnesses to whose presence the sub-lease is created, can come to the hands of the landlord. The proof of subletting thus depends upon the probability of the premises having been sub-let and all that is required is material on which the Court can, like a prudent person guided by his own experience and judgment, regard being had to the ordinary course of human conduct, reasonably act upon the supposition that the premises have been sublet......" 12. There is evidence which points out that Smt. Leela Devi is living in village Sundla in the house of Kishan Chand (Ex. PW 2/A). She also admits that she gave birth to some children after the death of Hoshiara and that in this village she has got 5 Bighas of land by way of Nautor and she is cultivating some part out of it. This village is away from Cham÷ba town, therefore, it can be safely concluded that she is living with Kishan Chand in village Sundla and the residential part of the premises is lying locked, as stated by Rustam (AW 1) and Noor Mohammad (AW 3). It is hardly believeable that Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath are working as labourers in the disputed premises at the rate of four Annas in a Rupee and paying her Rs. 100. In case she gets this amount as, l£th of the total, it is not understandable how Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath are living on Rs. 300. It is hardly believeable that Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath are working as labourers in the disputed premises at the rate of four Annas in a Rupee and paying her Rs. 100. In case she gets this amount as, l£th of the total, it is not understandable how Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath are living on Rs. 300. Further, licenses under the Gold Control Act are in their names. Smt. Leela has no license in her name nor she ever approached the authorities for transferring the license of her husband in her name or issuance of a new license in her favour. 13. The statements of Leela Devi (RW 1) and Kalyan Chand (RW 2) are not at all convincing. No record supporting their assertions has been shown and proved. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by them that no record has been maintained. How can this be possible when they are carrying on business under the Gold Control Act. It can, therefore, be reasonably concluded that Leela Devi has parted with the legal possession of the premises in favour of Kalyan Chand and Amar Nath who have separate licenses to carry on business in gold and it appears that they are paying Rs. 100 to Smt. Leela Devi by way of consideration for the subtenancy created in their favour by her. She has, therefore, parted with the legal possession of the premises and they are in physical possession of the same. 14. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is force in this petition and the same is allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller is upheld and confirmed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.