J. D. Jain ( 1 ) THE next submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned order betrays total non application of judicial mind by the learned Magistrate. This contention is sub divided into three parts. In the first instant it is urged that on a bare reading of the news item in question it is manifest that Miss Khiangte had lodged a complaint against the respondent at Vinay Nagar police station and a case of obstructing public servant in the performance of his official duties was registered against him. Thereafter she submitted an inspection note to the higher authorities giving details of the incident. This could b; well noticed by the learned Magistrate while going through the offending news items. It was thus obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to call for both these documents, one from the police station which was in his own jurisdiction and the other from Delhi Administration in order to verify true facts. The argument put forward precisely is that while holding a preliminary enquiry u/s 202, the Magistrate need not confine himself to the evidence adduced by the complainant and he is free to hold any kind of enquiry which he deems fit in order to as- certain the truth/falsehood of the allegations contained in the complaint before dismissing the same u/s 203 or issuing the process u/s 204 of the Code. On. the other hand the counsel for the respondent has urged vehemently that no obligation was cast on the Magistrate to summon the FIR or the inspection note as urged by the petitioners counsel. He has canvassed that the Magistrate could not be expected to summon documents which would constitute virtually the defence of the accused inasmuch as it would have amounted to prejudging the guilt/innocence of the accused. ( 2 ) ON a bare reading of S. 202 of the Code, it is manifest that the Magistrate may either enquire the case himself or direct the enquiry to be made by a police office or by such officer as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. ( 2 ) ON a bare reading of S. 202 of the Code, it is manifest that the Magistrate may either enquire the case himself or direct the enquiry to be made by a police office or by such officer as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The object of an enquiry or investigation under this section is to ensure that no person shall be compelled to answer a criminal charge unless the court is satisfied that there is prima-facie case for proceeding and issuing a process against the accused person. In other words enquiry/ investigation envisaged therein is to prevent abuse of the process of court by throwing out at the threshold a false and frivolous complaint. As observed by the Supreme Court Chandra Deo Singh V. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1340, "it is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an equiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accuse 1 person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial". The later observation was apparently made by the Supreme Court in the context of the question whether the accused has a right to take part in the proceedings at the stage of enquiry us 202 and their Lordships held in unequivocal terms that "he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so". The learned counsel for the respondent has invited my attention to the following further observations which were made by their Lordships while dealing with this aspect of the matter. "no doubt, as stated in sub-sec. (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which whould naturally mean. "no doubt, as stated in sub-sec. (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which whould naturally mean. the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complainant and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant". These observations are sought to be interpreted by the learned counsel for the respondent as implying that the Magistrate has no power to call any documents or witnesses other than those sought to be produced by the complainant himself. However, on a careful perusal consideration of the judgment, I am unable to find such a limitation being imposed on the power of the Magistrate in. this authority. The Supreme Court as stated above was confronted with the peculiar situation viz. that the Magistrate had even. examined the associates of the accused as court witnesses and the suggestion was that he did so at the instance of the accused. As I read Section 202 (1), I am unable to find any such fetter on the power of the Magistrate while enquiring into the case himself with a view to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Indeed an alert and experienced Magistrate with a little circumspection and sagacity can see through the game of the complainant and can call for any documents or summon any witnesses who is in his opinion will be able to throw light on the case and help in arriving at a conclusion whether the complaint is devoid of any substance or a prima facie case is made out. There is no strait-jacket rule. If there is any hesitation or doubt in the mind of the court, it can summon any witnesses or call for any documents which in. the opinion of the court can aid the court in confirming or removing such hesitation or doubt. Of course, the discretion vesting in him in this respect has to be exercised judicially. If there is any hesitation or doubt in the mind of the court, it can summon any witnesses or call for any documents which in. the opinion of the court can aid the court in confirming or removing such hesitation or doubt. Of course, the discretion vesting in him in this respect has to be exercised judicially. He is neither expected to play into the hands of the complainant and chew meekly what he is fed by the complainant nor is he expected to hold a brief for the accused and summon witnesses with a view to find out the defence of the accused, if any. He is neither a post office nor an automation and he is to exercise hisjurisdiction as the exigency of the situation demands, the only limitation being that he cannot convert the enquiry into a full scale trial. Of course, he is under a statutory obligation to examine the complainant and the witnesses, if any, produced by him. In this view of the matter, therefore, the Magistrate would have been well advised to call for the FIR and the inspection note made by Miss Khiangte to verify if the offending news items were substantially a fuitliful reproduction of the allegations made by Miss Khiangte in her official capacity against the respondent or not. However, ommission on his part to do so will not necessarily be inferential of either non application of his judicial mind or failing to perform his duties so as to vitiate the enquiry. Indeed as shall be presently seen it does not even affect in any manner his decision to summon the accused. ( 3 ) THE second limb of the contention of the petitioners counsel as regards non-application of judicial mind by the Magistrate is that he has misread and mis-quoted each and every sentence in the impugned order which he considers to be prima facie defamatory. For instance instead of the sentence "in her complaint she said that Mr. Arjun Dass had used abusive language and intimidated her" as appeared in the newspaper reports, the learned Magistrate has simply reproduced "mr. Arjun Dass had used abusive language and intimidated her" thus omitting the preceding words" in her complaint she said that". For instance instead of the sentence "in her complaint she said that Mr. Arjun Dass had used abusive language and intimidated her" as appeared in the newspaper reports, the learned Magistrate has simply reproduced "mr. Arjun Dass had used abusive language and intimidated her" thus omitting the preceding words" in her complaint she said that". This according to the learned counsel for the petitioners leaves an impression in one s mind that the aforesaid insinuation against the respondent was made by the reporter of the news and not by the complainant Miss Khiangte. Similarly according to the report "miss Khiangte said that Mr. Arjun Dass had asked the checking party not to collect oil sample from the shop and snatched the sample lifted from the shop". However the insinuation, as reproduced in. the impugned order is bereft of the opening words "miss Khiangte said that". The submission. made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, is that the learned Magistrate while recording the impugned order was all along labouring under the impression, that defamatory imputation and insinuation was made by the newspaper and not by Miss Khiangte whose report forms the very basis of the offending news items. It is no doubt true that the learned Magistrate has not reproduced the offending excerpts from the report appearing in the newspaper with exactitude but that will not necessarily reflect on non-application of the judicial mind. It may aswell be for the reason that he did not care to compare and tally the quotations in the impugned order with the original news items. At any rate this lapse on his part will not warrant an inference that the misquoting has stemmed from misreading of the offending news items. ( 4 ) LASTLY the learned counsel for the petitioners has made a valiant effort to canvass that in the absence of any allegation of malice the learned Magistrate should have held that the news items were published in good faith and for public good inasmuch as the publication was intended to high light unwarranted interference by local politician with the official duties of public servants who had gone on a routine checking of food stuffs with a view to curb adulteration of food articles which was extremely harmful to the society at large. Thus according to him the circumstances of the case speak eloquently of good faith on the part of the petitioners. It was to impress upon public men. to maintain a high standard of moral conduct and refrain from obstructing public servants in the discharge of their official duties in order to shield and placate antisocial elements and offenders. In publishing the offending news items the public good is equally transparent on. the face of it and in case the maxim res-ipsa loquitur is not invoked by the courts even in a self evident case like the present the journalists will find it difficult to discharge their duties in public interest. In other words the press will not be able to function. fearl-essiy and inform the public at large of the anti-social and illegal activities of politieians and other public men who ostensibly claim to be men of high moral calibre and rectitude. ( 5 ) THIS argument to my mind is wholly misconceived, having regard to settled law on the subject. [in paras 17 to 2l, Harbhajan Singh V. State AIR. 1966. SC. 97, Sukra Mahte V. Basudeo AIR. 1971. SC. 1567, Chamanlal V. State AIR. 1970. SC. 1372, Sewakram V. R. K. Karanjia AIR. 1981. SC. 1514 are briefly discussed]. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has in answer to the foregoing decisions placed reliance on Vadilal Panchal V. Dattalraya Dulati Ghadigaonkar and another, AIR 1960 SC. 1113 . In the said case the Magistrate had directed enquiry u/s 202 of the code for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint and on receipt of the report from the Enquiry Officer which supported a plea of self- defence made by the person complained against, the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint. The question arose as to whether it was open to the Magistrate to hold that the plea of self-defence was correct on the basis of the report and the statements of witnesses recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Replying in the affirmative. Their Lordships observed as follows : "the Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgement. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way. Replying in the affirmative. Their Lordships observed as follows : "the Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgement. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way. except by judicial considerations ; he is not bound to accept what the inquiring officer says, nor is he precluded from accepting a plea based on an exception, provided always there are satisfactory and reliable materials on which he can base his judgment as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding on the complaint or not. If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an inquiry under S. 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment". ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has fervently urged that this decision still holds the field and in none of the subsequent judgments adverted to above, the Supreme Court has taken a contrary view. It would no doubt appear to be so but at present we are concerned with the specific question whether a defence pleas based on any of the exceptions to Section 499 Indian Penal Code. can be considered and spelt out by the Magistrate even. at the stage of enquiry u/s 202 of the Code i. e. even. before such a plea is raised by the acuused. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the stage for considering such a plea is only after trial has commenced and the plea of the accused is recorded. If that be so surely such a plea cannot be considered by this Court in a revision or even in exercise of its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Cr. PC. unless, of course, it can be said to be a clear case of abuse of process of court or it is necessary to secure the ends of Justice. Evidently these considerations do not arise in the instant case. Hence this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners merits rejection as being premature.