Judgment :- 1. This Original Petition is by the Kakkattil Service Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., to quash Ext. P2 judgment of the Ist respondent, the Kerala Cooperative Tribunal, Trivandrum, The Rural Bank is a Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) engaged in the business of banking. 2. One Varkey Thomas bad taken a loan from the petitioner-Society on the security of a property in Sy. No. 159/1 Al in Naripatta Amsom, Badagara Taluk. On default of repayment of the loan the Society instituted a suit against him and obtained a decree for sale of the property In execution of the decree, the property was sold in court-auction by the Munsiff's Court, Nadapuram and the petitioner Society itself purchased the same. The sale was confirmed and a sale certificate was issued to the petitioner-Society. In pursuance to the decision of its general body, the Society sold the property to one Mathew Ambat. The 3rd respondent a member of the Society filed a case against the Society before the 2nd respondent the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Badagara under S.69 of the Act for a decision that the sale to Mathew Ambat is invalid for want of due publication of the intended sale, and a sale by public auction would have fetched a much better price. The petitioner-Society filed a written statement contending interalia that the question raised before the Assistant Registrar, the 2nd respondent is not a dispute within the meaning of the Act and the Assistant Registrar has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the sale of property is defective for all or any of the reasons mentioned by the 3rd respondent. Whether the matter referred to the 2nd respondent under S.69 of the Act, is a dispute within the meaning of the Act was considered as a preliminary question. The 2nd respondent by Ext. PI order dated 16-4-1979 found that the question raised before him is not a dispute within the meaning of the Act, and he has no jurisdiction to decide whether the sale effected pursuant to the resolution of the general body is valid or not. The case referred to him under S.69(1) of the Act was accordingly dismissed without considering the same on merits. In appeal by the 3rd respondent under S.82 of the Act, the 1st respondent the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum by Ext. The case referred to him under S.69(1) of the Act was accordingly dismissed without considering the same on merits. In appeal by the 3rd respondent under S.82 of the Act, the 1st respondent the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum by Ext. P2 order dated 13-61980 held that the question raised by the 3rd respondent in his petition before the 2nd respondent is a dispute within the meaning of the Act falling under sub-section (1) of S.69 and the 2nd respondent has jurisdiction to decide the dispute under S.70 the Act. Ext. P1 order of the Assistant Registrar was accordingly set aside and the case was remanded to him for disposal on the merits. 3. The 2nd respondent, Assistant Registrar, is invested with the powers of the Registrar under the Act by virtue of a notification issued by the Government under sub-section (2) of S.3 and published in the Kerala Gazette dated 8-7-1969. Sub-section (1) of S.3 empowers the Government to appoint a person to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for the State and subsection (2) of S.3 authorises the Government by general or special order to confer on any person all or any of the powers of the Registrar under the Act. The notification aforesaid has conferred on the Assistant Registrar, the 2nd respondent the powers of the Registrar under Ss.69 and 70 of the Act. According to Ext. P1 decision of the 2nd respondent, the question as to whether the sale of property effected in pursuance to the resolution of the general body of the Society is valid or not for all or any of the reasons mentioned in the petition filed by the 3rd respondent under sub-section (1) of S.69 of the Act, is not a dispute within the meaning of the Act. and hence the registrar has no jurisdiction to decide the question raised by the 3rd respondent in his application before him. Clause (i) of S.2 defines the word'dispute' as follows: "dispute" means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not". Clause (i) of S.2 defines the word'dispute' as follows: "dispute" means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not". Sub-section (4) of S.69 of the Act is extracted below: "If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this Section is a dispute as defined in clause (i) of S.2, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final". It is clear from sub-section (4) of S.69 that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar to decide whether the question raised before him on an application filed under sub-section (1) of S.69 is a dispute within the meaning of the Act. In the present case, the Registrar as per Ext. P1 order decided that the question raised by the 3rd respondent in the case filed under S.69(1), is not a dispute within the meaning of the Act and he has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case under S.70 of the Act. The decision of the Registrar under sub-section (4) of S.69 is final, and the 3rd respondent has no right of appeal to the Tribunal. S.82 of the Act provides for appeals to the Tribunal. The said section reads as follows: "82. Appeals to Tribunal - (1) Any person aggrieved by (a) an order of the Registrar made under clause (ii) of sub-sec. (8) or clause f ii) of sub-sec, (9) of S.14; or x x x x (d) any decision of the Registrar made under sub-section (3) of S.70; or (e) any decision under sub-section (3) of S.70 of the person invested by the Government with powers in that behalf; or (f) any award of the arbitrator under sub-section (3) of S.70, may, within sixty days from the date of such order, decision or award, as the case may be appeal to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal may pass such order on the appeal as it may deem fit. (2) An order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be final". It is only against those orders of the Registrar as are specifically referred to in S.82 of the Act that an appeal lies to the Tribunal. 4. Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent submits that Ext. (2) An order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be final". It is only against those orders of the Registrar as are specifically referred to in S.82 of the Act that an appeal lies to the Tribunal. 4. Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent submits that Ext. P1 order of the Assistant Registrar is a decision under sub-section (3) of S.70 by a person invested with the powers of a Registrar falling under clause (e) of subsection (1) of S.82 of the Act, under which an appeal lies to the Tribunal. Ext. P1 order of the 2nd respondent is not a decision under sub-section (3) of S.70 of the Act, nor is the dispute decided by him Ext. P1 is an order under sub-section (4) of S.69 by the Registrar deciding that the dispute referred to him is not a dispute as defined in clause (i) of S.2 of the Act. There is no right of appeal provided for against the decision of the Registrar under subsection (4) of S.69, and the appeal before the 1st respondent was not competent. The learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent submits that the petitioner has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Ist respondent Tribunal and it is not open to him to raise the question of jurisdiction at the hearing of the writ petition. It is also pointed out that no such point as to the want of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is specifically raised in the writ petition It is true that the petitioner has not raised the question of jurisdiction before the Ist respondent Tribunal, nor has he in this original petition taken a specific plea of want of jurisdiction of the Tribunal But it is well settled that the parties cannot by mutual consent confer jurisdiction on the Ist respondent and convert it into a proper judicial process. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Balai Chandra Mazra's case ((1978) 2 S.C.C. 559) stated thus at page 567: "10. Mr. De, however, contended that the appellant bad agreed or in fact had never objected to the appellate Bench examining witnesses and recording findings of fact on appreciation of evidence and that it would not now be open to the appellant to resile from the position adopted by him and he is estopped from doing it. Mr. De, however, contended that the appellant bad agreed or in fact had never objected to the appellate Bench examining witnesses and recording findings of fact on appreciation of evidence and that it would not now be open to the appellant to resile from the position adopted by him and he is estopped from doing it. This contention raises the vexed question whether consent can confer jurisdiction on a court which lacks inherent jurisdiction. If the court lacks inherent jurisdiction no amount of consent can confer jurisdiction. This is settled by a long line of decisions commencing from Ledgard v. Bull (13 IA. 134,145), wherein the Judicial Committee was examining the question whether a District Judge could entertain a suit complaining infringement of patent not upon institution before him but by transfer from the Court of the Subordinate Judge where it was instituted. It was accepted that if the suit was instituted in the Court of the District Judge, the District judge has jurisdiction to entertain it but a very narrow and limited question was examined whether the District Judge could entertain it on transfer from the Court of the Subordinate Judge. It was also pointed out that the defendant who had raised a contention as to the jurisdiction of the District judge to bear the suit has given his positive consent to the transfer of the suit. Even then the judicial Committee held as under: The District Judge was perfectly competent to entertain and try the suit, if it were competently brought, and their Lordships do not doubt that, in such a case, a defendant may be barred, by his own conduct, from objecting to irregularities in the institution of the suit. When the judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process although they may constitute the judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. Consent in such a situation could not be interpreted as waiver of the objection nor could it confer jurisdiction where the court inherently lacked jurisdiction to try the suit. 11. Consent in such a situation could not be interpreted as waiver of the objection nor could it confer jurisdiction where the court inherently lacked jurisdiction to try the suit. 11. This very principle was re-affirmed in Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri, wherein the High Court in appeal against the order of the District Judge had set aside the order of the District Judge appointing the appellant on the committee of the Pagoda in the Madras Presidency. When the matter was before the High Court it was never contended that the appeal was incompetent and such a contention was raised before the Judicial Committee for the first time. Following the decision in Ledgard v. Bull (Supra), it was held that when the judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. Therefore, the failure on the part of the appellant to object to the High Court ceasing an appeal under Clause.15 of the Letters Patent taking oral evidence in respect of the amended pleadings would not clothe the Bench with jurisdiction to record fresh oral evidence and proceed to appreciate the same and record findings of facts". 5. The 1st respondent Co-operative Tribunal is a creature of the Statute and its jurisdiction and powers are confined to those conferred by the statute itself The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act does not confer appellate powers on the Tribunal against the decision of the Registrar under sub-section (4) of S.69 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of S.69 in express terms makes the decision of the Registrar on the question as to whether the dispute raised before him is a dispute within the meaning of the Act, final. For the aforesaid reasons, Ext. P2 order of the Ist respondent is totally without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law. Ext. P2 order is accordingly quashed and the writ petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.