JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition filed by the petitioner seeking a direction for quashing the orders dated 9-3-1978, 31-3-1978, 28-10-1978 and 13-12-1978. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, he was appointed as a lower division clerk in the erstwhile Gwalior State in the Agriculture Department on 1-7-1940 and was promoted as an Upper Division Clerk from 15-4- 1948 and as Head Accountant with effect from 17-5-1950 in the State of Madhya bharat. He was confirmed on the post of Head Accountant on 1-4-1955 in the Agriculture Department. ( 3. ) ON 1-11-1956, the State of Madhya Pradesh was formed and in accordance with the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, the petitioner became a Head Accountant (confirmed) in the Agriculture Department. On 15-5-1958, he became Superintendent of the Accounts Section in the Directorate of Agriculture and was confirmed on that post with effect from 13-4-1968. By order dated 3-10-1968, he was promoted to the post of assistant Director of Agriculture (Account Establishment), Class II Service, and was posted at Gwalior. On 7-8-1973 he became Assistant Accounts officer, Directorate of Agriculture, Gwalior. ( 4. ) IT is further alleged that one Shri S. V. Kelkar who was working as Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture, retired with effect from 3-1-1976 and the petitioner took over charge as Accounts Officer from him in the Directorate of Agriculture on 2-1-1976. The State Government, by order dated 10-2-1976, appointed the petitioner to hold current charge of the duties of the post of Accounts Officer temporarily until further orders in addition to his duties. It is alleged that it is said in this order that the petitioner would receive special pay for the additional duty of the post of accounts Officer according to the standing orders in that behalf. There was also an endorsement in the letter that the post of Accounts Officer had to be filled in by direct recruitment and, therefore, office was directed to prepare a requisite draft for making a reference to the M. P. Public Service commission. ( 5. ) ON 6-4-1976, the State Government sanctioned continuance of the petitioner as Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture with effect from 3-1-1976 for a period of 3 months. ( 5. ) ON 6-4-1976, the State Government sanctioned continuance of the petitioner as Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture with effect from 3-1-1976 for a period of 3 months. It was further stated in this order that the petitioner would get additional salary for holding additional charge and by order dated 20-9-1976, the State Government sanctioned continuance of the petitioner as an Accounts Officer temporarily in addition to his duties upto 31-8-1976. ( 6. ) THE petitioner was retired from service with effect from 30-9-1977. He, therefore, requested the State Government to regularise his appointment as Accounts Officer, (Directorate of Agriculture), with effect from 3-1-1976 so that he may be able to get advantage of that appointment for purposes of fixation of pension. On 27-9-1977, the Government passed an order that proposal for re-employment of the petitioner was under consideration and, therefore, he should not be relieved with effect from 30-9-1977 which was the date of his superannuation. ( 7. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the State Government, by order dated 17-11-1976, sanctioned creation of an additional post of Accounts Officer in the scale of Rs. 500-30-680-40-800-EB-50-1150 for a period of 2 years and the Directorate of Agriculture issued a memo dated 30 9-1977 to the petitioner saying that the case of his re-employment was under consideration and, therefore, he was directed not to hand over charge. By order no. D/216/6315/xiv-1/77, Bhopal dated 12-1-1978, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Accounts Officer (Class I) in the pay scale of rs. 500-1150 until further orders with effect from 3-1-1976. According to the petitioner, this order was passed by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Department of Agriculture in the name and by order of the Governor of M. P. As an effect of this order, one Shri A. W. Khan was transferred on the post of Assistant Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture on 16-2-1978 and the petitioner banded over charge of Assistant Accounts officer to Shri A. W. Khan. ( 8. ) BY order dated 8-2-1978, the Directorate of Agriculture fixed the pay of the petitioner at Rs. 950. 00 p. m. in the scale of pay of Rs. 500-1150. The pay was fixed as on 3-1-1976 with the date of next increment as 3-1-1977. ( 9. ( 8. ) BY order dated 8-2-1978, the Directorate of Agriculture fixed the pay of the petitioner at Rs. 950. 00 p. m. in the scale of pay of Rs. 500-1150. The pay was fixed as on 3-1-1976 with the date of next increment as 3-1-1977. ( 9. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, by Order No. D /1037 /6315 /xiv-I /77, bhopal dated 9-3-1978, the order of promotion of the petitioner as an accounts Officer was cancelled and by another order dated 9-3-1978. he was relieved from the post of Assistant Accounts Officer and the Directorate of agriculture, by order dated 20-3-1978, relieved the petitioner from Government service and he was directed to hand over charge of the post of Assistant Accounts Officer to Shri A. W. Khan. By another order dated 31-3- 1978, the petitioner was retired from service as an Assistant Accounts officer in the Directorate of Agriculture with effect from 30-9-1977. It was also stated in this order that as the petitioner had attained the age of 58 years on 7-9-1977, he was being retired under F. R. 56 (1) and (2 ). Later by order dated 17/28-10-1978, the State Government sanctioned reemployment of the petitioner with effect from 1-10-1977 to 28-3-1978 as an assistant Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture. It was also stated in the order that the petitioner would get his salary every month after deducting the pension equivalent to death-cum-retirement gratuity. It was further said in this order that the revised salary of pension of the post after re-employment, will not be more than the maximum salary of the post. It was also said that the petitioner would get pension in addition to his salary. ( 10. ) IT is alleged by the petitioner that he made representations against these conflicting orders contending that his promotion as an accounts Officer (Class I) could not be cancelled and he could not be deprived of the emoluments of that post for which he had actually worked. He requested the State Government to withdraw the order dated 9-3-1978 cancelling the promotion. It was also contended that he had already worked as Accounts Officer (Class I) for about 27 months and by cancellation of the order of his promotion, he had suffered a loss of Rs. 61. 00 p. m. in pension and loss of Rs. 2,475. 00 in gratuity. It was also contended that he had already worked as Accounts Officer (Class I) for about 27 months and by cancellation of the order of his promotion, he had suffered a loss of Rs. 61. 00 p. m. in pension and loss of Rs. 2,475. 00 in gratuity. He also stated that the difference which he had already received, may not be recovered from him. It is also alleged that as the petitioner did not receive any reply, he served a notice of demand of justice to the State Government on 5-7-1978. It is also contended that the State Government issued a memo to the petitioner dated 8-5-1979 that the petitioner will get from 1-10-1975, 50% of the estimated gratuity which comes to Rs. 4,925. 00 and 75% of his salary as pension, i. e. Rs. 279 p. m It was also made clear in this" letter that the pension of the petitioner was fixed as Assistant Accounts Officer and he was also to be paid gratuity on the same basis. ( 11. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, he served another notice dated 19-12-1979. The petitioner did not receive any reply, but he received an order dated 13-12-1979 from the State Government of M. P. , Agriculture department saying that from 3-1-1976 to 30-9-1977 was the period of reemployment and from 1-10-1977 to 28-3-1978 he would get, in addition to his work, the remuneration for Accounts Officer (Class I) at the rate of 10% of the minimum scale as special pay. ( 12. ) AGGRIEVED by these orders, the petitioner has filed the present petition on the contention that he is entitled to the status of Accounts officer (Class I) on which post he actually worked. It is also contended that after his retirement, his services were extended and he was promoted as Accounts Officer (Class I) and was also paid salary of that post and, therefore, the State Government could not have cancelled his promotion retrospectively and reverted him to the lower post retrospectively. It is also contended that as he had worked as Accounts Officer (Class I), he is entitled to the salary of that post. ( 13. ) MOST of the facts are not in dispute. The main contention advanced in the Return is that the post of Accounts Officer (Class I) was a post to be filled in by direct recruitment. It is also contended that as he had worked as Accounts Officer (Class I), he is entitled to the salary of that post. ( 13. ) MOST of the facts are not in dispute. The main contention advanced in the Return is that the post of Accounts Officer (Class I) was a post to be filled in by direct recruitment. It is also stated that Shri Kelkar and Shri Rajaram were temporarily promoted. It is also contended that in fact when the petitioner was retired on 30-9-1977, he was asked not to hand over charge and continue with a clear direction that the question of his re-employment was under consideration and it was also stated clearly that he would be paid special allowance or salary for the higher post. ( 14. ) ACCORDING to the respondent State, in the order dated 30-9-1977, it was clearly stated that the matter of re-employment of the petitioner was under consideration and in the order dated 30-9-1976, it was clearly stated that in addition to the charge as an Assistant Director of Agriculture, he would hold the charge and perform the duties of the Accounts Officer temporarily and that he would receive special pay for the additional duties of the Accounts Officer. On the basis of these orders, it was contended that there was neither any assurance of extension of service, nor promotion, but what was stated was that the question of his re-employment was under consideration and as he had been directed to hold the charge in addition to his own duties of the Accounts Officer, he would be paid additional pay for discharging those functions. It is, therefore, contended that in the context of these orders, the order dated 12-1-1978 is apparently erroneous. ( 15. ) BY order dated 12-1-1978, it was stated that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Accounts Officer (Class I) retrospectively with effect from 3-1-1976 until further orders. It was contended that on 12-1-1978, the petitioner had already crossed the age of superannuation and was only working as a re-employee, as it was clearly stated in the earlier orders and, therefore, the question of promotion did not arise. It was contended that on 12-1-1978, the petitioner had already crossed the age of superannuation and was only working as a re-employee, as it was clearly stated in the earlier orders and, therefore, the question of promotion did not arise. It was contended by the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State that as the petitioner himself was acting as an Accounts Officer in the directorate of Agriculture immediately after these orders on 12-1-1978, he got the orders of his pay fixation on 8-2-1978, but it was contended that as the post of Accounts Officer (Class I) could only be filled up by direct recruitment and the petitioner could not be promoted as he had already retired from service and he was only a re-employee and senior to him in the department made representation that the mistake was detected on 9-3-1978, the State Government issued orders cancelling the promotion order of the petitioner and later on by respective orders, the petitioner was retired and his retirement benefits were also fixed on the basis of the post which he was originally holding and an order for payment of special pay also was passed. It was, therefore, contended that as the promotion of the petitioner itself was retrospective and as it could not be done for the reasons stated earlier, it had to be cancelled and the State Government had passed the orders carrying out the assurance that his case for re-employment was under consideration and that he would be paid additional special pay for doing additional duties. It was, therefore, contended that he was not entitled to any relief in this petition. ( 16. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that when order for promoting him to Class I post was passed in January 1978, it is no doubt true that he had already retired, but he was continued in service and what was stated was that the question of his re-employment was under consideration. It was, therefore, contended that when order for his promotion retrospectively was passed in January 1978, it could not be said that it was irregular. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in k. S. Venkataraman v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, 1977 Lab and Indus. Cases 1337. to support the contention that promotion could even be given after retirement. ( 17. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in k. S. Venkataraman v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, 1977 Lab and Indus. Cases 1337. to support the contention that promotion could even be given after retirement. ( 17. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner alternatively contended that even if the State Government decided to cancel this order in the month of march 1978 and retire the petitioner, it could only not be cancelled retrospectively. At best, it could only be cancelled prospectively as according to the learned counsel, consequent to the promotion, the pay of the petitioner was fixed in the higher scale and he was paid accordingly and by subsequent order cancelling the promotion retrospectively, amounts to reversion and recovery of the amount received also amounts to penalty which could not be done without following the procedure. It was, therefore, contended that the petitioner is entitled at lea$t to be continued as accounts Officer (Class I) till the date of cancellation of the promotion in the month of March 1978. ( 18. ) LEARNED Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, on the other hand, contended that when the post of Accounts Officer (Class I)fell vacant, it was clear that the petitioner could not be promoted to that post as that post could only be rilled in by direct recruitment and, therefore, as the department had none to take over the office of Accounts Officer (Class I), the petitioner was directed to hold charge as an additional charge and it was clearly stated that he would only be entitled to special pay for the extra duties that he would perform. ( 19. ) IT was also contended that when the petitioner was not relieved on his superannuation, it was clearly stated in the order that the question of his re-employment was under consideration and he could not be reemployed on a higher post for which he did not fulfil the necessary qualifications and for which he was not selected by the Public Service Commission. Therefore, it was contended that all the orders passed in connection with the petitioner are consistent except the order dated 12-1-1978. It was, therefore, contended that as this order dated 12-1-1978 was an erroneous order, as soon as it was noticed, immediately in the month of March, by order dated 9-3-1978, it was cancelled. ( 20. Therefore, it was contended that all the orders passed in connection with the petitioner are consistent except the order dated 12-1-1978. It was, therefore, contended that as this order dated 12-1-1978 was an erroneous order, as soon as it was noticed, immediately in the month of March, by order dated 9-3-1978, it was cancelled. ( 20. ) IT was contended that as the petitioner was working as an Accounts Officer in the Directorate of Agriculture, he managed to get his pay fixed as is indicated by order of the Directorate of Agriculture, dated 8-2-1978, but it was contended that this pay fixation was nothing but the enforcement of the order dated 12-1-1978 and as this order itself was cancelled by the State Government by order dated 9-3-1978, it could not be said that the petitioner has sufferred any loss, as what he got in excess had to be recovered from him. ( 21. ) IT was also contended by the learned Deputy Advocate General that as the promotion itself was retrospective, the cancellation had to be retrospective from the date on which by order dated 12-1.-1978, the petitioner was ordered to be promoted. It is clear that as the promotion itself was temporary and ad hoc, it could not be said that by cancellation, it amounted to reversion which fell within the ambit of penalty and, therefore, the question of following any procedure was not at all necessary. Learned Deputy Advocate General placed reliance on a decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Prayag Dass Seth v. Secretary to Government. U. P. and another 1968 Ser. LR 843. ( 22. ) IT is not disputed that by order dated 10 2-1976, the petitioner was asked to hold current charge of the duties of the post of Accounts officer temporarily until further orders and this was in addition to his own duties. It was also made clear in this order that he would receive special pay for the additional duties of the post of Accounts Officer. This order was to be effective only until further orders Afterwards, by another order dated 16-4-1976, again a similar order was issued for three months indicating that until some arrangement was made for the post of Accounts Officer, the petitioner would continue to hold the additional charge and he would be paid special pay for the additional duties. This order was to be effective only until further orders Afterwards, by another order dated 16-4-1976, again a similar order was issued for three months indicating that until some arrangement was made for the post of Accounts Officer, the petitioner would continue to hold the additional charge and he would be paid special pay for the additional duties. It is also not in dispute that by subsequent order dated 20-9-1976, he was again asked to hold the current charge of the post of Accounts Officer and it was indicated that he would be paid special pay for the additional work. It is, therefore, clear that when initially the petitioner was asked to work as an Accounts Officer, it was only on ad hoc stop-gap arrangement and it was also indicated that he would continue until arrangements were made for the post of Accounts officer and it was also made clear that as the petitioner would be performing the additional duties, he would be paid special pay for the additional duties. ( 23. ) BY order dated 28-9-1977, it was stated that as the petitioner was to retire on 30-9-1977, he should not be relieved as the question of his re-employment was under consideration of the Government. This order also does not indicate that there was any question of promotion as reemployment could not be done on a higher post. On 30-9-1977 on which date the petitioner was to retire, he was again intimated that the question of his re-employment was under consideration and, therefore, he had to continue until further orders. All these orders, therefore, clearly and consistently indicated that the petitioner was to be continued in service on re employment and as he was directed to hold the current charge of the office of the Assistant Accounts Officer, he would be paid special pay as he was performing additional duties. It is not in dispute that ultimately the state Government, by their ultimate orders, continued him in service till he was retired from the original post and directed payment to him as special pay for performing additional duties. It is, therefore, not disputed that except the order dated 12-1-1978, all other orders are consistent. ( 24. It is not in dispute that ultimately the state Government, by their ultimate orders, continued him in service till he was retired from the original post and directed payment to him as special pay for performing additional duties. It is, therefore, not disputed that except the order dated 12-1-1978, all other orders are consistent. ( 24. ) THE order dated 12-1-1978 stated that the petitioner who was an Assistant Accounts Officer (Class II), was promoted on ad hoc basis to class I post and it was also stated that this order would be effective retrospectively from 3-1-1976 when the order itself was passed on 12-1-1978. It, therefore, could not be disputed that till this order was passed, the petitioner was working as Accounts Officer (Class II) and as a re-employee, as he had crossed the age of superannuation on 30-9-1977. It was, therefore, contended by the Dy. Advocate General that a person who had retired and who was taking re-employment, could not have been promoted retrospectively and that too on a post which could only be filled in by an incumbent selected by the Public Service Commission after direct recruitment. There fore, it was contended that the State Government, having discovered this mistake, immediately by order dated 9-3-1978, corrected it and it was contended that there is nothing on the basis of which it could be contended that if an order was issued by mistake, it could not be corrected. ( 25. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that even a retired person could be promoted, placed reliance on 1977 labour and Industrial Cases, page 1337 cited above, but the following observations on which reliance was placed, are clear that if because of a departmental enquiry, a person could not be promoted and he was cleared from the departmental enquiry and he had retired, still on the date on which his promotion was to be considered as on that date he was not retired, he could be promoted from that date. It was observed as under : "according to the learned Advocate General, the petitioner has no such right after his retirement, but I do not see how that right can be denied to him even though he is no longer in service. It was observed as under : "according to the learned Advocate General, the petitioner has no such right after his retirement, but I do not see how that right can be denied to him even though he is no longer in service. When he came under suspension, his case for promotion to the selection grade and super time-scale was not considered for the sole reason that departmental proceedings were pending against him. After those proceedings were dropped, that right was revived and would enure to his benefit as from the date when he was due for consideration for promotion. It is true that he had no vested right to be promoted; but that he had a right to be considered for promotion when the occasion arose is not denied even by the learned Advocate General whose only argument is that when once that occasion has gone by the right is not revived in spite of the departmental proceedings by reason of the pendency of which that right was not extended to him, having terminated in his favour When once the petitioner is absolved of all charges the reason which prompted the government not to consider him for promotion is obliterated so that the petitioners right to have his case reopened and his name considered for promotion with effect from the date when a person junior to him was promoted would revive. Further, he is entitled to such consideration with the application of the same criteria which were brought to bear on the promotion of his juniors. If there was more than one such occasion, his case has to be considered in relation to them all and on the same basis. Refusal of those rights to him is a denial of equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and is hit by Article 16 of the constitution of India. Learned Advocate General has not been able to cite any authority in support of his proposition contrary to this conclusion which finds support from the decision in State of Mysore v. C. R. Seshadri AIR 1974 SC 460 1974 Labic 362. " ( 26. Learned Advocate General has not been able to cite any authority in support of his proposition contrary to this conclusion which finds support from the decision in State of Mysore v. C. R. Seshadri AIR 1974 SC 460 1974 Labic 362. " ( 26. ) THE above observations, therefore, make it clear that the date on which a civil servant was to be considered for promotion was the date when he had not retired, although promotion was deferred because there was a departmental enquiry pending against him and as he was cleared in that enquiry, although he had retired, the question of his promotion could be considered on the date when he was not considered and clearly on that date he had not retired. In my opinion, therefore, these observations do not help the case of the petitioner. ( 27. ) THE only order of promotion in favour of the petitioner is dated 12-1-1978. It is not in dispute that on this date, he had already retired. It is also clear that his promotion was never deferred on an earlier date as the earlier orders clearly state that he was asked to hold the current charge of the post of Accounts Officer, not on promotion, but as a stop-gap arrangement on payment of special pay and, therefore, the question of his promotion did not come up at any time except when this order dated 12-1-1978 was passed and admittedly on this date, he had already retired. Therefore, it could not be said that this order is not a mistaken order. ( 28. ) THE stand taken in the return on the basis of correspondence between the Public Service Commission and the State Government clearly shows that this post of Accounts Officer (Class I) could only be filled up after selection by Public Service Commission and could only be by direct recruitment. Although the correspondence discloses that the Government and the Public Service Commission felt some difficulty about it and thought of modifying the rule, yet it is not disputed that rule was not modified and even on 12-1-1978, the petitioner could not be appointed on this post, as it is clear that he was neither selected by the Public Service Commission, nor even his promotion was recommended by the Public Service Commission. It is, therefore, clear that it was an order which for reasons unknown, was passed, but was not a regular and legal order. ( 29. ) THE State Government, it appears, either on representation or otherwise, discovered the mistake and corrected it by order dated 9-3-1978. It was contended by the learned Dy. Advocate General that after the State government discovers that an order is erroneously passed, there is nothing to prevent the State Government from correcting it. He relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Prayag Dass Seth v. Secretary to Govt , U. P. and another {supra) cited above. In this decision, the learned Judge, placing reliance on a decision reported in Mazhar Hasnain v. State of U. P. AIR 1961 All 316 , quoted with approval the observations in the case and on the basis of those observations, it was held that if a promotion was given under a mistake, that mistake could be corrected. The observations are as under: " (9) In Mazhar Hasnain v. State of U. P. , a learned single Judge of this Court dealt with a case where one Mazhar Hasnain was appointed Munsarim by the District Judge. Another person Iqbal Hasan made a representation that he was senior to Mazhar Hasnain. The State government upheld his claim to seniority. (10) Consequently Iqbal Hasan was appointed Munsarim in place of Mazhar Hasnain and the order indicated that Mazhar Hasnain will be entitled to promotion after Iqbal Hasan. It was held by this Court that: the sole question that arose is : was the petitioner entitled to the rank? If he had been sent and another person was senior who have not been appointed, the petitioner was not entitled to the rank and in fact he was appointed by mistake and if that mistake has been corrected, it cannot be said that any right of the petitioner has been taken away from him. He has been placed at the place where he should have been, if there had been a proper interpretation as has been made by the State Government. He has been placed at the place where he should have been, if there had been a proper interpretation as has been made by the State Government. the learned Judge continued to observe: if this contention of the learned counsel is accepted that once a person is transferred on promotion to another place, thereafter he cannot be reverted back on representation made by some other person, then in that event, the right of representation will lose all its force. An appointment, where an appeal or revision is possible, is always subject to the result of such appeal or revision. these observations are apposite to the facts of the present cases. The promotion of the present petitioners was under a mistake which was sought to be corrected because of acceptance of the representation filed by the adversely affected Inspectors. It could be said that the petitioners promotion was subject to their representations and the petitioners were not entitled to hold the rank of Senior Marketing inspectors. " It is, therefore, clear that it could not be contended that if an order is issued by mistake, the authority which had the jurisdiction to issue it, could not correct it. ( 30. ) THE main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if this order is corrected by order dated 9-3-1978, it could not be given retrospective operation, but as the facts in this case clearly indicate that even the promotion order which is said to be an order issued under mistake, itself was an order granting promotion retrospectively and if an order of promotion was made retrospectively and it was inconsistent with all earlier orders and if it is cancelled, it is bound to take effect retrospectively and it could not be said that this order is being given retrospective operation. The order of promotion was passed on 12-1-1978 and it was cancelled on 9-2-1978, within less than 2 months. But the whole trouble arises because this promotion order was made effective from january 1976 retrospectively and, therefore, the cancellation order had to be given effect from that date and it would have resulted in nothing except for the fact that as the petitioner was the sole person in the Accounts section of the Directorate of Agriculture, he, within this short period, even got his salary fixed on the basis of the orders passed on 12-1-1978. It is, therefore, clear that in the circumstances in which these orders were passed, it could not be said that the petitioner was reverted retrospectively and, therefore, the question of recovery will amount to penalty. It is clear, therefore, that what was done by the State Government was to correct the order and it had to be corrected from {he date from which it was made effective. Under these circumstances, therefore, it could not be said that this order, in any manner, amounts to an order of reversion or recovery and, therefore, amounts to penalty. It is clear that even in the order dated 12-1-1978, it was stated that it was an ad hoc order and, therefore, was subject to be either confirmed or set aside and ultimately the order having been found to be erroneous and irregular, was cancelled by order dated 9-3-1978 and the petitioner could not make any grievance about it. ( 31. ) IN the light of the discussion made above, I see no reason to entertain this petition. It is, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.