JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - This appeal by the defendants arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent Basanti Lal for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disconnecting the supply of electrical energy to his cane crusher at Islam agar on the ground that the defendants had made short supply of energy during the period of dispute. 2. The facts set out in the plaint are these. The plaintiff-respondent Basanti Lal has a sugar cane crusher installed at Islam Nagar by name Islam Nagar Sugar Factory. He was granted an electric connection for 75 H. P. The plaintiffs machinery worked during the season commencing from 20th Nov. to 20th Mar. i.e. only for four months. The plaintiff alleged that since Nov. 1972 the defendants had supplied energy only for four hours to six hours a day with the result that the cane crusher could not be worked for full time. In para 5 it has been stated that the minimum guarantee given to the plaintiff regarding consumption of electrical energy was 120 per H.P. amounting to Rs. 9,000/- a year but since the plaintiffs concern was seasonal that fact would not apply to him. Para 7 of the plaint points out that owing to short supply of electrical energy by the defendants the plaintiff could consume electrical energy worth only Rs. 5,287-50 during 2-12-1971 to 3-3-1973 though during that period the plaintiff was entitled to consume energy worth Rs. 11,300-00. The defendants, however, served a bill No. 2339 dated 28-3-1973 requiring the plaintiff to pay Rs. 6,012-60 on account of minimum guarantee. The contention of the plaintiff in para 9 of the plaint was that the short consumption was entirely due to wrongful act of the defendants hence due to short supply of electrical energy the defendants were not entitled to realise any sum of Rs. 6,012-60 from the plaintiff. However, as the defendants threatened to disconnect the plaintiffs line there was no alternative but to file the suit for injunction. The defendants sent another bill No. 3118 dated 1-5-1973 to the plaintiff by which they demanded a further sum of Rs. 756-00 as dues for Mar. 1973. The plaintiff by way of abundant caution had paid the said sum of Rs. 756-00 by bank draft No. BJ 566848 dated 11-5-1973. 3. The defendants sent another bill No. 3118 dated 1-5-1973 to the plaintiff by which they demanded a further sum of Rs. 756-00 as dues for Mar. 1973. The plaintiff by way of abundant caution had paid the said sum of Rs. 756-00 by bank draft No. BJ 566848 dated 11-5-1973. 3. The suit was resisted by defendant 2 who' filed a written statement admitting that the plaintiffs minimum guarantee charges amounted to Rs. 9,000-00 and also admitted the service of the bill and the notice. It was stated in the written statement that the plaintiff had executed a deed of agreement dated 26-11-1971 and a load of 75 H.P. was sanctioned to him by the contesting defendant. It was not the responsibility of the contesting defendant whether the plaintiff consumed electrical energy for the whole year or for four months. The electric supply to the plaintiff was maintained as per rostering programme and by virtue of notification issued by the State Government the plaintiff was required to cut electric energy by 40%. As such the plaintiff could consume electric energy up to 60% which would count to more than that of the minimum guarantee charges hence the demand for the charges up to the minimum guarantee was correct. It was the fault of the plaintiff he did not consume 60% of the electricity. The cut was due to the notification of the State Government which was binding on both the parties. Both the parties filed documentary evidence but adduced no oral evidence. The trial court framed four issues on the pleadings of the parties. It held that the defendants were not entitled to charge minimum guarantee amount from the plaintiff hence the suit was decreed and the defendants were restrained by permanent injunction from disconnecting the supply of electrical energy to the plaintiffs cane crusher at Islam Nagar. The U. P. State Electricity Board and the Executive Engineer then filed an appeal in the court of the District Judge which came up for hearing before the III Additional District and Sessions Judge. The appellate court below dismissed the appeal; hence the present second appeal was filed in this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that both the courts below had erred in holding that the plaintiff though in arrears of electricity charges was entitled to the injunction prayed for. The appellate court below dismissed the appeal; hence the present second appeal was filed in this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that both the courts below had erred in holding that the plaintiff though in arrears of electricity charges was entitled to the injunction prayed for. The submission was that by reason of S. 24, Electricity Act, the supply of electricity could be discontinued to the plaintiff who had neglected to pay the charges and as the plaintiff had agreed to pay minimum guarantee charges the demand made from him for payment of that amount was justified even when the supply of electrical energy was reduced by 40%. The learned counsel submitted that admittedly the supply to the extent of t0% was available and if the plaintiff had consumed the entire 60% of the electricity he would have been liable to pay more than the minimum guarantee charges. In this connection it was urged that the supply of electricity available was sufficient enough to cove minimum guarantee charges and when a bill is sent to a person consuming the electricity he has to pay that bill. If he disputes the amount even then he should deposit the entire amount under protest and file a suit as required by S. 4, U. P. Government Electrical Undertakings (Dues Recovery) Act. A bill Ex. 1 dated 28-3-1973 was sent to the plaintiff which remained unpaid. Then it was followed by a notice dated 1-5-1973 intimating the plaintiff that he should pay the amount of the bill already sent by 11-5-1973 failing which the electric supply would be disconnected on that date. Admittedly the plaintiff has not .paid any sum against that bill though according to him he could consume electrical energy worth only Rs. 5,287-50 during the period 2-12-1971 to 3-3-1973. Even the said amount of Rs. 5,287-50 was not deposited by him. 5. Now it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Hari Shankar v. U.P. State Electricity Board, ( AIR 1974 All 70 ), that the term "Tariff' includes within its ambit not only the fixation of rates but also the rules and regulations relating to it. When the electrical supply is being made on the footing that the consumer will pay the minimum guaranteed charges, this charge is one of the terms or conditions for supply. When the electrical supply is being made on the footing that the consumer will pay the minimum guaranteed charges, this charge is one of the terms or conditions for supply. The fixation of this would be included in the fixation of rates for the supply of electricity. In the case of Bhagwan Industries (P) Ltd. Lucknow ( AIR 1979 All 249 ) it was noticed that by a notification dated Oct. 12, 1974 the Electricity Board in exercise of powers under S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act issued revised rate schedule and introduced minimum consumption guarantee charge. The notification of 1974 superseded the 1972 tariff and replaced the existing rates of charges and the corresponding provisions in the existing schedules and existing agreements between the parties. In place of 1972 tariff the new tariff became part and parcel of the agreement between the parties. It was held that the rate shall be subject to the revision by the Board from time to time under the provisions of the Act. The new tariff enforced in exercise of the statutory power under S. 49 of the Act would be legally valid and enforceable and that the Board was justified in imposing minimum guarantee charge even though there was shortage of supply as minimum consumption charge was correlated to energy charge and demand charge. In that case it appeared from the averments made in the counter-affidavit that energy was made available by the Board to the consumers generally at least for about 6 to 9 hours a day except on days when they were not permitted to consume energy under statutory orders passed by the Government, and the supply given was always more than sufficient to cover the amount of minimum charge. According to the respondents in that case the consumer of the category to which the petitioners belonged can consume sufficient electricity to meet the minimum guarantee charges if he runs his contracted load for 4 to 6 hours a day and even if he runs the contracted load at 60%, he can consume sufficient electricity to meet the minimum guarantee charges by using energy for 7.7 hours a day. The learned counsel for the appellants in the instant case made the same submission before me. The learned counsel for the appellants in the instant case made the same submission before me. He argued that the supply of electricity was available and if the plaintiff had consumed the entire 60% of the supply it would have been sufficient enough to cover minimum guarantee charges. In order to substantiate his submission the learned counsel referred me to certain admitted facts. The plaintiff was admittedly sanctioned a load of 75 H.P. The period in dispute for which charges were claimed was 2-12-1971 to 3-3-1973. During the period between 2-12-1971 and 31-12-1971 the rate schedule notified vide Board's notification No. 6012-CSEB-86-B/65 dated 25th June, 1968 was applicable. The rate schedule LMV 5-C applicable for Small and Medium Power (seasonal) was accordingly applicable to the plaintiffs case. The period involved was of 29 days. Now the second period commenced from 1-1-1972 and ended on 3-3-1973 which was governed by the rate schedule notified by notification Nos. 6021-N/SEB and 6022-N-SEB dated 29-12-1971 which became effective and operative from 1-1-1972. The rate schedule applicable to the cane crusher was LMV 7-A i.e. for medium power i.e. 20 Kilowatts (between 27 BHP and 100 BHP). The learned counsel submitted that one BHP is equal to .75 K.V. Now Kilowatt X hours = consumption in terms of units during those hours = KWH which is also known as a unit. Now, units multiplied by number of days in the month or year as the case may be reflected the maximum consumption during the month or year. The plaintiff was sanctioned a load of 75 BHP, which means 75 X .75 = 56.26 KW. Now when 56.26 are multiplied by 24 X 30 it would come to 40500 units. If the entire load was operated around the clock then 40500 units would have been consumed. However, there was restriction of consumption by imposing 40% cut. In other words only 60% electrical energy was supplied which would mean, therefore, consumption of 24300 units. Now the charges, after deducting rebate, for 24300 units would come to Rs. 3502.50. The monthly minimum guarantee charge at the rate of Rs. 10/- per BHP per month would, however, be Rs. 750.00 per month alone which means Rs. 9000.00 per annum. In other words only 60% electrical energy was supplied which would mean, therefore, consumption of 24300 units. Now the charges, after deducting rebate, for 24300 units would come to Rs. 3502.50. The monthly minimum guarantee charge at the rate of Rs. 10/- per BHP per month would, however, be Rs. 750.00 per month alone which means Rs. 9000.00 per annum. So it appeared that the supply given was more than sufficient to cover the amount of minimum charges and if the plaintiff had run the contracted load at 60% he would have consumed sufficient electricity to meet the minimum guarantee charges. The trial court had, however, observed while discussing Issue 3 that "It has not been disputed by the defendants that since Nov. 1972 the defendants have been supplying energy only for four hours or six hours of the day, and that as a result of the cut the defendants have not been able to supply energy even to the extent of minimum guarantee, it is not understandable as to how the defendants can demand the amount of minimum guarantee". The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the aforesaid observation of the trial court was factually wrong inasmuch as the defendants had never admitted that they were not able to supply energy even to the extent of minimum guarantee; rather in para 4 of the written statement it was stated that by virtue of state Government notification, the plaintiff was required to cut electric energy by 40% and as such the plaintiff could consume electric energy up to 60% which was equal to the consumption of minimum guarantee. Further in para 7 of the written statement it was stated that it was the fault of the plaintiff who could not consume 60% of the electricity and could not make up the minimum guarantee, and that it was not the fault of the contesting defendant to supply electric energy by 40% cut. Significantly nobody appeared before the courts below to state that even if the plaintiff had consumed the entire 60% electrical energy he could not have consumed that much of power the cost of which would have been up to the minimum guarantee charges. Significantly nobody appeared before the courts below to state that even if the plaintiff had consumed the entire 60% electrical energy he could not have consumed that much of power the cost of which would have been up to the minimum guarantee charges. I have gone through the record and I find no statement made on behalf of the defendants admitting that the defendants had not been able to supply electrical energy to the extent which could have been equal to the minimum guarantee charge. The premise on which the injunction was granted was, therefore, unfounded. Even the appellate court below did not approach the case in its right perspective. 6. Section 4, U. P. Government Electrical Undertakings (Dues Recovery) Act, provides that where a notice of demand has been served on the consumer under S. 3 of that Act, he may, if he denies his liability to pay the dues or any part thereof, and upon deposit thereof with the prescribed authority under protest in writing, institute a suit for the refund of the dues or part thereof so deposited. The bill Ex. 1 was no doubt sent to the plaintiff but it cannot be said to be a notice under S. 3 of the said Act. However, S. 24, Electricity Act, provides that where any person neglects to pay any charge for energy due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear days notice in writing to such person and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works, being the property of the licensee through which energy may be supplied, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply are paid, but no longer. The bill Ex. 1 was sent to the plaintiff demanding the amount mentioned therein towards the electricity charges. That bill was followed by a notice Ex. 2. By that notice also the plaintiff was given an opportunity to pay the amount of the bill and he was informed that failure to comply with it would result in disconnection of the supply line. 1 was sent to the plaintiff demanding the amount mentioned therein towards the electricity charges. That bill was followed by a notice Ex. 2. By that notice also the plaintiff was given an opportunity to pay the amount of the bill and he was informed that failure to comply with it would result in disconnection of the supply line. The plaintiff instead of making payment of the bill rushed to the court for an injunction. I have already indicated above that the plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint had stated to have consumed electricity to the tune of Rs. 5287-50. He had received a bill of Rs. 6012-60. Even the admitted amount had not been deposited by him, he had also not deposited the amount or any part thereof under protest. He was admittedly in arrears. The equitable relief of injunction in the circumstances was not available to him. So viewed from any angle the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff should not have been granted and the suit should have been dismissed. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The decree passed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court below is set aside and the suit is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.