JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmad, J. - This Writ Petition is directed against the order dated 12-12-1981 passed by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) Faizabad sadar by which the petitioner has been placed under suspension. The facts, in brief, as set out in the petition are to the effect that the petitioner was appointed as Lekhpal (Consolidation) on 9-3-1961. At the relevant time he was posted at Faizabad and was attached to the Assistant Consolidation Officer (7) Mau Shewala. It is stated in the petition that one Sri Shivanand had approached the petitioner to make certain corrections with respect to a Matrook Number in his Khata. The petitioner expressed his inability and pointed out that it could be done only by the Kanungo. It is further stated that on 4-12-1981 Sri Shivanand came again to the residence of the petitioner along with a vigilance squad. Sri Shivanand called the petitioner from his house and put a sum of Rs. 200/- in the pocket of the petitioner. The petitioner again told Sri Shivanand he could not correct the 'Matrook Number' and, therefore, he tried to return the money to Sri Shivanand who did not take it. The petitioner consequently threw the money "on the mouth of Shivanand Pande". At this stage, it is alleged, the vigilance squad caught the petitioner and challenged him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner was sent to jail and was subsequently bailed out. The petitioner has asserted that on account of the aforesaid case opposite-party 2 by the order dated 12-12-1981 suspended the petitioner, and the order of suspension of which a copy has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition was served on the petitioner on 6-1-1982. 2. The impugned order of suspension had been passed under the provisions of R. 49-A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The relevant portion of R. 49-A is quoted below : - "(1-A) A Government servant in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude." 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the provision of sub-r. (1-A) of R. 49-A was ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it gave absolute discretion to the appointing authority to place a Government servant in respect of, or against, whom any investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending under suspension. It had been urged that the appointing authority may or may not place a Government servant under suspension although such Government servant might be involved in a criminal case. The learned counsel further urged that the rule does not lay down any guidelines for the exercise of the discretionary power by the appointing authority and, therefore, the aforesaid sub-r. (1 A) of R. 49-A was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 4. We have examined the provisions of sub-r. (1-A) of R. 49-A and we are of the opinion that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of force. 5. The relevant portion of R. 49-A has been quoted above. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-r. (1-A) would indicate that sufficient guidelines have already been provided therein and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary is not correct. Sub-rule (1-A) itself provides that a Government servant in respect of, or against, whom any investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending maybe placed under suspension if the charge is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. The discretion has, therefore, to be exercised in terms of the provisions contained in sub-r. (1-A). The appointing authority could, therefore place a Government servant under suspension if the criminal charge in respect of which an investigation,inquiry or trial is pending is connected with the position of the employee concerned as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. 6. It may be pointed out that the learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of his submissions referred us to a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Air India v. Nargesh Meerza reported in AIR 1981 SC 1829 : (1981 Lab IC 1313). He, in particular, referred us to Para 117 of the Report on page 1859. He, in particular, referred us to Para 117 of the Report on page 1859. The relevant portion of the Report on which reliance has been placed is quoted below : - "So far as the Ahs are concerned, under the Regulation the discretion is to be exercised by the Managing Director to extend the period up to ten years. In other words, the spirit of the Regulation is that an AH, if medically fit, is likely to continue up to the age of 45 by yearly extensions given by the Managing Director. Unfortunately, however, the real intention of the makers of the Regulation has not been carried out because the Managing Director has been given an uncontrolled, unguided and absolute discretion to extend or not to extend the period of retirement in the case of AHs. after 35 years. The words at the option' are wide enough to allow the Managing Director to exercise his discretion in favour of one AH and not in favour of the other which may result in discrimination. The Regulation does not provide any guidelines, rules or principles which may govern the exercise of the discretion by the Managing Director. Similarly, there is also no provision in the Regulation requiring the authorities to give reason for refusing to extend the period of retirement of AHs. The provision does not even give any right of appeal to higher authorities against the order passed by the Managing Director. Under the provision, as it stands, the extension of the retirement of an AH is entirely at the mercy and sweet will of the Managing Director. The conferment of such a wide and uncontrolled power on the Managing Director is clearly violative of Art. 14, as the provision suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers." 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the words at the discretion of used in sub-r. (1-A) of R. 49-A clearly indicate that the power given to the appointing authority for placing a Government servant under suspension is uncontrolled, unguided and clearly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. He, therefore, stated that in terms of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court we should also strike down the provisions of sub-r. (1 A) as being violative of Art. 14. He, therefore, stated that in terms of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court we should also strike down the provisions of sub-r. (1 A) as being violative of Art. 14. We have already held above that sufficient guidelines have been provided in sub-r. (1-A) of R. 49A for exercise of the discretion by the appointing authority. The judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Air India's case does not, therefore, apply to the present case. 8. We may, however, refer to another decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1982 SC 65 , in which their Lordships upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, 1978 as amended by the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control (First Amendment) Order, 1980. In that case it was urged that the second proviso to sub-cl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order conferred upon the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and arbitrary power to suspend a licence and it, therefore, infringed the fundamental right to carry on trade or business guranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was also urged that the conferral of such unguided, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the licensing authority, without any guidelines, whatsoever, makes the impugned proviso unconstitutional as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. After considering the relevant provisions of the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order their Lordships of the Supreme Court held (Para 11): - "On a fair reading of the second Proviso to sub-cl. (1) of Cl. 11 of the Order, it cannot be said that it commits to the unrestrained will of the District Food and Supplies Controller, who is the licensing authority, the power of suspension of a licence. It does not confer arbitrary and uncontrolled power because the suspension can only be for specified reasons and the second proviso lays down the circumstances or grounds on which the power may be exercised. Such guidelines are expressly and specifically stated the power of suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the licence." 9. Such guidelines are expressly and specifically stated the power of suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the licence." 9. Considered in the light of the observations Of the Supreme Court it would appear that sub-r. (1-A) of R. 49-A furnishes sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power of suspension and it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 10. The question whether the allegations made against the petitioner are correct or not and whether he accepted the amount of Rs. 200/- offered to him by Sri Shivanand or that it was placed forcibly in his pocket is to be decided by the Criminal Court before which the. case may ultimately come up for hearing. It is not for us to express any opinion on that matter. We are, however, satisfied that the allegations made against the petitioner,as set out by him in the petition, do constitute prima facie an act of moral turpitude and the charge in respect of which the investigation is pending against the petitioner is certainly connected with his position as a Government servant. The appointing authority cannot, in this situation, be said to have exercised the discretion in an arbitrary manner. The discretion appears to have been exercised on the basis of the guidelines provided in the rule itself. 11. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.