Judgment : This is an appeal filed by the State against the order passed by the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras-1 in C.C. No. 27681 of 1974, acquitting the accused who were charged for an offence under sections 18 (a) (i) and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 2. The prosecution case is as follows: A-1 is a firm situate at No. 177, Govindappa Naicken Street, Madras-1, licensed to repack and sell drugs as provided under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Accused 2 to 4 are the partners and A-5 is the chemist of the said firm. P.W. 1 is the Drug Inspector. 3. On 7th April, 1973, P.W. 1 visited The Government Medical Store Depot, Madras-3 and found there a stock of 3,000 packets each of 500 gms. of purified talc I.P. Batch No. 639. He took four samples each of 500 gms under Exhibit P-1 and sealed those four sampler with his seal and also the seal of the Government Medical Stores Depot and handed-over one sample to the Manager. The second sample was sent for chemical analysis under Exhibit P-2. He kept the third sample with him. He received the Government Analyst’s report Exhibit P-4 stating that the sample was not of standard quality. On 9th October, 1973, he went to Messers. Ramesh Medical Hall belonging to A-3. He seized some records under Exhibit P-5. The manufacturer’s record of Messrs. Uni Drug (A-1) is Exhibit P-6. He seized a few records from A-1 firm. On 16th October, 1973, he wrote to the Deputy Assistant Director General, Government Medical Stores Depot, with a copy of the Analyst’s report Exhibit P-4 to furnish the name and address of the supplier of the drug covered by Exhibit P-4, quantity received, the balance having in hand and the other distribution particulars, by letter dated 16th November, 1973. On 19th November, 1973, he, received a reply Exhibit P-12. Then, a show cause memo was issued to A-1 with a copy of Exhibit P-4. He tried to hand over the samples to Accused 2 to 4 with the Analyst’s report and copy of the memo but they declined to receive them. On 19th November, 1973, he, received a reply Exhibit P-12. Then, a show cause memo was issued to A-1 with a copy of Exhibit P-4. He tried to hand over the samples to Accused 2 to 4 with the Analyst’s report and copy of the memo but they declined to receive them. After finding out the partners of A-1 firm with the help of the original partnership deed he made a report to the Drugs Controller under Exhibit P-15 for sanction which was duly granted by Exhibit P-16, dated 18th September, 1974. Then, the proceedings were launched against the accused under section 18 (a) (i) of the Act for having manufactured a drug which is not of standard quality. 4. P.W. 2 Manager of Government Medical Store Depot, testified that an order was placed with A-1 for supply of 1500 kgs. of Talc Purified LP. under Exhibit P-17, dated 16th February, 1973. 3,000 packets each containing 500 gms. bearing Batch No. 639 repacked by the Uni Drug (A-1) was delivered . Later, a copy of the report of the Government Analyst declaring the item as not conforming to the standards prescribed in the I.P. was received with a request not to dispose of the stock. They then intimated A-1 by Exhibit P-18 about their rejection of the stock which was acknowledged by Exhibit P-19 by A-1. 5. P.W. 3 is examined for the production of Exhibit P-20, the partnership deed of A-1 firm, which is dealing in drugs, and P.W. 4 is examined to speak about P.W. 1 seizing records on 9th October, 1973, from Ramesh Medical Hall under Exhibit P-5 mahazar, which has been attested by him. 6. When the accused were examined, they denied their complicity in the crime. They examined four witnesses on their behalf. D.W. 1 is a retired Public Analyst. King Institute, Guindy. According to him, Talcum Powder I. P. Batch No. 639 was analysed by one Bagyam Krishnaswamy and he was not standing by her side when she analysed the sample. 7. D.W. 2 was the Senior Scientific Assistant at Government Medical Stores Depot. He has analysed Talcum Powder I.P. Batch No. 639. The sample was tested with dilute hydrochloric acid for about 15 minutes and then the filterate was evaporated. 8. D.W. 3 Senior Analyst of the King Institute, has deposed that she is not a Government Analyst. 7. D.W. 2 was the Senior Scientific Assistant at Government Medical Stores Depot. He has analysed Talcum Powder I.P. Batch No. 639. The sample was tested with dilute hydrochloric acid for about 15 minutes and then the filterate was evaporated. 8. D.W. 3 Senior Analyst of the King Institute, has deposed that she is not a Government Analyst. She carried out the test as mentioned in Exhibit P-4. She stated that the Government Analyst was not present when she carried out the test. 9. D.W. 4 is an employee of A-1 firm. He denied having sold any talcum powder Batch No. 639. No talcum powder was seized from him. He came to know about the case only when he received summons from the Court. 10. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused mainly on three grounds, viz., (i) Where a Government Analyst does not carry out the analysis himself, the prosecution cannot be permitted to rely upon the formal report of the analysis furnished by the Government analyst. (ii) The sample was taken on 7th April, 1973, and the analysis was, carried out only on 21st September, 1973, i.e., after a lapse of 5½months, and the drugs and cosmetics lost effectiveness and potency with the passage of time. (iii) The Government Analyst who issued Exhibit P-4 should have been examined as a witness on the side of the prosecution. 11. Even though the State appeal was admitted as regards all the five respondents accused, the whereabouts of A-4 having not been traced, he could not be served with the notice of the appeal. Hence, as far as the case against A-4 is concerned, the appeal against acquittal, not being pursued by the State, stands dismissed. There are only four respondents accused now before me. 12. The learned Public Prosecutor, assailing the order of the trial Court, contended that none of the grounds mentioned by the lower Court for acquittal is sustainable. As regards the first ground, he brought to my notice rule 45 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, which reads as follows: “Duties of Government Analysis.-(1) The Government Analyst shall cause to be analysed or tested such samples of drugs and cosmetics as may be sent to him by Inspectors or other persons under the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and shall furnish reports of the results of test or analysis in accordance with these Rules.” 13. He contended, it is not obligatory on the part of the Government Analyst that he should analyse all the samples himself as it would not be humanly possible and he could analyse some of the sample himself and whenever necessary direct such analysis to be carried out by his subordinate officers. Merely because a Subordinate Officer has been permitted to analyse the samples, it could not be thrown out on the ground there was no personal knowledge of the Government Analyst. When once the analysis has been done by the competent authority and the report has been submitted, it should be presumed that all necessary acts have been performed. In support of his contention, my attention was drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Kassium Kunju Pookunju and another v. K.K. Ramakrishna Pillai and another)1. Their Lordships were dealing with a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and they made the following observations: “The High Court relied on the principle that official acts must be presumed to have been regularly performed. Under rule 7, the Public Analyst has to compare the seal on the container and the outer cover with the specimen impression received separately on receipt of the packet containing the sample for analysis. The High Court considered that it must be presumed that the public Analyst acted in accordance with the rules and he must have compared the specimen impression received by him with the seal of the container. We do not find any error in the decision of the High Court on the above point.” (The Supreme Court has thus accepted the principle that the Official acts must be presumed to have been regularly performed. 14. It could also be a safe presumption under illustration (e) to section 114 of the Evidence Act, that an official performs the duties regularly and that he acted in accordance with the Rules. In the present case, I do not find any infirmity in the test conducted by D.W. 3 and the report Exhibit P-4, even though D.W. 1, the public Analyst was not bodily present at the time when the analysis was done. If there was any element of doubt as to the genuineness of the analysis made by D.W. 3, I have no reason to doubt D.W. 1 would not have released Exhibit P-4. If there was any element of doubt as to the genuineness of the analysis made by D.W. 3, I have no reason to doubt D.W. 1 would not have released Exhibit P-4. It is too much for an officer like the Government Analyst to supervise each and every sample sent to the Institute for being analysed. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor in this respect. The reasoning of the trial Court for the first ground of acquittal is erroneous. 15. It was next contended, there was a delay of 5½ months after the simple was taken and the analysis being made but there is nothing elicited from the witnesses to show that the passage of time makes an article like the talc lose its effectiveness and potency. The accused should have elicited that the a passage of time has an adverse effect. The accused examined the Government Analyst, the Senior Scientific Assistant and the Senior Analyst as D.Ws. 1 to 3 and they could have elicited materials from regarding this aspect. Without any material one is at a loss to know for certain that the delay in analysing has adverse effects on the sample. As the analysis of the sample was done and the report submitted by the Government Analyst, I have to take it that there would not have been any change because of the time lapse between the seizure and the analysis of the sample. The rending of the trial Court regarding this aspect of the matter is favour of the accused also fails. 16. As regards the third ground that the Government Analyst was issued Exhibit P-4 was not examined on the side of the prosecution, it has not substance in it. The lower Court has proceeded on the basis that the Analyst should have been a witness to speak as to how and why he declared the sample of Talcum Powder in question as not of standard quality and how it fell below the standard laid down is the Indian Pharmacopoeia. Failure to put him in the witness box, according to it, has denied an opportunity to cross-examine him and establish infirmity in Exhibit P-4 report. Failure to put him in the witness box, according to it, has denied an opportunity to cross-examine him and establish infirmity in Exhibit P-4 report. Section 25 (3) of the Act reads as follows: “Any document purporting to be a report signed by a Government Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken or the person whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 18-A, has within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that the intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report.” This is no uncertain terms makes a report signed by the Government Analyst evidence and such evidence shall be conclusive unless some steps are taken to adduce evidence in controversion of the report. The report of the Public Analyst is admissible in evidence without any proof. The lower Court has clearly erred on this aspect of the same. This ground of acquittal is also not maintainable. 17. Though the grounds of acquittal by the trial Court are not tenable, Mr. S.C. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, contended that there were some more features in the prosecution case which the lower Court could have adverted to in support of its order. He contended that section 3 (b) of the Act defines a ‘drug’ and the prosecution has not let in any evidence to show that talc is a drug and for what purposes it was used. The learned Public Prosecutor countered this argument bringing to my notice the second schedule of the Act, dealing with standards to be complied with by imported drugs and by drugs manufactured for sale, sold, stocked or exhibited for sale or distributed. Under clause (a) of item 5 of the second schedule are drugs included in the Indian Pharmacopeia. Talc is one of the items included in the Indian Pharmacopoeia. Hence talc is a drug within the meaning of the Act. The contention of the learned Counsel is not tenable. 18. It was then contended that even though the accused were charged for an offence under section 18, there is no specific accusation of contravention either in the charge or in the evidence. Hence talc is a drug within the meaning of the Act. The contention of the learned Counsel is not tenable. 18. It was then contended that even though the accused were charged for an offence under section 18, there is no specific accusation of contravention either in the charge or in the evidence. Section 18 deals with manufacture for sale, sold, stocked or exhibited for sale or distributed etc. The allegation against the Respondents is too vague for them to meet. 19. No doubt, the wording of the charge could have been more specific in its terms and pinpointed which clause under section 18 of the Act is contravened. But then, the learned Public Prosecutor relying on the decision reported is Amichand & Co. v. State of Karnataka1, contended that the objection of the charge being defective should have been taken at the earliest stage. He contended that the charge is specifically under section 18 (a) (i) of the Act inasmuch as the talc was not of standard quality. No prejudice has been caused and the accused had understood the gravamen of the charge and the offence complained of quite satisfactorily. I am inclined to agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the accused knew the accusation against them and no prejudice has been caused because at any vagueness in the charge. 20. A faint attempt was made that some of the mandatory provisions relating to the sending of the sealed samples to the Analyst, as contemplated under rule 57, which deals with the procedure for despatch of sample to the Government Analyst, have not been complied with. But the evidence of P.W. 1 and the ‘documents produced in the case do satisfactorily establish that all the necessary formalities have been scrupulously complied with in this case. 21. Next, it was contended that the accused had not sold any purified talc to the Government Medical Stores Depot, but had only supplied to them subject to approval and therefore, the accused cannot be made liable under the penal provisions of the Act as the Government Medical Stores Depot was at liberty to send back the goods supplied to them if it was not satisfactory. 22. The word ‘manufacture’ includes packing also. The accused have packed the talc and passed them on to the Government Medical Stores Depot. 22. The word ‘manufacture’ includes packing also. The accused have packed the talc and passed them on to the Government Medical Stores Depot. What they have packed is of sub-standard quality punishable under section 27 of the Act. The offence is complete when once there is a manufacture of a substandard product. The recipient of the goods if he so chooses can return them on not being satisfied is no ground to exonerate the manufacturer. This view of nine derives support from the decision rendered in State of Karnataka v. Vikram Chemical Laboratories2. 23. Lastly, it was contended by the Counsel for respondents that Accused 2 and 3 are the partners of the firm. The offence was committed without their knowledge and in spite of exercising due care to prevent the commission of such offence. The partnership deed Exhibit P-20 makes it abundantly clear that they could not have been looking after the day-to-day business to make them liable for the offence committed by the firm. It is also submitted, A-3 is running another shop by name Ramesh Medical Hall, in a different place and he would not be in a position to know the happenings of A-1 firm in time. In support of this contention, the decision in State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand and others1, was placed before me, wherein their Lordships have made the following observations: “......the partner of a firm is also liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the firm if he was in charge of, and was responsible to, the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm or if it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of the partner concerned.” A person should be in overall control of the day-to-day business of the firm to be designated as “a person in-charge”. A-5 in this case is the Chemist attached to A-1 firm. No doubt, supervision alone is not enough to make a person liable. The learned Public Prosecutor, relying on the terms of the partnership deed Exhibit P-20, contended that the respondents are liable as they would satisfy the requirements contemplated under section 34 of the Act. A-5 in this case is the Chemist attached to A-1 firm. No doubt, supervision alone is not enough to make a person liable. The learned Public Prosecutor, relying on the terms of the partnership deed Exhibit P-20, contended that the respondents are liable as they would satisfy the requirements contemplated under section 34 of the Act. However, in view of the order I propose to make, it is not necessary to enter into the merits of the contentions raised on both sides regarding this aspect of the case. 24. It has been brought to my notice that the partnership has been dissolved long ago and A-1 firm at present is not in existence. This is an offence which is said to have taken place a long time back, i.e., on 11th April, 1973 and no economic motive is alleged against the respondents. In view of the circumstances narrated above, though the order of acquittal! passed by the trial Court is not legally sound, there does not appear to be adequate reasons for interference in the order as, in my view, the public interest does not require such an interference at this belated stage. Therefore, it appears expedient and necessary in the interests of justice to decline to interfere with the order of acquittal. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal against acquittal stands dismissed.