JUDGMENT G. Balagangadharan Nair, J. 1. The petitioner was originally a clerk in the Field Publicity Office under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, He resigned this post when he was selected as a clerk in the Posts and Telegraphs Department. After the theoretical and practical training he was appointed as a temporary clerk with effect from 7-9-1979 by the order Ext. P1 dated 27-9-1979. However by a Memo Ext. P2 dated 11-6-1980 the 1st respondent, the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices. Calicut terminated the petitioner's service under the proviso to sub-r.(1) of R.5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. By Ext. P2 he was further told what he would be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of the services, or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. The petitioner thereupon submitted a representation Ext. P3 to the 2nd respondent, the Regional Director of Postal Services, Calicut requesting him to cancel Ext. P1 and reinstate him in service. A representation Ext. P4 to reopen the case and reinstate him in service was also made to the 3rd respondent, the Union of India. By Ext. P5 dated 29-1-1981 the petitioner was informed by the 1st respondent that his representation was considered by the Government and that it has been held that the termination was in order and there was no justification for interference. The petitioner seeks to quash Exts. P2 and P5 by a writ of certiorari and to reinstate him in service by a writ of mandamus. 2. In the counter affidavit filed by the Assistant Director in the office of the Post Master General, Trivandrum on behalf of the respondents, it is maintained that in terms of R.5 of the petitioner's services were liable to termination at any time on one month's notice and that Ext. P2 which was in conformity with R.5 was not liable to challenge. However it is further stated that the petitioner was at the time of his appointment involved in a criminal case before the Chief Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kawaratty for offences under S.143, 147, 148, 149, 353 and 336, I.P.C. which arose out of an incident on 3-3-1978. P2 which was in conformity with R.5 was not liable to challenge. However it is further stated that the petitioner was at the time of his appointment involved in a criminal case before the Chief Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kawaratty for offences under S.143, 147, 148, 149, 353 and 336, I.P.C. which arose out of an incident on 3-3-1978. Along with the application for appointment the petitioner filed as he had to, an attestation form (Ext. R1) in respect of several details under column 12 of the form. Column 12(1)(i) contains a question whether any case is pending against the applicant in any court of law at the time of filing up the attestation form. The petitioner had entered "No" against this column and at the foot of the form he had certified that the foregoing information was correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief. The counter affidavit states that the answer "No" to question 12(1)(i) was wrong as he had deliberately suppressed the pendency of the criminal case. It is added that this was a fraudulent conduct and that since the appointment was based on the representation, the appointment itself was vitiated and void. Therefore a decision was bona fide taken under R.5 and the Memo Ext. P2 was issued to him. 3. Neither the records of the Police Station nor the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kawaratty concerning the criminal case had been filed along with the counter affidavit. However, at the hearing the learned Senior Central Government pleader placed before me a copy of the F.I.R. in Crime No. 3 of 1978 of the Kawaratty Police Station and also a letter from the Post Master General dated 19-1-1982. The former shows that on 3-3-1978 at 9 P.M. a case was registered for the offences under the above Sections against the petitioner and 6 others. The letter form the Post Master General to the Senior Central Government Pleader states that Crime No. 3 of 1979 was taken on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate as C.C.2 of 1979 and that the case is reported to have been withdrawn on 31-12-1979 under S.321, Criminal Procedure Code. 4. From the copy of the F.I.R. and the above letter there is no reason to doubt that on 3-3-1978 the petitioner was an accused in a prosecution. 4. From the copy of the F.I.R. and the above letter there is no reason to doubt that on 3-3-1978 the petitioner was an accused in a prosecution. The case is also seen to have been registered as C.C.2 of 1979 although it is not clear when exactly the case was registered in the court. Ext. R1 is dated 4-5-1979. The respondents can successfully invoke the wrong answer to Clause. 12(1)(i) in Ext. R1 only by proving that on 4-5-1979 the case was pending against him in the court. Of this there is no evidence. It would not be proper to make an adverse presumption against the petitioner by assuming that an F.I.R. registered on 3-3-1978 could not but have reached the court on 4-5-1979 especially as the matter was capable of easy proof. The respondents were also taking adjournments to produce relevant materials on this point. I am therefore inclined to hold that there is no proof that on 4-5-1979 a prosecution was pending against the petitioner so as to visit him with any penalty for suppression of the criminal case from Ext. R1. The petitioner also alleges that he had no knowledge at all of the prosecution on 4-5-1979 and that even if the case was pending against him at that date he should not be penalised for not mentioning something of which he was not aware. Time was repeatedly granted to the Central Government Pleader to produce records either from the concerned police station or from the court to show that the petitioner was in fact aware of the, criminal case on 4-5-1979. This could have been established by producing any notice or summons or warrant issued to the petitioner or if he had appeared in the case by producing some record in that behalf. Despite successive adjournments he could produce no material except the two records already mentioned above, which do not prove the petitioner's knowledge of the case on or before 4-5-1979. The result is that there is no proof that the petitioner was aware of the prosecution. If he had no knowledge of the prosecution he cannot reasonably be charged with the suppression of any know-pledge. Suppression postulates knowledge and as knowledge has not been proved the charge of suppression cannot stand. Proof of knowledge is all the more important for the certificate at the foot of Ext. If he had no knowledge of the prosecution he cannot reasonably be charged with the suppression of any know-pledge. Suppression postulates knowledge and as knowledge has not been proved the charge of suppression cannot stand. Proof of knowledge is all the more important for the certificate at the foot of Ext. R1 is only to the affect "that the foregoing information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief." As the pendency of the case in court and its knowledge on the part of the petitioner is unproved, the ground put against him must fail. 5. Although Ext. P2 ex facie is innocuous the real ground underlying it, as appears from the counter affidavit, is that the petitioner was guilty of fraudulent suppression of facts. As that charge is untenable Ext. P2 has to be invalidated. 6. On this conclusion I do not think it necessary to discuss the alternative ground taken by the petitioner that the termination of his service violates the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. I quash Exts. P2 and P5. The petitioner will be entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequent benefits. The Original Petition is thus allowed but without costs.