Judgment :- This writ petition is for certiorari to quash the G.O. Ms. No. 802, Transport department, dated 16th July, 1980 in so far as it relates to the petitioner’s land of an extent of 0.75 acre comprised in R S. No. 301/3-A, No. 44, Raja Sooriamadai village, Ramanathapuram Taluk, Ramnad District. 2. The facts are as under: The petitioner is the owner of the land of an extent of 2.25 acres in R. S. No. 301/3-A. Land acquisition proceedings were initiated to acquire a portion of the land, viz., 0.75 acre equivalent to (035.5 hectare) for a public purpose to wit, for the construction of Micro Wave Building and Tower. 3. In view of the urgency, the statutory enquiry under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was dispensed with and a declaration under section 6 was made in G.O. Ms, No. 989, P. W. (General), dated 28th June, 1977. This was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 20th September, 1977. At that stage the petitioner filed W.P. No. 3281 of 1977 to. quash the said declaration. The writ petition was dismissed at the admission stage. However in W. A. No. 592 of 1977 the Division Bench quashed the said G.O. Ms. No. 989 P.W. (General), dated 28th June, and made the following order: "In this case, the notification under section 4 (1), the direction and the declaration have all been simultaneously published on 20th July, 1977. This is scant respect to the statutory provisions and the rule of law as embodied therein. Apart from this consideration there is another fundamental aspect. Section 17 (2) does not contemplate the application of section 17 (4) for purposes of the acquisition as stated in the notification under section 4 (1) in this case. This merely indicates that there has been no application of the mind to section 17 at all, before wielding the heavy weapon given to the authority under section 17 (4). Such an action borders on arbitrariness if not on perversity. In such circumstances, we are constrained’ to interfere by issue of necessary directions. We consider that interests of justice demand that the notification dated 28th June, 1977, which is at page 7 of the typed set of papers must be quashed in toto, that is, as far as the declaration portion is concerned, and so also the dispensing with the enquiry under section 5-A is concerned. We consider that interests of justice demand that the notification dated 28th June, 1977, which is at page 7 of the typed set of papers must be quashed in toto, that is, as far as the declaration portion is concerned, and so also the dispensing with the enquiry under section 5-A is concerned. We do so." However, certain observations were made with regard to delivery of possession and the relevant portions of the judgment reported in paragraphs 9 and 10 at page 177 are as follows: Vide P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. State of Tamil Nadu1. "9. Before parting with this case, we would like to record that counsel for the appellant stated that he has no objection to 75 cents of land being taken from the portion of the land lying away from the road and that he has no objection to the whole of that 75 cents being taken, and he only wants his interest being safeguarded. The portion lying adjacent to the road, it is said, is necessary for the purpose of opening a cinema theatre which he proposes to do so. It is not disputed that only 75 cents is required for the purpose for which public acquisition was resorted to. In the light of these statements made by counsel on behalf of the appellant, it seems to us to be possible to have the enquiry concluded without any delay, because the land is available to the Government and only its location need be determined. 10. We direct that notice be given of the enquiry and the appellant given an opportunity to state his case and his claim that the acquisition be confined to the back portion, that is, the portion lying away from the road, be considered. The authority conducting the enquiry should apply his mind to this question and pass proper orders before proceeding further with the acquisition proposed." The effect of this as I understand is to direct a fresh enquiry under section 5-A in the light of the observations made above. This judgment was on 5th January, 1978. With regard to the possession, the following events require to be noted. On 18th June, 1978, the Sub-Collector, Ramanathapuram, had taken possession of the land from the Micro Wave Department. On 19th June, 1978, a telegram was issued calling upon the petitioner to take possession on 21st June, 1978. This judgment was on 5th January, 1978. With regard to the possession, the following events require to be noted. On 18th June, 1978, the Sub-Collector, Ramanathapuram, had taken possession of the land from the Micro Wave Department. On 19th June, 1978, a telegram was issued calling upon the petitioner to take possession on 21st June, 1978. This is seen from page 395 of second respondent’s file (volume 3). However, the petitioner refused to take possession. On 26th June, 1978, again there was a further (sic) development, and on 3rd November, 1978, the Government instructed the Collector to proceed with the enquiry under section 5-A. On 14th December, 1978, section 5-A enquiry was conducted as seen from pages 929 and 931 of the second respondent’s file (volume 2) produced by the learned Government Pleader. On 6th December, 1978, communication was sent by the petitioner through his counsel refusing to participate in the enquiry. This is contained at page 931 of volume II of the records. On 14th December, 1978, section 5-A enquiry was conducted without the petitioners. On 21st December, 1978, the report of the 5-A enquiry was sent to the Board of Revenue by the Collector (within the meaning of the Act). On 7th January, 1979, the Board has made a report. That is available at page 513 of volume III of the records. It is thereafter G.O. Ms. No. 802, Transport Department, dated 16th July, 1980, was passed declaring the need for acquisition, which was made under section 6 of the Act. This is available at page 889 of Volume II of the records. It was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, which publication is available at page 893 of Volume II of the records. On 22nd April, 1980, applications in C.M.P. Nos. 9849 and 9850 of 1978 and 12627 of 1979 were taken out by the Collector and the following order was passed by this Court- "In the order in writ appeal the State was directed to hand over possession of the property sought to be acquired to the writ petitioner immediately. But, it appears that after taking possession of the property, the Government have put up a compound wall and dug a well, costing about Rs. But, it appears that after taking possession of the property, the Government have put up a compound wall and dug a well, costing about Rs. 26,000; and when the department wanted to hand over possession to the writ-petitioner (respondent herein) along with the compound wall, he refused to take them and demanded that he should be given possession of the property in the same position as it was taken from him. It is at this stage, the Government filed these three petitions, one for a direction to the respondent to take possession of the property comprising 75 cents in R.S. No. 301/3-A Rajasooriamadai village, Ramanathapuram district, with the existing constructions and structures and another petition for directing the respondent to maintain the status quo obtaining on the date when possession is given with respect to the building, and the third one for suitable directions to the respondent for taking possession of the land without insisting for the removal." We think that in the peculiar circumstance of this case, the proper directions in these three petitions will have to be as follows- 1. The Department is at liberty to hand over possession either with or without the compound wall and well. 2. If the Department chooses to hand over possession with the compound wall and well without demolishing the same, the respondent will be entitled to take the property with the compound wall and well as if the compound wall and well belonged to him and were in existence even before the section 14 (1) notification; 3. In case the acquisition is proceeded further and completed, the respondent will be entitled to the compensation for the compound wall and well separately as if the compound wall and well were put up by him and they belong to him; 4. Subject to the above conditions, in case the property is handed over along with the compound wall and well, the respondent will not be at liberty to demolish the same for a period of one year from this date, subject to further orders as to extension of time by this Court; and 5. If the Government agrees to acquire the rear portion of the property now sought to be acquired which is offered by the respondent for acquisition, then the respondent will pay a sum of Rs. If the Government agrees to acquire the rear portion of the property now sought to be acquired which is offered by the respondent for acquisition, then the respondent will pay a sum of Rs. 26,000 to the Government towards the value of the compound wall and well which are handed over to him. Subject to the above terms, before parting with this case we also want to express our feelings having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, that in case the rear portion offered by the respondent is found suitable for purposes for which the land is sought to be acquired, the Government may consider acquiring the same, instead of depriving the respondent of the property which is now sought to be acquired which he considers as very valuable and useful to him. This order is also subject to the condition that it will be open to the respondent to have all the defences that are open to him with reference to the acquisition of the property as such." On 24th May, 1980, the Requisitioning department was contacted to consider whether the rear portion of the land could be acquired as requested by the petitioners. To this, there was a reply on 27th May, 1980 by the Requisitioning department that the same was not feasible since the alignment throughout is likely to be spoiled. On 9th June, 1980, a telegram was issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the petitioner calling upon him to take possession. On 11th June, 1980, the petitioner replied refusing to take possession. Further correspondence followed between the parties as seen from page 855 of volume I of the records. Then on 20th June, 1980, the Collector informed the Government of the position. The Revenue Divisional Officer again issued a telegram on 6th July, 1980, to the petitioner as seen from page 873 of volume II of the records. To that, the counsel for the petitioner replied on 8th July, 1980 about his client’s inability to take possession. That is seen from the page 879 of volume II of the records. It was in these circumstances, the present writ petition has come to be preferred for the above said relief. 4. To that, the counsel for the petitioner replied on 8th July, 1980 about his client’s inability to take possession. That is seen from the page 879 of volume II of the records. It was in these circumstances, the present writ petition has come to be preferred for the above said relief. 4. The following grounds are urged in support of the prayer- (1) Section 4 (1) notification does not specify or localise the extent excepting merely to state that 75 cents of land is required. This is therefore, not a valid notification. As laid down in Narendrajit v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, if the locality is not specified, the public purpose cannot be said to be fully subserved. (2) In the instant case section 4 (1) notification was made on 22nd March, 1977, and ultimately section 6 declaration came to be made on 16th July, 1980. Therefore, reckoned from that date it is beyond three years. This again will be a reason to hold that section 4 (1) notification is invalids Section 4.(1) notication cannot be used as a reservoir as it is well-settled in law. Looked at from that point of view, the notification will have to fall to the ground. (3) Section 5-A enquiry has not been conducted properly on 13th May, 1978, and 20th November, 1978, the notices were issued fixing the hearing date as 14th December, 1978. However on 24th May, 1980, a further notice was issued. Therefore, what exactly was the enquiry one is not in a position to determine. This apart, the report of the Section 5-A enquiry was not sent to the Government, as a result of which there has not been a recompliance of the statutory provision. (4) The next argument is that the procedure laid down under rule 3 (4) of the Land Acquisition Rules framed under the Act has not been followed in that after the objections of the petitioner were filed, the copies were not forwarded to the Requisitioning department and their opinion elicited. Unless that opinion is made known to the petitioner, there cannot be an effective opportunity of putting forth the objections. As a matter of fact, the affording of an opportunity is essential as has been laid down in Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi2, and State of Mysore v. V.K. Kanga.3 5. Unless that opinion is made known to the petitioner, there cannot be an effective opportunity of putting forth the objections. As a matter of fact, the affording of an opportunity is essential as has been laid down in Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi2, and State of Mysore v. V.K. Kanga.3 5. If under section 6 (3) the acquisition is in the manner contemplated under the Act and possession can be taken only in accordance with section 9 (1), which will be pursuant to a valid declaration here the declaration itself not being valid, without a proper section 5-A enquiry, the same cannot be done at all. In other words, what the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to contend precisely is that when, there is a clear direction from this Court to deliver possession, unless of and until the delivery possession takes place, there cannot be a valid section 6 declaration much less taking possession under section 9 (1) of the Act. Failure to deliver possession is the grossest abuse of process having no respect for the decision of this Court. 6. In meeting these contentions, it is argued for the respondents represented by the learned Advocate-General that the effect of the ruling P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. State of Tamil Nadu1, is not that a fresh section 5-A enquiry should be conducted. Actually section 4 (1) notification was left intact and what was quashed was only the section 6 declaration and dispensation of enquiry under section 5-A by the invocation of the urgency provisions. On 12th June, 1978, in this case section 5-A enquiry was conducted to which the petitioner objected stating that unless and until he was delivered possession, section 5-A enquiry could not be proceeded with. This is not a case of failure to localise or specify the extent sought to be acquired Actually, reading section 4 (1) notification, one is in a position to know what exactly is the property that is sought to be acquired. This is not a case of failure to localise or specify the extent sought to be acquired Actually, reading section 4 (1) notification, one is in a position to know what exactly is the property that is sought to be acquired. As a matter of fact, the petitioner himself had been asking that instead of front portion being acquired, the rear portion of the same extent be acquired and, therefore, it does not suffer from any vagueness nor is it correct to contend that section 4 (1) notification once issued is exhausted in view of the clear ruling of the Division Bench of this Court reported in P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. State Tamil Nadu1. In Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality2, the demarcation of the land was not found and therefore, the party was handicapped. Here there is no such handicap and consequently, it is not possible for the petitioner to contend otherwise. As regards the three years limit, the argument of the respondents is that the time taken during the pendency of the writ petition will have to be necessarily excluded in view of the amendment. If so excluded, then section 6 declaration is well within time. Girdharilal v. State of Gujarat3 is clearly against the petitioner and his contention that section 4 (1) is sought to be used as a reservoir is without any susbstance. 7. In the instant case, the Requisitioning department was actually moved to find out whether it was possible for them to acquire the rear portion. But, such a request could not be complied with because the Requisitioning department was of the view that it would cause disturbance of alignment, which is most important having regard to the sophisticated machinery involved in micro wave technology. No doubt, on 24th May, 1980 a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Collector to file his objections and it was only with a view to elicit further opinion, but that will not in any way militate against the validity of section 6 declaration. 8. Throughout, the petitioner was unwilling and non-co-operative in regard to taking possession. No doubt, on 24th May, 1980 a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Collector to file his objections and it was only with a view to elicit further opinion, but that will not in any way militate against the validity of section 6 declaration. 8. Throughout, the petitioner was unwilling and non-co-operative in regard to taking possession. He would go to the extent of saying that he would not take possession at all in spite of the specific orders of this Court in C.M.P. No. 9849 of 1978, etc., and the repeated telegrams of the Revenue Divisional Officer did not bear any result with regard to taking of possession. Therefore, it is incorrect to contend that possession was retained and section 6 declaration was made. 9. In fact, the report of the section 5-A enquiry is not absolutely essential, because law says ‘report, if any’, and in this case, there is no such necessity to send the report. Factually the report had been sent. That the procedure under rule 3 has been followed is clear from the averments made in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit. 10. I will take up the points one by one. Whether section 4 (1) notification in valid? I have already extracted the relevant portions of the judgment of the Division Bench reported in P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. State of Tamil Nadu1. From a reading of that judgment it is very clear that what the Division Bench quashed was only the declaration made under section 6 and the dispensation of enquiry under section 5-A. No doubt, there were directions issued by this Court for handing over possession, which I will consider in the later part of the judgment. Once that was the position, viz., section 4 (1) notification was left intact and the Government were enabled to conduct the section 5 enquiry, I am unable to see how a contention could be raised on the basis of Doongarsee and Sons v. State1, that section 4 (1) is exhausted. It is not as if the Government cancelled the section 6 declaration, but it was quashed by an order of the Court, but that would not invalidate section 4 (1) notification, which had come to be issued by independent powers contained in the section. It is not as if the Government cancelled the section 6 declaration, but it was quashed by an order of the Court, but that would not invalidate section 4 (1) notification, which had come to be issued by independent powers contained in the section. It is well-settled that such a notification under section 4 (1) is purely preliminary in character without affecting the rights of the parties. For this no authority is needed. However, if any authority is needed, one has to refer to the decision reported in Somawanti v. State of Punjab2, Therefore, in this case, the effect of it is that section 4 (1) notification has remained intact. Whether, the procedure laid down in section 4 (1) has been followed or not is a different question, which will be taken up as the next point. Suffice it to hold here that this not a case where section 4(1) notification could ever be said to be exhausted. Nor am I persuaded to accept the contention that the locality of the extent to be acquired is not specified actually, as section 4 (1) notification contained the following schedule- "District...Ramanathapuram taluk Taluk ...Ramanathapuram Village ...Rajasoorimadai Description of land, wet or dry, inam or poromboke with servey on paimash numberName of the owner or occupier Boundaries of the land required to be taken up North, East, South, West Extent under acquisition (approximate) Whether arable or waste. Ground rent S. No. 301/3-A P. V. Mohamed Ghouse S/o.Varusai Mohamed Ramnad-Madurai 301/4, Road 1/3-B, 301/2 0.75 Ground rent land From a reading of the above, it is clear that the ratio of the ruling in Narendrajit v. State of Uttar Pradesh3, will not apply. Of course, where there is no specification of the property the party would be handicapped by the absence of the particulars as has been held in Gunwanti Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality4. The actual position is entirely different in that case. As a matter of fact, I may now refer to Girdharilal v. State of Gujarat5. Paragraph 4 in that decision reads as follows - "Counsel for the appellants next submitted that on issuing the notification, dated 18th July, 1961, the power of the State Government to issue a notification under section 6 was exhausted and the Government could not issue a fresh notification under section 6. There is no substance in this contention. The notification, dated 18th July, 1961, was invalid. There is no substance in this contention. The notification, dated 18th July, 1961, was invalid. By the issue of this notification, the Government had not effectively exhausted its power under section 6. In the circumstances, the Government could well issue the fresh notification under section 6, dated 14th August, 1964." These observations are clearly against the petitioner. 11. In the instant case, section 4 (1) notification was issued on 21st March, 1977. Ultimately after the proceedings, which culminated in writ appeal as reported is P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. State of Tamil Nadu1. Section 6 declaration was issued on 16th July, 1980. Reckoned from the date of section 4 (1) notification, it is clearly beyond three years. However, the Act itself makes provision for exclusion of time taken during the pendency of any proceeding. That is because of the amendment of section 6 wherein the following Explanation has been added. "In computing the period of three years specified in this proviso, any period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 4 is held up on account of stay or injunction by an order of Court shall be excluded." Therefore, the period during which the proceedings were pending has to be necessarily excluded. If so excluded, it is well within time. Accordingly, there is no legal infirmity attached to section 4 (1). It does not suffer either from want of vagueness nor it has been exhausted nor again it is beyond three years. 12. Coming to the validity of section 5-A enquiry, I have already referred to the important dates. The ruling of the Division Bench reported in P.V. Mohamed Ghouse v. Slate of Tamil Nadu1, is dated 5th January, 1978. After this a notice under section 5-A was issued to the petitioner on 13th May, 1978, calling upon him to file his objections within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. To this, petitioner replied on 31st May, 1978, referring to the proceedings of this Court stating that proposed conducting of the enquiry under section 5-A was illegal. On 6th June, 1978, the Sub-Collector makes the following note. "The notice referred to in the reference cited has been received in this office and further action has been stopped." On 12th June, 1978, when section 5-A enquiry was sought to be conducted, the petitioner objected. On 6th June, 1978, the Sub-Collector makes the following note. "The notice referred to in the reference cited has been received in this office and further action has been stopped." On 12th June, 1978, when section 5-A enquiry was sought to be conducted, the petitioner objected. On 18th June, 1978, the Sub-Collector called upon the petitioner to take possession and issued a telegram, dated 19th June, 1978, to take possession on 21st June, 1978 (page 395 of volume III of the records produced by the Government Pleader). The petitioner refused to take possession. A further request was made to that effect. That was also refused. It was on 3rd November, 1978, the Government instructed the Collector to proceed with the statutory enquiry under section 5-A and on 6th December, 1978, the petitioner through his counsel replied refusing to participate in the enquiry. On 14th December, 1978. the enquiry was conducted without the petitioner, having regard to his refusal to participate in the enquiry. On 21st December, 1978 the report of the enquiry under section 5-A was sent to the Board of Revenue. The Board made its comments on 7th January, 1979 to the following effect- "...Thus, it is clear from the above facts that the Land Acquisition Officer was ready to deliver the possession to the landowner who has refused to take over possession of the land." Then comes section 6 declaration. If the matter had stood at that stage, I do not think any one could have quarrelled. Unfortunately; it was possession which was a thorn in the flesh of the Government. They seem to have been irked by the attitude of the petitioner, which certainly is not warranted. A person who is deprived of his land has every right to fight and be can fight to the last, I am not for a moment saying that there was any lack of public purpose. Nevertheless, if law requires a particular procedure to be followed, it has to be necessarily followed. What I mean by this will be evident when I refer to a few more facts. 13. I have already alluded to the fact that C. M. P. Nos. 9849 and 9850 of 1978 and 12627 of 1979 were filed by the Collector and a Division Bench of this Court made an order. This was on 22nd April, 1980. What I mean by this will be evident when I refer to a few more facts. 13. I have already alluded to the fact that C. M. P. Nos. 9849 and 9850 of 1978 and 12627 of 1979 were filed by the Collector and a Division Bench of this Court made an order. This was on 22nd April, 1980. On the basis of this order, the Collector writes to the petitioner on 24th May, 1980 as follows- "In accordance with the instructions of the High Court, Madras, I am to inform you that you may file objection, if any, for the acquisition of your land in S. No. 301/1-A of Rajasoorimedai village, Ramnad taluk, for Micro Wave Project, to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ramanathapuram who is the Land Acquisition Officer, in this case before 31st May, 1980, and send a copy of your objection". 14. I am totally unable to understand the purpose of issuing a notice of this kind. If really section 5-A. enquiry had been made and a valid section 6 declaration had also been emanated why such a notice came to be issued on 24th May, 1980 remains unexplained. It is not for me to dive into the file and make out reasons. The question of filing any objection to the acquisition does not arise at all. The order of the Division Bench extracted above does not even warrant filing of objections. It was only concerning possession which required the Government to consider the request of the petitioner to acquire the rear portion, if possible. Therefore, when the Collector by the communication extracted above, calls upon the petitioner to file his objections and the Revenue Divisional Officer to whom a copy of this communication was marked, is directed to transmit the objections, if any, received from the landowner through a special messenger addressed in a named cover to the Additional Personal Assistant to the Collector of Ramanathapuram, I have no other option but to conclude that the head of the revenue hierarchy in a district who is in charge of administration is not in a position to understand the power wielded by him under the Land Acquisition Act. It is needless for me to emphasise that the power of eminent domain is a very valuable power, causing serious inroads into the fundamental rights of the landowners in so far as they are deprived of their lands. It is needless for me to emphasise that the power of eminent domain is a very valuable power, causing serious inroads into the fundamental rights of the landowners in so far as they are deprived of their lands. Such power should be exercised with great caution and restraint. What has now been done is just calling upon the petitioner to file objections. Is the Court to conclude that there was a valid section 5- A enquiry or not ? I have already referred to the fact that section 5-A enquiry was concluded as disclosed by the files on 14th December, 1978, and the report was sent to the Board of Revenue on 21st December, 1978, on which the Board made its comments. After all this, the Government issued section 6 declaration. The effect of issue of section 6 declaration is final and conclusive. Therefore, having regard to this notice, one is to conclude that neither the Government had made up its mind notwithstanding the finality attached to section 6 declaration non again the Collector was aware of the scope of powers which he was wielding under the Land Acquisition Act. 15. In a highly contentions matter of this kind where the petitioner has been fighting and both sides have been resorting to Court for some guidance or other, one desires that the Collector had taken proper legal advice before the issue of the above letter of 24th May, 1980. After all the Government has its own legal advisers at its elbow and it is more surprising that an attitude of this kind should have been taken. I am not for a moment criticising the Collector with regard to delivery of possession. Of course, the petitioner has been adopting an obstinate attitude, but that will not relieve the Collector of the application of mind, while exercising his duty properly. Therefore, on the basis of this letter, when it requires the petitioner to file his objections, if any, for the acquisition of his land, I am to necessarily conclude that there has not been any valid and concluded section 5-A enquiry. If that be so, it follows a fortiori that there cannot be a valid section 6 declaration as well. That is the conclusion on the second point. 16. If that be so, it follows a fortiori that there cannot be a valid section 6 declaration as well. That is the conclusion on the second point. 16. In view of this, it is unnecessary for me to go into the question whether the procedure under rule 3 (6) has been followed or not. But, it appears that the Requisitioning department was contacted on 24th May, 1980, to consider the feasibility of acquiring the rear portion to which the reply by the Requisitioning Department on 27th May, 1980, was that it could not be complied with, since it was likely to disturb the alignment. However, the report of the Requisitioning department could not be furnished to the petitioner, since his attitude is one of complete obstinacy from section 5-A enquiry. In the instant case, a report has been sent by the Collector to the Board of Revenue. Therefore, I am unable to accept the argument of the petitioner that a report ought to have followed section 5-A enquiry. 17. I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that because, possession was not parted with, there cannot be any valid section 6 declaration. I have already referred to the various proceedings including certain telegrams dated 9th June, 1980, and the letter of the Collector, dated 24th May, 1980, and the further telegrams of the Revenue Divisional Officer to the petitioner dated 6th July, 1980, requiring him to take possession, which he refused to comply with for reasons best known to him. On that score, I cannot say that there was any invalidity attached to the acquisition proceedings. 18. In the result, holding that there has been no valid concluded final enquiry as a follow-up of which there could be no valid section 6 declaration, the impugned proceedings are quashed. I make it very clear that section 4 (1) notification will remain intact, which means, if and when the Government is desirous, they could further proceed according to law from the stage of section 4 (1) notification. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 250. 19. I make it very clear that section 4 (1) notification will remain intact, which means, if and when the Government is desirous, they could further proceed according to law from the stage of section 4 (1) notification. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 250. 19. ORDER: The matter having been set down for being spoken to: — The delivery of possession will be strictly in terms of the order of the Division Bench, dated 22nd April, 1980, in W. A. No. 592 of 1977 which means, all the conditions stipulated by the Division Bench shall be observed by both the parties except as regards the time. However, should the Government be inclined to proceed further with the acquisition and do the final enquiry the same shall be done within one year from today.