JUDGMENT 1. - As identical questions of fact and law are involved in both the petitions, we dispose of the same by one order. 2. In order to appreciate the facts we deal with the petition No. 657/1982, which has been filed by Smt. Saira Begum wife of Detenue Abdul Zabbar. 3. On 29th January, 1982, about 7.30 a.m. customs officials raided the house of Abdul Zabbar situate in Chowkari Topkhana Hazuri, Jaipur City. During the raid the customs officials searched the house-cum-business premises occupied by Abudul Zabbar and his brother Abdul Sattar under the authority of a search warrant issued by the Assistant Collector (Preventive) Customs and Central Excise, Jaipur. The search resulted in the recovery of rough/cut and polished precious stones, which, according to the customs authorities were of foreign origin and valued at Rs. 3,00,150/-The precious stones were found concealed in different places like water tank, bath-room, below the floor covering and Nali etc. of the room on the first floor of the house. According to the customs authorities the search was conducted from 8 a.m. to 8.15 p.m. The contention of the petitioners in this regard is that the search was conducted from 7.30 a.m. to 10 p.m. and the precious stones found in the recovery were not of foreign origin but were of Indian origin and the value was not more than 75,000/- or 80,000/- in any case. 4. The petitioner alleged that the search started at 7 30 a.m. and the customs officials took out the raw, cut and polished precious stones and placed them in different places in the house and got photographs taken at about 3 p.m. and remained in the premises upto 10 p.m. and then took away the seized precious stones with them. They also took away Shri Abdul Zabbar, his brother Abdul Sattar, one Shri Motilal Sharma (another detenue) and Shri C. Narayan to the Customs Office situate near Railway Station, Jaipur. Shri Abdul Sattar was released in the morning of 30th March, 1982 But Abdul Zabber, Moti Lal Sharma and C. Narayan were kept detained. They were severely beaten, terrorised and coerced to put their signatures on certain papers containing statements and other materials which were not made by them and which were neither read over to them nor disclosed. No copies of the aforesaid documents were given to any of the aforesaid three persons. They were severely beaten, terrorised and coerced to put their signatures on certain papers containing statements and other materials which were not made by them and which were neither read over to them nor disclosed. No copies of the aforesaid documents were given to any of the aforesaid three persons. Shri Abdul Zabbar was beaten so severely that twice he was taken by the customs officials to S.M.S. Hospital, Jaipur, firstly on 31st January, 1982 and secondly on 2nd February, 1982. The doctor on duty scolded the customs officials and gave injection and medicines to Abdul Zabber. Thereafter they were produced before the Civil Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Jaipur on 31st January, 1982 and a remand was given upto 2nd February, 1982, then extended upto 4th February, 1982. On 2nd February, 1982, bail applications were filed for the release of the aforesaid three persons which was heard and dis-allowed on 4th February, 1982 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. However, they were ordered to be sent to Judicial Lock-up. Thereafter bail applications were submitted before the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur City and vide his order dated 6th February, 1982, released the aforesaid three persons on bail. The case of the petitioner further is that soon after being released on bail on 6th Feb., 1982, Shri Abdul Zabbar made a complaint in writing to Collector Customs, Jaipur stating therein that a false case has been cooked up against him and the manner in which his signatures were obtained on documents, contents whereof were neither disclosed nor read over to him nor copies were given. He further complained about severe beating given to him and the fact of taking him to the hospital. He categorically stated in the complaint that the statements were not given by him. A complaint in this regard was also sent by registered post to Collector Customs Jaipur, on 8th February, 1982. It is further alleged that Abdul Zabbar was again called on 11th, 12th and 16th February, 1982, in the office of the Collector Customs Jaipur and his statement were recorded. When he did not agree to give his statement as directed by the Customs Superintendent, he was kept detained and confined to a room in the Customs Office. He again made a complaint in this regard to the Collector Customs on 17th February, 1982, vide Annexure 4. When he did not agree to give his statement as directed by the Customs Superintendent, he was kept detained and confined to a room in the Customs Office. He again made a complaint in this regard to the Collector Customs on 17th February, 1982, vide Annexure 4. The Secretary to the Government and Commissioner, Home Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur, passed an order on 1st March, 1982, purporting to act under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as `the COFEPOSA ACT') ordering the detention of Abdul Zabbar in Central Jail, Jaipur. A copy of the order dated 1st March, 1982, has been filed as Annexure 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid order dated 1st March, 1982, Shri Abdul Zabbar was arrested on 3rd March, 1982 by the Customs Officials and lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur. By letter dated 4th March, 1982, Shri Abdul Zabbar was served with a memorandum containing the grounds of detention along with the copies of certain documents enclosed with the memorandum. It was stated in the letter dated 4th March, 1982, that a representation may be submitted to the Secretary to the Government and Commissioner of Home Department Rajasthan Jaipur through the Superintendent Central Jail, Jaipur. Letter dated 4th March, 1982, has been filed as Annexure 8, and copies of memorandum along with its enclosures have been filed and marked as Annexure 9, 9,a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Shri Abdul Zabbar then submitted a representation through the Superintendent. Central Jail on 22nd March, 1982, a carbon copy of which kept by him, has been filed as Annexure 10. It is further alleged by the petitioner that Abdul Zabbar submitted an application on 22nd March, 1982, through the Superintendent Central Jail, Jaipur to the Advisory Board constituted for screening the cases of detenues wherein it was stated that he was an illiterate person and whereas the case before the Board will be put against him by highly educated and trained officers and as such he may be permitted to be represented through a counsel. In the alternative he may be permitted for his assistance in placing his case before the Board by an educated person and necessary permission in this regard be communicated to him before any meeting of the Advisory Board took place so that he could manage for the appearance of an advocate or assistance by an educated person. Even before the advisory board on 5th April, 1982, Abdul Zabbar reiterated the above request but the same was not found reasonable by the advisory board. It is further alleged that the case against him was put before the advisory board by Customs Collector Shri Kishan Singh. Thereafter, Abdul Zabbar was asked a few questions which he answered stating the facts as mentioned above and pleaded that the allegations made against him were incorrect, false and baseless. It is further alleged that on 5th April, 1982, when Abdul Zabbar was brought to the High Court premises Shri K.S. Rathore Advocate contacted him and asked whether he had received any communication with respect to his representation dated 22nd March, 1982 or with respect to his application made on 22nd March, 1982 referred to above. On this Shri Abdul Zabbar informed Shri Rathore that he had not yet received any communication. The petitioner made her husband on 2nd May, 1982, in Central Jail, Jaipur and asked him whether he received any reply of his representation dated 22nd March, 1982. Again Shri Abdul Zabbar replied in negative. On 6th May, 1982, some reply was given by Abdul Zabbar to his brother Abdul Sattar who met him in Central Jail on 6th May, 1982. Thereafter on 10th May, 1982, S/Shri B L. Sharma and K S. Rathore Advocates met Shri Abdul Zabbar in Central Jail, Jaipur and when asked whether he received any communication with respect to his representation or any confirmation order of his detention. Shri Abdul Zabbar replied that he had received none. Then the aforesaid advocates inquired from Shri Kalyan Mai Deputy Superintendent Central Jail, Jaipur as to the fact of representation of Shri Abdul Zabbar dated 22nd March, 1982 and it was disclosed to them that the representation had been rejected vide order dated 1st April, 1982 and till now no confirmation order has been received. Then the aforesaid advocates inquired from Shri Kalyan Mai Deputy Superintendent Central Jail, Jaipur as to the fact of representation of Shri Abdul Zabbar dated 22nd March, 1982 and it was disclosed to them that the representation had been rejected vide order dated 1st April, 1982 and till now no confirmation order has been received. When Shri Kalyan Mai was asked by the aforesaid advocates as to how Shri Abdul Zabbar had not been given a copy of the order dated 1st April, 1982, they were told that the Jail did not receive an extra copy, one copy was for the record of the Jail and another copy was to be sent to the Home Department. Therefore, they did not give a copy to Abdul Zabbar. However, on request a true copy of the order dated 1st April, 1982, was supplied to the aforesaid advocates on 10th May, 82 by the Deputy Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur which is filed and marked as Annexure 12. It is further alleged that Abdul Zabbar is an illiterate person and he only knows to put his signatures in Hindi and can write digits. 5. The petitioner's counsel Shri B.L. Sharma and Shri K.S. Rathore met Shri Abdul Zabbar on 15th March, 18 in the Central Jail, Jaipur on the request of the petitioner in order to give legal advice. Shri Sharma and Shri Rathore requested the Jail Authorities and Customs Officials presented there that they may be allowed to talk Shri Abdul Zabbar though in their presence but at such a distance that their talks may not be heard by the Jail and Customs Officials. This was dis-allowed. Then Shri B.L. Sharma having failed to contact the Home Commissioner contacted the Special Secretary to the Government, Home Department Shri O.P. Joshi on phone, who replied that he could say only after studying the Rule. In these circumstances the petitioners' counsel had to talk to that petitioner's husband in presence of the customs and jail authorities closely sitting with the advocates and in these circumstances the petitioner's husband could not talk freely to the advocates nor the advocates could do so. A note to this effect was put on 15th March, 1982, itself by the advocates. Copy of the permission letter dated 12th March, 1982, containing the above note has been filed as Annexture 12. A note to this effect was put on 15th March, 1982, itself by the advocates. Copy of the permission letter dated 12th March, 1982, containing the above note has been filed as Annexture 12. It is further alleged in this regard that the Home Department had sent the instructions for permitting interviews with the advocates keeping the officials beyond the hearing distance only in the second week of April, 1982 and not earlier. 6. It is also alleged that Shri Abdul Zabbar is being detained in ward No. 10 in Cell No. 7. In this ward hardend criminals are kept including murderers'.Abdul Zabbar was allowed to remain in the ward in open only for half-an-hour i.e. from 3.00 to 3.30 p.m Though there is a separate ward meant for keeping the detenues who are detained under the COFEPOSA ACT, but Abdul Zabbar is not being kept there and was kept in the ward of hardened criminals. Even they quarrel with him and sometimes even assault him but notwithstanding his complaint, he has been kept in ward No. 10 where hardened criminals are kept. 7. The respondents in the reply submitted that the search of the house-cum-business premises of the detenue was conducted from 8. a.m. to 8.15 p.m. and not from 7.30 a.m. to, 10.00 p m. The Customs party left the premises at 8.15 p.m. after completing all the requirements of law as per details given in the Panchnama Annex. 9 to the writ petition. It is further submitted that after the search was over the Superintendent Customs (Preventive) Jaipur, served a summon under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 upon Abdul Zabbar requiring him to present himself before the aforesaid Superintendent in his office at 22.00 hrs., on 29th January. 1982, where after he was permitted to leave the customs office but before so leaving he was again served with a summon under section 108 requiring him to appear again in the office on 30th January, 1982 for further interrogation/investigation. It is further stated Moti Lal and Abdul Zabbar appeared voluntarily before the Superintendent Customs (Preventive) on 30th January, 1982 when they were interrogated in connection with the aforesaid seizure case and they voluntarily rendered tentered their statements. It is further denied that Shri C. Narayan was taken to the Customs office from the premises of Abdul Zabbar. It is further stated Moti Lal and Abdul Zabbar appeared voluntarily before the Superintendent Customs (Preventive) on 30th January, 1982 when they were interrogated in connection with the aforesaid seizure case and they voluntarily rendered tentered their statements. It is further denied that Shri C. Narayan was taken to the Customs office from the premises of Abdul Zabbar. On the other, hand, he was traced by the Customs Officers in the Muslim Musafar-khana He volunteered himself to appear before the Superintendent Customs for interrogation and voluntarily tendered his statement on 29th January, 1982 itself wherein he admitted to be indulged in transportation etc. of `RUBIS' smuggled from Burma. As the interrogation of the aforesaid persons and the other evidence on record led to a reasonable belief that Abdul Zabbar, Moti Lal and C. Naryan had committed offences punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, all these three persons were arrested under Section 104 of the Customs Act and subsequently produced before Chief Judicial Magistrate, who ordered them to be remanded upto 4th Fabruary, 1982. Shri Abdul Sattar was allowed to go home because no prima facie case for punishment under Section 135 of the Customs Act was found against him. It was vehemently denied that either Shri Abdul Zabbar, Shri Moti Lal or C. Naryan were terrorised or coerced to sign any statement or document against their wishes. Of course, their statements were recorded & whatever was voluntarily disclosed by them were recorded in their statements & they voluntarily signed the same. Shri Abdul Zabbar, who during the course of interrogation complained of exhaustion was taken to the hospital on his request and shown to the doctor. Neither had he complained of any harassment by the Customs Officers before the doctor nor there was any question of doctor scolding the Customs Officers.The assertion in Annexure 1 that Abdul Zabbar did not know about the smuggled nature of the seized-goods as also the assertion that the value of the seized goods was assessed much higher, are incorrect, and denied. It is further stated that the filing of a complaint dated 6th February, 1982 against the seizing Officers by the detenue before the Collector of Customs is admitted. However the contents of the complaints are not admitted. Similarly the fact of filing of a complaint dated 17th February, 1982. It is further stated that the filing of a complaint dated 6th February, 1982 against the seizing Officers by the detenue before the Collector of Customs is admitted. However the contents of the complaints are not admitted. Similarly the fact of filing of a complaint dated 17th February, 1982. is admitted but the allegations levelled in the complaint are denied as being incorrect. The complaint was lodged to create false evidence which could be used at the time of adjudication of the case or in any other eventuality like the present detention. 8. Filing of an application by Abdul Zabbar on 22nd March, 1982 through the Superintendent, Central Jail Jaipur is admitted. However, it is added that under section 8 (e) of the COFEPOSA ACT the detentue was not entitled to be represented through his counsel or by someone else before the advisory board. 9. It is further alleged by the respondent that the contents of government's letter dated 1st April, 1982, were duly conveyed to Shri Abdul Zabbar on 2nd April, 1982 under proper acknowledgement. However, on demand a copy of the said letter was supplied to the counsel of Shri Abdul Zabbar on 10th May, 1982 by the Jailor. Shri Abdul Zabbar appears to be literate as he has signed all the documents in Hindi. 10. It is further alleged that as a matter of fact Shri B.L. Sharma and K S. Rathore Advocates of Abdul Zabbar requested the administration when they had held an interview with Shri Jabbar on 15th March, 1982 that the Customs and Jail Authorities present at the time of interview be asked to remain at such a distance so that their conversation may not be over-heard by them. Their request was examined and accepted before they met Shri Zabbar next on 10th May, 1982. 11. It was contended by Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the detenue, that in the grounds of detention dated 1st March, 1982, Annexure 9,in para 2 thereof, a mention has been made of a report of Collector Customs and this was one of the documents perused by the detaining authority while making the detention order but no copy of the said report of the Collector Customs was made available to the detenue. It is thus contended that the detenue could not make an effective representation as copies of the documents relied upon by the detaining authority were not supplied to the detenue. This is in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. We do not find any force in the above contention. Para 1 of Annexure 9 itself makes a disclosure of the contents of the report of the Collector. The respondents in their reply claimed a privilege on the ground that the report of the Collector was a secret document and it was based on several documents, copies of which had already been duly supplied to the detenue. Neither Article 22 (5) of the Constitution nor Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act envisaged supply of such report to the detenue. In our view, the contents of the Collector's report are mentioned in para 3 of Annexure 9 and as such the detenue was made aware of the facts contained in the said report. However, in order to do full justice and to alley all fears of the detenue in this regard, we asked the learned Government Advocate to show the Collector's report. We ourselves perused the said report and it was also shown to Mr. B.L. Sharma learned Advocate for the detenue. After a perusal of the report we were fully convinced that it had not contain any facts other than those which have been incorporated in detail in the grounds in Annexure 9, which had admittedly been served upon the detenue. We may also mention that after perusal of the said report by Shri B L. Sharma, he.was unable to raise any argument that the report contained any facts which were not disclosed to the detenue. Mr. Sharma, however, based the argument on the more technicality that such report should have been given to the detenue as a matter of right whether in fact the detenue was prejudiced or not. In our view, when the contents have already been made known in Annexure 9 and the report did not contain any additional facts are unable to hold that the detention order itself may be held to be illegal on this account. 12. Mr. Sharma placed reliance on Mohd. In our view, when the contents have already been made known in Annexure 9 and the report did not contain any additional facts are unable to hold that the detention order itself may be held to be illegal on this account. 12. Mr. Sharma placed reliance on Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration and others, AIR 1982 SC 696 , in which it was held that it is the constitutional mandate which requires the detaining authority to give the documents relied on or referred to in order of detention in order that the detenue may make an effective representation immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied with. It is manifest that question of demanding the documents is wholly irrelevant. The infirmity in this regard is violative of constitutional safeguard enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It is contended that the above authority followed the view already taken by the Supreme Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and other, AIR 1980 SC 1983 and Kamia Kdnhaiya Lal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1981 SC 814 . The facts in Mohd. Zakir's case (supra) were that the pivotal ground on the basis of which the detenue was detained, was the allegation that he smuggled out huge amount of silver from India to foreign counties. The documents showed that one Mr. D.H. Anand had a passport dated February 12, 1975, and had flown to Hongkong by flight No. T602 and declared 90 kgs. of silver and there was an allegation that the detenue having passport dated October 4, 1978, travelled from Delhi on flight No PA 002 and declared 50 Kg. of silver. There was Darshan Lal Anand also who had returned from Bangkok and declared 110 Kgs. of silver, It was further stated that necessary inquiries from the customs department confirmed the information received from Hong Kong regarding the declaration of silver. The aforesaid documents regarding the facts mentioned in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority were not admittedly furnished to the detenue at the time when the grounds were served on him or pari passu the same. The aforesaid documents regarding the facts mentioned in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority were not admittedly furnished to the detenue at the time when the grounds were served on him or pari passu the same. In the above facts the Supreme Court took the view that in the instant case, the detenue did make a representation promptly on December 30, 1980, but was seriously handicapped in making an effective representation because the aforesaid documents which were of vital importance were not supplied to him and for these reasons the continued order of detention of the detenue was rendered void. As already observed above in the case before us, para 1 of Annexure 9 itself makes a disclosure of the contents of the report of the Collector and after persual of Collector's report by us and by Mr. B L. Sharma, learned counsel for the detenue, it did not contain any facts other than those which had already been incorporated in detail in the grounds of detention. In these circumstances there is no scope of any argument in the present case that in the absence of such report the detenue was unable to make an effective representation. 13. It was next contended by Mr. Sharma that the interview allowed to the advocates of the detenue in the presence and hearing of the jail authorities and customs officials cannot be said to be a valid interview. As the detenue was not allowed to discuss freely with his advocates till 10th May, 1982, it cannot be said that the detinue got an earliest opportunity to make a representation as envisaged under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As the detenue was not allowed to discuss freely with his advocates till 10th May, 1982, it cannot be said that the detinue got an earliest opportunity to make a representation as envisaged under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on Francie Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, 1981 (1) SCC 608 , in which it was observed that the interview need not necessarily take place in the presence of a nominated officer of Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of the interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then such officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, then any other jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but not so as to be within hearing distance of the detenue and the legal adviser Learned Government Advocate in this regard contended that Section 5 of the COFEPOSA Act provide for power to regulate place and condition for detention under clause (a) of Section 5, wherein it was provided that every person in respect of whom a detention order has been made, shall be liable (a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to maintenance, interviews or communication with others, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify. It is contended that in pursuance of the aforesaid powers conferred on the State Government. National Security (Rajasthan Conditions of Detention) Order, 1980, has been framed by the State Government vide notification dated December 9, 1980 published in Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary Part IV (Ga) of the same date. Section 10 of the aforesaid order deals with. "10 Interview (1) A detenue shall be allowed interviews with relatives, friends, legal practitioner in accordance with the instructions issued by the Government from time to time. (2) All interviews shall take place in the presence of an officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector deputed for the purpose by the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan and such officer may stop the interview if the conversation turns on any undesirable subject and may also report the matter to the Superintendent who may inflict any of the punishments enumerated in clause 14. Subject to this provision the place and mode of interview shall be determined by the Superintendent. Subject to this provision the place and mode of interview shall be determined by the Superintendent. (3) The Superintendent shall maintain a statement of all interviews between a detenue and his relatives or other persons with the names of the persons present at each interview." 14. On the basis of the aforesaid provision it is contended by the learned Government Advocate that it was necessary to allow the interview within hearing distance of the police officer as he could stop the interview if the conversation turns on any undesirable subject. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the detenu contended that the provision contained in Section 10 of the above order was in violation of the observations made in Francis Coralie Muffin's case (supra). We find no force in the contention of Mr. Sharma in the facts and circumstances of the case before us. In the above case the provisions of clause 3(b) sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention Order framed by the Delhi Administration under order dated August 23, 1975, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the COFEPOSA Act came up for consideration. These two sub-clauses of clause 3(b) provided inter alia as under : 3. The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under : (b) Interviews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under : (i) Interview with legal adviser in connection with defence of a detenue in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement, who sponsors the case for detention. (ii) Interview with family members : A monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife, children or parents of the detenu................." The petitioner who was a British National preferred a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of Habeas Corpus challenging her detention which was rejected by Supreme Court on February 27, 1980. As a result whereof she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. As a result whereof she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced considerable difficulty in having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family. The petitioner was effectively denied the facility of interview with her lawyer and even her young daughter about 5 years old could not meet her except once in a month. The petitioner thus preferred another petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Clause 3(b) of the Conditions of detention order and prayed that the Administrator Union Territory of Delhi and the Superintendent Tihar Jail be directed to permit her to have interview with her lawyer and the members of her family, without complying with the restriction laid down in these two sub clauses. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid provisions were violative of Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution inasmuch as they were arbitrary and unreasonable. Dealing specifically with the manner and conditions of interview as laid down in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) their Lordships of the Supreme Court found that the procedural requirement contained therein regulating a right of detenue to have interview with a legal adviser of his choice was violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution and must be held to be unconstitutional and void. Thereafter it was observed as under : "We think that it would be quite reasonable if a detenue were to be entitled to have interview with his legal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should be given by the Superintendent without any avoidable delay We may add that the interview need not necessarily take place in the presence of a nominated officer of Custom/Central Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of the interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then such officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, then any other jail official may, if thought necessary, which the interview but not so as to within hearing distance of the detenue and the legal adviser." Supreme Court itself has suggested that the jail officials may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but not so as to be within the hearing distance of the detenue and the legal adviser. In any case the petitioner has nowhere challenged the vires of the aforesaid provisions of Section 10 in the petition and we are not directly called upon to decide the vires of the above provision in the present case. The fact remains that such provision was existing at the time when the interview took place on 15th March, 1982, and there was no violation of any of the above provisions as contained in Section 10 in allowing the interview to the detenue with his legal adviser. Apart from the above legal aspect of the matter we are also not convinced that the detenue ever made any grievance in this regard on 15th March, 1982, when he was permitted interview with his legal adviser so as not to be within hearing distance of the jail authorities. Admittedly he had made a representation on 22nd March. 1982, and it was for the first time such grievance was raised in the representation. This, in our opinion, was merely an after thought so as to make it a ground for the release of the detenu. 15. Admittedly he had made a representation on 22nd March. 1982, and it was for the first time such grievance was raised in the representation. This, in our opinion, was merely an after thought so as to make it a ground for the release of the detenu. 15. In para 15 of the writ petition it has been alleged that Shri B.L. Sharma and K.S. Rathore met the aforesaid Abdul Zabbar on 15th March, 1982 in the Central Jail, Jaipur on the request of the petitioner in order to give Shri Abdul Zabbar legal advice. It is further mentioned that Shri Sharma and Shri Rathore requested the jail authority and customs officials present there that they be allowed to talk Abdul Zabbar, though in their presence, but at such a distance that their talks may not be heard by the jail and customs officials. This was disallowed. Then Shri B.L. Sharma having failed to contact the Home Commissioner, contacted the Special Secretary to the Government, Home Department, Shri O.P. Joshi on phones, who replied that he could say only after studying the Rules. In these circumstances, the petitioner's counsel had to talk the petitioner's husband in presence of the customs and jail authorities closely sitting with the advocates and in these circumstances the petitioner's husband could not talk freely to the advocates, nor the advocates could do so. It is further mentioned that a note was put on 15th March, 1982 itself by the advocates to this effect. A copy of the permission letter dated 12th March, 1982 containing the above note is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure 13. It is further stated that the Home Department had sent the instructions for permitting interviews with the advocates keeping the officials beyond the hearing distance only in the second week of April, 1982 and not earlier. The respondents in reply to the above paragraphs stated that the contents of this the para are denied. As a matter of fact S/Shri B.L. Sharma and K.S Rathore Advocates of Abdul Zabbar requested the administration when they had held the interview that regard has been dealt with Abdul Zabbar on 15th March, 1982 sent to customs and jail authorities present arrangement of interview be asked to forwarding such inquiries so that their Conversation may not as being heard by them. Their request was examined and forwarded before they met Abdul Zabbar on 10th July, 1982. From the aforesaid reply given by the respondent it is clear that such request was made when the advocates had already held an interview with Abdul Zabbar on 15th March, 1982. Such request was subsequently accepted where the advocates met with Abdual Zabbar on 10th May, 1982. As regards the plea taken by the petitioner in para 15 of the petition that a note in this regard was to put on the permission letter dated 12th March, 1982, it is contended by the learned Government Advocate that the document Annexure 13 has been filed by the petitioner from his own custody and the note in this regard has been put afterwards. We find force in the contention of the learned Government Advocate in this regard. The fact regarding putting of such note on the permission letter has not been mentioned by the petitioner in his representation dated 22nd March, 1982, though a ground was specifically taken in the representation that when the counsel had come to meet him on 15th March, 1982 they had requested the jail authorities and customs officials to remain at a distance so as not to hear the conversation, but such permission was not granted. Though all the details have been mentioned, but it is silent about the fact of putting any note on the permission letter Annexure 13. It is also not understandable as to how the aforesaid note could be by a carbon on the permission letter when the note admittedly is not in the hand writing of any jail or customs officials. Thus, we are not satisfied that any request was made on 15th March, 1982 by the petitioner to allow him to have a conversation with his legal adviser beyond the range of hearing of any officials. The representation was made on 22nd March, 1982 and detailed grounds have been taken in that representation and we are not satisfied that the detenue was in any way prejudiced to make an effective representation. The representation was made on 22nd March, 1982 and detailed grounds have been taken in that representation and we are not satisfied that the detenue was in any way prejudiced to make an effective representation. It may also be mentioned that the representation contained all the grounds which have now been taken in the writ petition and it is difficult to understand as to what other grounds he would have taken in the representation in case he would have been allowed to have an interview with his legal adviser on 15th March, 1982, beyond the range of hearing of the officials as alleged by him. 16. It was next contended by Mr. Sharma that though the detenues were allowed bail by the learned Sessions Judge, but that fact was not taken into consideration by the detaining authority. It was further argued that even from the grounds of detention, it is not spelled out that the detaining authority even applied its mind or was even aware of the fact that some proceedings have been taken before a court of law in the matter. It is further submitted that the respondents in the reply have only taken the plea that the fact that Abdul Zabbar was arrested as under the Customs Act and then produced before the concerned Magistrate for obtaining remand are totally irrelevant as far as the detention of the accused under the COFEPOSA Act is concerned. From the aforesaid reply it is contended that the detaining authority had neither applied its mind nor was aware about the proceedings taken against the detenue for remand and his release on bail. We find no force in the above contention of Mr. Sharma. In the grounds of detention it was not at all necessary to make a mention regarding the fact of remand and release of the detenue on bail. These facts are not at all relevant for the purpose of a person like Abdul Zabbar, who was involved in smuggling activities of precious stones brought from foreign countries and sold on commission at Jaipur which is a famous centre of jewellery business in India. A criminal proceeding and preventive detention are not parallel proceedings. These facts are not at all relevant for the purpose of a person like Abdul Zabbar, who was involved in smuggling activities of precious stones brought from foreign countries and sold on commission at Jaipur which is a famous centre of jewellery business in India. A criminal proceeding and preventive detention are not parallel proceedings. The object of a criminal prosecution is to punish a person for an offence committed by him while preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to determine whether there are sufficient materials to place the person under preventive detention in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the national interest. Clause (ii) of para 2 of the grounds of detention clearly makes a mention that the customs officials had made a raid on the business-cum-residential accommodation of Abdul Zabbar on 29th January, 1982,where raw, cut & polished precious stones of Burmese origin were found concealed at several places which amounted to Rs. 3,00,150/-. The above facts further found support from the statement of Abdul Zabbar himself which was annexed with the grounds of detention in which he admitted that he was associated in the smuggling activity of such precious stones brought inside India from border of Burma by Motilal and C. Narayan. The above facts were further supported by the statements of Moti Lal and C. Narayan and panchnama and its witnesses. From the above facts and documentary evidence the detaining authority was satisfied that Abdul Zabbar was involved in smuggling business. He was purchasing such goods of Burmese origin on commission basis, was keeping them concealed and selling and was thus actively engaged in such activities. Abdul Zabbar was thus required to be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such activities. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the fact of remand and release of the detenue on bail had no relevance for the detention under the COFEPOSA Act. 17. It was further contended by Mr. Sharma that the detenue was denied opportunity of being represented through a counsel or assistance by an educated person before the advisory board. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the fact of remand and release of the detenue on bail had no relevance for the detention under the COFEPOSA Act. 17. It was further contended by Mr. Sharma that the detenue was denied opportunity of being represented through a counsel or assistance by an educated person before the advisory board. It is further contended that vide Annexure 11 the detenu had made a request on 22nd March, 1982 that he was an illiterate person and as such he may be allowed to be represented through a counsel and if no such permission is granted, then he may be granted permission to put forth his case through some educated person of confidence. Reliance is placed on Nand Lal Sajaj v. State of Punjab and another, 1981 (4) SCC 327 , in which it was observed as follows: "It is the arbitrariness of the procedure adopted by the Advisory Board that vitiates the impugned order of detention. There is no denying the fact that while the Advisory Board disallowed the detenue's request for legal assistance, it allowed the detaining authority to be represented by counsel. It appears that the Advisory Board blindly applied the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act to the case of the detenue failing to appreciate that it could not allow legal assistance to the detaining authority and deny the same to the detenue. The Advisory Board is expected to act in a manner which is just and fair to both the parties. The report of the Board placed before us shows that the detenue exercised his-right to recall some of the witnesses for the purpose of cross examination We are informed that the hearing before the Advisory Board went on for 4 to 5 days and there were as many as 11 witnesses cross-examined by the detenue. It cannot be, as is suggested by the counsel for the States, that the lawyers representing the State Government did not participate in the proceedings. On the contrary, the report itself shows that the Public Prosecutor was called upon to explain some aspects of the case. If the matter was so intricate, the Advisory Board should have ensured that both the parties had equal opportunities to place their respective cases. On the contrary, the report itself shows that the Public Prosecutor was called upon to explain some aspects of the case. If the matter was so intricate, the Advisory Board should have ensured that both the parties had equal opportunities to place their respective cases. It appears that the dice was loaded against the detenue in that whereas he had to go without legal assistance, the State Government had the benefit of an arrary of lawyers." We find no force in the above contention. Section 8(a) of the COFEPOSA Act itself lays down that a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. In Devji Vallabhbhai Tendal & Another v. The Administrator of Goa, Daman & Diu and another, AIR 1982 SC 1029 , it was observed as under:- "A detenue does not have any right to be heard in person by the detaining authority. Nor can he be permitted cross-examination of rebuttal evidence. The detenue has not right to appear before the detaining authority or before the Advisory Board by a legal practitioner. A `friend' or an `agent' who, in truth and substance, are friends of the detenue may appear for the detenue but if such a `friend' or `agent' also happens to be a legal practitioner, he cannot, as of right, appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenue. Further, if such a `friend' or an `agent' of the detenue is essentially a comrade in the profession of the detenue for which he is detained, then such a `friend' or `agent' will also be barred from appearance on behalf of the detenue." 18. The detenue had vaguely mentioned in his application Annexure 11 dated 22nd March, 1982, that he may be allowed to put forth his case through any educated person of his confidence. Neither any name of such person nor his details or antecedents were mentioned which could have been verified by the Customs Officials or by the Advisory Board. In the absence of such particulars it could not be ascertained as to whether such person was a fit person for allowing him to appear before the Advisory Board. Neither any name of such person nor his details or antecedents were mentioned which could have been verified by the Customs Officials or by the Advisory Board. In the absence of such particulars it could not be ascertained as to whether such person was a fit person for allowing him to appear before the Advisory Board. It is nowhere the case of the detenue that he had actually taken some person before the Advisory Board for explaining his case and then permission was refused. The Supreme Court in Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel' case (supra) has observed that if such a friend or an agent of the detenue is essentially a comrade in the profession for which he is detained then such a friend or agent will also be barred from appearance on behalf of the detenue. 19. It was also contended by Mr. Sharma that the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and as such the order of detention is bad. In this regard Mr. Sharma urged that the detaining authority did not consider the report of the Collector, the retracted confession of the detenue which were made by applications dated 11-2-1982, 12-2-1982, and 16-2-1982 and the order of release on bail by the Sessions Judge. We have already dealt in detail with regard to the report of Collector and the fact of release of the detenue on bail. 20. The statement of a person recorded by the Customs Officer under Section 108 cannot be said to be a person `accused of any offence" under the Customs Act. An accusation which would stamp with the character of such a person can be levelled only when a complaint is filed against him by the Customs Authorities of the commission of offence under Section 135(a) and Section 135(b) of the Customs Act. The mere fact that a raid is made and a house is searched by the Customs Authorities and a Panchnama is prepared seizing the goods and the person whose house is raided or whose goods are seized makes a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act cannot amount to a confession. Even an admission of an incriminating fact, by such person, howsoever grave, is not by itself a confession. Even an admission of an incriminating fact, by such person, howsoever grave, is not by itself a confession. Such statement as such cannot come within the purview of the benefit and guarantee against testimonial compulsion embodied under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Firstly, such statement is not by the person who was accused of an offence and secondly we are not satisfied in this case that such statement was made under any compulsion. The question, therefore, of any retracted confession as argued by Mr. Sharma does not arise in the case. We find support in this regard by a decision of the Supreme Court in Veera Ibrahim v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 1167 . 21. It has also been laid down in Perey Rustomji Basta v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 1087 , that Custom Officer making inquiry under section 107 or Section 108 of Customs Act is not a police officer and person against whom inquiry is made is not an accused person. Statement made by such person in that inquiry is not statement made by a person accused of any offence. We may also refer to the reply submitted by the respondents in this regard. According to the respondents no statement of Abdul Zabbar was recorded on 11th Feb., 1982 and 12th February, 1982. It is, however, admitted that he was summoned on these dates and interrogated. The recording of statement on 16th February. 1982, has been admitted. However, it was not considered necessary by the Sponsoring Authority to place this statement before the detaining authority as it did not contain any additional material. According to the respondents the detention order dated 1st March, 1982 was issued after subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. A perusal of the record shows that there is no statement of Abdul Zabbar recorded on 11th February, 1982, and 12th February, 1982. Statement of Abdul Zabbar recorded on 29th January, 1982, was admittedly supplied to the detenue along with the grounds of detention and this statement only by Abdul Zabbar dated 29th January, 1982, finds mention in the grounds of detention. This statement is self evident to show that the detenue was actively involved in the smuggling business along with Moti Lal and C. Narayan. The order of detention Annexure 9 itself discloses sufficient material on record which was taken into consideration by the detaining authority. This statement is self evident to show that the detenue was actively involved in the smuggling business along with Moti Lal and C. Narayan. The order of detention Annexure 9 itself discloses sufficient material on record which was taken into consideration by the detaining authority. It is also pertinent to mention here that Shri S.P. Bishnoi has filed an affidavit to the effect that on 25th February, 1982, he was working as Home Commissioner and Home Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Rajasthan. On the same day he persued the record of the case of the detenue Abdul Zabbar relevant to the seizure of the contraband goods recovered from his house and he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain Abdul Zabbar to prevent him from smuggling of goods engaging in transporting, selling and keeping of smuggled goods. There is no force at all in the argument of Mr. Sharma that the detention order has been passed without application of mind. 22. It was next contended by Mr. Sharma that the petitioner was an illiterate person and could understand only Hindi language, though he could not read and write this language also. He does not understand English language at all The Panchnama dated 29th January, 1982, which was supplied to the detenue along with the grounds of detention was in English and supplying of such document in English amounted to non-communication of a document relied upon by the detaining authority in making the detention order. This was in violation of safeguards provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA Act. Supplying of this document in language not known by the detenue amounted to denial of opportunity of making effective representation. Reliance is placed on Surjeet Singh v. Union of India and others, 1981 (2) SCC 359 . The contention of the respondents in this regard is that Abdul Zabbar appeared to be literate as he has signed all the documents in Hindi. Though it is not denied that Panchnama had been prepared in English but the contents of the Panchnama are not only corroborative of the voluntary statement given by Abdul Zabbar himself but also of voluntary statements of others viz., Moti Lal Sharma, Abdul Sattar etc. We find no force in this objection also made by Mr. Sharma. Abdual Zabbar cannot be said to be an illiterate person. We find no force in this objection also made by Mr. Sharma. Abdual Zabbar cannot be said to be an illiterate person. We have perused his signatures on the statement dated 29th January, 1982, which shows that he has put his signatures in legible Hindi in a clear manner, which leaves no doubt in our mind that he understands Hindi very well. As regards the supply of Panchanama in English language, Abdul Zabbar has admitted in his statement dated 29th January, 1982, that Panchnama was prepared on the spot and the same was signed by two attesting witnesses and also by himself and his brother. He has also admitted that according to the valuation put by customs appraiser, the price of the foreign goods was valued at Rs. 3,00,150/-. The Panchnama Annexure 9E contains the signatures of Abdul Zabbar, his brother Abdul Sattar and two attesting witnesses on every page and also makes a mention that the said signatures were appended in token of having understood its contents which were explained to them in Hindi. It may also be mentioned that the detenue never made a request to the Jail Authorities to supply the translation of Panchnama in Hindi before making representation on 22nd March, 1982 Surjeet Singh's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the detenue does not help him as the above authority only lay down that the grounds of detention are always required to be furnished in a language which is understood by the detenue. That apart it was a case where the police officer served an order of detention along with the ground as which it was passed and both the documents were in English. The detention was challenged on the ground that English was not a language which the detenue understood and this factor rendered it necessary for the grounds of detention to be served on them in Hindi which was their mother language and the same having not been there was in law no communication of such grounds to either of the detenues. In the case before us it is undisputed that not only the grounds of detention but a1l other documents were also supplied in Hindi except Panchnama which was prepared in English, was also understood and signed by the detenue in token of its acceptance. In the case before us it is undisputed that not only the grounds of detention but a1l other documents were also supplied in Hindi except Panchnama which was prepared in English, was also understood and signed by the detenue in token of its acceptance. Even in his own statement he had tried to explain each & every item shown in the Panchnama which clearly shows that he had clearly understood & was clearly explained the contents of Panchnama. That apart before submitting the representation, the detenue never raised any objection on this account, The representation dated 22nd March, 1982. filed by the detenue also shows that he clearly understood the contents of Panchnama. He had already been given the facility of interview with his advocates on 15th March, 1982, and thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the detenue was not communicated with any grounds or did not understand the contents of any documents as as not to be able to make effective representation. 23. It was next contended by Mr. Sharma that order Annexure 12 rejecting the representation of the detenue dated 22nd March, 1982, does not contain any reasons for rejecting the same. It is argued that such order, which rejects the representation of a detenue curtailing his freedom of movement, must disclose reasons for rejecting the representation. We do not find any force in this contention. A detenue is furnished with grounds of his detention alongwith the order of detention and he has only a right of representation. The only safeguard given under Article 22(5; of the Constitution of India is that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford the earliest opportunity of making any representation against the order. A perusal of the above provision clearly shows that the detenue has a right of getting the communication of the grounds on which the order has been made and affording him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Under the above provision it is not at all necessary to state any reasons in the order rejecting the representation of the detenue. Under the above provision it is not at all necessary to state any reasons in the order rejecting the representation of the detenue. The representation has to be considered by the appropriate Government and Annexure 12 clearly makes a mention that the State Government had rejected the representation after having considered the same. A similar kind of objection raised by the detenue was rejected by the Supreme Court in John Martin v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 775 In para 4 of the above report a view has been taken that this contention, attractive though it may seem, is not well founded. It stands concluded by the decision in Hardhan Saha's case W.P. No. 1999 of 1973 reported in AIR. 1974 S.C. 2154 . It was pointed out in that case by Ray C J. speaking on behalf of the Court "There need not be a speaking order. There is also no failure of justice by the order not being a speaking order. All that is necessary is that there should be a real and proper consideration by the Government " These observations must give quietus to the contention that the order of the State Government must be a reasoned order. 24. It was also contended that the detenue was not made known about the fate of his representation as late as 10th May, 1982 when on the request made by his counsel a true copy of the order dated 1st April, 1982, rejecting the representation was supplied by the Deputy Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur and which has been enclosed as Annexure 12. We don't find any force in the contention. The respondents in their reply have clearly stated that Government's letter dated 1st April, 1982, was duly conveyed to Shri Abdul Zabbar on 2nd April, 1982 under proper acknowledgement. However, on demand a copy of the said letter was supplied to the counsel of Shri Abdul Zabbar on 10th May, 1982 by the Jaipur. There is nothing on record to believe the bald allegation made by the petitioner in this regard merely supported on the basis of information given to the petitioner Saira Begum wife of the detenue by her counsel. There is nothing on record to believe the bald allegation made by the petitioner in this regard merely supported on the basis of information given to the petitioner Saira Begum wife of the detenue by her counsel. It does not find support by any affidavits of the counsel and we do not find any reason to hold that the order of rejecting the representation was not communicated to the detenue as alleged by the petitioner. The contents of government's letter dated 1st April, 1982, were duly conveyed to Shri Abdul Zabbar on 2nd April, 1982 under proper acknowledgement. This fact of conveying to Abdul Zabbar on 2nd April, 1982, under proper acknowledgement has not been refuted by the petitioner in rejoinder to the respondents' reply filed on 10th June, 1982. In the rejoinder the petitioner has only submitted that with respect to the contents of para 13 of the respondents reply, the position stated in para 13 of the writ petition is re-asserted. This clearly goes to show that the petitioner never challenged the clear stand taken by the respondents that the contents of government's letter dated 1st April, 1982 were duly conveyed to Abdul Zabbar on 2nd April, 1982, under proper acknowledgement. In common course of conduct such order rejecting the representation is communicated by the officers in discharge of their official duty and we cannot accept the contention of the petitioner that such order was not communicated till 10th May, 1982. 25. It was also contended by Shri Sharma that there was no scientific method with the respondents to arrive at the conclusion that the precious stones found in the seizure, were of Surmese origin and not of Indian origin. In this regard it is contended that Gem and Jewellery Exporters Association have given a certificate vide Annexure 17 that there was no scientific method by which the country of origin of Gem stones could be identified either before or after cutting and polishing. Similarly reliance is placed on Annexure 18, a letter from Geological Institute of America to Director Gem and Jeweller Information Centre of India that there was no practical way in which the origin of a diamond could be determined after it had been cut and polished. Even before cutting, it is simply a matter of probability as to its course. Similarly reliance is placed on Annexure 18, a letter from Geological Institute of America to Director Gem and Jeweller Information Centre of India that there was no practical way in which the origin of a diamond could be determined after it had been cut and polished. Even before cutting, it is simply a matter of probability as to its course. Reliance is also placed on similar kinds of letters issued by other authorities vide Annexures 19 and 20. Strong reliance in this regard is placed on Annexure 20 a letter written by Assistant Collector of Customs to Messrs. S. Gupta & Co., in which it is stated as under: "Sub-Examination of Imported Goods. Please refer to your letter No. Nil dated 6-4-82 on the above subject. In case of Precious & Semiprecious stones like Rough Diamonds, Rubies, Emeralds, etc. the country of origin is verified on the basis of Certificate issued by the Chamber of Commerce or by Notary Public of the country from where the goods have been shipped. After all these are natural material stones and therefore even in the case of doubt the Customs House cannot state emphatically that the goods are of any particular country of origin other than declared in the Bill of Entry. It may also be stated there is no method or contrivance or appliance with the help of which the exact Country of Origin can be established. Thus, reliance is placed on the certificate of Origin issued by Chamber of Commerce or by the Notary Public in the country from which the goods are exported." The respondents in this regard in reply have stated that it was always possible to indicate the country of origin of `RUBI and precious stone by experts. Even though there may be some mines in the country where Saphire and RUBI is mined, the fact is that the rough of these stones mined in India is of inferior quality and is distinct and distinguishable from those of Surmise origin. Moreover, apart from the expert opinion of the Customs appraiser with regard to the foreign origin of these seized precious stones even otherwise there is sufficient independent evidence on record to show the foreign origin of the seized goods. In fact Abdul Zabbar had himself admitted that he knew of the foreign origin of the seized goods. Moreover, apart from the expert opinion of the Customs appraiser with regard to the foreign origin of these seized precious stones even otherwise there is sufficient independent evidence on record to show the foreign origin of the seized goods. In fact Abdul Zabbar had himself admitted that he knew of the foreign origin of the seized goods. The fact that these goods were being brought all the way from Burese border was also a clear indication about the Burmese origin of the goods and this also corroborates Abdul Zabbar's statement about his knowledge regarding the foreign origin of the goods. From a perusal of the above reply of the respondents we are satisfied that apart from the expert opinion of the customs appraiser in this case foreign origin of the seized precious stones is found proved by the statements of Abdul Zabbar himself and also Moti Lal on whose behalf the other habeas corpus petition has been filed. That apart the conduct of Abdul Zabbar in having no bill or voucher account-books available at the business-cum-residential premises nor any such bills, vouchers or account-books having been presented before any customs authority by either Shri Abdul Zabbar or anybody else also speaks volumes against him Even in Annexure 20 the Assistant Collector has only said that in case of precious and semiprecious stones like rough diamonds, Rubies, Emeralds, the country of origin is verified on the basis of certificate issued by the Chamber of Commerce or by Notary Public of the country from where the goods have been shipped, In the case before us there was material on record for the detaining authority for its subjective satisfaction that the goods in question were of Burmese Origin and the petitioner has not shown anything to hold conclusively that the seized goods were of Indian origin only. The petitioner could have proved it by placing proper bills and vouchers and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the action taken by the detaining authority suffers from any error of law so as to call for an interference by this Court. It may be pointed out that in matters of preventive detention it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and this Court cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds of detention. 26. Mr. It may be pointed out that in matters of preventive detention it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and this Court cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds of detention. 26. Mr. Sharma, who is counsel for another detenue Moti Lal Sharma also did not make any argument and adopted the arguments made with regard to the detenue Abdul Zabbar. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with his case separately. In the result we find no force in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the detentues and these petitions having no merit are dismissed. Petition Dismissed. *******