JUDGMENT B.S. Sharma, Member - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated September 27, 1974 passed by Sri G.S. Seth, Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow against the judgment dated March 16, 1973 passed by the A.C. 1st Class, Sitapur dismissing the suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. anti L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents including the D.G.C. (R). I have also gone through the record of both the courts below. 3. The facts of the case are narrated in the judgment and order of the learned Additional Commissioner and they need not be reproduced here. Briefly, the appellants case is that after the enforcement of the U.P. Urban Areas Z.A and L.R. Act 1956, the Theka granted in favour of tile then town Area and later on tho Nagar Panka Misrikh district Sitapur came to an end and the plaintiff-appellants who wore the proprietors of toe grove in question became Bhumiadars of the land in grove and hence they had right to recover possession of the grove and the land therein. The courts below have erred in holding that the grove and the laud therein was not an agricultural land and, therefore, they had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter and further they have also erred in holding that through the Theka in question the plaintiff-appellant had permanently settled the land in favour of Town Area/Nagar Palika of Misrikh and hence no rights could accrue to the plaintiff-appellants in the grove land in question. 4. The second appeal has been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the following grounds: - (1) As the land in dispute was a grove, Thekedar's rights were extinguished under Section 10(j) of the U.P. Urban Areas Z.A. and L.R. Act as soon as the said Act came into force in regard to the land in dispute. In this context a case reported on page 187 R.D. 1973 SC has been cited. (2) That the land being a grove could not be held to be non-agricultural area when no declaration under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act had been made by the Asstt. In this context a case reported on page 187 R.D. 1973 SC has been cited. (2) That the land being a grove could not be held to be non-agricultural area when no declaration under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act had been made by the Asstt. Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division and consequently the land in dispute will not cease to be agricultural land and the suit is within the competence of the revenue courts which have erred in dismissing the suit on the ground that the land in dispute is not agricultural land. (3) That if the land in dispute was not held to be agricultural land the proper course for the trial court was to have returned the plaint to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation before the proper court as required under Rule 10 Order VII, C.P.C. The learned trial court thus manifestly erred in law in dismissing the plaint on the ground that the land in suit was not agricultural land. (4) That if the dispute regarding nature of the laud in dispute arose during the proceedings of the suit, the learned trial court, as laid down under Section 331-A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act should nave referred the dispute for decision by the Asstt. Collector in-charge of the Sub-Division under Section 143 of the Act and that the muling recorded by the Tahsildar in regard to the nature of the land is obviously without jurisdiction and both the courts below have thus acted erroneously in accepting this finding of a court which was not competent to decide the said dispute. (5) That the application for amendment of the plaint was wrongly dismissed by the learned trial court as it should have returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court as stated earlier. In view of the above, it has been argued that the orders of both the courts below are illegal and liable to be set aside and the claim of the plaintiff appellant decreed. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents have opposed the second appeal on the following grounds: - (1) According to the plaintiff-appellant himself, the land with the grove in question had been leased on to die Town Area Misrikh now Nagar Palika Misrikh, for a period of 99 years for non agricultural purposes, i.e., for holding Mela constructing shops and buildings, etc. and thus after execution of this lease in favour of the Town Area Nagar Palika, the land ceased to be a grove and an agricultural area and thus the suit for this land was not triable by the revenue courts which rightly rejected it oil this ground. (2) That the said lease had been duly accepted by the plaintiff-appellant who had been receiving lease rent from the local body concerned and the acceptance of lease rent even after the abolition of Zamindari in the Urban Area of the local body clearly established the fact that the lard in dispute ceased to be a grove land and in possession and use of the plaintiff appellant as such and therefore, the latter had no rights left in it. (3) That the lease granted by the plaintiff-appellant was not a Theka within the meaning of Section 3(24) of the U.P.T. Act, 1939 as has been rightly held by the learned Additional Commissioner and therefore, there was no question of extinction of lights of the local body under the provisions of Section 10(j) of the U.P. Urban Areas Z.A. and L.R. Act. In fact the lease for 99 years had conferred permanent rights on the lessee and consequently the rights of the plaintiff-appellant as intermediary had been extinguished on account of continued possession of the local body over the land and its use for non agricultural purposes by that body. Further on the date of enforcement of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, the land in dispute i.e. grove was neither a grove nor an agricultural area and it was also not in possession of the plaintiff-appellant as such and, therefore, his rights as an intermediary were abolished under Section 10 of the said Act. (4) That the land in dispute has been rightly held to be non-agricultural area on the basis of the Commissioner's report by a court which was competent to decide this issue under orders of the Collector and, thereof both the courts below have rightly relied on the findings of this court to the effect that the land in dispute was non-agricultural area and thus not governable of the provisions of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. (5) That the plaintiff-appellant could have himself withdrawn the plaint and filed it before the proper court. (5) That the plaintiff-appellant could have himself withdrawn the plaint and filed it before the proper court. As he did not do so, there was no alternative for the trial court but to dismiss his plaint on the ground of jurisdiction as well. 6. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant has conceded that the land in dispute is covered by the U.P.U.A.Z A. and L.R. Act but contended that even then the provisions of Sec. 143 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will apply. He has further contended that as the land is still recorded as a grove, it should be deemed to be held by the plaintiff-appellant as an intermediary and according to the provisions of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the U. P. U. A. Z. A. L. R. Act, it should be deemed to be settled with the plaintiff-appellant as an intermediary and he should be entitled to get its possession as a Bhumidhar thereof. In support of this a case reported in 1979 A.L.J. 710 has been cited. 7. From the foregoing narration of facts and arguments the first important question that arises for consideration is whether the grove in question was an agricultural area and the plaintiff-appellant was in possession of it as a grove on the date of enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. From the record of the trial court it is clear that the plaintiff-appellant had himself come up with the plaint claiming the grove to be an agricultural area and a grove for declaration of bis rights as a Bhumidhar therein and for claiming its possession under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. In para 2 of the plaint, the plaintiff-appellant had clearly stated that the land in suit had been leased cut for 99 years to the Town Area Misrikh through a registered deed dated August 6, 1935 and that the name of the lessee had been mutated in the revenue record after the possession of the land had been delivered to it. The terms and conditions of the said lease clearly show that it was given for purpose of holding Mela, construction of shops and buildings etc. In other words the purpose of the lease was clearly for non-agricultural use of the land in suit by the lessee. The terms and conditions of the said lease clearly show that it was given for purpose of holding Mela, construction of shops and buildings etc. In other words the purpose of the lease was clearly for non-agricultural use of the land in suit by the lessee. It appears that during the course of proceedings of the suit before the trial court, the nature of land in suit was disputed by the defendants and, therefore, the question whether the land in suit was an agricultural land or not was referred to the Asstt. Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division for decision under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. A perussal of the judgment and order of Sri Mohd. Safatullah, A.C., 1st Class, Sitapur dated December 19, 1972 shows that issue whether the land in suit was an agricultural land or not and if so what was its effect was first referred to the Asstt. Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division, Misrikh, Sitapur. But the latter officer reported to the Collector that as he was working as Officer In-charge of the Nagar Palika Misrikh which is a party to the suit, it would not be proper for him to decide the issue. Para 2 of the said judgment and order of the A.C., 1st Class. Sitapur shows that the Collector on the receipt of the said report of A.C., 1st Class, In-charge of the Sub-Division, Misrakb transferred the case to the court of A.C., 1st Class, Sitapur. Thus this officer as A.C., 1st Class, In-charge of the Sub-Division decided the aforesaid issue only after the suit involving the issue had been duly transferred to him under the Collector's orders. A perusal of this courts's order further shows that if got the land in suit duly inspected by a duly appointed Commissioner and alter considering the Commissioner's report and the evidence of the parties concerned came to the clear conclusion that the land in suit was not being used for agricultural, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry purposes and it was non-agricultural land and thus not governable by the provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 8. In view of what is stated in the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the trial court referred the issue of land being agricultural one or non agricultural one only when the nature of the land was disputed by the defendants. 8. In view of what is stated in the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the trial court referred the issue of land being agricultural one or non agricultural one only when the nature of the land was disputed by the defendants. Since the plaintiff-appellant had himself come up with the case in his plaint that the land was a grove land, the trial court could not in the initial stages be expected to take different view on this point and to return die plaint to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation to the proper court. The trial court became seized of this question only when the dispute about nature of land was raised on behalf of the opposite party. At this stage the learned trial court deferred the issue for decision by the competent court under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. According to the provisions of Section 64, the provisions of Chapter VIII and X of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and the Rules framed thereunder are applicable to the agricultural area acquired under the U.P P.A.Z.A. and L.R. Act. In view of these clear provisions, the trial court was perfectly within its power to have (referred the issue to the Asstt. Collector 1st Class Incharge of the Sub-Divisional Misrikh for deciding the issue under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. Now the question is whether the Collector Silapur was competent to transfer the suit under Section 143 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act for decision by an A.C. Ist Class. This question has been considered in great detail by the Full Bench of this court in the case Kedar Nath v. Binda Bux Singh, 1974 R.D. 38. In this case the learned Members of the Board have clearly held that the Collector can change an Assistant Collector First Class from one Sub-Division to the other, and thus he can confer powers upon A.C. 1st Class to be In-charge of Sub-Division by his order. The learned Members have further held that admittedly jurisdiction conferred upon an A.C. 1st Class thus vested is exercised by him during the pleasure of the Collector and is not inseparable from his identity. The learned Members have further held that admittedly jurisdiction conferred upon an A.C. 1st Class thus vested is exercised by him during the pleasure of the Collector and is not inseparable from his identity. In other words an A.C. 1st Class who is entrusted with any case which required to be disposed of by an A.C. 1st Class ln-charge of the Sub-Division can be entrusted with a case by the Collector and if such a ease is enquired to be disposed of by ail A.C. 1st Class In-charge of Sub-Division, the Collector's assignment of such a case to that Asstt. Collector First Class will also coaler upon him necessary powers to dispose of such a case as if he was an Asstt. Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division. In this particular case, it is clear from the record that the suit under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act had been transferred to the A.C. 1st Class Sitapur on genuine and reasonable grounds because the Asstt. Collector incharge of the Sub-Division Misrikh could not hear and decide this suit being an interested party himself. In view of all these considerations. I find nothing wrong in the order of the Collector transferring the suit under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act to the A.C. 1st Class Sitapur and the latter deciding it finally. The findings of the A.C. 1st Class Sitapur who was duly authorised to decide the suit under Section 143 of the Act are, in view of the clear opinion expressed in the Full Bench case cited earlier and the findings of a competent court under Section 143 of the Act, and therefore this court's findings cannot be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction. As regards merits, it is no where the case of the plaintiff-appellant that the grove land was not leased out for 99 years for non-agricultural purposes. On the other hand from the evidence on record as before the courts below, it is clear that the land in dispute was neither in possession of the plaintiff-appellant nor it was being used as a grove on the date of enforcement of the U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act. On the other hand from the evidence on record as before the courts below, it is clear that the land in dispute was neither in possession of the plaintiff-appellant nor it was being used as a grove on the date of enforcement of the U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act. In view of this clear finding the land in dispute could not be said to be an agricultural area held or deemed to be held by the plaintiff-appellant as an intermediary on the date of vesting of this area as a result of enforcement of the U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act 'J within the jurisdiction of Town Area Nagar 11 Palika Misrikh district Sitapur. 9. In this context the learned counsel has invited my attention to the case Sri Ram Prakash v. Mohammad Ali Khan, 1973 R.C. 187 (SC). In this case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that the grove is land covered by the provisions of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and, therefore, it will be governed by the provisions of this Act and not the provisions of the T.P. Act. The facts of this case I am afraid are not applicable to the present case and, therefore, the said ruling is of no benefit to the plaintiff-appellant. In another case S.P. Watel and others v. State of U.P., 1973 R.D. 189 decided by a Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice himself (reported on pages 189-196 the learned Judges have examined in details the meaning and implications of the expression of agricultural area as defined under sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the U.P. U.A. and Z.A. and L.R. Act and have interpreted clearly the provisions and implications of Section 17(1) of the said Act. From the interpretation and findings given by the learned Judges in this case, it is clear that only such lands as were in possession of the intermediaries as grove and were being used as such could be the subject matter of enforcement of Bhumidhari rights therein. From the judgment and orders of the courts below it is clear that the land in dispute was neither in possession of the plaintiff-appellant nor was it being used as a grove by the latter. From the judgment and orders of the courts below it is clear that the land in dispute was neither in possession of the plaintiff-appellant nor was it being used as a grove by the latter. Further it is also clear that the land in dispute was being used for non-agricultural purposes and was in possession of the Town Area Nagar Palika Misrikh district Sitapur prior to and on the date of and after the date of abolition of zamindari under the provisions of U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 10. In view of this position, both the courts below have rightly held that no rights accrued to the plaintiff-appellant in regard to the land in dispute as a consequence of abolition of Zamindari in the area concerned. 11. To sum up the learned trial court could not return the plaint to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation to the proper court on the ground that the land in suit was not an agricultural land because the plaintiff-appellant had himself come up with a categorical statement that the land in suit was a grove land. The learned trial court was fully justified in referring the question of the land in dispute being an agricultural or non-agricultural area to the proper court as soon as the dispute about this point arose before it during the proceedings of the suit. The Collector's order transferring the case to the A.C. 1st Class vested in him with the proper legal authority not only to hear and decide the suit hut also conferred upon him the necessary powers as A.C. 1st Class In-charge of the Sub-Division to hear and decide the suit under Section 143 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. The land in suit according to the findings of the competent court under Section 143 of the said Act clearly show that it was not an agricultural area and had thus ceased to be governed by the provisions of either U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act or U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and, therefore, the courts below have rightly rejected the suit on this ground. Both the courts below have also rightly held that no rights of Bhumidhari accrued to the plaintiff-appellant as a consequence of enforcement of the provisions of the U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act within the jurisdiction of Town real Nagar Palika Misrikh district Sitapur. Both the courts below have also rightly held that no rights of Bhumidhari accrued to the plaintiff-appellant as a consequence of enforcement of the provisions of the U.P. U.A. Z.A. and L.R. Act within the jurisdiction of Town real Nagar Palika Misrikh district Sitapur. The various contentions purforth by the learned counsel for the appellant have no substance and are therefore, liable to be rejected. 12. In view of what is stated above, the second appeal has no force and is her by dismissed with costs.