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1982 DIGILAW 299 (CAL)

C. MURALEE DHARAN v. ARATI NATHS

1982-08-18

N.C.MUKHERJI

body1982
N. C. MUKHERJI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under section 115 of the Code and is directed against Order No. 115 dated 12. 7. 82 passed by the learned Munsif, Second Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 124 of 1979 allowing an application filed under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The opposite party brought a suit for eviction on the ground of default and for reasonable requirement. After appearance the petitioner filed an application under section 17 (2) of the Act. The said application was rejected as the petitioner did not deposited the admitted arrear of rent. The petitioner being aggrieved came to this Court. But this Court did not interfere. The opposite party thereafter filed an application under section 17 (3) on 20. 2. 80. The opposite party then filed an application or amendment of the plaint which was allowed on 20. 6. 80 and thereafter, the petitioner filed a fresh application under section 17 (2a) (a) and (b) on 16. 7. 80 which was rejected. Being aggrieved, the petitioner came up to this Court. This Court again did not interfere. The hearing of the suit was taken up on 29. 6. 82. On that day the plaintiff was examined in chief. The matter was adjourned to 1. 7. 82. Before cross-examination commenced the petitioner drew the attention of the learned Court that the application under section 17 (3) still remained undisposed. The Learned Court passed an order for disposal of the application before cross-examination. The opposite party did not press the application under section 17 (3) filed on 20. 2. 82 and made an endorsement to that effect. Thereafter, plaintiff was cross-examined and the defendant was examined and cross-examined on 5. 7. 82 and 7. 7. 82. On 7. 7. 82 the opposite party filed another application under section 17 (3) of the Act. The application was opposed by the petitioner. The application was taken up for hearing on 12. 7. 82 and the application was allowed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court. ( 2 ) MR. 7. 82 and 7. 7. 82. On 7. 7. 82 the opposite party filed another application under section 17 (3) of the Act. The application was opposed by the petitioner. The application was taken up for hearing on 12. 7. 82 and the application was allowed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court. ( 2 ) MR. Sunil Kumar Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the plaintiff having stated that he would not press the application and by an endorsement having been made to that effect the plaintiff waived his right, if any, to have the defence struck out by filling an application under section 17 (3 ). By not pressing the application under section 17 (3) it must be held, Mr. Ghosh submits, that the plaintiff gave up the point that some of the deposits made by the defendant were invalid deposits. ( 3 ) MR. Suchit kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party, relies on the three decisions which were also relied on by the learned Munsif. The first decision of (1) Hindusthan Industrial Co. v. Chandi Prosad More has been reported in 1977 (2) CLJ 508 . This a Bench decision and it was held: 'dismissal of an application under section 17 (3), when the said application had not been pressed by the plaintiff-respondent, does not constitute a bar either by way of esstoppel or by the judgment of the Court'. Their Lordships observed: "an adjudication on the application under section 17 (3) would not have furnished any opportunity to the tenant-appellant to secure any relief against eviction for default committed. He looses that protection because of his own default to comply with section 17 (1) or to raise a dispute under section 17 (2 ). ???. . Then again, there having been no decision on the merits as to whether the appellant was in default or not on the application under section 17 (3) that decision would not constitute res judicata by interlocutory orders so far as the trial court is concerned?". The next decision of (2) Provati Chakrabarty v. Satyendra Nath Chatterjee and Ors. is reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 629. In this case, a question arose whether an application under section 17 (3) was maintainable as the suit was heard in part. The next decision of (2) Provati Chakrabarty v. Satyendra Nath Chatterjee and Ors. is reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 629. In this case, a question arose whether an application under section 17 (3) was maintainable as the suit was heard in part. It was held by Chittatosh Mookerji, J. : "so long as the ejectment suit remains pending in the trial court, the defendant-tenant has a statutory obligation under section 17 (1) to deposit in Court or in the office of the Rent Controller a to pay to the landlord a sum equivalent to rent month by month within the 15th day of each succeeding month. The landlord's right to apply before the Court for striking out the defence against delivery of possession under section 17 (3) must be co-extensive with the application of the tenant to make deposit or payment under section 17 (1 ). The liability of the defendant to deposit or to pay under section 17 (1) commences from the date of institution of the ejectment suit a proceeding ends with the termination of the said suit". ( 4 ) THE last case of (3) Chotalal Shawv. Ram Golam Shaw and Ors. , relied upon by the learned Munsif, has been reported in AIR 1975 436. This case was cited both on behalf of the plaintiff and on behalf of the defendant. In this case, however, it has been held that the right under section 17 (3) must be exercised before the defendant starts leading evidence in support of his defence against the ground of his eviction under section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act". But, it has again been held: "once the trial court decides the case on merits on consideration of the evidence on record including that of the defendant adduced without any objection by the landlord and the suit or proceeding is disposed of, it will have no jurisdiction after the judgment to recall the same for the purpose of striking out the defence". In the case reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 629 (supra) Chittatosh Mookerji, J. held: "in fact, section 17 (3) does not require that in all cases the landlord must make an application before the tenants' defence against delivery of possession could be struck out. In the case reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 629 (supra) Chittatosh Mookerji, J. held: "in fact, section 17 (3) does not require that in all cases the landlord must make an application before the tenants' defence against delivery of possession could be struck out. Where facts are disputed, it is desirable that a verified application should be filed by the landlord to enable the defendant-tenant to contest the allegations in the landlords application about contraventions, if any, of the provisions of section 17 (1) and 17 (2) or 17 (2a) as the case may be. " ( 5 ) ON a reading of section 17 (3), it does not appear that it is necessary for the plaintiff to file an application. If an application is filed by the defendant under section 17 (2) and if it is found that he has not complied with the provisions of section 17 (1) and 17 (2), then the Court can strike out the defence against delivery of possession under section 17 (3) of the Act without any application having been filed by the plaintiff. In this case as has been indicated earlier the first application under section 17 (2) and the subsequent application under section 17 (2a) were rejected by the trial court and those decisions were upheld by this Court. That being so, it must be held that the defendant did not comply with the provisions of section 17 (1) and 17 (2) and as such, the defence against delivery of possession was rightly struck off by the learned Munsif. The rejection of the earlier application under section 17 (3) on the ground that the same was not pressed by the plaintiff did not present the plaintiff from filing a second application before the final disposal of the suit. For the reasons stated above, I find nothing to interfere. In the result, the application fails and is rejected. There will be however, no order for costs in this application.