Judgment :- 1. Respondents 1 and 2 made an application against the petitioner under S.80B, Land Reforms Act for purchase of a kudikidappu. The petitioner contested the application on the ground that the building involved is not a hut, that the respondents were ineligible to be kudikidappukars as they owned land exceeding 10 cents on which they could erect a building and that they were in any event disentitled to the protection of S.75 as their kudikidappu originated subsequent to January 1, 1970. The Tribunal found the building to be a but and overruling the petitioner's other objections granted the application in favour of the second respondent. The petitioner carried an appeal to the Appellate Authority contesting all the findings of the Tribunal except the nature of the building. The appeal was however unsuccessful as the Appellate Authority agreed with the findings of the Tribunal. Hence the revision. 2. Counsel for the petitioner urged two points of which one had been raised unsuccessfully before the authorities below. 3. The contention that a kudikidappu which has sprung into existence subsequent to January 1, 1970 would not entitle its occupant to the protection of the Act has been considered on more than one occasion. It was first considered in Purushan v. Prakasan, 1977 KLT. 10, where it was held: "...if the other elements are satisfied, a kudikidappu can come into existence even after 1-1-1970." This decision was approved by a Bench consisting of Gopalan Nambiyar C. J. and Chandrasekhara Menon J. in Kunhimama v. Vasu,1979 KLT. 88. In the words of the learned Chief Justice: "We are of the opinion, that the mere fact that the kudikidappu sprang into existence only subsequent to 1-1-1970 would not disentitle the kudikidappukaran to the status or the privileges conferred by the Act, so long as the other conditions of the definition stand satisfied." The contention therefore fails. 4. R.81 of The Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules reads: "81. 4. R.81 of The Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules reads: "81. Status of applicant to be decided as a preliminary issue.- Where there is dispute as to whether the applicant is or is not a kudikidappukaran, the Land Tribunal shall decide such dispute as a preliminary issue and record a finding on such issue; and where such finding is that he is not a kudikidappukaran, the Land Tribunal shall forthwith dismiss his application." This prescription is part of the procedure of dealing with applications under S.80B made by persons claiming to be kudikidappukars. R.81 has not obviously been followed by the Tribunal in the sense it did not decide the respondents' status as a preliminary issue. This, counsel contended, would vitiate the order. If as R.81 prescribes the result of the preliminary finding is against the applicant's status as a kudikidappukaran, the Tribunal has forthwith to dismiss the application without having to take any other steps. The object of the rule is to abbreviate the procedure where the applicant fails at the threshold to establish his status. If he satisfies the Tribunal of his status the proceedings take their inevitable course leading to the issue of the certificate of purchase. Here respondent 2, as the result shows, is a kudikidappukaran and it is difficult to see nor was counsel for the petitioner in a position to explain how the absence of a threshold decision on the respondents' status could prejudice him. As for the petitioner's right to question the favourable finding on the respondents' status, the absence of a preliminary order would not prejudice him as he could challenge the entire order with all its findings in the appeal. (Mariakutty v. Chummaru Uthuppu,1980 KLT. 736, and Ayammed v. Parameswaran Namboodiri,1976 KLT. 788). 5. The omission to pass a preliminary order does not affect the Tribunal's power to pass a final order disposing of the application nor the validity of that order. It was at the best a piece of irregularity which was capable of waiver; this was what the petitioner did before the Appellate Authority. That being so, I do not think that I should set aside the orders and direct the Land Tribunal to begin from the beginning by passing a preliminary order. I dismiss the revision but without costs.