JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, M. - An order of the trial court passed during the pendency of proceedings for preparation of final decree, dismissing the application of the defendant, Amar Singh, for correction of compromise, deed filed earlier, was made subject of revision in the court of the learned Additional Commissioner, but that revision petition was dismissed by the learned Additional Commissioner on March 8, 1979. Against that, this second revision has been filed. 2. It so happened that in a suit under Section 176, U.P. Z.A. and R.L. Act, the parties to the case filed a compromise deed on the basis of which a preliminary decree was passed, which was allowed by the parties to become final. When the proceedings for preparation of final decree were started, the defendant filed an application to the effect that share of the plaintiff, Smt. Ramvati, had been wrongly mentioned as ? instead of 1/9. Smt. Ramvati filed an objection against that application, mentioning that according to the pedigree she was entitled to ?rd share in the land in suit and that such share was accepted genuinely by the defendant and there was no cause for any misunderstanding or mistake in mentioning the share of the parties. The learned trial court was of the opinion that the compromise was genuine and, therefore, there was no possibility of any mistake in the shares of the parties. The learned Additional Commissioner was also of the view that by reason of the fact that preliminary decree had been passed on the basis of the compromise deed, there was no reason to vary the shares mentioned in the compromise deed. 3. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that by C.P.C. Amendment 1976, a proviso was added to Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that 'where it was alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at, the court shall decide the question; but no adjustment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment'. On the basis of this proviso, the learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that when his client denied the adjustment or satisfaction, the court was bound to decide whether such adjustment or satisfaction was really made or not. On the basis of this proviso, the learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that when his client denied the adjustment or satisfaction, the court was bound to decide whether such adjustment or satisfaction was really made or not. The learned counsel argued that by not deciding this question the courts below committed an illegality in the exercise of their jurisdiction and hence the order is liable to be interfered with. As this proviso has been newly added, there is no case law available on the point. However, from very language of the proviso shows that the decision by the court about the question of adjustment or satisfaction has to be made before any decree is passed on the basis of the compromise deed. The intention of the legislature is also clear by incorporation of a condition that the question has to be decided on the same date without granting any adjournment and that if any adjournment is at all to be granted the court is bound to record reasons for such adjournment. The language suggests that the allegation and denial by the parties about any adjustment or satisfaction in the case has to be made before final order is passed and that it does not envisage raising of this dispute after the decree on the basis of the compromise deed had been passed. 4. Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing the correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This section provides that a preliminary decree, which has become final, cannot be questioned at any subsequent stage even in appeal. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that this section applies only to appeals and that in revision petitions this question can be raised. He has not cited any authority on the point, His contention is prima facie wrong and has been stated only to be rejected. Moreover, no revision was filed against that order an hence this argument is not open to the learned counsel for the revisionist. 5. The execution of compromise deed has not been denied by the defendant-revisionist. He has not cited any authority on the point, His contention is prima facie wrong and has been stated only to be rejected. Moreover, no revision was filed against that order an hence this argument is not open to the learned counsel for the revisionist. 5. The execution of compromise deed has not been denied by the defendant-revisionist. He only applied that there was some mistake in enumeration of the shares of the parties in the compromise deed Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act also preclude the defendant from challenging the terms of the compromise, which had been lawfully incorporated in the deed. 6. No illegality or material irregularity has been committed by the courts below. There is no force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionist that proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII C.P.C. allows his client to re-agitate about the terms of the compromise deed filed earlier in the case. 7. The revision is dismissed with costs and Rs. 50/- as counsel's fees.