JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - In this reference dated April 9, 1975, the learned Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, has recommended that the revision petition be allowed and the order of the learned trial court dated May 20, 1974, setting aside the ex parte decree against Soambar, be set aside. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that in a case under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, an ex parte decree against Soambar defendant was passed on February 30, 1969. He moved an application on August 22, 1973 that he had never received any summons, the ex parte decree had been fraudulently obtained by the plaintiff and that it should be set aside. He filed an affidavit also. Teju the plaintiff contested the application and filed a counter-affidavit. The main point of contest was whether summons had been served on Soamber and he had made the thumb-impression in the presence of witnesses or not. Both the parties appeared as witnesses and alter hearing, the trial court set aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit on May 20, 1974. holding that Soambar had no information of the case and when he not information, he promptly filed the restoration application and that the application was not beyond limitation. The learned Commissioner did not agree with the reasoning of the trial court in coming to the conclusion that service of summons was not adequate. He further found that the trial court had wrongly exercised jurisdiction in setting aside the ex parte decree after four years without good cause. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the trial court went beyond bis jurisdiction in acting as expert while comparing the thumb-impression and handwriting. He further argued that the witnesses of service of summons were not relied upon by the trial court without any reason. In support, he cited a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1973 Alld. (Civil) 501. This is ruling is not applicable to the present case because it concerns the question of a document being forged when there was no contest at the trial court stage and the trial court accepted it as genuine but without close examination by an expert at the appellate stage, it was considered as forged. (Civil) 501. This is ruling is not applicable to the present case because it concerns the question of a document being forged when there was no contest at the trial court stage and the trial court accepted it as genuine but without close examination by an expert at the appellate stage, it was considered as forged. In the present case, summons are not forged but the writings and thumb-impression made at the time of service are being questioned as forged. Further, no party offered to call an expert to compare the thumb-impression of Soambar. Both the parties had produced evidence and so the question had to be decided on whatever evidence was available. Soambar denied that he had made the thumb-impression on the summons. He denied that the process-server went to him. Against this denial in affidavit, Teju has affirmed in his affidavit that Soambar had been served with summons and that he had made his thumb-impression before the witnesses. So these assertions neutralise each other and the court observed that no party had produced the peon serving the notice or any expert to compare the thumb-impression. It is incorrect to say that the trial court had compared the thumb-impression or that the court gave a finding that the thumb-impression was not of Soambar. No expert opinion was given by the trial court but it was only observed that the intensity of ink and mode of writing on Ex. Ka-1 differed in respect of that thumb-impression of Soambar and Puranwasi and various writings during the alleged service. The learned Commissioner has considered the matter as an appeal rather than revision and just because lie did not agree with the finding of the trial court, he has found a wrong exercise of Jurisdiction. I am unable to agree with this view. 5. Even about the observation of the trial court about the mode of writing, though it may not amount to comparison of hand-writing, the learned counsel for the opposite party cited a ruling reported in A.I.R 1980 S.C. 531. wherein it was held that the argument that the court should not compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume itself the role of an expert, is entirely without force. wherein it was held that the argument that the court should not compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume itself the role of an expert, is entirely without force. Since in the instant case, there is no much need of this ruling it need not be considered in detail but it suffices to confirm the view that the trial court was entirely within jurisdiction in observing the mode of writings, ink used and the intensity of ink for a conclusion whether these were consistent with the oral evidence produced by the opposite party, Teju. When the service is Farzi, it is certainly a fraud played on the court and the question of four years having elapsed or of explaining the delay or the restoration application being within limitation lose relevance. There is hardly any doubt that the trial court based the order under Section 151 C.P.C. as well, although the application was within limitation from the date of knowledge August 7, 1973. 6. It is further observed that the notice for State through the Collector was served on the D.G.C which is wrong. Unless the D.G.C. files his memo of appearance, lie does not represent the State and there is no provision that the summons meant for the Collector should be served on the D.G.C. in a general manner. This is also true for the summons meant for the Gaon Sabha which can be served on the Pradhan on behalf of the Gaon Sabha but not on the D.G.C The D.G.C. becomes entitled to any notices only after he has filed him memo of appearance in a particular case. For this reason, again a clear case of fraud on the court is made out for the trial court was made to believe that summons were served on the Slate through the Collector and that the State did not contest, when actually the Collector had not been served with any summons at all. 7. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned trial court in passing the order dated May 20, 1974. The reference is, therefore, not acceptable and the revision petition being without force is hereby dismissed.