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1982 DIGILAW 301 (KER)

JOHN v. MAMMUKUTTY

1982-12-14

KADER

body1982
Judgment :- 1. This revision is filed by the first defendant in OS. No. 170 of 1977 on the file of the Sub Court, Kozhikode and is directed against an. Order passed on I. A. No. 2371 of 1982 by that Court refusing to condone delay occurred in filing I. A. No. 2927 of 1979 for setting aside an ex-parte decree passed against the revision petitioner. The main application for setting aside an ex-parte decree was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Against the Order passed on I. A. No. 2927 of 1979 refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree, the revision petitioner has filed C. M. A. No. 202 of 1982 before this Court "under 0.33 R.3 (1) of C.P. C. 2. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent plaintiff contended that in view of the fact that an appeal, C. M. A. No. 202 of 1982, has been filed and the same is pending, this revision is not maintainable as the question raised in this revision can be raised in the appeal. 3. There is considerable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff. In the light of the decision reported in Kunhiraman v. Rassy (1979 KLT. 718) the proper remedy in the circumstances of this case to the revision petitioner is to file an appeal. This decision applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. In Kunhiraman v. Rossy, my learned brother, Viswanatha Iyer, J. held that when a petition to excuse delay was dismissed and the appeal was also dismissed on the ground that it was time barred, the remedy of the person aggrieved was to file an appeal against the decree, if that was allowed by law, and take a ground in the appeal that the lower court was wrong in not excusing the delay in filing the appeal. After the amendment of Order XLIII by introducing R.1A this position has been made clear. R.1A of Order XLIII reads: "Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees (1) where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should or should not, have been recorded." 4. The main point to be decided in the appeal is whether the application filed before the Court below for setting aside the ex-parte decree is barred by limitation or not. If the appellate court is satisfied that the party was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time, the appeal has to be allowed and automatically the order passed by the Court below refusing to condone the delay also has to be set aside. The application for excusing delay has only then to be allowed and the case sent back to the court below. This Court in the case referred to above has also observed that the same principle applies to a case where an application to excuse delay in applying for setting aside the ex-parte decree is dismissed. It was further observed that when a petition to excuse the delay in filing an appeal or an application to set aside the ex¬parte decree is dismissed and the consequent decision of the latter appeal or application is appealable, the proper remedy is to appeal and take a ground regarding the incorrectness of the order on the delay petition. Apart from this, the scope of revision under S.115 CPC. in a matter of this nature is limited; while in an appeal, as of right, an appellant is entitled to be heard not only on question of law, but on the facts also. Whereas in a revision, revision petitioner has no right to be heard on facts, except in exceptional circumstances. 5. In the light of the decision in Kunhiraman v. Rossy (1979 KLT. 718) and R.1A of Order XLIII of CPC. revision cannot be sustained. The learned Advocate appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that he has failed to take a ground in this regard in the appeal CMA. No. 202 of 1982 filed by him and therefore any order passed, in the revision may not be a bar to his raising the additional ground in this regard in the appeal. revision cannot be sustained. The learned Advocate appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that he has failed to take a ground in this regard in the appeal CMA. No. 202 of 1982 filed by him and therefore any order passed, in the revision may not be a bar to his raising the additional ground in this regard in the appeal. In the result this revision fails and is hereby dismissed, but it is made clear that this Order will not in any way prevent or bar the revision petitioner from raising additional ground or grounds in the appeal on the point involved in the revision. No costs in the circumstances. Dismissed.