SIDHU, J.-This judgment will deal with all the thirteen connected appeals listed above. These are special appeal under sec. 18, Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. They have been filed by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short the Commission), from the judgment, dated, March 29, 1982, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, thereby allowing 18 connected writ petitions and consequently issuing several directions to the Commission commanding it inter alia, to call the writ petitioners for interview with a view to adjudging their suitability for appointment to certain posts, regardless of their failure to qualify for such interview in the written examination held for the purpose. 2. The material facts are not in dispute. These may be shortly stated herewith reference to the writ petitions of Miss Damyanti Dadich as typical of all other petitions. Miss Damyanti Dadich who will here in-after be referred to as the petitioner, holds a first class Masters Degree and a Ph.D. degree, earned from the University of Rajasthan in 1973 and 1979, respectively. She applied for the post of a lecturer in Hindi in response to an advertisement published by the Commission on April 4, 1980, inviting applications for direct recruitment to such posts in several subjects, including Hindi, in accordance with the Rajasthan Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules 1971 (hereinafter to be called the Rules). The advertisement made it clear that in the event of the number of applications being too large the Commission may, if it considered it necessary to do so, hold a written examination by way of a screening test and call for interview only those examinees who pass the examination scoring such marks as may be prescribed by the Commission. 3. All the petitioner in the 18 writ petitions took the written examination held in October, 1981, but failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks with the result that they were not called for interview. 3. All the petitioner in the 18 writ petitions took the written examination held in October, 1981, but failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks with the result that they were not called for interview. In March, 1982, when the Commission had either already prepared or was in the process of preparing the list of candidates whom they considered suitable for appointment to these posts, the petitioner and others with similar qualifications, filed their separate writ petitions for orders, inter alia, quashing the result of the written screening test held in October, 1981, for perpetual injunction restraining the Commission from holding such tests in future and from preparing any panel and recommending any names for appointment to these posts on the basis of the process of selection commencing with the advertisement, dated April 4, 1980 and ending with the interviews, held on the basis of the impugned screening test, in January, 1982. The petitioners also prayed for mandamus directing the Commission to call them for interview for adjudging their suitability for various posts regardless of their failure to qualify for such interviews in the written examination. 4. The petitioner pleaded as many as twenty two grounds in the writ petition in support her claim to the aforementioned relief and other relief specified in clauses (a) to (h) of the prayer clause. A perusal of the impugned judgment made by the learned Single Judge would, however show that only three grounds were urged before him on behalf of all the writ petitioners including the petitioner. The three grounds urged before the learned Single Judge were: — (i) The academic qualification, prescribed by the University of Rajasthan under the Rules, and advertised by the Commission, would on their true construction, reveal that candidates, like the petitioners, who hold Masters degree with a minimum of 54% marks, and a Ph. D./M. Phil/ M. Litt. degree, are entitled to be called for interview straight-away, and that they cannot be lawfully clubbed with candidates holding a Master degree alone and cannot be compelled to take and pass the written examination by way of a screening test as a pre-condition to qualify for the interview. (ii) The advertisement dated April 4, 1980, was published for the purpose of making recruitment against the number of vacancies anticipated to occur from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1980. (ii) The advertisement dated April 4, 1980, was published for the purpose of making recruitment against the number of vacancies anticipated to occur from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1980. The process of selection by the Commission was required by law to be completed within that year. No selection by the Commission for filling in the number of vacancies anticipated for the 12 months of the year 1980 is legally permissible during the year 1981 or any subsequent year. (iii) There are posts of Lecturers in some other subjects to which recruitment is made on the basis of interviews alone, and no written examination is held to ascertain the desirability or otherwise of calling a candidate for interview. The insistence of the Commission to require the petitioners to pass the written examination, in their respective subjects with certain a minimum marks as a pre-condition to qualify for the interview, offends against the petitioners right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. The State of Rajasthan and the Commission contested these writ petitions and raised certain preliminary objections to their maintainability. First, they pleaded that the petitioners took the written examination, by way of a screening test with full knowledge of the syllabus and that it was only after their failure to score the qualifying marks in that examination that they rushed to the court to prevent other candidates from getting their appointments as Lecturers for which they have been found suitable as a result of a long and laborious process of selection including written examination and interview. It is submitted that the petitioners are estopped from challenging the validity of the written examination and its result which indicated their unsuitabillity for the posts in question at the very there should of the process of selection. 6. Second, they pleaded that these writ petitions were pre-mature inasmuch as the Commission, which is the recommending authority, had not yet made any recommendations, and that even after their recommendations, the Government may or may not appoint the candidates recommended by them. 7. The third and last objection raised is regarding non-joinder of necessary parties. It is contended that all the candidates who have qualified for interview in the written examination are necessary parties, because if the writ petitions are allowed, their rights will be adversely affected. 8. 7. The third and last objection raised is regarding non-joinder of necessary parties. It is contended that all the candidates who have qualified for interview in the written examination are necessary parties, because if the writ petitions are allowed, their rights will be adversely affected. 8. The respondents also contested the writ petitions on merits. They explained that a written examination, by way of a screening test is one of the modes of selecting the most suitable candidates for such posts and that less suitable candidates get weeded out in the written examination itself. No illegality is involved in holding such examinations. Whether to hold or not to hold such a written screening test as was held in October 1981, is a matter depending upon the discretion of the Commission. The respondents pleaded that the Commission had made it clear in the relevant advertisement itself that such a test would be half depending upon the number of applications received and the decision of the Commission in that behalf. The Commission decided to hold the written screening test in the instant case after careful consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances including the facts that the number of applications received for the posts was too large. 9. The respondents denied that Ph D./M. Phil/M.Litt. or any other recognised degree beyond the Masters level is an absolute academic qualifications for any of the posts of lecturers involved in these petitions. The requirement in the Rules regarding a degree beyond the Masters level is subject to some exceptions and reservations. The respondents explained that a Masters degree with a minimum of 54% marks is the minimum qualification prescribed by the University of Rajasthan for the post of Lecturer by direct recruitment and that a candidate possessing a degree beyond the Masters level may, all other factors being equal, be more suitable than a candidate possessing a Masters degree alone, but if he found less suitable from the stand-point of other relevant factors, the mere possession by him of a degree beyond the Masters level will not make up for his deficiency in other factors. The respondents added in this context that the petitioners, who had taken the written examination in their respective subjects with advance notice of the syllabus for the examination, failed to score even the minimum number of marks which, in the opinion of the Commission; was the bare minimal test of their suitability. Such candidates, notwithstanding the fact that they possessed degrees beyond the Masters level were found unsuitable as compared to those who had scored the qualifying marks for interview. The Commission made it clear in their reply that in the interviews as a result of the screening test the Commission invariably gives some weight age to a candidate possessing a degree beyond the Masters level as compared to a candidate possessing a Masters degree alone. 10. The respondents also denied that holding of a written screening test in some subjects and not holding such a test in other subjects involves any violation of the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. They also denied that the Rules make it mandatory for the Commission to finalise its recommendations within a particular year to which the vacancies, as determined under rule 9 of the Rules, relete. 11. The findings of the learned Single Judge on the controversy raised before him may be summarised as follows: (i) Persons, likely to be adversely affected in the event of these writ petitions being allowed are not necessary parties to these petitions. (ii) The petitioners are not estopped from challenging the validity of the written examination and its result by reason merely of taking the said examination and waiting till the result, which declared that they had failed to qualify for the interview. (iii) The writ petitions are not premature. (iv) The rule (i.e. rule 9 of the Rules) laying down that the Appointing Authority shall determine each year the number of vacancies anticipated during the following twelve months and that such vacancies shall be determined again before the expiry of 12 months of the last determination of such vacancies is directory and not mandatory. Non-compliance with this rule dies not vitiate the selections made by the Commission. (v) Holding the screening test for some subjects and not holding it for others does not involve any hostile discrimination and therefore is not opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution. Non-compliance with this rule dies not vitiate the selections made by the Commission. (v) Holding the screening test for some subjects and not holding it for others does not involve any hostile discrimination and therefore is not opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution. (vi) The written examination by way of a screening test is permissible in law to restrict the number of candidates who may be called for interview. (vii) Candidates possessing Masters degree alone, and candidates possessing Masters degree and Ph.D/M.Phil/M.Litt. degree or a recognised degree beyond the Masters level or published work etc. belong to two different classes. These two classes, as the learned Judge put it, "shall not be jumbled together in the screening test". Since they were "jumbled together" for giving them the written screening test, the said test must be quashed. (viii) A written examination, by way of a screening test, in a particular subject based on the syllabus of a graduate or post-graduate (Masters level) course is no better than a test of "retentive memory" and "bookish knowledge" in which candidates, who have freshly done graduation or post-graduation, are at an advantage as compared to candidates possessing a Ph. D/M. Phil,/M. Litt degree. Such a test is not a valid test of comparative suitability of the two categories of candidates. (ix) The only way to give meaning and life to both the clauses, i.e. clauses (a) and (b) of the rule laying down qualifications for appointment as Lecturers by direct recruitment is to so construe the rule as to mean that candidates possessing both the qualifications enumerated as (a) and (b) of the rule, that is, candidates who possess both Masters degree as well as Ph. D /M.Phil/M. Litt. etc. are entitled to be called for interview straight away, and that they cannot, for that purpose, be lawfully subjected to comply with the requirement of taking the written screening test and scoring therein enough marks for qualifying for the interview. (x) The Commission is legally bound to call for interview all the candidates who have qualified for it as a result of the written examination or screening test held in October 1981. It is further under a legal duty to call for interview all the candidates possessing both Masters degree as well as Ph.D./M.Phil/M.Litt. etc. regardless of their failure to qualify for such interview as a result of the screening test. 12. It is further under a legal duty to call for interview all the candidates possessing both Masters degree as well as Ph.D./M.Phil/M.Litt. etc. regardless of their failure to qualify for such interview as a result of the screening test. 12. It was on the basis of these findings that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions of all the 18 candidates who, according to him, possessed both a Masters degree as well as a Ph.D/M. phil/M.Litt. degree. As already stated, the learned judge issued to the Commission a number of directions with detailed instructions regarding their implementation with exceptions to them here and there. We may reproduce here the operative portion of the impugned judgment as follows: "Those persons who have not been interviewed inspite of fulfilling qualification A and B both together, would now be interviewed by the Commission and marks would be given to them in the interviews. After marks are given to them in the interviews those marks would be readjusted comparatively with the already selected persons and if according to the marks obtained by these persons, they can find a place in the merit list of the requisite number of vacancies, then their names should be forwarded to the Government under Rule 20 for appointment. "The selection list already sent in these subjects to the Government would remain in abeyance and would not be implemented, unless the revised list is sent by the Commission on the basis of fresh interviews of these persons who were not interviewed earlier and fall in this category. "It is held that the screening test was permissible and the Commission has not committed any error of law in holding the screening test for determination of the zone of consideration, which have been bonafidely done according to the exigencies of the situation. "It is further held that in future the Commission would not require the persons who fulfil conditions A and B in such cases to undergo the Screening Test. But in case the number of such persons who fulfil both conditions is very large, so as to require any curtailment, then screening test can also be half for them, but while doing so the number of the persons who are to come into exception would not be taken into account. But in case the number of such persons who fulfil both conditions is very large, so as to require any curtailment, then screening test can also be half for them, but while doing so the number of the persons who are to come into exception would not be taken into account. "In other words at all stages and particularly at stages of the interview the first thing which the Commission should find out is whether those persons who fulfil qualifications A and B and therefore fulfil both the conditions are suitable or not, and the moment they are found to be suitable in view of the marks which they are given in interviews, then they should be taken in the selection list and should be recommended. It is only after that these persons who are trying to get employment by resort to exception or proviso should be considered and thereafter they can also be accommodated in case the persons who are in category A and B are found to be not suitable. "It is true that for suitability only the marks which are to be given by the Commission in interview should be the criteria and there cannot be any other criteria except the marks given in the interview. The Commission can evolve its own method for holding any suitability test in interview by giving marks and for that no interference can be done by this Court in that respect, unless malafides are proved". 13. The Commission has challenged the judgment of the learned Single judge in 13 separate special appeals based on identical grounds. We propose to dispose of all the 13 appeals by this common judgment. 14. Mr. N.L. Jain, the Advocate-General representing the appellant questioned the correctness of the findings of the learned Single Judge mentioned at (i), (ii), (iii), (vi), (viii), (ix) and (x). On the other hand, Mr. Paras Kuhad learned counsel for the writ petitioners who are respondents in these appeals, not only defended these findings but went a step further and argued that the learned Judge had erred in recording the findings at (iv), (v) and (vi) against the writ petitioners. We are thus called upon to examine all the ten findings afresh. 15. Paras Kuhad learned counsel for the writ petitioners who are respondents in these appeals, not only defended these findings but went a step further and argued that the learned Judge had erred in recording the findings at (iv), (v) and (vi) against the writ petitioners. We are thus called upon to examine all the ten findings afresh. 15. The three preliminary objections to these writ petitions raised on behalf of the Commission which form the subject of the first three findings of the learned Single Judge (i,e. findings (i), (ii) and (iii) above) need not detain us long. Now that these writ petitions have been heard on merits by the learned Single Judge in the exercise of the extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court and again by us in special appeal, we would hesitate to dismiss these writ petitions on such technical grounds as non-joinder of parties, and the like. So far as the defect of non-joinder is concerned, the court has ample powers under law to pass orders requiring the name of any person who ought to have been impleaded as a respondent to be added as such. As for estoppel, we are of opinion that this issue does not arise in the context of the arguments raised. It will be presently seen that the main argument raised on behalf of the writ petitioners before us is, that under the rules, the writ petitioners were entitled to be called for interview, regardless of the fact whether they took the screening test or not and further whether they passed in the said test or not. If this argument is accepted, as it has been accepted by the learned Single Judge, it will not in that case, be legally permissible to entertain the argument from the opposite side to the effect that the writ petitioners are estopped by their conduct from challenging the validity of the screening test and their exclusion from interview on the basis of the result of that test. It is well settled that there is no estoppel against the law of the land. The petitioners cannot be legally precluded, not even on the principle of estoppel-by-conduct, from showing, if they can really so show, that their exclusion from interview on the basis of the result of the screening test is illegal and invalid under law. It is well settled that there is no estoppel against the law of the land. The petitioners cannot be legally precluded, not even on the principle of estoppel-by-conduct, from showing, if they can really so show, that their exclusion from interview on the basis of the result of the screening test is illegal and invalid under law. If on the other hand it is held, as we will presently show it has to be so held, that the petitioners were legally bound to pass the test with qualifying marks to earn the right to be called for interview, and that, since they could not so pass it, they were rightly excluded from the interview, there would in that case be no need or occasion to go into the question of estoppel. Thus, the issue regarding estoppel is a wholly false dilemma and it must therefore be ignored as such. Similar observations would govern mutatis mutandis, the issue of unripeness. If the screening test for the petitioners could not be lawfully held, they are entitled to challenge it right-away without waiting for decision of the Government on the recommendations of the Commission regarding appointment to these posts. If it was legally permissible to hold the screening test together, in respect of all candidates including the petitioners, the writ petitions would fail on merits rather than on the ground of their so-called unripeness. 16. Turning now to the question as whether rule 9 of the Rules is directory or mandatory, the learned Single Judge has held that it is directory and that the direction contained therein must be taken to have been complied with in the instant case as soon as the vacancies anticipated to occur in 1980 were determined in the year 1979. Rule 9 has been reproduced by the learned Single Judge in his judgment under appeal. We agree with the learned Judge that this rule embodies a direction requiring the Appointing Authority to determine each year the number of vacancies anticipated during the following 12 months. This rule is in the nature of a statutory instruction to or guidance for the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority fails to comply with it, his failure in that behalf may create administrative difficulties and he would certainly be answerable to his superiors for his failure in that behalf. This rule is in the nature of a statutory instruction to or guidance for the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority fails to comply with it, his failure in that behalf may create administrative difficulties and he would certainly be answerable to his superiors for his failure in that behalf. The failure of the Appointing Authority to comply with this rule in any particular year cannot invalidate the process of selection for making appointments to the vacancies already determined for a previous year. Rule 9 has indeed no application whatever to a process of selection pending with the Commission for making recruitment to the vacant posts for which the Appointing Authority has already sent a requisition to it. This rule addresses itself to the Appointing Authority and not to the Commission. If the Appointing Authority has failed to discharge its statutory duty and such failure adversely affects the legal rights of the petitioners, they may if so advised, seek redress for compelling the Appointing Authority to perform its duty, but they cannot on that ground alone, be allowed to obstruct the process of selection in respect of the vacancies for a previous year which may remain pending with the Commission for reasons beyond its control. We would therefore endorse the finding of the learned Single Judge that rule 9 is directory and not mandatory. In any case, the alleged non-compliance with the rule by the Appointing Authority in the year 1980 and 1981 cannot adversely affect the process of selection pending with the Commission for making recruitment to the vacancies already determined in the year 1979 for the year 1980. 17. Similarly, we also affirm the finding, No (v), of the learned Single Judge to the effect that it is for the Commission to decide as to which is the subject which requires the holding of a screening test and which not for the purpose of selecting suitable candidates for appointment as Lecturers in those subjects The Commission is a Constitutional entity charged by the Constitution with a duty to conduct examinations for appointment to the services of the State and to make recommendations according to rules regarding such appointments. The Commission is certainly in a much better position than a court as to how to go about the business of making selections of suitable persons for appointments to various posts coming within its purview. The Commission is certainly in a much better position than a court as to how to go about the business of making selections of suitable persons for appointments to various posts coming within its purview. The Court should therefore be extremely slow to interfere in the selection process and the methodology adopted for the purpose by the Commission. Obviously, there are many relevant factors which would influence the decision of the Commission whether to hold a screening test in a subject or not to hold it. It mere fact that it decides against the screening test in one subject is no ground to preclude it from holding it in another. The principle of equality enacted in Article 14 does not absolutely prevent the Commission from making such differentiation between different subjects. The Commission has power of classification on the basis of rational distinction. It is quite easy to understand such distinction made on the basis of subjects and the court should not interfere in the matter in the absence of any allegation and proof of mala fides. 18. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and mentioned at Nos. (vi) to (x) above are inter-connected and may therefore be discussed together. The finding (No. vi) to the effect that a written examination by way of screening test is permissible in law to restrict the number of candidates who may be called for interview amounts to an endorsement of the stand taken by the Commission before the learned Single Judge. Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, who questioned the correctness of this finding before us, was not able to convince us as to why, in the absence of any legal bar to the holding of a written screening test, the Commission should not be left free to devise its own procedure and methodology to weed out less suitable candidates at the initial stage of the process of selection. Surely, a written test in the subject in which a particular candidate may claim the requisite competency to teach is one of the tests, if not the best, to adjudge the suitability of the candidate for the job of a Lecturer in that subject. Even Mr. Surely, a written test in the subject in which a particular candidate may claim the requisite competency to teach is one of the tests, if not the best, to adjudge the suitability of the candidate for the job of a Lecturer in that subject. Even Mr. Kuhad had to concede that, as a general proposition, there may not be any objection to the holding of a written screening test for the purpose of adjudging a candidates suitability for a particular job. He however, strenuously defended the approach of the learned Single Judge to the effect that candidates possessing doctoral degrees and other qualifications beyond the Masters level should not be clubbed with candidates possessing Masters degree alone for holding such a written test. According to Mr. Kuhad, the only reasonable interpretation of the relevant rule should be that the screening test should first be held if necessary, for candidates possessing both a Masters degree as well as a doctoral degree in the subject concerned, and that if none of such candidates is found suitable for appointment as a Lecturer in that subject then, that case the Commission should start the process of selection afresh with a view to selecting suitable candidates for such appointment from among those who are possessed of a Masters degree alone. In advancing these arguments, Mr. Kuhad was obviously adopting the reasoning of the learned Single Judge to the effect that a candidate possessing a doctoral degree cannot, as the learned judge put it, "be jumbled together" with a candidate possessing a Masters degree alone, for holding a written test, and that a written test is not a good test of the suitability as Lecturer of a candidate possessing a doctoral degree for, as the learned judge further pointed out, a screening test is no better than a test of "retentive memory" and "bookish knowledge" in which a candidate who has freshly done a Masters degree alone is at an advantage as compared to a candidate possessing a doctoral degree. 19. Let us now read the relevant rule to find out if the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, which is the basis of the present arguments of Mr. Kuhad, can be sustained on a proper and legal interpretation of the rule. 19. Let us now read the relevant rule to find out if the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, which is the basis of the present arguments of Mr. Kuhad, can be sustained on a proper and legal interpretation of the rule. The Rules (see rules 6,11 and the Schedule) lay down that all the posts of Lecturers shall be filled by direct recruitment and that the minimum qualification and experience for direct recruitment shall be as laid down, from time to time, by the. University of Rajasthan. It is common ground between the parties that such qualifications and experience for the post of a Lecturer as laid down by the University of Rajasthan were correctly published by the Commission in the advertisement for these posts. The qualifications and experience as published are: (a) Good academic record with atleast high second class (with a minimum of 54% marks) Masters degree in the subject concerned of an India University or an equivalent degree of a foreign University; and (b) A Ph. D/M. Phil/M. Litt. degree or a recognised degree beyond the Masters level or published work indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research work; provided that — (1) If a candidate possessing the qualifications at (b) is not available or is not considered suitable for appointment, the Commission may recommend a person who fulfils the requirements as given in (a) above on the condition that he will have to obtain a Ph. D/M. Phil/M. Litt. degree or a recognised degree beyond the Masters level within five years of his appointment, failing which he will not be able to earn future increments till he obtains that degree or gives evidence of published work of high standard indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research work. (2) If a candidate has passed Post-graduate Examination/M Phil/M. Litt. Examination in the subject concerned in First Division or has teaching experience of degree/Post-graduate class in the college (s) concerned under the same management and affiliated to the University for atleast three continuous academic years; A relaxation upto 3% marks may be allowed in the percentage of marks obtained in the Masters degree examination as required in (a) above and/or upto 3% in explanation of (a) thereof. OR If a candidate has a Doctorate degree, a relaxation upto 5%may be given in the percentage of marks obtained in the Masters degree examination required in (a) above and/or upto 2% in explanation of (a) thereof. EXPLANATION: (i) Good academic record means an average of atleast 50% marks of the aggregate of two examinations prior to masters degree (viz. Higher Secondary/Pre-University/Intermediate or any equivalent Examination and B. A./B. Sc./B. Com/B. Music. (ii) A high second class means a second class with at least 54% marks. N.B. (1) One academic year for purpose of teaching experience will be deemed to imply an academic sessions major part but not less than five months. (2) The above conditions may be relaxed in the case of those temporary Lecturers who were in service of an affiliated college concerned on the last working day of the session 1978-79 i.e. on the 30th Nov. 1978 or on the 14th June 1979 subject to the condition that they fulfilled at the time of their first appointment, the minimum eligibility qualifications which were in force at that time. 20. A plain reading of the above material dealing with "minimum qualifications and experience for direct recruitment" to the posts of Lecturers would show that there is nothing in it which may be so read as to impose on the Commission an obligation to treat candidates with both Masters and doctoral degrees one side, and candidates with Masters degree on the other, in two separate water-tight compartments, and to hold one written test for adjudging the suitability of the former, and a second and separate written test for adjudging the suitability of the latter in the event of the former category of candidates not throwing up enough suitable persons for appointment as Lecturers in a particular subject. Besides, that the suggestion regarding two separate written tests for adjudging the suitability of candidates for appointment as Lecturers in one and the same subject is on the face of it unnecessarily offensive, irritating, and discriminatory against the candidate who may be said to be less qualified from the stand-point of academic degrees, but who is prepared to compete on equal terms with those who possess higher degrees. If the written examination by way of a screening test is valid, as the learned Single Judge has held, and rightly so in our opinion, that it is valid, the argument for two separate processes of selection and two separate written examinations, one for candidates possessing doctorate degrees and the other for candidates possessing Masters degrees must be rejected as wholly invalid and unacceptable. 21. We are not much impressed by the argument that a candidate possessing a doctorate degree would ipso facto and necessarily prove to be a better, Lecturer than a candidate possessing a Masters degree alone. In any case, we must be prepared to make allowance for the fact that this is a matter on which opinions may differ. That being so, the court must defer to the Commission which is a Constitutional entity consisting of experts charged by Article 320 of the Constitution with the duty" to conduct examinations for appointment to the services of the State". We regret we cannot endorse the view of the learned Single Judge that the Commission ought to have called for interview all candidates possessing doctoral degrees regardless of the fact whether they had taken the written examination or not and whether they had secured the qualifying marks or not. We are also of the view that when confronted with such controversial issues, in the area of executive functions of the State, as to whether a written examination in a particular subject is an effective test of a candidates suitability to teach that subject, or whether such a test is no better than a test of, what the learned judge chose to describe as, "retentive-memory" and "bookish knowledge", the wiser course for a Court would be to leave it to the expert executive agency, especially so when the agency happens to be a Constitutional entity like the Commission, to make its well considered choice from such competing values. 22. 22. Learned Single Judge is further of opinion that the only way to give meaning to clause (a) and (b) of the rule regarding minimum qualifications and experience for direct recruitment to the post of Lecturers, as produced in paragraph 19 of this judgment, is to so construe it as laying down that the Commission is under a legal duty to call for interview the candidates possessing doctorate degrees without insisting on the requirement that they pass the screening test with minimum qualifying marks, as prescribed by the Commission, and that the only valid test of adjudging their suitability for appointments as Lecturers is the interview. It appears that the learned Judge arrived at this conclusion on the view that candidates possessing a Masters degree alone do not fulfil the prescribed minimum qualifications for the job of a Lecturer. This is evident from the remarks of the learned Judge to the effect that the proviso to clause(a) and (b) as reproduced in paragraph 19 of this judgment should not be allowed to over-ride the said clauses. The learned Judge says that, if on the basis of the proviso, a Masters degree is also accepted as fulfilling the minimum qualification laid down for the post of a Lecturer, it will, in effect, mean that "what has been provided as an exception or a proviso to the rule or to the qualification clause would become a part of the clause, as good or as bad, as the main clause". At another place in his judgment, however, the learned Judge made a somewhat contradictory remark in that he gradgingly conceded that "those who want to come by way of an exception want to come by back door entry of course permissible in the Rules" (Emphasis supplied). The underlined words in this quote would show that though the learned Judge does not approve of it, the qualification of a Masters degree alone is "permissible in the Rules". 23. We have very carefully studied the entire rule along with its clause(a) and (b), the proviso and what follows the proviso, and are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge is in error if he thinks that a proviso ranks inferior to a main clause in a particular section or rule and that in case of repugnancy the proviso must be ignored as redundant. This approach is not in consonance, with the well accepted rules of interpretation of statutes. We may quote here from Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition) regarding construction of provisos and saving clauses. This is what the learned author has to say about it: It sometimes happens that there is repugnancy between the enacting clauses and provisos and saving clauses. The question then arises. How is the Act, taken as a whole, to be construed? The generally accepted rule with regard to the construction of a proviso in an Act which is repugnant to the purview of the Act is that laid down in Att. Gen. vs. Chelsea Waterworks, namely that where the proviso of an Act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers. Where there are two sections dealing with the same subject-matter one section being unqualified and the other containing a qualification, effect. Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition) also quotes cases lying down that when the proviso appended to the enacting part is repugnant to it, it repeals the enacting part. He then hastens to quote from Kents Commentary on American Law to indicate that the view to the effect, that if the proviso is repugnant to the main clause then the proviso stands and the main clause is repealed, is an extreme view."How can we say that one provision is repealed by the other when both received the Royal Assent at the same moment?" is the question raised in Kents Commentary, and quoted by Maxwell. Both Craies and Maxwell seem to agree with the editors of Kents Commentary that the correct rule of interpretation at the present day is as follows : The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute on a view of the enacting clause, saying clause, and proviso, taken and construed together, are to prevail. The Supreme Court affirmed the correctness of this rule of interpretation in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. P. Krishna Warrier (1) and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue Madras vs. Ram Krishan Shri Kishan Jhaver(2). The Supreme Court affirmed the correctness of this rule of interpretation in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. P. Krishna Warrier (1) and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue Madras vs. Ram Krishan Shri Kishan Jhaver(2). The Supreme Court has laid down in these rulings that generally speaking a proviso is an exception to the main part of the section, but in some cases a proviso may be the substantive provision itself and may have to be read as such. In State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Jain (3) their Lordships pointed out that even if effect has to be given to a proviso as a substantive provision and not merely as an exception on the basis of its plain language, the court must give it effect as a substantive provision we may quote here with advantage the following observations of their Lordship. Unless the words are unmeaning or absured, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on every elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. 24. For all these reasons, we are of opinion that the main rule and the proviso along with explanations have to be taken and read together and given a harmonious construction. If the language so requires, the proviso may even be construed as a substantive clause. It will not be permissible to so read the rule as to ignore the proviso or to render it otiose. 25. In the instant case, we do not find any irreconcilable conflict between the rule and the proviso. Clauses (a) and (b) of the rule lay down the minimum qualification for direct recruitment to the post of Lecturer. The minimum qualification for such recruitment broadly stated is (a) good academic record with at least a high scored class Masters degree in the subject and (b) a Ph. D /M Phil/M. Litt. degree or a recognised degree beyond the Masters level or published work indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research work. The minimum qualification for such recruitment broadly stated is (a) good academic record with at least a high scored class Masters degree in the subject and (b) a Ph. D /M Phil/M. Litt. degree or a recognised degree beyond the Masters level or published work indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research work. The proviso engrafts one exception to the aforementioned minimum qualifications in it provides that if a candidate possessing the aforementioned minimum qualification is not available or not considered suitable for appointment, a candidate possessing a Masters degree alone may be recommended for such appointment. Another exception to this rule is contained in the explanation appended to it. A perusal of the explanation reproduced earlier in this judgment will show that the minimum qualification may be relaxed in the case of temporary lecturers who were in service in the affiliated college concerned on the last working day of the Ses. 1978-79, i.e. on 30th November, 1978 or on June 14, 1979. The proviso and the explanation thus make it clear that the rule regarding minimum qualifications as laid down in clause (a) and (b) is not an absolute rule. It is subject to exceptions given in the proviso and the explanations. The entire rule, i. e. clauses (a) and (b), the provisos and the explanations thereto must be read and construed together. Each part of the rule should be given meaning by applying the principle of harmonious construction. If the minimum qualifications as laid down in clauses (a) and(b) suffer some eclipse or diminution by reason of the provisos and the explanations, the same has to be accepted as the inevitable result of the intention of the rule making authority as manifested in the entire rule. The court must give equal effect to all parts of the rule. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Jain (supra), the court cannot refuse to give effect to the provisions of a rule (including the proviso) on what their Lordships described as "the very elusive ground" that to give such effect to the proviso would lead to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of justice or propriety entertained by the Court 26. We may now proceed to examine if what the Commission has done in the instant case is in accordance with the provisions of this rule. We may now proceed to examine if what the Commission has done in the instant case is in accordance with the provisions of this rule. As already stated, the Commissions held screening tests in various subjects in order to weed out less suitable candidates and thus restrict the number of candidates to be called for interview. The Commission did not make any distinction between candidates possessing both Masters degrees and doctorate degrees and those possessing merely Masters degree inasmuch as both category of candidates were given one and the same test. What has happened in this process is that while some candidates like the present petitioners, who possess both Mosters degrees as well as doctorate degrees, have failed to qualify for interview, others who possess a Masters degree alone have come out successful and qualified for the interview. A candidate who could not even score the minimum qualifying marks in the written test in a particular subject cannot legitimately claim to be suitable for appointment as a lecturer in the subject. A written test is certainly as good a test, if not better one, as an interview for adjudging a candidates suitability for appointment as a Lecturer. It will now be for the Commission to interview both categories of successful candidates and select the more suitable ones for appointment as Lecturers in their respective subjects. Of course, as the learned Advocate General pointed out, the Commission will certainly give some weight age in the interview to candidates possessing degrees beyond the Masters level as compared to candidates possessing a Masters degree alone. Such weight age is bound to be given having regard to that part of the provisions of the rule which follow the proviso reproduced above. 27. We have therefore no hesitation in deciding that by holding the written tests in various subjects for which Lecturers are to be recruited with a view to restricting the number of candidates who are to be called for interview, and giving one and the same test to both category of candidates, the Commission has committed no illegality or impropriety. We are satisfied that the procedure adopted by the Commission in that behalf is not only legal but also fair and just to all concerned, if found suitable, candidates with doctoral degrees will have to be preferred by the interviewing board to candidates possessing Masters degrees alone. We are satisfied that the procedure adopted by the Commission in that behalf is not only legal but also fair and just to all concerned, if found suitable, candidates with doctoral degrees will have to be preferred by the interviewing board to candidates possessing Masters degrees alone. If on the other hand, the Commission finds in the interview that a particular candidate with a doctorate degree is not suitable for appointment as Lecturer for one reason or the other, it would be free to recommend a suitable candidate possessing a Masters degree alone for such appointment, not with-standing the fact that the candidate possessing the doctorate degree had passed the qualifying test with prescribed number of marks. 28. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners then argued that the Commission discriminated against the petitioner by holding written tests in their respective subjects, while not holding simitar tests for such appointment in certain other subjects. This argument is also without any force. The law is well settled that the principle of equality enacted in Article 14 does not absolutely prevent the State from making differentiation between persons and things. The State has power of classification on the basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular matter dealt with If the Commission did not feel the necessity of holding a written test in a particular subject for restricting the number of candidates to be called for interview, the petitioners cannot be heard complaining about it because so far as they are concerned the written tests in their respective subjects were held without making any discrimination for or against any of their potential competitions. 29. We may also mention here that Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, raised some argument as to what he described as arbitrary ratios fixed by the Commission for calling candidates for interviews in different subjects. He placed on record a chart giving ratios of candidates called for interview with reference to the number of vacancies to be filled in and pointed out that whereas in one subject the Commission called seven candidates for each vacancy, in another it called only two candidates for one vacancy. This according to Mr. Kuhad is discriminatory. We are unable to agree. It is for the Commission to decide about such ratios depending on various factors considered relevant by it. This according to Mr. Kuhad is discriminatory. We are unable to agree. It is for the Commission to decide about such ratios depending on various factors considered relevant by it. No hard and fast rule can be laid down by the Court for fixation of such ratios. 30. In conclusion, we allow these appeals set aside the judgement and consequent directions given by the learned Single Judge to the Commission and instead dismiss all the thirteen writ petitions of the petitioners listed in the title of this judgment. In the facts and circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs. 31. In view of the dismissal of all the thirteen writ petitions by us, we do not find it necessary to pass any order on an application filed on July 5, 1982 by counsel for the appellant. Similarly, it is no longer necessary to deal with the application dated, July 2, 1982 made by Phool Chand Mahirania who sought some modification of the interim order of stay. These applications will be placed on the record.