JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. 1. Both these petitions are connected and can be disposed of by one common judgment. The petitions have arisen out of an application for release under Sec. 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which was given by the landlady Smt. Shanti Shah against her tenant Sri B.N. Tiwari. 2. The facts, in brief, are these Smt. Shanti Shah is the landlady and Sri B.N. Tewari is the tenant in the accommodation in question. The accommodation is suite no. 5 on the first floor of a building known as 'Shanti Niketan', situated in Malli Tal in Naini Tal. This rented accommodation consists of four big rooms, two lavatories and two rooms in the out-houses. The landlady applied for release of the said accommodation under Sec. 21 (1) (a) of the said Act. A true copy of the said application is annexure no. 'C' to Civil Misc. Writ petition no. 4819 of 1980, i.e. the tenant's writ petition. As will be evident from the prayer set out in the said application, the landlady expressed her willingness to share the accommodation in question with the tenant's son who, according to her, alone was in occupation of the accommodation in dispute. The stand of the landlady throughout the release application and even in this Court has been that she would be satisfied if two rooms and the lavatories on the first floor were released to her out of the four rooms and lavatories on the first floor of the building in question. Of course, she also in addition sought the release of a portion of the out-house which was sought to be used as kitchen. The tenant contested the said release application. The Prescribed Authority by a detailed order dated 28-8-1979 allowed the application for release in part. The details of the released accommodation are given in the operative part of the said order with reference to a map which was made a part of the said order. In broad terms, the Prescribed Authority released one room out of the four rooms on the first floor, lavatory and half portion of the out-house in the tenancy of Sri Tewari. Both sides felt aggrieved and went up in cross-appeals before the appellate court. In broad terms, the Prescribed Authority released one room out of the four rooms on the first floor, lavatory and half portion of the out-house in the tenancy of Sri Tewari. Both sides felt aggrieved and went up in cross-appeals before the appellate court. The appellate court dismissed both the appeals by a common judgment, dated May 8, 1980, a true copy of which is on record as Annexure 'A' to the petition of Sri B.N. Tewari, the tenant. A certified copy of the order of the Prescribed Authority is annexure 'B' to the said petition. Feeling aggrieved, both sides have now come up in the instant cross writ petitions and in support and in opposition of the two writ petitions, I have heard Sri Kameshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the tenant and Sri Tandon in support of the petition of the landlady. The authorities below have concurrently held that the need of the landlady was bona fide and on a comparison of the hardships involved, it was felt that she would be put to a greater hardship in case the application for release was rejected in comparison to the hardship which would be suffered by the tenant in case the application was allowed. However, taking into consideration the situations of both the sides, the authorities below have felt that it was just and equitable to allow the release application in part and, therefore, it was partly allowed in the manner that only one room out of the four rooms in the tenancy of Sri Tewari has been directed to be released alongwith the lavatory on the first floor and also alongwith a portion of the out-house in the tenancy of the said tenant. Sri Kameshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the authorities below were in error in holding that the need of the landlady was bona fide. It was further contended that the said authorities also erred in holding that on a comparison of hardships involved, the landlady stood to suffer a greater hardship by the rejection of her release application than the hardship which was likely to be suffered by the tenant in case the said application was allowed. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the authorities below are not justified in holding that the alleged partition between the landlady, Sri J.P. Shah and Smt. Sudha Shah was a genuine transaction. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the authorities below are not justified in holding that the alleged partition between the landlady, Sri J.P. Shah and Smt. Sudha Shah was a genuine transaction. In fact, the said transaction was mala fide and its only aim was to get rid of the tenants including his client Sri B.N. Tewari. Learned counsel further contended that there was no evidence on record which justified the finding of the authorities below that, infact, there was a transaction and that the same was genuine. In this connection the learned counsel placed reliance on the following authorities of the Supreme Court. (1) M.N. Aryamurthi v. M.L. Surbharaya, AIR 1972 SC 1279 . (2) Kaley v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807 =1976 (3) SCC p. 119. 3. On the other hand, Sri Tandon, learned counsel for the landlady, contended that this petition stood concluded by findings of fact and there could be no interference within the narrow ambit of jurisdiction of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He placed reliance on S.S. Phillai v. K.S. Phillai, AIR 1972 SC 2069 para 25. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary that some more facts be stated. One Sri Inderlal Shah was possessed of big properties in Naini Tal. He died on 3-1-1976 and was admittedly succeeded by three heirs, namely, Sri J.P. Shah (bachelor son), the landlady in the case Smt. Shanti Shah (widow of predeceased son of Inderlal) and Smt. Sudha Shah, daughter of Smt. Shanti Shah. It was the case of the landlady that after the death of Sri Inderlal Shah, there was an oral partition between the co-owners of the property and as a result of the said oral partition, properties were allotted to each of the three co-owners. Admittedly, the building known as Shanti Villa was allotted to Smt. Sudha Shah. It is in this building that the landlady is presently residing. The landlady came forward with a case that she wanted to reside separately from her married daughter and, therefore, she sought the release of a part of the suite in question from Sri Tewari, who was occupying the same as a tenant. Sri Tewari's defence, inter-alia, was that the alleged partition was fictitious and it was not real. Its only aim was to get rid of the tenants. Sri Tewari's defence, inter-alia, was that the alleged partition was fictitious and it was not real. Its only aim was to get rid of the tenants. Certain circumstances were pointed out to establish the said contention. They have been examined by the authorities below. Inter-alia, it was suggested that if the partition was genuine, the landlady would have insisted on getting a portion of the property which was not in occupation of the tenant and it was some-what artificial that whereas Smt. Sudha Shah was given the entire Shanti Villa which was in self occupation of the co-owners, the tenanted buildings were allotted to the share of Sri J.P. Shah and Smt. Shanti Shah. It was further contended that there was no written document evidencing the partition. It was alleged to be oral. Learned counsel contended that the mere fact that on the basis of the oral partition, mutation was effected in the municipal records did not go to establish the genuineness of the transaction. Further, it was contended that the division was wholly unequal and extra-ordinary in the sense that Smt. Sudha Shah was getting the best of the allotment of the properties and the two other co-owners were allotted strikingly less valuable properties. It was contended that there was no real occasion for the co-owners to divide the properties and the entire exercise had only one single motivation and that was, as stated above, to get rid of the tenant. Sri Tandon, on the other hand, contested the contention that the partition was unequal or artificial. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit of the landlady filed in this case that the partition was not an unequal division of the properties as has been alleged from the side of the tenant. 5. I have taken into consideration these rival contentions. It seems to me that the findings, which have been recorded in the instant case by the authorities below, are findings of fact and it cannot be said that these findings are without any evidence to support them or that they can be said to be erroneous in law. Whether, the partition was genuine or not is basically a finding of fact. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that there could be no oral partition and that it was bound to be by a registered document. Whether, the partition was genuine or not is basically a finding of fact. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that there could be no oral partition and that it was bound to be by a registered document. Further, as a matter of law it cannot be said that there can be no unequal division. It is basically for the co-owners to decide in what manner and to what extent each co-owner would get share in the common properties. It is not necessary to go to the extent of saying that in any controversy touching upon the genuineness of such a transaction, a tenant can have no say in any circumstances whatsoever. I should not like to pronounce any crystallised opinion on this controversy but as at present advised, it seems to me that since under Section 21 (1) (a) it is open to a tenant to show that the application for release is not bonafide he may seek to establish in any appropriate case that a partition or family settlement is malafide in the sense that there was no real partition or family settlement whatsoever and the very factum of the alleged transaction lacked basis. However, in this connection certain other aspects have also to be emphasized. It is a well settled cardinal rule that no tenant can be allowed to question the title of a landlord. If after the alleged partition, a tenant has attorned to a particular erstwhile co-owner as his sole landlord, 1 apprehend that it will not be open to such a tenant to question the title of such a landlord on the ground that the transaction whereby his landlord became the sole owner of the property, was a malafide one and not a genuine one. It is not necessary to advert to the exceptional cases of fraud etc., namely a fraud which the tenant might allege to have been practised upon him. In such extreme cases, I feel that the law is as I have stated above. In the facts of the present case, however, the aforesaid logic may not strictly apply because the admitted position is that the suite in question was not the subject matter of the partition between the three co-owners. In fact, this suite had been purchased by the landlady from her father-in-law during the latter's life time on 30th October, 1974. In the facts of the present case, however, the aforesaid logic may not strictly apply because the admitted position is that the suite in question was not the subject matter of the partition between the three co-owners. In fact, this suite had been purchased by the landlady from her father-in-law during the latter's life time on 30th October, 1974. Therefore, it can be stated that the aforesaid reasoning which I have shown in the preceding discussion will not be attracted to the present case and it may be said that it is open to the tenant to show that there was no real partition whatsoever. 6. However, in my view, the cases on which Sri Kameshwar Prasad has placed reliance do not support him in the contention which he advanced. Firstly, as I have stated above, the findings which have been recorded in the present case are pure findings of fact and in recording the said findings it has not been shown that any error of law was committed by the authorities below. Adverting to the two Supreme Court pronouncements on which Sri Kameshwar Prasad placed reliance, in my view, the ratio of the said decisions is not applicable to the instant case. Firstly, it should be seen that in the said cases questions of law were involved and secondly, the kinds of family settlement with reference to which the said cases were decided were different from a simple partition between the three co-owners with which we are concerned in the instant case. Here admittedly, as I have stated above, the properties left by Sri Inderlal Shah were inherited by three heirs and they divided the properties among themselves. The special facts equities which figured in the aforesaid Supreme Court pronouncements are not attracted to the partition in question. It seems to me that the order which was passed by the Prescribed Authority and which was affirmed by the appellate court is a most equitable and just order in the circumstances of the case. Out of four rooms in the possession of the tenant on the upper storey, only one room hasf been released in favour of the landlady. Of course, the attached lavatories have also been released which were bound to be released. The tenant is still left with three rooms and the attached lavatory. Out of four rooms in the possession of the tenant on the upper storey, only one room hasf been released in favour of the landlady. Of course, the attached lavatories have also been released which were bound to be released. The tenant is still left with three rooms and the attached lavatory. Of the two rooms in the out-house, one has been released in favour of the landlady and the other has been allowed to be retained by the tenant. It seems to me that no better solution would have been improvised in the circumstances of the instant case. 7. Sri Tandon pressed his petition on behalf of the landlady on the ground that the portion which had been released by the authorities below was not adequate for the needs of his client. In my view, for the very reasons which I have stated above, namely, that the findings recorded by the authorities below are findings of fact, I cannnot accept the contention of Sri Tandon within the narrow ambit of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not for me to evaluate the respective needs and requirements of the parties in this writ petition. That is basically a task which the statute has entrusted to the authorities below. 8. Both these writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.