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1982 DIGILAW 307 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Deepchand Khushalchand Jain

1982-11-27

JAHAGIRDAR

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JUDGMENT Jahagirdar, J. - By my judgment and order dated 22nd November, 1982, I rejected the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ganatra on the question of the maintainability of this appeal. He had contended that the appeal was barred by time and the delay in the filing of the appeal could not be condoned. In that judgment, however, one serious error has crept in where I have mentioned that the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are not cognizable offences. This is to be found in paragraph 16 of the judgment. Mr. Ganatra has been gracious enough to show me today this error which has crept in paragraph 16 of the judgment. A proper examination of the relevant provisions of both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act shows that the offence under the Act are cognizable offences. 2. Section 2(c) of the Code defines "cognizable offences" to mean an offence for which a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. The First Schedule to the Code mentions that offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code shall be regarded as cognizable if they are punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than seven years. These offences are triable by a Court of Session. Offences under other laws are also cognizable if they are punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards bur not more than seven years. These offences are triable by a Magistrate of First Class. Under Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the offences are punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years or six years or even with life imprisonment. 3. This error which has crept in paragraph 16 of the judgment, however, makes no difference to the conclusion which has been otherwise arrived at in the said judgment. Subject to the mentioning of this part of this judgment, the judgment delivered on 22nd November, 1982 may be reported, if so desired. 4. On merits, Mr. 3. This error which has crept in paragraph 16 of the judgment, however, makes no difference to the conclusion which has been otherwise arrived at in the said judgment. Subject to the mentioning of this part of this judgment, the judgment delivered on 22nd November, 1982 may be reported, if so desired. 4. On merits, Mr. Barclay, the learned Public Prosecutor, has contended that the Court below has acquitted the accused only on the ground that there was non-compliance with Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, as it then stood, namely in the year 1973 when the sample in the present case was taken. The Sample was taken by the Food Inspector on 6th of September, 1973 and was received by the Public Analyst on 15th of September 1973. The report of the Public Analyst has been received the Food Inspector on 16th of November, 1973 whereas according to Rule 7(3) as then stood, it should have been sent within sixty days after the receipt of the sample by the Public Analyst, It means, it should have been sent by the Public Analyst on or before 14th of November, 1973. There is no evidence to show that there has been compliance with this rule. On this ground the learned trial Magistrate has acquitted the accused. 5. Mr. Barday, however, contends that there is evidence to show; that the report has been signed by the Public Analyst on 8th of November, 1973. It has undoubtedly been received by the Food Inspector on 16th of November, 1973. In the normal course of things it should be presumed that it has been sent two days earlier. It is impossible to proceed on presumptions in criminal cases. The burden of proving that there is compliance with Rule 7(3) of the Rules, which has been held to be mandatory by this Court in more than one case, is on the prosecution. It is not open to the Courts to raise presumptions for filling the gaps in the prosecution evidence. On this ground alone the order of acquittal has to be upheld. 6. In the result, this appeal must fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, of Niphad in Criminal Case No. 72 of 1974 is confirmed. Appeal dismissed.