VAMAKSITY v. STATE OF KERALA — 1982 DIGILAW 307 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This appeal by the petitioner in the Original Petition is directed against the judgment in O. P. No. 875 of 1981 to the extent that the learned judge quashed the decision of the Executive Officer, Exts. P2 and P3, against which orders, according to the appellant, she had no complaint. The respondents are the State of Kerala, the Executive Officer, Ochira Panchayat, the Ochira Panchayat Committee and one K. Aravindakshan. The facts leading to the filing of the Original Petition can be briefly stated: 2. The petitioner, her husband and daughter own 55 cents of land in Perinad Village situated within the Ochira Panchayat. One Vijayan was granted a licence as per Ext. P5 for 10 years for the purpose of conducting a cinema theatre in the property. O. S. No. 122 of 1980 of the Karunagappally Munsiff's Court, was filed by the petitioner and others against Vijayan for recovery of possession of the property. In this suit Vijayan filed Ext. P8 written statement claiming to be in possession of the property as a lessee and in the alternative, entitled to the benefits of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It is stated that the question of tenancy in this suit has been referred to the Land Tribunal concerned for its finding on the question of tenancy set up. 3. The 4th respondent who is said to be the brother of the said Vijayan applied to the Executive Officer of the Panchayat, the 2nd respondent herein, for grant of a licence for conducting the cinema in the property for the years 1978-79, under the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958. It is seen that Vijayan had conducted cinema shows in the site from 1966 to 1969 and thereafter the 4th respondent was conducting cinema shows. There is dispute whether the 4th respondent was acting as the Manager of Vijayan or whether he was conducting cinema by himself, When the 4th respondent applied for licence for the years 1978-79, the appellant and her daughter objected to the issuance of the licence. By this order dated 19-10-1979, the 2nd respondent rejected the application on the ground that the conditions necessary for such an application were not satisfied by the applicant. Aggrieved by this order, the 4th respondent filed OP. No. 4163 of 1979 challenging that order. The appellant was not impleaded. By this order dated 19-10-1979, the 2nd respondent rejected the application on the ground that the conditions necessary for such an application were not satisfied by the applicant. Aggrieved by this order, the 4th respondent filed OP. No. 4163 of 1979 challenging that order. The appellant was not impleaded. Getting to know of the filing of the petition, the appellant got herself impleaded in the said Original Petition. 4. Against the same order the 4th respondent bad filed an appeal to the Panchayat also. During the pendency of the Original Petition, the Panchayat passed a resolution Ext. P12 on 31-3-1980 directing the Executive Officer to issue a licence to the 4th respondent with a condition that he should discharge the arrears of tax due to the Panchayat. Thereupon, the 4th respondent moved this court by a CMP. in the pending Original Petition for implementation of the said resolution. The Original Petition was disposed of on the representation made by the Panchayat that the Executive Officer was bound to implement the Panchayat decision. 5. The present appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 155 of 1980 against the judgment in OP No. 4163 of 1979. By Ext. PI judgment a Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeal directing that renewal of the licence should not be granted by the Executive Authority or by the Panchayat until the appellant and the joint owners of the property were afforded an opportunity to make their representation. Ext. P1 judgment contained a further direction that no renewal of the licence should be granted until "the licensing authority is duly satisfied that the applicant has a legal right to apply for and obtain a licence in respect of the plot under the Act". This judgment was rendered on 25-9-1980. The matter went back to the Executive Authority. Notice was given to the appellant who filed objections to the issue of licence. The executive authority granted a temporary licence for one month and directed the 4th respondent by Ext. P2 order dated 7-11-1980 to produce documentary evidence from the legal authorities regarding the legal possession of the lands in question and further directing that if he failed to submit such documentary evidence no licence would be issued. This was followed by Ext. P3 order dated 18-12-1980 rejecting the application for licence since no evidence was produced to show that he had lawful possession. 6. This was followed by Ext. P3 order dated 18-12-1980 rejecting the application for licence since no evidence was produced to show that he had lawful possession. 6. The appellant challenged the grant of temporary permit by filing O.P-No. 4301 of 1930. This petition was dismissed ultimately since the application for licence had been rejected by the Executive Authority pending an Original Petition and also since the Panchayat submitted before court that no temporary licence would be issued under R.24 of the Cinemas (Regulation) Rules. The 4th respondent himself had filed an appeal before the Panchayat under S.5(7) of the Act for setting aside the order of the Executive Authority rejecting his application for licence. The Panchayat, the 3rd respondent, allowed the appeal by Ext. P6 and directed the Executive Officer to issue a licence to the 4th respondent for the conduct of the cinema. The decision of the Panchayat was by a majority of 4 to 3. The appeal was heard on 9-2-1981 at 10- 30 a. m. and the O.8 pages long was issued at 2 p.m. In Ext. P6, the majority view was that the 4th respondent was a lessee entitled to the benefits of S.106 of the Land Reforms Act. The minority took the opposite view. The appellant has a case that the order was prepared in advance, for, it is not normally possible for a Panchayat to prepare such an order in such a short time. The counsel for the Panchayat submits that the dissenting view was also delivered at the same time and therefore the accusation against the majority view should equally apply to the minority view also. We have adverted to this aspect only in passing and nothing turns on this in disposing of this appeal. 7. Ext. P6 decision renewing the licence in favour of the 4th respondent was followed by the consequential order Ext. P7. In the Original Petition the appellant wanted only to quash Exts. P6 and P7 on the following grounds: (1) The exercise of the appellate powers by the Panchayat was mala fide, (2) The Panchayat has no jurisdiction to decide whether a transaction is a lease or a licence or whether the applicant is entitled to the benefits of S.106 of the Land Reforms Act, (3). The appellate authority's order not being a unanimous decision is not enforceable in law, and (4). The appellate authority's order not being a unanimous decision is not enforceable in law, and (4). The orders were passed without considering the fatal defect in the application itself. The decisions were taken in desperate haste without giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity to put forward her case. 8. It may not be necessary to consider in detail the submissions made in elucidation of the grounds mentioned above because the appellant has substantially succeeded in getting Exts. P6 and P7 quashed. The appeal is primarily directed against the quashing of Exts. P2 and P3 against which the appellant had no grievance and which orders were not challenged by her. Even so, we will briefly advert to the submissions made before us touching the grounds detailed above. Before doing so, it would be useful to refer to the case put forward by the Panchayat and the 4th respondent in their counter affidavits. In Para.3 of the counter affidavit filed by the Panchayat, it is admitted that the appellant is the owner of the property. The transaction in favour of Vijayan is described as a lease. It is further stated that the 4th respondent was conducting the cinema pursuant to the licence issued in his name from 1969 onwards upto date, and that the grant of such licence was not objected to at any time till 1980 because the said Vijayan had transferred his rights over the land to the 4th respondent. The Panchayat's jurisdiction to pass Exts. P6 and P7 orders is reiterated. It is further stated that it can consider the legal questions involved in dispute. It is also stated by the Panchayat that the 4th respondent, besides being entitled to the protection of S 106 of the Land Reforms Act, is also entitled to be in lawful possession under S.60 of the Easements Act. 9. The counter affidavit filed by the 4th respondent contains the following averments. Vijayan was conducting the cinema for 3 years upto 1969 and from 1969 the 4th respondent was running the cinema. The appellant knew this and had admitted this. From 1969 onwards the 4th respondent was given the licence to conduct the cinema and the appellant had never objected to this. It is stated that Exts. P2 and P3 orders are not validly passed and were passed under pressure exerted by the petitioner. In Para.7, it is stated that Ext. The appellant knew this and had admitted this. From 1969 onwards the 4th respondent was given the licence to conduct the cinema and the appellant had never objected to this. It is stated that Exts. P2 and P3 orders are not validly passed and were passed under pressure exerted by the petitioner. In Para.7, it is stated that Ext. P5 is not a deed of licence but a regular lease. In 1969, Vijayan, the lessee transferred his rights to the 4th respondent. The transfer is valid as Vijayan had every right to do so. It is stated that the transaction squarely falls within S.106 of the Land Reforms Act. The Panchayat Committee is a democratic body elected by the people and the decision of the majority is the decision of the Panchayat. The contention that unanimous decision of the Panchayat alone will be valid has no merits and has to be rejected. In the reply affidavit, the appellant has stated that the rights of Vijayan had not been transferred as alleged and that in Ext. P8 written statement filed by Vijayan in O. S. No. 122 of 1980 which is even now pending, he has asserted his right under Ext P5. In Para.11, it is stated that the electric connection to the premises is in the name of Vijayan. In support of this submission, the certificate granted by the Assistant Engineer on 26-3-1981 marked as Ext P9 is produced. That the 4th respondent was conducting the cinema is not admitted. It is stated that it was Vijayan who was conducting the cinema all along and the claim that respondent No. 4 is conducting the cinema is stated as incorrect and hence denied. 10. The facts disclosed from the pleadings which are relevant for adjudicating the rights in dispute are as follows: Vijayan was granted the right to conduct the cinema as per Ext. P5 for a period of 10 years on 21-7-1966. There is a suit pending as O S No. 122 of 1980 filed by the appellant against Vijayan for recovery of the property. In that suit, Vijayan asserts his right in the property. That suit is pending. The question of tenancy raised by Vijayan has been referred to the Land Tribunal. Vijayan is seen to have conducted cinema from 1966 to 1979. In that suit, Vijayan asserts his right in the property. That suit is pending. The question of tenancy raised by Vijayan has been referred to the Land Tribunal. Vijayan is seen to have conducted cinema from 1966 to 1979. The documents coming from the Panchayat show that the 4th respondent was granted licence from 1979 till the dispute arose. At no time was the appellant notified about the application for licence nor was she heard. The 4th respondent has not produced any document in support of the right that he sets up in the property. The Panchayat has stated that there was transfer of possession by Vijayan to the 4th respondent. The appellant has denied knowledge of the grant of licence to the 4th respondent. According to her, Vijayan was the licencee at all relevant times. There is some material to show that the 4th respondent was conducting himself as the manager of Vijayan. 11. We will now briefly refer to the various stages at which the question of grant of licence was considered by the court. Originally, the appellant had filed an application for injunction to be issued to the 4th respondent not to run the cinema. The injunction was granted on 9-3-1981, after hearing the parties. Along with the Writ Appeal, the appellant bad filed C. M. P. No. 1457 of 1982 for stay of all further proceedings pending before the Panchayat. An interim stay for one month was granted by this court by its order dated 22-1-1982. Subsequently, C. M. P. No. 6980 of 1982 was filed by the respondent praying for a direction to the Executive Officer of the Panchayat to dispose of the matter covered by O. P. No. 875 of 1981 relating to the grant of licence in accordance with law. This petition was disposed of by this Court by its order dated 1-4-1982 observing that Executive Officer need not be restrained from dealing with the application for licence pursuant to the direction of the learned Single Judge since there was no stay in force and the stay originally granted was not extended. It was observed (hat everything would depend upon the success of the appellant in the Writ Appeal. Thereafter. It was observed (hat everything would depend upon the success of the appellant in the Writ Appeal. Thereafter. C. M. P. No. 16798 of 1982 was filed by the appellant requesting for stay of all further proceedings pending before the Executive Officer pursuant to the direction contained in O. P. No. 875 of 1981 and to transfer the proceedings from the Executive Officer to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Quilon. This petition was apparently moved because of the apprehension that the appellant would not get justice from the officer since the Panchayat was against her. The Bench before which that application came up for orders passed the following order: "Heard the parties. The 1st respondent could proceed according to law on the application of the 2nd respondent. But if an order granting licence is passed by him that shall be intimated to this court and it is only after this court looks into the matter and passes appropriate orders that the licence could actually be issued to the 2nd respondent. Disposed of as above". Thereafter, the Executive Officer filed C. M. P. No. 18321 of 1982 stating that pursuant to the order of this Court in C. M. P. No. 16798 of 1982, he issued notice to the parties to appear before him on 17-8-1982, that the case was adjourned to 20-8-1982 at the request of the counsel for the objectors, that on 20-8-1982 the applicant as well as Vamakshy (Appellant) were examined and cross-examined, that written objections were filed before him, that no arguments were addressed by the advocates because they did not want separate arguments, that the case was thus closed on 20-8-1982 and that the order on the application for renewal of licence was passed on 23-8-1982. It is further stated in the petition that the appellant's counsel wanted a certified copy of the evidence, which could be given when the records were got back from his advocate. Alongwith this application, be has produced bis proceedings granting licence to the 4th respondent for approval as observed in the order mentioned above. 12. In the proceedings produced, it is stated that the 4th respondent has produced earlier the consent letter from Vijayan saying that he had no objection for licence being granted to the 4th respondent. The Executive Officer understood this document to be a consent letter. The order granting licence was passed on the following conclusions. 12. In the proceedings produced, it is stated that the 4th respondent has produced earlier the consent letter from Vijayan saying that he had no objection for licence being granted to the 4th respondent. The Executive Officer understood this document to be a consent letter. The order granting licence was passed on the following conclusions. Licence was granted to the 4th respondent from 1969 to 1979 and no one had objected to the licence given to him for 10 years. The 4th respondent produced a consent letter from Vijayan stating that he had no objection to the licence being granted to the 4th respondent and that the latter was in possession of the land with his permission and consent. Though there is a suit pending against Vijayan, Vijayan or any person appointed by him can run the cinema till Vijayan is evicted through court. 13. Thus, the position at present is that despite the appeal, the Executive Officer of the Panchayat has granted a licence to the 4th respondent. However, he is not in a position to run the cinema because the licence can become effective only after this Court approves the grant. The approval in this case will have to depend upon the result of the Writ Appeal and the resolution of the dispute between the parties depends ultimately on the result of the appeal. 14. We have detailed above the background against which the dispute in the appeal has to be considered. The points for consideration and decision by us can be stated as follows: (1) whether the decision of a local body (Panchayat in this case) while granting licence has to be unanimous decision, (2) whether the owner of a land has a right to object to the grant of licence under the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, when an application for licence is made before a local authority, and (3) whether the grant of licence in this case by the Panchayat is valid and in conformity with the provisions of the Act governing the grant of licence. 15. The first point need not detain us long because we are not impressed with it. A Panchayat is a body constituted after electrons in a democratic way. Such bodies take decisions by a majority. The proceedings of the meetings of a Panchayat are regulated by rules. 15. The first point need not detain us long because we are not impressed with it. A Panchayat is a body constituted after electrons in a democratic way. Such bodies take decisions by a majority. The proceedings of the meetings of a Panchayat are regulated by rules. Where provisions are absent regarding the regulating of meetings of a Panchayat, the general law of meetings should govern the meetings. It is common knowledge and legally recognised practice that decisions of elected bodies have to be by decisions by majority, unless the law governing them indicates to the contrary. Though we have no difficulty in rejecting the submission made by the appellant's counsel, we wish to briefly refer to the contentions for the completeness of the judgment. 16. The appellant's counsel invited us to the provisions contained in various enactments in support of his contention that decisions of the Panchayat have to be unanimous. He contended that in some statutes where it was felt that decision of bodies could be by a majority, specific provision in that behalf was made in those statutes. When there is absence of such a provision, the presumption, according to him, should be that the decision of the body concerned should be by unanimity. 17. The following are the instances that he brought to our notice. S.98 of the Civil Procedure Code states that where an appeal is heard by a Bench of two or more judges, the appeal shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such judges or of the majority (if any) of such Judges. Provision is also made when there is difference of opinion when a Bench is constituted by an even number of Judges. S.392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure where judges of Court of Appeal are equally divided. S.255(4) of the Income-tax Act provides that if the members of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, and provides further as to how decision is to be taken when the members are equally divided about a point. S.255(4) of the Income-tax Act provides that if the members of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, and provides further as to how decision is to be taken when the members are equally divided about a point. S.100(3)(b) of the Land Reforms Act states that where any matter is heard by a Bench consisting of all the three members of the Land Board and there is difference of opinion on any point, the point shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority, and(3)(c) provides for reference to a third member when a Bench of two members is divided in their opinion about any point. According to the appellant's counsel, such a provision is not seen made in the Cinemas (Regulation) Act. In the absence of such a provision it has to be presumed that the decision is to be a unanimous one by the Panchayat. The Counsel for the Panchayat brought to our notice the following provisions in the Panchayat Act in reply to the appellant's counsel. S.43(1) of the Panchayats Act provides that the proceedings of every Panchayat and of the Committees thereof shall be governed by such rules as may be prescribed. S.43(2) makes provision for voting and preventing any member from voting under given circumstances. S.144(1) deals with appeals to the Panchayat. It enables the Panchayat to pass such orders on the appeal as it deems fit. R.8 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962. provides that all questions which may come before a Panchayat at any meeting shall be decided by a majority of the members present and voting at the meeting and in the case of equality of votes, by the exercise of a casting vote by the President. Similar provisions in the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 were also brought to our notice. S 364 deals with appeals to the Municipal Council. S.364(1A) enables the Chairman to pass orders of stay of the operation of the order appealed against, and S.364(1 B) makes it obligatory on the part of the Chairman to place the order of stay passed by him at the next ordinary meeting of the Council. S 364 deals with appeals to the Municipal Council. S.364(1A) enables the Chairman to pass orders of stay of the operation of the order appealed against, and S.364(1 B) makes it obligatory on the part of the Chairman to place the order of stay passed by him at the next ordinary meeting of the Council. R.6 of the Rules regarding proceedings of the Council states that all questions which may come before the Council at any meeting shall be decided by a majority of the members present and voting at the meeting. The presiding member shall have and exercise a second or casting vote in every case of equality of votes. On the strength “of these provisions, it is contended that decisions at meetings of Panchayat and similar local bodies have to be by a majority. The counsel referred us to Shacklaton on the Law and Practice of Meetings, Chap.8, under the heading 'Majority' and read the following passages: "The principle has long been established that the will of a corporation or body can only be expressed by the whole or a majority of its members, and the act of a majority is regarded as the act of the whole. Unless there is some provision to the contrary in the instrument by which a corporation is formed, the resolution of the majority, upon any question, is binding on the minority and the corporation, and, in the case of a company every shareholder, has a right to vote even though he may have an interest in the subject-matter which may be in conflict with the interests of the company. ' ............................................................ We are in complete agreement with the submissions made by the Panchayat's Counsel. It is not open to the Appellant’s counsel to submit that the decision of the Panchayat should be unanimous. Law is clear that decisions have to be, taken by Panchayats and every local bodies by a majority. 18. The next question to be considered is whether the owner of the land has either a right to object to the grant of licence or has necessarily to be heard before the grant of licence. This question has to be considered with reference to the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958. S.3 of the Act makes it obligatory on a person who wants exhibition by means of a cinematograph to take a licence under the Act. This question has to be considered with reference to the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958. S.3 of the Act makes it obligatory on a person who wants exhibition by means of a cinematograph to take a licence under the Act. The licensing authority under S.4 is the executive authority of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the place in respect of which the licence is to be granted is situate. S.5 deals with the restrictions on powers of licensing authority. S.5 (2) (a) stipulates that the licensing authority shall not grant a licence unless it is satisfied that the rules made under the Act have been substantially complied with. S.5 (6) states that every licence under the Act shall be personal to the person in whom it is granted. S.5 (7) provides for appeals by any person aggrieved by the decision of the executive authority. R.17 (iii) of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1975 is the rule that governs the grant of licence. We shall read the relevant portion of this rule for a proper understanding of its scope: 17 The application shall be accompanied by (iii) documentary evidence pertaining to the ownership and possession of the site, building and equipment and if he is not the owner, documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipments to the satisfaction of the licensing authority;" The form in which an application for licence is to be made is form A. Column 9 reads as follows: "9. If the land/site is not owned by the applicant: (i) Name and address of the owner, (ii) Is document to prove the lawful occupation of the applicant enclosed." 19. The counsel for the appellant submits that the owner of the land has a right to be heard before the grant of licence. The insistence by the rule of the production of documentary evidence to show lawful possession of the site carries with it an obligation on the part of the licensing authority to hear the person who owns the land, lest the licensing authority grants a licence in favour of a person without lawful possession. The insistence by the rule of the production of documentary evidence to show lawful possession of the site carries with it an obligation on the part of the licensing authority to hear the person who owns the land, lest the licensing authority grants a licence in favour of a person without lawful possession. If the grant of licence is to be made without reference to the owner, it would result in persons without any vestige of right in the land walking away with the licence to the detriment of the owner of the land. Case may arise where interested persons even fabricate documents to secure a licence to defeat the interests of the owner of the land. All such difficulties can be obviated if the owner of the land is heard prior to the grant of licence. This submission was attempted to be met by the counsel for the 4th respondent saying that it is not the duty of the licensing authority to regulate the relationship between the land owner and the applicant for licence in such cases and neither the Act nor the Rules contemplate such an investigation. All that is necessary is that the licensing authority should be satisfied about the applicant's right to lawful possession. In support of this submission, the counsel for the 4th respondent invited us to the judgment of this Court in Kumarappan v. Secretary, Home Department, Trivandrum (1960 KLT. 636) which was followed in O.P.No. 2315 of 1973, and to Jacob v. Executive Officer (1981 KLT. 742), also of this Court In O P. No. 2315 of 1973 Eradi J. (as he then was) noticed the decision in 1960 KLT. 636 rendered by Velu Pillai, J., where it was held that the landlord of the premises in cases like this has no right to move this Court under Art.226 for challenging the grant of a renewal of a cinema licence to the tenant. 636 rendered by Velu Pillai, J., where it was held that the landlord of the premises in cases like this has no right to move this Court under Art.226 for challenging the grant of a renewal of a cinema licence to the tenant. Eradi J. observed thus: "The purpose of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act in imposing the restrictions on the exhibition of the cinematograph is to ensure in public interest that the site and the building used for the cinematograph exhibition are suitable for such use, that the construction and electrification are done in such a way as to ensure complete safety for the persons who come to witness the entertainment and that the exhibition of the films is done only in conformity with the rules and orders issued in that regard. The provisions of the said Act and rules are not intended to regulate the relationship Inter se between the owners and the lessees of the theatres; nor do they confer any right whatever on the owner of the building or site so as to entitle him to raise objections to the grant of the licence. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as a person aggrieved". (para 4) The appellant's counsel submits that the principle of law thus widely put by the learned judges in the above decisions does not reflect the correct position, and wanted us to reconsider the principle so laid down. 20. In this case, we do not think it necessary to consider in any depth the reasons that persuaded the learned judges to say that the landlord of the premises had no right to be heard. So far as this case is concerned, there is a direction in Ext P1 judgment to the executive authority to afford an opportunity to the appellant and the other joint owners of the property to make representations touching the matter. All that we wish to say regarding the above decision, with respect, is that we have our reservations about the wide manner in which the law has been laid down in the two judgments preventing the owners of land from objecting to the grant of licence. Exceptional cases may arise where the owners of land can object to the grant of licences. Exceptional cases may arise where the owners of land can object to the grant of licences. It is necessary to note that in both the above cases the applicant was a tenant enjoying the benefits of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, and therefore a statutory tenant even after the expiry of the period of lease. 21. The decision in 1981 KLT. 742 was rendered by one of us (Balagangadharan Nair, J.). The facts of the case are also dissimilar to the facts of the case on hand. It was on the strength of S.60(b) of the Easements Act that decision was rendered. There it was held relying on S.60(b) of the Act that the possession of the applicant for licence was lawful. The decision turned on the right of the applicant there under S.60(b) Easements Act since he had put up a building of a permanent character and had thus rendered the licence in his favour irrevocable. In this case such a plea is not available to the 4th respondent. The point decided in that case also cannot help the 4th respondent 22. That takes us to the next point as to whether the grant of licence in this case by the Panchayat is valid. The 4th respondent's case is that he had been running the cinema from 1969 onwards without any objection and that what is now applied for is only for the renewal of the licence. The fact that he had been running the cinema under a valid licence, according to him, is itself sufficient proof of his lawful possession. The law does not insist upon strict adherence to the requirements of R.17(iii) in cases of renewal of licence. This submission was strenuously opposed by the appellant's counsel. According to him, there is no distinction in law between a fresh application for licence and an application for renewal. In either case the requirements of law have to be satisfied. In any case it is submitted that necessary documentary evidence has to be made available even for renewal of licence. 23. We will usefully refer to the decisions in N. S. Shethna v. Vinubhai (AIR. 1967 SC. 1036) and M. C. Chookalingam v. V. Manickavasagam (AIR. 1974 SC. 104) to meet the submission made by the 4th respondent that in a renewal application the requirements of R.17(iii) need not be respected. 23. We will usefully refer to the decisions in N. S. Shethna v. Vinubhai (AIR. 1967 SC. 1036) and M. C. Chookalingam v. V. Manickavasagam (AIR. 1974 SC. 104) to meet the submission made by the 4th respondent that in a renewal application the requirements of R.17(iii) need not be respected. Paragraph & of the first decision reads: "8. In our view the fact that renewal is not a matter of course, the fact that the Licensing Authority can in proper circumstances refuse an application for renewal and is not precluded from imposing different conditions and can grant it for a different period coupled with the absence of any Rules for renewal are all indications leading to the result that renewal is a fresh grant and is not merely continuation of the licence previously issued. The High Court was therefore correct in allowing the writ petition on a conclusion that the show cause notice relating to the licence for the year 1960 could not be regarded as a show cause notice in respect of the renewal for the next year and if the renewed licence was sought to be affected in the inquiry a fresh show cause notice relating to the renewed licence was necessary". In AIR. 1974 SC. 104, Para.17 reads thus; "17. We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr. Setalvad that the case of renewal of a licence of this type is different from that of a grant. R.13 finds place in Part I-A of the Rules with the title 'General'. Under S.5(2)(a) of the Act, the licensing authority shall not grant a licence unless it is satisfied that the rules made under this Act have been substantially complied with. We, therefore, do not find any justification in making a distinction between grant and renewal of a licence under the provisions of the Act read with the Rules. R.13 is, therefore, clearly applicable to grant as well as to renewal of a licence". The above extracts clearly show that a renewal of a licence in law stands on the same footing as a fresh application for licence. 24. We have already referred to the rival contentions of the parties before us. The appellant has granted Vijayan a licence to be in the property. There is no document to show that Vijayan bad in any manner transferred his right to the 4th respondent. 24. We have already referred to the rival contentions of the parties before us. The appellant has granted Vijayan a licence to be in the property. There is no document to show that Vijayan bad in any manner transferred his right to the 4th respondent. What is now produced is a letter dated 11-1-1982 purporting to be one from Vijayan permitting the 4th respondent to apply for a licence. It is this document that is pressed into service to meet R.17(iii). We are not satisfied that this letter can be accepted as documentary evidence to prove lawful possession of the site by the 4th respondent. The judgment under appeal was rendered on December 14,1981. The learned judge observes thus in Para.20: "Even if Vijayan has not transferred his rights it may be that if the applicant establishes by proper evidence that be is in possession with due permission of Vijayan and Vijayan has no objection to the grant of licence and further that Vijayan is found to be in lawful possession, applicant can be granted licence. However, the Panchayat has not considered the question on that basis". The letter produced is dated 11-1-1982. No argument is necessary to say that this is an induced letter. We do not propose to rely upon this letter, not only for the manner in which it now finds place in the records, but more so because it has not been properly proved. Vijayan is now where in the picture. He is seen to resist the suit for recovery by the appellant in the Munsiff's Court, setting up a claim under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. We are told that the suit is pending, the question of tenancy is referred to the concerned Land Tribunal and that the Land Tribunal has not returned its finding. The competent authority to decide this question is the Land Tribunal. Vijayan has not stated any where either of a transfer of right in favour of the 4th respondent or a permission granted to him to conduct the cinema. The appellant cannot be expected to know what transpired between Vijayan and the 4th respondent. If Vijayan was examined before the licensing authority or the appellate authority to prove the letter now produced, a submission made on this letter would have persuaded us to examine its effectiveness. The appellant cannot be expected to know what transpired between Vijayan and the 4th respondent. If Vijayan was examined before the licensing authority or the appellate authority to prove the letter now produced, a submission made on this letter would have persuaded us to examine its effectiveness. In this state of the record, it has only to be said that the letter produced is not one on which any reliance can be placed. No one has proved it and no one knows whether it is genuine or not. 25. In support of bis submission that the 4th respondent cannot claim to be in lawful possession in any case, he invited us to Para.15 of the decision in AIR. 1974 SC. 104, which reads; "The fact that after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property by resisting a suit for eviction, does not establish a case in law to answer the requirement of lawful possession of the property within the meaning of R.13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh's case, (1968) 2 SCR. 203 = (AIR. 1968 SC. 520) had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession". The consent of the landlord will be irrelevant only if the applicant has a statutory right to be in possession. His possession in the context of the records of this case, cannot be said to be lawful possession or litigious possession, for the reason that his possession is not supported either by any statutory provision or by documentary evidence. 26. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellent is entitled to succeed. We modify the judgment of the learned judge by deleting the direction quashing Exts. 26. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellent is entitled to succeed. We modify the judgment of the learned judge by deleting the direction quashing Exts. P2 and P3 orders of the executive officer and further directing him to consider the question afresh. The decision now taken pursuant to the direction of this court in C.M. P. No. 16798/82 evidenced by the proceedings of the executive officer dated 23-8-1982 has also to be set at naught, for, that decision can be sustained only if approved by this court. That decision is based on the licence from 1969 to 1979, on the consent letter given by Vijayan and on the finding that till Vijayan is evicted through court, he or any person appointed by him can run the cinema. According to us none of these conclusions are supportable in law. We allow the appeal in the above terms and direct the parties to bear their costs.