JUDGMENT - Dharmadhikari C.S. J.-As all these writ petitions involve common question of law and fact they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The respondents landlords filed suits under section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rent Act. The chawl bearing Municipal House No. 77 situated at Kotter Gate is owned by the respondents-landlords. This chawl consists of 9 rooms and they were rented to different tenants. The petitioners in these writ petitions are the tenants in the suit chawl. Notices to all the tenants terminating their tenancies were issued on or about 31st of December 1974. After following the necessary legal procedure the respondents land-lords filed ejectment suits before the Civil Judge, J. D. Bhiwandi. 3. These sults were resisted on behalf of the tenants. Parties also led evidence in support of their respective contentions. However ultimately the Civil Judge, Junior Division Bhiwandi allowed the suits filed by the respon-dentsahd directed the defendants to vacate the suit premises and hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents. The trial Court also issued) consequential directions. Being aggrieved by thisjudgment and decree passed by the trial Court the tenants filed appeals before the District Court at Thane which were heard and decided by the Joint Judge, Thane. Since the appellate Court dismissed all the appeals the tenants approached this Court by filing various writ petitions. Writ Petitions Nos. 3193, 3194, 3195, 3196 of 1981 and Writ Petition No. 3151 of 1981 came to be decided by Chandurkar J. vide judgment dated 15th October 1981. In those pro-ceedings the respondents-landlords filed a purshis making certain concessions, With a slight modification in terms of the purshis, i.e. “that the, landlords should allot two tenements to the tenants or if they so desire one tenement in the proposed building to be constructed” all other contentions came to be negatived. In those petitions also Shri Abhyankar the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-landlords has made a statement that land-lords will abide by the purshis filed before the Hon'ble Shri Justice. Chandurkar J. 4. In those petitions also Shri Abhyankar the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-landlords has made a statement that land-lords will abide by the purshis filed before the Hon'ble Shri Justice. Chandurkar J. 4. In the petitions before me Shri Tipnis the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-tenants in Writ Petition No. 2607 of 1979, contended that the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are wholly vitiated as the Courts below have not considered the provisions of section 13 (1) (g) of the Rent Act while deciding the controversy involved in those proceedings. He also contended that the plaintiffs did not require bona fide and reasonably the premises for immediate demolition. According to him the Courts below also committed an error in not considering the question of comparative' hardship. It was also contended by Shri Tipnis that while issuing the certificate which is the foundation of the proceedings, the tenants were not given any opportunity of being heard by the appropriate Tribunal and there- fore the said certificate is vitiated it being issued in violation of well esta- blished principles of natural justice. 5. Shri Rane the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in other writ petitions adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Tipnis and also con-1 tended that certain hutment dwellers i.e. (1) Smt. Sakina Sultanmiya Dhobi, (2) Sakina Gulabkhan, (3) Kutabulla Monim Jade, (d) Khatunbi Lal Mohammad and (5) Sakina Nanu Bhiste have filed Civil Suit No. 493 of 1981 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bhiwandi for a permanent injunction against the present landlords restraining them from disturbing their possession of the huts and the open plots. They have also obtained an ad-interim injunction against the plaintiffs. In view of this, according to Shri Rane the decree passed by the trial Court is impossible of compliance and on that count also the judgment and decree passed by the Court below is liable to be set aside. 6. On the others hand it is contended by Shri Abhyankar that the plaintiffs in the suit-No. 403 of 1981 pending in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bhiwandi are the same persons whose writ petitions were dismissed by Chandurkar J. vide his order dated' 15th October 1981. He also contended that the controversy raised in the said suit is not relevant for deciding the dispute involved in the present proceedings. He also contended that the controversy raised in the said suit is not relevant for deciding the dispute involved in the present proceedings. According to Shri Abhyankar the requirements or elements of the provisions of sec- tion 13(l)(g) of the Rent Act cannot be imported in section 13(1)(hh) of the Rent Act. Section 13(1)(hh) of the Act confers an independent right upon the landlord to seek possession of the property, if he intends to re- construct the building. This special provision has been made by the Legis- lature to encourage further building activities. If the restrictions laid down in section 13(1)(g)of the Rent Act are imported in section 13 then the very purpose behind the said section will be frustrated. In support of this contention Shri Abhyankar has placed-reliance upon a decision of the Gujrat High Court (Tribhovandas Khtishaldas and ors. v. Mulchandbhai Damodardas)1 He then contended that it is not open to the tenants to challenge the validity' of the certificate issued by the competent authority This is more so in the present case when the certificate was not challenged at any stage on the ground that before issuing the certificate the tenants were not given any opportunity of being heard. According to Shri Abhyankar the principles of natural justice are not applicable to these proceedings since the certificate is to be granted by the Expert Tribunal after taking into consideration the relevant, data. Further the said 'certificate is treated as conclusive evidence of the facts as stated therein. 7. So far as the challenge to the certificate issued by the competent authority is concerned, in my opinion the petitioners tenants cannot be permitted to raise such a contention for the first time in these writ petitions. From the bare reading of the certificate produced before the trial Court, it is quite obvious that it complies with the requirements laid down by the rules framed in that behalf. In these circumstances, the tenants cannot be permitted to make out an altogether a new case for the first time in these writ petitions. 8. Further the requirements of section 13(l)(g) of the Rent Act can-not be imported in section 13(1)(hh) of the Rent Act for more than one reason. The requirement of section 13(1)(g) and that of section 13(1)(hh) are distinct and different. The area and the field covered by these two sub- sections is also different. 8. Further the requirements of section 13(l)(g) of the Rent Act can-not be imported in section 13(1)(hh) of the Rent Act for more than one reason. The requirement of section 13(1)(g) and that of section 13(1)(hh) are distinct and different. The area and the field covered by these two sub- sections is also different. Section 13(1)(hh) was introduced by the Legis- lature by Bombay Act L III of 1950. It was inserted with the sole object that without causing much hardship to the tenants' the building activities should continue so that more space will become available for dwelling pur poses. 'The statement of objects-and reasons, of the relevant amendment reads as under: “There is no provision in the Act under which a landlord can recover vacant possession of the premises for the purpose of demolishing them and erecting in their place new' larger' premises.' It is felt that the absence of such provisions comes in the way of development of properties to the fullest extent, specially in the case where small structures stand in the middle of big plots of land. In order therefore to encourage the fullest development of all plots With a view ultimately to providing maximum number of tenements on them, a new clause is being introduced in sub-section (1) for this purpose. At the same time to prevent abuse of this right on the part of the landlords, certain conditions are imposed before getting vacant possession of the premises, non-fulfilment of which would amount to a cognizable offence entitling the penalties of fine or imprisonment or both;” 9. Then by section 13(3A) of the Act it is laid down that no decree of eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (hh) of sub-sec- tion (1) of section 13, unless the landlord produces at the time of institution of the suit a certificate granted by the Tribunal and gives an undertaking in the terms enumerated in sub-clauses a, b,,'c. By section 13 (B) a right isconferred upon 'the tenants to serve notice upon the landlord of their inten- tion to occupy the tenements in the new building. -Section 17 C cast a duty upon the landlord to intimate to the tenant date of completion of building fend tenant's right to occupy tenement in new-building. Thus for the purpose of section 13(1)(hh) practically a complete code has been laid down by the Legislature. -Section 17 C cast a duty upon the landlord to intimate to the tenant date of completion of building fend tenant's right to occupy tenement in new-building. Thus for the purpose of section 13(1)(hh) practically a complete code has been laid down by the Legislature. The question of hardship is also resolved by the Legislature by making special provisions in that behalf i. e. by providing that the tenants will be entitled to suitable premises in the new building. In this view of the matter in my opinion the requirements of section 1'3(1)(g) cannot be imported in section13(1)(hh). Reading requirements of section 13(1)(g) in sec- tion 13(1)(hh) Will practically amount to adding something more to the section, which is not permissible while construing and interpreting the statu- tory provisions. 10. It is no doubt true that in support of his contention a reliance was placed by Shri Tipnis upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (Ramnik-lal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman AniratlaV Sheth)2. The import of the Said decision was considered by the Gujarat High Court in (Tribhovandas Klntshdldas ors. v. Mulchandbhai Damodardas)3, with which I respectfully agree. While construing the scope and ambit of section the Gujarat High Court held that where the landlords invoked clause (hh) of section 13, it is not open to the tenant to repel their case by invoking clause (g) of sec-tion 13(1).' If the Court has recorded a conclusion on appreciation of evidence, that the plaintiffs have the means, the capacity and the intention to immediately demolish the suit premises and to erect a new building on the premises which he seeks to demolish, the only conclusion which can be recorded is that their requirement is both reasonable and bona fide. By mixing up consideration of clause (hh) with clause (g) and sub-section (1) of section 13 decree for possession cannot be refused to the plaintiffs. In para 9 of the judgment the Gujarat High Court has explained the scope of' ambit of the Supreme Court's decision in Ramniklal Pitambardas's case. Then while dealing with such a controversy this is what the Gujarat High Court has observed in para 14 of the judgment: “14. It may be noted that clause '(a) ' of sub-section (3A) of sec-tion 13 requires the landlord to construct not less than two times the number of residential tenements. Then while dealing with such a controversy this is what the Gujarat High Court has observed in para 14 of the judgment: “14. It may be noted that clause '(a) ' of sub-section (3A) of sec-tion 13 requires the landlord to construct not less than two times the number of residential tenements. A landlord may construct a larger number of residential tenements or he may construct a building which will have two-times the number of residential tenements contained in the premises which he has demolished and also some more residential accom-modation: If a landlord after having constructed such a building lets out in the new building double the number of residential tenements contained in the premises which he has demolished and occupies the rest of the building himself, even then the provisions of clause (g) of sub-sec-tion (1) of section 13 do not come into play at ail. After having satisfied the requirement of law if a landlord wants to occupy a part of the build-ing, it cannot be said for that reason that his reasonable and bona fide requirement within the contemplation of clause (hh) of sub-section (1) of section 13 is a motivated requirement or is a dishonest requirement. What use a landlord makes of his new premises after satisfying or com-plying with all the statutory requirements which he is required to comply with is immaterial for the purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to protect the sitting tenants and to see that some more residential accommodation becomes available to intending tenants. If the interests of all the sitting tenants are protected by the landlord by constructing for them residential tenements in his new building and letting them out to them and by constructing another set of residential tenements in equal number and offering them to the intending tenants for rent and yet if there is some more accommodation left for him to occupy, he can certainly do so. Such an act on his part does not reflect upon his reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises as contemplated by clause (hh) of sub-section (1) of section 13. The question which the Court has to ask itself is whether the requirement as to protection which the statute grants to the sitting tenants and the requirement as to extension of the benefit to the intending tenants are satisfied. The question which the Court has to ask itself is whether the requirement as to protection which the statute grants to the sitting tenants and the requirement as to extension of the benefit to the intending tenants are satisfied. If they are satisfied, the object of the statute is fulfilled. It is not the object of the statute to deprive a landlord, who has satisfied the statutory requirements, of an opportunity to construct some more accommodation for himself. In my opinion, therefore, the provisions of section 13(J)(g) do not project themselves into a case under section 13(l)(hh) merely because the landlord states that he wants to occupy a part of the new building which he seeks to construct after demolishing the old one if the landlord satisfies other requirements laid down in sub-section (3A) of section 13. In the instant case, the defendant is the only sitting tenant. The landlords have given an undertaking to the Court that they will let out to him a tenement after they have constructed the new building and that they will do so in accordance with the provisions of section 17-B of the Bombay Rent Act. The interests of the defendant who is the only sitting tenant are, there-fore, fully protected. If the plaintiffs have filed that undertaking there are ways and means to enforce it against them. So far as the extension of benefit to intending tenants is concerned, that question does not arise in the instant case because the suit premises are not a residential building and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not required to construct not less than two times the number of residential tenements therein. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Appellate Judge was in error in confirming the decree of dismissal passed by the learned trial Judge. This is a case which is more governed by the decision of the Court in, the case of Chimanlal Manganlal Shah (supra). It is not governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramniklal Mehta (supra).” As I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court it is not necessary for me to deal with the said question in any further details. 11. It is not governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramniklal Mehta (supra).” As I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court it is not necessary for me to deal with the said question in any further details. 11. So far as the contention raised by Shri Rane i. e. the civil suit is pending in the Bhiwandi Court, is concerned,-in my opinion there is nosubstance in the said contention also. For verifying the fact as to who are, the plaintiffs in the said suit, I have perused the judgment delivered by Chandurkar J. From the said judgment it is quite clear that same persons whose writ petitions were dismissed by Chandurkar J. have now filed the present suit. In the present proceedings I am not concerned with the con- troversy raised in the said Civil Suit, nor the decision or a decree in the present proceedings has any thing to do with the question involved in the suit pending in the Bhiwandi Court. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the decrees passed by the trial Court in these proceedings are impossible of compliance or execution. 12. It is also not necessary to modify the order passed by the appel-late Court in view of the undertaking given by the landlord which is already incorporated in the decision of Chandurkar J. It is needless to say that in view of the undertaking which is again repeated before me, the decrees passed by the appellate Court will stand modified in terms of the purshis filed before Chandurkar J. However it is stated by Shri Abhyankar that so far, as the Writ Petition No. 2607 of 1979 is concerned the tenement in possession of the tenant is of one room only and therefore the said tenant will be entitled to get premises to the extent of one room only in the newly constructed building. This offer is more than reasonable and deserves to be accepted. 13. These are the only contentions raised and argued before me. In the result therefore all the petitions fail and are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Hence rule is discharged in all these petitions with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. ----