JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner by this writ of habeas corpus has challenged his order of detention dated September 6, 1981, passed by District Magistrate, Ajmer, under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980. 2. Though the detention order was passed on 6th September, 1981, it appears that the petitioner could not be arrested till 17th September, 1981 and as such the grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on 21st September, 1981 after he was arrested and was detained in Central Jail, Ajmer. The petitioner submitted a representation against his order of detention on 26th September, 1981. Though no objection was taken in the writ petition that the petitioner was not informed about the result of his representation, but during the course of arguments before us it was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenue was not apprised about the result of his representation. The petitioner has challenged his detention on several grounds but it would not be necessary to deal with all those grounds as a petition filed by another co-detenue Prahlad on almost identical grounds has already been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Criminal Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1580/1981, Smt. Jaaki v. District Magistrate, Ajmer and others on January 12, 1982 . 3. It was first contended by Mr. Asopa that Prahlad had filed an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India against the dismissal of the writ petition by this Court. In that appeal before the Supreme Court, the State felt weakness of the case and withdrew the order of detention against Prahlad and as the Government itself had revoked the order of detention, there remained no necessity to decide the appeal on merits by the Supreme Court. It is thus contended that as co-detenue has been released by the Government, the petitioner is also entitled to be released at once. It is thus contended that as co-detenue has been released by the Government, the petitioner is also entitled to be released at once. Learned Government Advocate in this regard contended that in the case of Prahlad objections were raised that a representation submitted by him to the Central Government was not decided and challenge was made to the provisions of interview allowed to the detenue in the presence of the Jail Officials and the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of State in the Supreme Court had advised to revoke the order in case of Prahlad and on this account the Government considered it proper to cancel the order of detention in case of Prahlad. It is contended by learned Government Advocate that the aforesaid two objections raised in the case of Prahlad did not arise in the case of present detenue Tara as such the Government is not prepared to withdraw the order of detention in case of the present detenue. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not decided the appeal of co-detenue Prahlad on merits, we are unable to seek any guidance from any order passed in the case of Prahlad and we would consider the objections raised by Mr. Asopa in the present case on merits. 4. It was contended by Mr. Asopa that the petitioner is being subjected to criminal prosecution with regard to the incident alleged in the grounds of detention order. As parallel proceedings under the ordinary criminal law have been resorted to by the State no order of detention could have been passed on the basis of self same incidents for which the petitioner is being tried and prosecuted under the provisions of ordinary criminal law. It is also contended in this regard that proceedings could have been taken under the Police Act, Rajasthan Gunda Act, and Cancellation of bail etc. and there was no justification for detaining the petitioner for those very incidents under the National Security Act. Reliance in this regard is placed on Biram Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1974 SC 1161 in which it was observed that : "The fact that the ground of detention could be a subject matter of criminal prosecution is not enough to vitiate a detention order if the detaining authority does not choose to prosecute him and only passes an order of detention in accordance with law. In that case it will be no answer that the detenue must be prosecuted in the criminal court in an open trial. The choice of the authority concerned for the mode of tackling the illegal activity cannot perse be illegal and the order of detention will be judged on the merits in accordance with the law. The position will be, however, entirely different if the authority concerned makes an order of detention under the Act and also prosecute him is a criminal case on the self-same facts. The detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor can take recourse to a ground which is the subject matter of a criminal trial," 5. Learned Government Advocate in this regard contended that the proceedings taken under the National Security Act are of preventive nature. The petitioner who is a dangerous criminal and against whom the witnesses are not prepared to give evidence due to fear, it was perfectly valid to take proceedings under the National Security Act in case the detaining authority was subjectively satisfied that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Reliance is placed on the following observations made in Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1982 SC 8 , in which it was held as under : "Possibility of a prosecution or the absence of it is not an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention the authority may prosecute the offender for an isolated act or acts of an offence for violation of any criminal law, but if it is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to go on violating such laws, then there will be no bar for the State to detain him under a Preventive Detention Act in order to disable him to repeat such offences. What is required is that the detaining authority is to satisfy the Court that it had in mind the question whether prosecution of the offender was possible and sufficient in the circumstances of the case, In some cases of prosecution it may not be possible to bring home the culprit to took as in case of a professional bully, a murderer or a dacoit against him out of fear, it may not be possible to collect all necessary evidence without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt." 6. It is also contended that the above authority has been affirmed in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Saraswathi Seshagri v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1982 SC 1165 . 7. We find no force in the contention of Mr. Asopa, learned counsel for the petitioner. The case of Biram Chand (supra) does not give any assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case. The grounds of detention served on the petitioner show that in several incidents the cases were registered against the petitioner for various offences under the Indian Penal Code and investigations were pending in those cases. As regards the incident mentioned in grounds Nos. 12 and 13 which relate to 24th August, 1981, first information reports were lodged and investigations were in progress. It has been mentioned in the order of detention that in view of the incidents committed by the petitioner and his associates on 24th August, 1981, a great terror and tension prevailed in the minds of the businessmen and shop-keepers that the entire market in the City of Ajmer, remained closed on 24th August, 1981 and 25tn August, 1981. It is not the case of the petitioner that on the date of detention order i.e. 6th September, 1981, the petitioner had been prosecuted in all the criminal cases on the self-same facts which have been made the basis of the grounds of detention. It is not the case of the petitioner that on the date of detention order i.e. 6th September, 1981, the petitioner had been prosecuted in all the criminal cases on the self-same facts which have been made the basis of the grounds of detention. In Smt. Hem Lata Kantilal Shah's case(supra) the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the authority may prosecute the offender for an isolated act or acts of an offence for violation of any criminal law, but if it is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to go on violating such laws, there will be no bar the State to detain him under the Preventive Detention Act in order to disable him to repeat such offences. The past conduct of antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making the detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclination of a person that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of services essential to the community or his act of violation of foreign Exchange Regulations and his smuggling activities are likely to have deleterious effects on the national economy. The above observations equally apply in the case like that of the petitioner whose past conduct or antecedent history showed that he was likely in future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is well settled that the question of satisfaction of the detaining authority is beyond the scope of judicial review of this Court, except that such satisfaction is alleged to be based on any ground of mala fide or it is based on extraneous grounds. 8. Mr. Asopa next contended that the State Government had approved the order of detention on 16th September, 1981 and the grounds of detention were served on 21st September, 1981 and thereafter any opportunity given to the petitioner for making a representation was futile. The Government had already made up as mind while approving the detention order on 16th September, 1981 and the representation, if any, made by the petitioner on 26th September, 1981, was a useless formality and the petitioner as such has been denied a right of making effective representation against the order of detention. We find no force in this contention. The Government had already made up as mind while approving the detention order on 16th September, 1981 and the representation, if any, made by the petitioner on 26th September, 1981, was a useless formality and the petitioner as such has been denied a right of making effective representation against the order of detention. We find no force in this contention. It is no doubt true that order of detention was passed on 6th September, 1981 but as the petitioner could not be arrested till 17th September, 1981, there was no question of serving the grounds of detention prior to his arrest. Under sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act it was incumbent upon the State Government to approve the order of detention within 12 days of making of the order of detention. The State Government as such under sub section (4) of Section 3 had approved the order of detention on 16th September, 1981, within 12 days of the order of detention which it was obliged to do. The consideration of representation has nothing to do with the order of approval made under sub section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. The power to consider the representation is independent of the exercise of power of approval of the order of detention and it cannot be said that the making of representation by the petitioner on 26th September, 1981 was merely futile exercise. 9. It was also contended by Mr. Asopa that the order of detention for a period of one year was contrary to the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. It is contended that the State Government could not have made the order in the first instance for more than three months and could have amended such order by extending such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any time. The argument is absolutely devoid of force. It is contended that the State Government could not have made the order in the first instance for more than three months and could have amended such order by extending such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any time. The argument is absolutely devoid of force. Provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act do not provide for the period of detention but it contemplates the period during which the State Government is satisfied by the order in writing that having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police it was necessary so to do to give such powers to the aforesaid authorities as provided in sub-section(2) of Section 3 of the Act. Thus, the restriction contained in the provision is with regard to the powers conferred on District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police in any area within the local limits of their jurisdiction and not with regard to the period of detention for which a detenu can be obtained. Section 13 lays down the period of detention under which the maximum period for which one person can be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed by the Advisory Board under Section 12 of the Act, is 12 months from the date of detention. Thus, in the present case, the order of detention passed for a period of 12 months from the date of detention which has been admittedly confirmed by the Advisory Board, suffers from no illegality. 10. It was next contended by Mr. Asopa, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was un-educated and did not know Hindi. The order of detention, the grounds of detention and the approval of detention order were all in Hindi language and the petitioner being a Sindhi ought to have never been to any School and being completely illiterate, all the aforesaid documents ought to have been supplied in Sindhi language. The respondents in this regard have replied that the detenue was resident of Ajmer and he has knowledge of the local language Hindi. The detenue knows Hindi. Moreover, the documents were read over to him by the Superintendent Jail, Ajmer whose certificate is also given under the foot of the grounds. The respondents in this regard have replied that the detenue was resident of Ajmer and he has knowledge of the local language Hindi. The detenue knows Hindi. Moreover, the documents were read over to him by the Superintendent Jail, Ajmer whose certificate is also given under the foot of the grounds. The detenue made representations on 26th Sept., 1981 and 30th December, 1981 but he never made any complaint regarding the vagueness of the grounds nor demanded fresh copies of the grounds. Mr. Asopa, in this regard placed reliance on Smt. Razia Umar Bakshi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1751 , Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors, 1981 Cri. L.J. 288 and Surat Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1981 Cri. L.J. 585 . We see no force in the above contention. The petitioner is admittedly a resident of Ajmer, where the local language is Hindi. It cannot be said that the petitioner does not understand Hindi language as he puts his signatures in Hindi and even the representation made by him on 26th September, 1981, is in Hindi. The documents were read over to the petitioner by the Superintendent Jail, Ajmer which is proved by the note appended below the grounds. That apart, it is no where the case of the petitioner that he ever made a grievance to the Superintendent Jail or to the detaining authority that he was not understanding Hindi language and the documents should be supplied to him in Sindhi language. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Asopa in this regard are of no assistance at all in the facts and circumstances of this case. 11. It was next contended that the petitioner was never made known about the result of his representation filed on 26th September, 1981. We find no force in this contention as well. In the original writ petition no such objection was raised by the petitioner and the only fact mentioned by him in para 5 of the writ petition was that he submitted a representation against the order of his detention on "6th September, 1981. The respondents in the reply admitted that a representation was submitted by the petitioner. Mr. In the original writ petition no such objection was raised by the petitioner and the only fact mentioned by him in para 5 of the writ petition was that he submitted a representation against the order of his detention on "6th September, 1981. The respondents in the reply admitted that a representation was submitted by the petitioner. Mr. Asopa in this regard submitted that though in the original writ petition no such objection was taken but subsequently an affidavit of Shri Pratap Kumar Advocate was filed in which it was stated that he had verified the fact about the representation to the Central Government from the dentenu who had not received any intimation regarding the representation forwarded to the Central Government. A courts affidavit in reply to the aforesaid affidavit has been filed by the respondent through Rajiv Mehrishi. City Magistrate, Officer incharge, Ajmer in which it is clearly stated that the detenu never made any representation to the Central Government. He did make representations only to the State Government on 26th September, 1981 and 30th December, 1981, which rejected by the State Government after due consideration and detenu was informed accordingly. It is further stated that the contention of the petitioner that representations remained undecided did not survive On the request of Mr. Asopa, learned counsel for the petitioner, we asked the respondent to show the original record from which it transpired that the representation made by the petitioner on 26th September, 1981 was rejected on 3rd October, 1981 and the fact of rejecting the representation was also communicated to the petitioner. Mr. Asopa was also shown the original record and after going through the record, Mr. Asopa could not pursue this objection any further. Asopa, however, contended that the representation submitted to the State Government ought to have been sent to the Central Government and there was nothing on the record to show that the same was considered and disposed of the Central Government. It was contended that the Central Government has a power to revoke or modify the detention order made by the State Government under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and it was not necessary for the petitioner to have made a separate representation to the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act. We find no force in this contention. We find no force in this contention. Section 8 of the Act envisages for affording an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention to the appropriate government. Admitted the appropriate Government in the present case is the State Government as defined in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act. There is no duty caste on the State Government to send the representation made to it to the Central Government, In the present case admittedly no representation was made by the petitioner to the Central Government nor any request was made for sending the same to the Central Government It has been observed in Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, AIR 1982 SC 1178 as under : "Diplomatic communications between one country and another cannot be treated as representations to the statutory authorities functioning under the Act, as representations which require immediate consideration by the statutory authorities and which if not considered immediately would entitled the detenus to be set at liberty. Nor is it possible to treat the countless petitions, memorials representations which are everywhere presented to Prime Minister and other Ministers as statutory appeal or petitions statutorily appeals or petitions statutorily obliging them to consider and dispose of such appeals and petitions in the manner provided by statute. No doubt the Prime Minister and other Minister as leaders in whom the people have reposed faith and confidence, will deal with such appeal and petitions with due and deserved despatch. But quite obviously that will not because they are discharging statutory obligation. It is not possible to treat representations from whether source addressed to whatsoever officer of one or other department of the Government as a representation to the Government requiring the appropriate authority under the Act to consider the matter." In the case before us, in the absence of any representation made to the Central Government or even any request made in this regard by the petitioner, question of non-compliance of the powers of the Central Government under clause (b) of sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act is out of question. 12. It was also contended by Mr. 12. It was also contended by Mr. Asopa that the entire acts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner as contained in the grounds of detention are merely acts of violence against individual person and they cannot be considered as disturbing the even tempo of life or against the maintenance of public order. We do not find any force in this contention. In similar circumstances against Prahlad co-detenue a bench of this Court we have already held in detail that the alleged activities of the detenue were bound to disturb the even tempo of life and fall within the scope of public order. Mr. D.C. Samant, District Magistrate, Ajmer, has given an affidavit that he was satisfied that the activities of Tara were detrimental to the maintenance of public order and because of his activities, market of Ajmer remained closed for two days. He has further deposed that the activities of detenue un-leashed terror waves in the locality which disturbed the even tempo of public life. After satisfying himself he bad issued the detention order dated 6th September, 1981 pertaining to Tara s/o Locumal and framed the grounds of detention on the same day. His representations were rejected within reasonable time. The case was placed before the Advisory Beard within three weeks and the Central Government was also informed within time. 13. It was lastly contended by Mr. Asopa that only an extract of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer dated 31st August, 1981 was given to the petitioner which made a mention that in view of terrorising activities of these Gundas (BADMASHAN) the market of Pannigaran, Mundri Mohalla, Nala Bazar and Diggi Bazar remained completely closed on 24th August and 25th August, 1981. It is contended that full report of the Superintendent of Police was not supplied to the petitioner and on this account the petitioner was deprived in making an effective representation in this regard. It is further contended that the above extract even does not make a mention of the name of the petitioner. We find no force in this contention. It is contended that full report of the Superintendent of Police was not supplied to the petitioner and on this account the petitioner was deprived in making an effective representation in this regard. It is further contended that the above extract even does not make a mention of the name of the petitioner. We find no force in this contention. Firstly, this objection has not been raised in the writ petition and in any, case, it was clearly mentioned in ground No. 13 given along with the order of detention that in view the criminal activities done by Tara and his associates on 24th August, 1981 which had been mentioned in ground No. 12 a wave of terror spread amongst the general public and business and the markets of City of Ajmer remained completely closed on 24th, 25th August, 1981. Thus , the question of not making an effective representation on this account by the petitioner does not arise. 14. In the result we find no force in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner and the writ petition is dismissed accordingly.Writ Dismissed. *******