JUDGMENT - Masodkar B.A., J.-The present second appeal arises out of a suit filed by respondent Girjabai (the original plaintiff), alleging that the adoption of appellant No. 1 Hiraman was void and it should be so declared and both the appellants, who were the original defendants, be restrained permanently from interfering with her possession of the properties, being five agricultural fields situate at Varadsim of Bhusawal Taluka in District Jalgaon. 2. Undisputedly, the properties for the protection of which she sought the relief of injunction were the properties in the hands of Girjabai and were her properties and, but for the adoption, appellant No. 1 Hiraman could not have any right or interest therein. The Courts below found that the adoption, which was evidenced by a certified copy of the registered deed at Ex. 66, did, in fact, take place on November 10, 1969, but in view of the provisions of section 11(iv) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (here-in after called “the Act”), that adoption was invalid conferring no status on Hiraman as far as the family of Girjabai was concerned. As the declaration was sought by filing the suit on June 13, 1973, i. e. more that three years from the adoption that took place in November 1969, the trial Court refused to make a decree for declaration in view of Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the appeal filed by the defendants before the District Judge, by the impugned order the Assistant Judge, Jalgaon, found that the bar of limitation, as was upheld by the trial Court, was erroneously applied in view of the fact that the adoption was void ab initial. The first appeal Court found that the bar would not be available as the main relief sought was that of injunction and that relief was rightly given. While considering this aspect, the learned Assistant Judge remarked that in view of the fact that this adoption was void, the plaintiff would be entitled to get the declaration sought. For that purpose, the first appeal Court found that Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not govern the entire suit. Holding so and affirming the finding with regard to the invalidity of the adoption, the appeal was dismissed. 3. In this Court, a debate is raised by Mr. For that purpose, the first appeal Court found that Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not govern the entire suit. Holding so and affirming the finding with regard to the invalidity of the adoption, the appeal was dismissed. 3. In this Court, a debate is raised by Mr. Divekar, the learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal, submitting that the first appeal Court was not within its jurisdiction to reconsider the question of limitation, as is prescribed by Article 57 of the Limitation Act, because the unsuccessful plaintiff, whose suit was partly dismissed as being barred by limitation, had not filed any appeal questioning the decree of dismissal of the suit on that ground. Once the relief of declaration was barred because of Article 57 of the Limitation Act, the position of appellant No. 1 would be that of an adopted son, whose adoption is evidenced by a deed duly registered and the adopting mother, like Girjabai, would not be entitled to any injunction. 4. It is not in dispute, and as has been found, that on the date of adoption, the respective ages of Girjabai and Hiraman, as evidenced by the entries in the Birth Register (Exs. 44 and 45), were such that Girjabai could not be said to be older by at least 21 years than Hiraman. The adoption, thus, did not conform with the requirements of section 11(iv) of the Act. Such adoption, which is not in accordance with the conditions laid down in section i 1 of the Act, is invalid, as is provided for by section 6 (iv) of the Act. Chapter II of the Act deals with adoption and section 5(1) of the Act statutorily provides that after the commencement of the Act, a Hindu is required to follow the provisions of the Chapter for the purpose of adopting a child and any adoption made in contravention of the said provisions is void. Sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act, which is declaratory, emphasises that a void adoption does not create any rights in the adoptive family in favour of any person, nor does it destroy his original rights to the family of his or her birth. Sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act, which is declaratory, emphasises that a void adoption does not create any rights in the adoptive family in favour of any person, nor does it destroy his original rights to the family of his or her birth. The principal aim of section 5 of the Act is to lay down, there-fore, the rule of law and the entire provision is in the nature of a legislative declaration with regard to the adoption and the effects thereof. In the con-text of section 5 of the Act, section 6 lays down by employing negative phraseology that every adoption, with which the Act is concerned, to be recognised by law as valid, has to satisfy the matters mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) thereof. Clause (i) of section 6 of the Act deals with the capacity and the right to take in adoption (sections 7 and 8), clause (ii) deals with the capacity to give in adoption (section 9), clause (iii) deals with the capacity of the person to be adopted (section 10) and clause (iv) lays down the other conditions which are required to be satisfied (section 11). Thus, sections 5 and 6 of the Act together lay down a complete code with regard to matters of adoption, if fulfilled, that confers the legal status upon the adopted person. The scheme of these provisions is a compact one that underscores the need to lay down clearly dos and don'ts of a valid adoption. If anything is wanting, the adoption does not result nor is recognised as such. The conditions in their entirety being satisfied, the person adopted gets the place in the adoptive family, as if he was born therein. 5. Adoption as such is a legal device by which a stranger can be admitted to the membership and privileges of a child in the adoptive family. It is a recognised form of personal affiliation. Being a legal device for being effective, all the conditions of such a device must be shown to have been fully complied with before the adoptive status is asserted or recognised. It is, therefore, obvious that once the condition of clause (iv) of section 11 of the Act with regard to the difference of age between the adoptive mother and the adopted person is shown to be wanting, the adoption must fail and so also the claim for status. It is, therefore, obvious that once the condition of clause (iv) of section 11 of the Act with regard to the difference of age between the adoptive mother and the adopted person is shown to be wanting, the adoption must fail and so also the claim for status. The difference of age not being in dispute, the adoption of Hiraman by Girjabai cannot be an adoption recognised within the meaning of this law. 6. This position is emphatically declared by categorical language available in section 5 of the Act. It employs the term “void” as indicating the imperative result attached to the non-compliance or non-fulfilment of the provisions enacted for a valid adoption. The word “void” signifies in juridical legislative sense that the thing so done is non est in the eye of law. What, therefore, is void will have to be treated as such. What is in law void need not be so declared. The statutory declaration is universally available to any party to set up in matters wherein the question of validity of an adoption is in issue. 7. Mr. Divekar, the learned Counsel, made an ingenious attempt, relying on the wordings of Article 57 of Limitation Act, that that Article uses the word “invalid” which would include “void” as well as voidable act and, according to him, if the matter of declaration is governed by Article 57, after the lapse of the period prescribed by third column of that Article, notwithstanding the legislative declaration, the Court would be bound to proceed on the basis that the adoption could not be so declared as void. In other words, the learned Counsel contended that when a relief of declaration is not available, the status of the adopted person will have to be presumed to have been accepted and the other reliefs and entitlements of the plaintiff will have to be worked out on that basis. 7-A. This submission of the learned Counsel overlooks the fact that the Law of Limitation in every case does not lay down that upon the period of limitation being lapsed, a particular recognisable status would arise or could be relied upon, excepting in cases of property wherein persons in settled adverse possession could protect the same on the basis of the Law of Limitation. Thus, there does not appear to be any principle which would go to support the submission of Mr. Divekar. Thus, there does not appear to be any principle which would go to support the submission of Mr. Divekar. Primarily, the provisions of the Limitation Act are intended to lay down the period of limitation so that within the period so prescribed the parties could agitate a particular issue. It is not a substantive law of conferring rights or entitlements. On the other hand, it is adjective or procedural law and each of the Articles of the Schedule will have to be applied when the sole relief in a suit is within the four corners of the given Article. 7-B. Three types of cases can conceivably arise in the context of the provisions like Article 57, which deals with a suit to obtain a declaration that “an alleged adoption is invalid or never, in fact, took place,” Firstly, the suit may be, only a declaratory suit and then it will have to satisfy the requirement of Article 57. Secondly, it may be the suit mainly and primarily for getting protective relief's with regard to the property, such as injunction, eviction, possession, etc., or may be the suits of other kinds concerning other declarations regarding confirmation of possession and could be said to be the suit involving seeking of mixed or more relief's. Thirdly, the cases may arise where a relief of declaration is claimed and also reliefs with regard to the rights and property are sought. It is obvious that in the second class of cases and so also in the third one, relief's with regard to the property and the rights therein or any other matters not concerning a mere declaration of adoption would not be governed by Article 57 and those relief's will have to be adjudicated upon on the basis of other Articles. It is only in those cases of class 1 indicated above or class 3 indicated above, wherein a separate relief of declaration is sought, that Article 57 may be set up so as to non-suit the prayer for declaration. 8. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Where the adoption is ipso jure void and as such of no effect, the suitor can treat it so and seek the consequential reliefs on that basis. By the very nature, the declaratory decree does not by itself confer any new status. 8. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Where the adoption is ipso jure void and as such of no effect, the suitor can treat it so and seek the consequential reliefs on that basis. By the very nature, the declaratory decree does not by itself confer any new status. Decrees are instruments that are made on the basis of pre-existing entitlements and rights. That can at best be the evidence of recognition of such rights. When status is the creature of law and is its gift, the existence or non-existence thereof does not depend upon whether a declaration is sought or given. Without it also, such a status could be asserted and found; denied and negative. It is not, therefore, always necessary to seek a declaratory decree, nor would the position be changed if merely such a declaration is sought which cannot be granted because of the bar of limitation. The declaratory relief may be barred, but that would not clothe the person concerned with the entitlement that comes because of adoption recognised by law. Lapse of time, as is indicated by Article 57, does not cure, nor does it clothe any further right or entitlement upon the person claiming the adoptive status. Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, therefore, will have to be universally applied and whether it be the matter as the foundation for seeking relief's by the plaintiff or the matter by raising defense relying upon adoption, in either case before the Court accepts such a status, the requirements of these provisions will be necessarily in issue and. will have to be satisfied. Both assertion or denial of such a status are matters clearly governed by the provisions of the law. 9. In the matters of adoption, there is nothing which can be treated to be implied or inherent. The adoption in the very nature of things is a legal device resulting in the process of affiliation of a stranger to an other- wise alien family. In contrast to natural birth, it is the juridical recognition of the status of the person that comes because of the compliance with all the provisions that are necessary to be so complied laid down by the given system of law. In contrast to natural birth, it is the juridical recognition of the status of the person that comes because of the compliance with all the provisions that are necessary to be so complied laid down by the given system of law. As is available, this vital condition may include and take within it the conditions with regard to the capacity, with regard to the entitlement and disabilities and with regard to the matters which the law enjoins to be followed before the act can be treated having the force of valid adoption. Anything lacking or wanting in these matters would lead to the result of invalidity of such an act. 10. A brief reference is necessary at this stage to the judicial approach with regard to these matters that highlight the relevant principles and are available since quite before the Limitation Act of 1908 was enacted. In (Thakur Tribhuwan Bahadur Singh v. Raj I Rameshar Baksh Singh)1, the Judicial Committee held that the immunity that operates on the proprietary rights under the provisions of the Limitation Act is not available in acquiring legal status in the case of an invalid apparent adoption, nor does that clothe a person with the adoptive rights. The ratio of that judgment was applied in (Umar Khan v. Niaz-Ud-Din Khan)2-, by laying down that the omission to bring within the period prescribed by Article 118 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, a suit to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption was invalid or never in fact took place is no bar to a suit like the one for possession of property. Both these judgments were noticed by the Full Bench of this Court in Doddawa v. Yellawa3 and the majority view, as is available in the judgment of Macleod, Kt., Chief Justice, ruled : - “The Limitation Act is an Act for the limitation of suits, prescribing the period within which suits asking for various reliefs' can be brought. In a suit for possession or title, the only answer by the defendants which can be successful is a better title than that proved by the plaintiff, and such a title may be obtained by adverse possession. An adoption may be the origin of such a title being acquired, but the defendant may succeed in his title by adverse possession and not by virtue of his adoption. An adoption may be the origin of such a title being acquired, but the defendant may succeed in his title by adverse possession and not by virtue of his adoption. But if his title depends on adoption apart from the question of adverse possession, he may succeed by proving his adoption and the question of the limitation of plaintiff's suit does not arise, provided it is brought within the period prescribed for the particular suit he has brought. For the plaintiff is in the position of a defendant when he is resisting a claim by adoption and there is no bar of limitation to a defense. The mere fact that an adoption alleged to have taken place is not challenged does not set time running in favour of the adopted son, so that he may acquire a title, unless he is in possession.” In (Kalyartadappa v. Chanbasappa)4, the position was made clear that the words “a suit to obtain a declaration” were the terms of art and they had reference to the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which enabled the making of the declaratory decrees and it was to that class of suits that the particular limitation applied. Further, in the case of (Padmalay v. Fakira Debya)5, the principles of Kalyanad-appa's case were applied. It is only where a suit is, for all purposes, the one that seeks only relief of declaration that the bar of the provisions of Article 57 of the Limitation Act (old Article 118) could be set up. In all other cases, where the suit is in substance for the rights relating to property or seeking the reliefs for the purpose of protection of the property, the entire suit would not be governed by that Article. As explained by the Full Bench of this Court in Doddawa v. Yellawa (supra), in such matters the plaintiff is in a position of the defendant and could well show that for getting the main relief, notwithstanding the bar of the Article, the defendant is not entitled to rely on the alleged or apparent adoption. 11. This is all enough to reject the submission of the learned counsel based on the effect of lapse of limitation under Article 57 of the Limitation Act. This approach, as was submitted, does not render Article 57 nugatory or a dead-letter. 11. This is all enough to reject the submission of the learned counsel based on the effect of lapse of limitation under Article 57 of the Limitation Act. This approach, as was submitted, does not render Article 57 nugatory or a dead-letter. In appropriate cases, the Article could have its efficacy and will have to be applied just like the present one where an independent decree for declaration was sought. 12. That leaves the remaining aspect of the submission of Mr. Divekar with regard to the jurisdiction of the first appeal Court so as to consider the matters under Article 57, as was agitated before the Court by the respondent, without filing any cross-objections or cross-appeal. 13. Admittedly, the trial Court had decreed the suit as far as the relief of injunction was concerned. The first appeal was filed by the present appellants questioning that decree. In such an appeal, it was open to the respondent-plaintiff to support the decree that was appealed against on such of the grounds that would have been available had the respondent been the appellant. The provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure are ample to permit any respondent to support the decree on any of the grounds decided against the respondent in Courts below. See (Itakhoolie Tea Estate v. Its Workmen)6 and (Virdhachalam Pillai v. Chaldhan Bank)7. The respondent-plaintiff, therefore, could agitate before the first appeal Court that the finding on the question of application of Article 57 of the Limitation Act should be reversed so as, and to that extent only, to support the decree for injunction. That is not all. In the present case, it appears that it was the submission of the appellants that having denied the relief of declaration because of the bar of limitation under Article 57 of the Limitation Act, the trial Court was not right in granting the injunction or making the discretionary decree for the purpose of injunctory relief. By reason of such type of plea, the first appeal Court was entitled to consider the question with regard to the bar of limitation. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any lack of jurisdiction in the first appeal Court preventing it from considering the matters of Article 57 of the Limitation Act only because the same had gone against the plaintiff and had not been specifically appealed against. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any lack of jurisdiction in the first appeal Court preventing it from considering the matters of Article 57 of the Limitation Act only because the same had gone against the plaintiff and had not been specifically appealed against. In substance, the first appeal Court has affirmed the decree of injunction and has not varied the decree by granting any declaration. In that regard, no exception can be taken. 14. In the result, therefore, both the submissions of the learned counsel fail. The appeal to stand dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----